THE “HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION”
OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD GEORGIA,
MOLDOVA, UKRAINE,
AND THE BALTIC STATES

The 2nd, supplementary edition

Riga, 2010
This book is work of six think tanks from Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Centre for East European Policy Studies (Latvia) had a leading role in the implementation of this research project. Contributors include the International Centre for Defence Studies (Estonia), the Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Lithuania), the School for Policy Analysis at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Ukraine), the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (Moldova), and the International Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Georgia).

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Editor: Gatis Pelnēns

Project Director: Andis Kudors

Authors of the study: Juhan Kivirähk, Nerijus Maliukevičius, Dmytro Kondratenko, Olexandr Yeremeev, Radu Vrabie, Nana Devdariani, Mariam Tsatsanashvili, Nato Bachiashvili, Tengiz Pkhaladze, Gatis Pelnēns, Andis Kudors, Mārtiņš Paparinsks, Ainārs Dimants, Ainārs Lerhis.

English translation editor: Rihards Kalniņš

Design of the cover and layout: Toms Deģis

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

There are always those who overestimate importance and scope of events ongoing around them. There are also those, who underestimate such events or do not realize the extent of their scope. Most of the researchers would like to assume, that their approach to assessing such events is somewhere in-between! We, the authors of this research, share the same belief, while recognizing, that we are not just a passive observers that highlighten certain trends in environment around us, but also participants of debate on Russia’s policies and its influence on our countries.

Not a long time has passed since publication of the first edition of this study at the October of last year. However, a need for an update was obvious when research was discussed in book presentation seminars. There were five seminars held altogether to discuss the results of this study – one in each of the „target countries“ (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia). Discussions in seminars allowed us to assess the conceptual framework, that has been chosen as a basis of this study and apply particular cases of “humanitarian” actions to trends in domestic politics of each country. Presentations and discussions also gained attention from media that helped to promote general ideas of the study and highlightened the most sensitive issues for each country.

In general, discussions gave positive review on research in all countries. However, certain issues were addressed that show the complexity of our work and two of those in particular should be explained to the reader before entering the study. One of the issues was pointing on incoherent nature of Russia and its Foreign policy. It was argued, that Russia’s foreign policy is not as comprehensive and intentional as portrayed in our study, because there are also other actors than official policy makers that shape actions of “humanitarian trend” and there are a lot of actions taken by accident rather than rational implementation of policy directions. On the one hand, we can agree on such argument for it calls for further analysis of Russia's domestic policy factors influencing “humanitarian trend” of its foreign policy. On the other hand, however, we would like to note, that analysis of the official level of policy formulation and implementation was chosen exactly for the purpose to avoid fragmentized overview of domestic factors and their role. As it was noted, another study would be required to reveal those actors and aspects of Russia's domestic policy that shape its foreign policy decisions and implementation. Therefore, we have chosen an official policy of Russian Federation as a focal point of this study as [at least] a first step to explore its sources and implications.

The other issue was highlighted by media regarding significance of Russian culture in our study. We were faced with a problem that Russian culture was portrayed as a threat by media and given a decisive role in Russia's attempts to spread its influence. However, we do not refer directly to the issues of national security when revealing Russia's cultural influence. It must be noted, that promotion of culture by Russia should be regarded as a toll of influence by “soft power” that does undermine national security in any direct way. Even more, promotion of culture, in context of this study, should be regarded as less threatening than other elements of “humanitarian trend”.

Second edition of this book, does not provide conceptually new approaches or overall update of the empirical study. However, some important details are clarified and minor technical details precised.

Editor, Gatis Pelnēns
Policy towards its neighboring states. The influence on other players of international policy, especially neighbors. Therefore, in the international environment, the active policy of any state has an influential globalized world, the states are less protected from the unwelcome influence of other actors. In the international environment, the active policy of any state has an influence on other players of international policy, especially neighbors. Therefore, in its research, the CEEPS devotes special attention to the influence of Russia's foreign policy towards its neighboring states.

During research work for the book outside influence on the ethnic integration process in Latvia (English version: Riga, 2007; 2nd edition, Riga, 2008) CEEPS researchers struck upon the idea to deepen and broaden their research of the humanitarian trend of Russia's foreign policy. CEEPS then embarked on a combined international research project with five research centers from other states: the International Centre for Defence Studies (Estonia), the Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Lithuania), the School for Policy Analysis at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Ukraine), the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (Moldova), and the International Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Georgia).

As a result of this research, you have in your hands the second book issued by CEEPS. The new edition is a research study on the problem of Russia's humanitarian influence on independent countries of the former U.S.S.R.

Let us take a brief glimpse at the history of this region. During the period of the Soviet Union's disintegration (1989–1991), one of the aims of non-Russian Soviet republics was to minimize the strength of power of the "federal centre", i.e., Kremlin domination, in order to procure equal rights for all Soviet republics. Even the state structures of the biggest Soviet republic, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), suffered from the Kremlin to comply with these requirements resulted in many centrifugal tendencies which led to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.

To some extent, along with economic factors and other reasons, this was a response to decades-long Soviet policy of Russification of all non-Russian republics. (In spite of official Soviet ideology of equal rights for all peoples, Russification was allowed during the entire Soviet period under the slogans of "proletarian internationalism" and "brotherly assistance to other peoples (republics)" and in the process of industrialization.)

It may seem somewhat paradoxically, but in this way the previous tsarist policy of Russification was continued by the Communists. Under Communist rule, the U.S.S.R. inherited almost all the territory of the former Tsarist Russian Empire. Despite many mutually irreconcilable ideological contradictions, in some issues (such as Russification and regaining the former territories) the position of the Communists and the supporters of the former tsarist Russian Empire among Russian exiles (the White movement) were similar. During the Soviet era, Russia was considered a core of the Soviet Union, and many people (especially immigrants who fled to non-Russian republics) also unofficially treated the other fourteen Soviet republics (i.e., outside R.S.F.S.R.) as Russia. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., many immigrants suddenly found themselves "living abroad", and were uncomfortable outside the new borders that now divided them. It seems that, because of this factor, the collapse of the Soviet Union is considered a geopolitical catastrophe among influential political forces in Russia today.

In recent years, to some extent as a response to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and possibly in order to overcome the aforementioned "geopolitical tragedy", one can notice the return of Russia to the strengthening and concentration of ideological and other internal and external resources. Let us mention here only two of them. First, the merger of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church on May 2007. Second, the change in an internal ideological paradigm: the proclamation of November 7 as a Day of Reconciliation and Agreement, before the amendments in the Labor Codex (adopted in December 2004), when a new holiday, November 4 (People's unity Day), was introduced in Russia.

Many international political analysts have already noticed Russia's growing tendency to employ a confrontation policy toward the West. Some of them see Russia's return to a Soviet-style domination (expansionistic) policy. In spite of the fact that former Soviet republics are now sovereign countries and full members of the international community, influential political circles and state structures of the Russian Federation are involved in measures to return to Russia's domination in the ex-U.S.S.R. area, by voicing the tasks of the "reintegration of Post-Soviet space". Even more so, the ideological concepts of "Russian World", "Russian Doctrine", and "Eurasian Doctrine" have been elaborated, and the borders of this "world" are planned to expand and to cover the territories of many sovereign countries, far beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, the former U.S.S.R., or even the former Tsarist Russian Empire. When we hear the phrases "Russian London", "Russian New York", "Russian Riga", or...
other "Russian" cities outside the Russian Federation, we can also suppose that they are considered to be a part of this "Russian World".

In spite of the fact that, first, the Baltic States were annexed to the Soviet Union as a result of the Soviet occupation of 1940, and thus radically differed from the juridical grounds of the other former Soviet republics that constituted the Soviet Union, and, second, the U.S.S.R. recognized the independence of the Baltic States on September 6, 1991, i.e., three months before the total disintegration of the U.S.S.R. (December 1991), the Kremlin continues to treat the Baltic States as a part of the Post-Soviet space. The Baltic States are considered by the Kremlin to be new states first established in 1991. This position stands in direct contradiction to the historical fact that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were proclaimed as sovereign countries in 1918. Therefore, in terms of Russia's strategic aims at the "reintegration of Post-Soviet space", Russia sees no difference between the C.I.S. and the Baltic States. This is yet another issue that has made our comparative study possible. The differences in the internal situation of each country forces Russian authorities to diversify their methods, their means, and their resources for achieving their goals.

Russia today stresses the importance of spreading its influence on the basis of the Russian language and assistance to Russian compatriots abroad. Therefore one can assume that Russia is making use of the consequences of Soviet-era immigration policies. These are the result of processes that, during the Soviet period, were aimed at the growth of the percentage of Russians (and, accordingly, the diminishing of the percentage of inhabitants belonged to the "titular nations") in every non-Russian Soviet republic in order to ensure the following: first, the use of immigrants as a labor force for the needs of growing industrialization; second, the formation of the so-called new "Soviet nationality" ("Soviet people"); and, third, the preservation of the U.S.S.R. as a union of 15 republics, to avoid any of the republics leaving the U.S.S.R. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these results were upheld in ex-U.S.S.R. states in the form of a large amount of Russian-speaking people and the widespread distribution of the Russian language. In the Baltic countries, both of the aforementioned factors can also be considered consequences of the Soviet occupation period (the Soviet-type colonization policy of the annexed republics).

A relatively new phenomenon is the use of soft power technologies as measures to strengthen the humanitarian influence of Russia on other countries (Russian political technologists, officials and state structures do not even conceal this goal today) and, first of all, on in its neighboring countries. On the one hand, the desire of the political leadership of every country to have friendly neighboring states along its borders is understandable. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether this goal is achievable by attempts to restore previous positions, especially in countries that recently liberated themselves from outside domination. On the one hand, can anybody be against cultural activities and exchanges, tourism, reading books, learning languages, watching TV, listening to radio, etc.? I think, nobody, of course! On the other hand, the character and instruments of this humanitarian dimension and influence are so complicated and various that it is easy to miss the crossing of the "red line".

One side of this line, these activities remains only cultural and educational; but on the other side, the use of these humanitarian activities for political goals and influence on foreign countries commences.

The aforementioned book (Riga, 2007, 2008), which analyzes the "Latvian case", states the following: "Thanks to globalization processes and modern technologies (satellite television, the internet, etc.), the Russian language information environment in Latvia has become largely self-sufficient and in terms its size has long outgrown the corresponding information environment in the Latvian language".1 Similarly: "Russia's institutions are making no effort to conceal their attempts to promote an opposite integration of the "Russian speaking" section of the Latvian population in the direction of Moscow in the broader context of reintegration of the entire Post-Soviet territory under Russian dominance".2

This study is a continuation of the research on the Latvian case. But more importantly, this book is an attempt to analyze the humanitarian trend of Russian foreign policy on the basis of several "case studies", on Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine. This content will then be summarized using comparative and other methods.

My sincere thanks to the authors and to everyone who made this research possible by contributing to the publication of this book. Thanks to our readers for their interest.

Ainārs Lerhis
Ph.D., Chairman of the Board, CEEPS

2  Ibid.
INTRODUCTION

"...Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are lost; Adzharia has fallen; Transnistria is under siege. Enemies have engaged in subversive activities in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and are approaching the gates of Belarus. Minsk is standing firm, but if it (God forbids) falls, the road to Moscow will be wide open." These lines are not a part of operational report from military high command – different war is meant by approaching Moscow. These lines were written by leading researcher at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry Furman. Furman talks about war, that is "...less menacing continuation of the Cold War that was waged by the West and the Soviet Union for almost half a century, and now entails a smaller space and a different alignment of forces". In fact, Furman has caught picture similar to the one proposed by Edward Lucas an that a lot of people in and around Russia believe – Cold War has not ended with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and struggle between Russia and the West over “spheres of influence” has not ended. Just like in the case with modernization of weaponry, also means by which this war is fought have changed. “Humanitarian” approaches and “soft power” techniques have replaced struggle between ideological dogmas and prejudices. Development of global communication systems has given an option of “precision targeting” to the new “advanced weaponry of the war for hearts and minds” making them less costly and highly effective.

Although Russia remains a strong regional power with firm position on international level it is still hard for Moscow to accept loss of the position of “great power”. It is even harder to recognize loosing control over its “near abroad”. Recent trends in Russia’s foreign policy reveal the ambitions to regain its former status, both internationally and regionally. Counterbalancing the West and becoming a “pole of power” for the Post-Soviet space are not just a statements of radical-wing politicians, but foreign policy objectives that are stated in a foreign policy planning and implementation of Russia. Russia recognizes that it has an advantage to become a “pole of power” for the Post-Soviet countries – Russia is a regional power in several regions at once and it still has considerable “hard power” resources.

Influence in its neighborhood is also a precondition to claim a status of “great power” and important part of balancing the West. On the other hand, influence of the EU and U.S. is growing in Post-Soviet space and despite efforts to regain its influence on “near abroad”, these countries are moving even further away from Russia. Russia seems to have no triggers to influence such course of action!

Indeed, after the loss of a status of superpower Russia found itself in a different world with different rules of the game and most important – within different position in the game. Russia found itself in a game where “it had a lot of aces that were use-

less by the new rules – rules by which you had to play in teams and where kings and queens were also required to win.... by playing on your own and having only aces instead of combinations of kings and queens all that Russia could do was continue the game with some losses and hope the rules will change once more...”. Russia continued the game adjusting itself to the new rules while suffering sufficient gaming dept. Now Russia has learned the combinations needed for success and is trying to recover its gaming dept.

Baltic States was the first sufficient loss for Russia – first breakaway territories of the former Soviet influence that moved towards the “West” by becoming members of the European Union and NATO. To avoid further losses, Russia defined its relations with the C.I.S. as a priority – despite all the efforts, integration of C.I.S. is not really taking place with some of its members. Emergence of the “orange revolutions”, insufficient results of economic sanctions and political losses when using military force assured Russia to use other instruments of foreign policy. These instruments were defined in Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007 under “humanitarian trend” of foreign policy. “Humanitarian trend” contains traditional elements of Russia’s actions in its near abroad (human rights, compatriots, campaigns of aspersion and propaganda, political consolidation of Russian speaking minorities), the technical/practical means to enforce these actions (consular issues, informational superiority), and new approaches of soft power (culture, education, science, public diplomacy).

This study is an attempt to explore “humanitarian trend” of Russia’s foreign policy and view its expressions in Baltic States and several members of C.I.S. Russia’s dialogue with Ukraine has actualized a link of economic and political interests, where energy resources, the “Orange Revolution” and political tensions have left a lasting gap in a relationship between two countries. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, which Moscow justified as a defense of its citizens in South Ossetia, revealed the need for a study of Russia’s policy of support for compatriots living abroad. Support of separatism in Transnistria indicates Russia’s desire to play an important role in events in Moldova. The “humanitarian dimension” of Russian foreign policy is particularly discernible in Russia’s relationship with the aforementioned members of the C.I.S. For this reason, these states have been chosen as one of the groups to be analyzed in this study. Despite the fact, that international institutions have deemed that policy with respect to ethnic minorities is in compliance with the norms of international rights in Baltic States, Russia continues to complain about violations of the rights of Russian speakers in the Baltics. The recent events concerning the relocation of a Bronze Soldier monument in Estonia indicate Russia’s equivocal foreign policy in this region Therefore, Russia’s attempts to actualize its foreign policy goals using the “humanitarian dimension” approach can be observed in the Baltic States as well.

“Humanitarian trend” has not been systematically studied as a separate part of Russia’s foreign policy. Some recent studies contributed to the subject of Russia’s foreign policy are focused on Russia’s role in world affairs in general (confronting

Ibid.
with the West, Russia and international organizations), particular aspects of Russia’s foreign policy (energy resources and finance as foreign policy tools) or even specific actions or issues (gas crisis, war in Georgia). Important contributions for study of “humanitarian dimension” has been made by those studying Russia’s “soft power” or specific areas related to “humanitarian trend” (compatriots, culture, media), but only some of such studies actually recognize these areas as part of wider sphere of Russia’s foreign policy or refer to the “humanitarian dimension” specifically.

An aim of this research is to reveal the meaning and elements of “humanitarian trend” its expressions, influences and differences and similarities in six states (target countries) – Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Study is carried out by researchers of each country providing different interpretations and emphasis on various expressions of the research subject. These differences are important, because they demonstrate the perceptions of “humanitarian actions” of Russia in each country and reveal most important aspect of “humanitarian trend” in each country. Are there any connections and trends in Russia’s attitude and actions toward the six neighbouring states? What instruments of influence Russia uses? How should the neighbouring states react to these actions? These are few questions the study is trying to answer.

Methodology

Research design is build up by two major parts – 1) conceptual analysis of “humanitarian dimension” of Russia’s foreign policy and 2) empirical study of its implications. In framework of this study, foreign policy is defined in terms of “actions of a state toward the external environment...” Boundaries of foreign policy are set by one-dimensional model of actions and intentions of one state (Russia) towards other states (target countries), rather than dynamics of actions and responses. This means that target countries are analysed from the perspective of Russia’s actions in a sphere of “humanitarian trend” of its foreign policy. The main focus is on presence, specifics and influence of “humanitarian trend” of Russia’s foreign policy in target countries.

Conceptual analysis deals with meaning and development of “humanitarian trend” as a part of broader context of Russia’s foreign policy. This part also provides conceptualization of “humanitarian trend” where its elements are revealed and its generalization as policy direction and part of wider theoretical framework of “soft power” is made. Further operationalization of research subject is provided through an empirical study (case studies and comparison) where the elements (areas) of “humanitarian trend” are studied through their meanings, expressions and influences.

Two approaches are used for empirical study – case studies and comparison – which are performed on two-dimensional frame with countries and issues (see table No. 1). These approaches represent two major directions of analysis. First direction (case studies) puts emphasis on countries as a dependent variable and areas of “humanitarian trend” as independent variables. Second direction seeks to discover differences of means, tools and options used to exercise “humanitarian trend” in different countries. In this case, areas of “humanitarian trend” are studied as dependent variables and countries as independent variables through comparison of the results of case studies. This direction follows the assumption that means, tools and options of “humanitarian trend” differ depending on the target country.

Table No. 1. Design of the empirical study.

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Case Studies

Case studies are used as an approach for this study to discover presence of “humanitarian dimension” in each country, specifics of its expression in each country and its actual or potential influences in each country. Each case study is structured by the areas of “humanitarian trend” as defined in Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review – Human rights issues, Russia’s Compatriots policy, Consular issues, Culture and education (science). In addition the role of media is added as a separate sphere of humanitarian dimension, to emphasize its role as channel of information and message by itself.

Methods used for case studies differ according to specifics of particular areas. In most cases methods include qualitative assessments and interpretations on subject as well as quantitative data.

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7 For example: “Countdown to War in Georgia, Russia’s Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia” by Ana K. Niedermaier.
**Issue of human rights** is studied by viewing Russia's attempts to stress human rights violations in target countries. Pointing on human rights violations affect Russia’s internal society, societies in target countries, but more explicitly in an international organizations to draw their attention away from problems caused by Russia and to discredit these countries in eyes of international society. Researchers will also look at the involvement of Russian foreign-policy institutions and NGOs in defending for human rights in target countries.

Russia's Compatriots policy is closely related with human rights issues for Russian policy makers. A study is conducted by viewing Russia’s policy for protecting ethnic Russians and ethnic minorities in the neighboring states (events, projects, campaigns, etc.).

Consular issues are technical means for support of Russia’s Compatriots policy, but it is also a message by itself. Recent events in South Ossetia, which concerned the distribution of Russian passports, and Russia's subsequent justification of its aggression as a defense of its citizens in Georgia, have turned our attention to Russian policy in consular matters. It is necessary to study the distribution of Russians passport in the Crimea (Ukraine) and the possible consequences of this process. In addition, we need to analyze the possible changes in Russian lawmaking that relate to the distribution of "compatriot cards". These changes prescribe alleviations for cardholders in the process of obtaining Russian visas and citizenship.

Media and education are the main elements that show the growing role of a "soft power" for Russia’s foreign policy. For the purpose of this study Russia’s efforts to spread its cultural influence trough various cultural artifacts (Orthodox Church, popular culture, cultural centers, language, history) and education programs are viewed as a sources of "soft power".

Media is emphasized not only as a channel of information flow, but also as meaning and message by itself. Such notion seems obvious if we look on practical emphasis Russia is putting on a role of media when promoting and exercising humanitarian dimension. That is why media are considered as separate area of humanitarian dimension despite it overlapping with other elements. Media not only intensifies other areas but also shapes information spaces and influences identity formation by itself. In examining Russia’s information policy, the study will analyze which forms of Russian mass media are available in the six neighboring states, as well as the content of media and its impact on audiences.

An empirical study was carried out by representatives of each country providing different interpretations and emphasis on various expressions of the research subject. Structure and general thesis of the research was provided at the beginning of a work. Evidently case studies of different countries also differ by structure and some aspects of the studied areas are excluded from particular case studies of countries. Researchers from each country were free to interpret the contents of case studies – by emphasizing most important issues within each area and not elaborating on other issues if they are not regarded as significant for their country. These differences were permitted to provide secondary meaning for the results of case studies that is also further used for the comparison. This secondary meaning is based on the assumption that the more intensive actions in particular area are traced [in case of particular country], the more important such area and actions should be for Russia [to perform in particular country].

**Comparison**

Structure by areas of “humanitarian trend” is important for the second direction of research – understanding differences of means, tools and options used to exercise “humanitarian dimension” in different countries. In this case, areas of “humanitarian dimension” are studied as dependent variables and countries are independent variables. That is – means, tools and options of “humanitarian dimension” differ depending on target country. Comparison is based on the results of case studies, but follows different logics of that used for case studies – it provides study of differences between countries by separate areas. Comparison also allows revealing arguments why Russia’s actions differ in target countries – what causes Russia’s different approach on each country.

**Materials Used for Research**

Both primary and secondary information sources are used for the case studies – official documents (foreign-policy documents, programs, strategies, speeches by officials and politicians, announcements, un statements, OSCE, etc.), statistics (media assessments, statistical information on language usage, migration etc.) and academic studies and descriptive sources of information (studies on “compatriots”, human rights, mass media, etc.; newspaper articles, official web sites of the NGO’s, and news agencies, etc.). In some cases – interviews with officials and experts are conducted in order to supplement, specify, and expand information.

**Conclusions of the Research**

Conclusions are developed by looking at the outcomes of activities of Russia’s Foreign policy’s “humanitarian dimension” and outlining general trends and influences of these activities. Conclusions are framed in accordance with overall structure of the research: general conclusions on “humanitarian dimension” of Russia’s foreign policy are composed by results of conceptual analysis and results provided by empirical study; conclusions on the areas of “humanitarian dimension” are distinguished from results of the case studies; comparison serves as a basis for conclusions and recommendations for countries to respond the “humanitarian” actions of Russia.
1. THE “HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION”
OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
MEANING AND BACKGROUND

To describe the nature of the foreign policy actions of a particular state, one must take into account the interests of that state, the strategy (manner) by which it pursues those interests, the resources available to it, and the external context in which the actions of that state are performed.

Interests are formulated as the goals of foreign and security policy and reveal the primary imperatives for the possible action of a state. There are various means that describe the resources and strategy for action in foreign policy: force, positive or negative economic sanctions, bilateral or multilateral diplomacy, informational superiority, persuasion, etc. All of these means represent a combination of resources and strategic choices; the more diverse they are, the more effective the pursuit of foreign policy goals. An external context (environment) is the role of a state, its relations to the biggest powers, and interplay with other actors in an international system. Context shifts the choices of actions of a state when certain "moves" are made.

Russia is an object of study in this research; its foreign policy objectives and means are directions through which its foreign policy is studied. The main objectives of Russia’s current foreign and security policy have been defined in the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020", which was approved by a presidential decree on May 12, 2009. This document states that it is in Russia's long-term interests to transform the Russian Federation into a global superpower and a key actor in an emerging multi-polar system of international relations. Russia’s objectives in its "near abroad" view the entire post-Soviet area as a zone of exclusive Russian interests, thus marking the second direction of Russia’s foreign policy objectives. It must be noted, that the post–Soviet area was regarded as an object of such interests already beginning in the 1990s.

In order to achieve the objectives in both of these directions, "hard power" and other "traditional" means are employed: coercion (military intervention in Georgia, strategic military moves around the world); economic sanctions (the natural gas crisis in Ukraine, investment policy); diplomatic activities (multilateral diplomacy in international and regional organizations, coalition building against "major military threats"); aspersion and propaganda campaigns (accusations of human rights violations in the Baltic States, defending the interests of compatriots in the C.I.S. and Baltic States); shifting political environments in other sovereign countries (support to pro-Kremlin political parties in the C.I.S. and Baltic States). At the same time, Russia is also developing its instruments of foreign policy. With waves of "orange revolutions" sweeping its "spheres of influence" in the C.I.S., the insufficient results of economic sanctions (both positive and negative) and mostly (so far) failed efforts of multilateral diplomacy, Russia realized that tactics of coercion, economic sanctions, and aggressive diplomacy — which were fairly effective some time ago — are not sufficient to achieve its goals now. Russia knows that in today’s world, the role of international activity on the part of parliamentary diplomacy and civil society institutes is increasing. This is confirmed by the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007, which distinguishes a separate foreign policy dimension called the “humanitarian trend” of Russian foreign policy. This trend provides for the Russian Federation's committed activities in the following areas: 1) the defense of human rights; 2) the protection of the interests of compatriots living abroad; 3) consular matters; and 4) partnerships in the cultural and scientific sectors. As we can see, the humanitarian trend contains some of the traditional elements of Russia’s actions in its near abroad (human rights, compatriots, campaigns of aspersion and propaganda, consolidation of Russian speaking minorities), the technical/practical means to enforce these actions (consular issues, informational superiority), and new approaches of soft power (culture, education, science, public diplomacy).

The official outline of the humanitarian dimension as a separate part of Russian foreign policy (the humanitarian trend) can be found in two documents relevant for foreign policy planning: Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007, and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July, 2008. Simply defined, the humanitarian trend is the sum of the different political and administrative resources, instruments, and approaches in Russian foreign policy, designed to influence particular target countries, groups within target countries and/or international society for the purpose of "legitimizing" or gaining political support for Russian foreign policy objectives. The humanitarian trend is regarded as a separate direction of foreign policy and, because of its similarity with the concept of soft power formulated by Joseph Nye, it can also be explained as an interpretation and practical declaration of such "soft power in a Russian way!"

The humanitarian trend was most completely described in the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007. According to the Foreign Policy Review, the concept of the humanitarian dimension states that Russia sees its goals in "protecting the rights and legitimate interests of the Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad; …expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture; …consolidating the organizations of compatriots; …contributing to learning and spreading the Russian language; …firmly countering manifestations of neo-fascism, …attempts to rewrite the history...and revise the outcome of World War Two; …building up interaction with international and non-governmental human rights
organizations to strengthen universal norms in the area of human rights without double standards. To understand the major features of the humanitarian trend, a more detailed look at its components is necessary.

1.1. Opening the Box: Elements of the “Humanitarian Trend”
Protection of the Interests of Compatriots Living Abroad

Protection of the interests of compatriots living abroad is regarded as a “natural priority of Russia’s foreign policy.” According to the Federal Law on National Policy of Russian Federation Towards Compatriots Abroad the term “compatriot” embraces four categories of people: 1) citizens of the Russian Federation who are permanently living abroad; 2) persons who were citizens of the U.S.S.R. and now live in the former republics of the U.S.S.R., those that have obtained citizenship in the residence country and those without any citizenship; 3) emigrants from Russia and its historical forms of state who were its citizens and are citizens of another country, have obtained the allowances of permanent residence, or are without any citizenship; 4) posterity of persons mentioned above, except representatives of foreign countries, i.e. the titular nation.

The importance of compatriots for Russia lies in the legacy of the Soviet Union as it is outlined in the Foreign Policy Review: “...as a result of collapse of U.S.S.R., tens of millions of our people found themselves outside the country [Russia].” Russia declares its interest as the “historical homeland” (историческая родина) for the protection of the rights of compatriots and the preservation of their ethno-cultural roots. This reference to permanent cooperation with the compatriots who form the “Russian World” (Русский мир) as a unique element of human civilization... and designation of the role of compatriots as an “intellectual, economic and culturally—spiritual partner of Russia in a world politics that helps to maintain “objective image” [quotation marks by author] reveals a different picture of Russia’s interest in its compatriots. Compatriot diasporas are regarded as a potential supporting force for Russia’s foreign policy and as a tool for raising the status of the Russian language and culture.

Thus we can draw two main conclusions arising from the Foreign Policy Review’s discussion of these matters:

First, Russia wants to use compatriots living abroad as a geopolitical entity that defends Russia’s interests, regardless of the compatriots’ home countries or other identities. In this case Russia’s strategy lies in an even deeper rooted tradition of Russian foreign policy, one that is perceived as the notion of (post)imperial control.

Second, Russia’s overall goals for this action refer directly to Russia’s image in the world, thus making a clear analogy with the aims of using “soft power”. Even more than the strategic goal, the instruments for support of compatriots are very close to the notion of “soft power”: “Maintaining the space of the Russian language in foreign countries – also through cultural cooperation, education, and science”.

One of the distinct features of the Russian diaspora is that it has been formed on a political basis, rather than an economic basis. Russians have been spread across the territory of the former Russian Empire or the Soviet Union mostly because they were encouraged or forced to do so by the state and its authoritarian rulers. Many Russians fled their homeland because of political or religious repressions and formed diasporas in the Baltic States, Western Europe, or America. The Russian diaspora is bound by the sense of displacement; its members feel separated from their historic homeland. Usually such people hope to return to their roots at some point in life, but the biggest problem for the Russian diaspora is that their “homeland” — the Soviet Union or Tsarist Russian Empire — does not exist anymore. Moreover, their desire to return to modern Russia is very weak, which is evident from the results of the National Program to Support Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation for Compatriots Residing Abroad. Therefore, the relationship of modern Russia with Russians living abroad is not a simple one. Still, the Kremlin tries to keep this relationship viable and useful for its foreign policy needs, and for this reason it continues to develop the concept of Russian compatriots abroad.

The Kremlin has structured the compatriots concept on several principles. First, it attempts to maintain a working relationship with Russian speakers abroad by encouraging them to form a loyalty to modern-day Russia, including its interpretation of history and its political system, while at the same time remaining in the country of residence. In the future, this “soft” loyalty may evolve into a formal relationship through the use of the so-called “compatriot cards”, or even Russian citizenship. The latter possibility is best reflected in the final resolution adopted by the 2008 World Conference of Compatriots Living Abroad, where the compatriots specifically “call on the leadership of the Russian Federation to consider a possibility of granting Russian citizenship by simplified procedure”. Second, this policy is based on creating and consolidating compatriots’ organizations into an effective social networking system that can be used to attain specific foreign policy goals. Therefore, the Russian compatriots’ policy in the post-Soviet sphere is not just a humanitarian tool, but rather a tool of geopolitical influence.

Russia’s requirement that post-Soviet countries grant status to minorities de-
pends on the proportion of Russian-speakers in the home country; the bigger the diaspora, the higher the requirements. Both Russia’s governmental institutions and NGOs participate in the intensification of compatriot issues and the consolidation of compatriot organizations in order to achieve strategic goals. Approval and budgetary allocations are granted by the top administration of the Russian Federation.

- Compatriot matters are considered to be on a high political and institutional level (President, Government, Parliament, etc.).
- Russia earmarks great amount of resources to programs of compatriot support.  
- A wide range of specialists is involved in the activization of compatriots: officials, politicians, political scientists, sociologists, members of cultural and scientific circles, and the management of business structures controlled by the state.

Human Rights

Russia’s overall notion of protecting the rights of Russian compatriots and protecting human rights are closely related. Unlike in the case of compatriots, human rights policy is less strictly directed towards particular audiences (the domestic society of Russian Federation and compatriots living abroad). Protection of human rights is embraced within Russia’s foreign policy, because of its growing role in international relations. Assurance of this role comes from Russia’s own experience: criticism of violations of human rights in Russia has led to certain complications for Russia’s image and foreign policy aspirations. As a response to increasing criticism, Russia has chosen an offensive approach to human rights issues as the best form of defense. Russia realizes that criticism towards western countries with long traditions of democratic consolidation and strongly established standards of human rights would be potentially counter-productive. Thus, Russia constructs and maintains “artificial pseudo-problems” concerning other states (in particular, the C.I.S. countries and the Baltic States), as it brings reproach upon these countries and their partners and redirects the attention of international organizations away from problems in Russia. Such “pseudo-problems” are constructed on a mixture of the traditional meaning of human rights and Russia’s interests by historical legacy (compatriots), and recall historical perceptions on violating human rights (“fascism”) when it suits Russia’s foreign policy aspirations towards certain states. This is clearly outlined in the Foreign Policy Review: “The function of monitoring human rights has become stronger in foreign policy aspirations towards certain states. This is clearly outlined in the Foreign Policy Review. As a response to increasing criticism, Russia attempts to internationalize the issue. The Foreign Policy Review specifically states that “it is essential to step up an offensive in such important spheres as protecting the rights of compatriots and fighting the rebirth of neo-Nazism in some European countries… as well as purposefully increasing international human rights activities with the help of Russian NGOs and parliamentary diplomacy… and holding position to extinct double-standards on human rights issue." Following this line of logic, the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) was established in 2008. Its central office is in Moscow, but it has branches operating in Paris and New York. Two popular conservative Russian “polittechnologists”, Natalia Narochnitskaya and Andranik Migranyan, became the heads of the IDC in France and the United States, respectively. It must be noted that, in 2005, Natalia Narochnitskaya chaired the Duma’s Commission for the Study and Control of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms Practices Abroad, which analyzes the option of using the human rights issue in Russian foreign policy.

Consular Matters

Consular matters are a technical means for supporting Russians traveling and living abroad. According to the Foreign Policy Review, consular work is an element that develops the direction of foreign policy and that puts individuals first. With the number of Russian citizens traveling abroad growing, it is important to develop the network of Russia’s consular services abroad.  

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21 Интервью директора Департамента по работе с соотечественниками МИД России А.В. Чепурина. “Внешненекономические связи”1/1, March 2006.
24 For more, see the IDC web sites at http://argument.ru and http://www.idc-europe.org.
Consular activities are important because effective consular activities usually energize migration flows (tourism, cultural or educational exchanges, and migration of workers) between countries. Therefore it constitutes an important part of public diplomacy work. However, the Foreign Policy Review focuses only on the protection of Russian citizens traveling or living abroad, not on consular activities to enhance migration flows between Russia and the neighboring countries — to help solve problems encountered by Russians in other countries. This official wording makes Russia’s neighbors very suspicious of such consular activities, due to the experience in the 2008 war with Georgia, when the Kremlin declared that it was using military force to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.

**Partnerships in the Sectors of Culture, Science, and Education**

Partnerships in culture, science, and education are the aspect of the humanitarian trend that most directly relates to the conception of “soft power.” According to the Foreign Policy Review, globalization encourages the growing importance of international cooperation in the field of culture and “Russia, as a great power, will give a great input in the development of international culture [author’s underline] and cooperation in the fields of education and science.”

Culture is regarded as “an instrument to ensure Russia’s economic and foreign policy interests and positive image in the world” just like in the case of “soft power”. The Foreign Policy Review also refers directly to the concept: “The experience of major powers in the world is evidence of positive outcomes from using ‘soft power’.”

The only difference from the original meaning of “soft power” is that Russia tends to control and direct its “soft power,” with the great involvement of government structures. This is not a conflicting feature, but rather an attempt on Russia’s part to make its soft power highly manageable through diplomatic services, orders from the Kremlin, and the cooperation of Russia’s local governments with the local governments of other countries. As defined in the Foreign Policy Review, it is a “humanitarian diplomacy” with an aim to “develop [Russia’s] informational – cultural presence in the world”.

To support Russia’s cultural attraction (with artifacts of “high culture” and popular culture, education, language, etc.), the development of centers for culture and science is mentioned as an important instrument.

The Foreign Policy Review also refers to the question of the interpretation of history as a part of defending the interests of compatriots. This historical issue has brought a high degree of tension between Russia and its neighbors because of the legacy of the Second World War, and has become an matter of political debate. As noted in the Foreign Policy Review, Russia will work on the “explanation” of history, because polarization of this issue damages Russia’s image. In May of 2009, a commission to counter attempts to falsify history was formed, under Medvedev, to “explain” history and to “prevent attempts to rewrite history [that] are becoming more and more harsh, depraved and aggressive.”

**1.2. Making Ideas Work: The Provision of Resources for Foreign Policy**

As was noted before, Russia is diversifying its foreign policy, along with the resources necessary to make this foreign policy work. In addition to its diplomatic services, Russia also names its state structures, parliament, political parties, business and social science communities, and the international activities of NGOs as resources to implement its foreign policy. Informational support is emphasized as an important tool for implementing foreign policy, and is described in a separate part of the Foreign Policy Review.

**Informational Support for Russian Foreign Policy: the Role of the Media**

Media and information is playing a large role in the performance of foreign policy of Russia; it is even larger when we speak of the humanitarian trend in Russian foreign policy. Russia recognizes that information and media can shape peoples attitudes, so Russia must “…provide objective and precise information about its positions in international relations to the foreign partners…” in practice, that means creating and maintaining an “effective campaign of information in everywhere the interests of Russia are challenged.” Anti-Russian attitudes and propaganda campaigns on the part of the United States are named as an example of such challenges, and political support for Russia in several European countries is presented as an error of such campaigns. This was also mentioned in the Russian National Security Concept of 2000: “There is an increased threat to the national security of the Russian Federation in the information sphere. A serious danger arises from the desire of a number of countries to dominate the global information domain space and to expel Russia from the external and internal information market.”

Thus Russia wants to view its risks for security as a rationale for its campaigns, while not recognizing possible risks arising against other countries.

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26 For more on migration as a part of public diplomacy, see Howard H. Frederick, Global Communication and International relations, The American university, 1993, p. 129.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Joseph Nye argued that soft power is hard to manage, because perceptions are produced not exclusively through the actions of a state, but also through economic or societal entities.
32 The Baltic States insist on recognition of the fact of Soviet occupation, while Russia denies an occupation and refers to the definitions of incorporation or annexation. Ukraine attempts to make the Gолодором фамини recognized internationally as an act of genocide by the Soviet Union; Russia also denies these accusation of the Soviet Union.
35 Ibid.
According to a few previous studies, a large number of Russian-speaking minorities in the C.I.S. and Baltic countries watch Russian TV channels available on commercial cable networks, which are practically (to a larger or lesser extent) controlled by the Kremlin. Most of these people gain information about processes in politics and society exclusively from these channels, and also trust information exclusively from these channels.

Russia works in two ways to improve its capabilities in the sphere of information. The first way is the development of information networks: building information channels worldwide. The second way is an improvement in the style of information. As noted in the Foreign Policy Review: the “offensive character [of information] does not mean returning to the confrontation and ideological struggle. It is enough to justify ourselves for whatever reason…”

It must be noted that Russia uses harsher definitions than soft power when talking about the sphere of information. In the Russian National Security Concept of 2000, the term “information warfare” was used to describe the threats Russia was facing, and the “improvement and protection of the domestic information infrastructure and integration of Russia into the world information domain” was named as a possible reaction to this threat.

1.3. Inputs and Outputs: the “Humanitarian Trend” and its Targets

Protection of the interests of Russia’s compatriots is a starting point when explaining the logics of the humanitarian trend, because other areas are subordinated to the protection of the interests of compatriots. The idea of consolidating Russian-speakers arose directly from the notion of compatriots in the near abroad. It gave rise to a wider geopolitical conception of the “Russian World” which can be used in Russia’s foreign policy interests. A consolidation of the global Russian community, which could be used as a tool for increasing Russia’s power and international prestige, was described as one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy in the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review.

At the same time, the humanitarian trend has gone further than its origins, and its set of targets has expanded. According to the objectives of Russian foreign policy, the humanitarian dimension works in three directions: the target countries of “problematic issues” (near abroad) nomats Russian speaking population [primarily] of these countries and elsewhere in the world (compatriots), and international society (soft power). The near abroad is a key direction for tracing the beginnings of the humanitarian dimension as a whole. The countries of the near abroad (Baltic States and C.I.S.) have been defined as the “Russian natural sphere of influence interest,” not only because of the former rule of Moscow over these countries, but also because of the specific interest of Russia in these countries, such as compatriots living in these countries and their human rights being “oppressed” by these countries. The story of the near abroad does not end with these issues anymore; now Moscow presents these countries as “problem” countries that undermine Russian — EU and Russian — NATO relations or widen the notion of a “multi-polar balance”. By doing so, Russia tends to create tensions within the EU and NATO in order to hamper the formulation of joint positions by the organizations or to demonstrate examples of the “hegemonic influence” of the U.S.

Particular elements of the humanitarian dimension already were a part of Russian foreign policy before they were embraced in the notion of the humanitarian trend as a separate direction/part of Russian foreign policy. At the same time, the humanitarian dimension displays a significant shift in Russia’s previously declared foreign policy directions. It shows that Russia learns fast from its former mistakes and is ready to use more advanced patterns of influence than primitive actions of coercion and economic sanctions. To understand how this change has evolved, an historical analysis of the development of the humanitarian dimension is necessary.

39 “It is a strategic objective of Russia to empower compatriots to fulfill the role of Russia’s respected intellectual, economic and cultural-spiritual partners in global politics by strengthening their ethnic-cultural identity […] The engagement of compatriots in the Near Abroad and in more distant foreign countries offers great potential for shaping Russia’s image in objective terms” Обзор основных идей Российской Федерации. March 27, 2007. Available at http://www.mid.ru/bp_r4.nsf/0/3647DA97748A106BC32572AB002AC4DD. Last accessed on July 7, 2009.
2. THE “HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION” AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Russia has passed major changes following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The struggle for political and economic power, a major economic crises, unfinished reforms, and a transition to democracy have pushed Russian society and elites to make constant transformations on internal as well as on external policy. It is possible to trace the changes in Russian foreign policy in accordance with its internal transformations — in society, economics, and, most importantly, in its politics. At the same time, some analysts argue that "broader systemic imperatives account for broad patterns of Russian foreign and security policy, rather than domestic policies". These imperatives state that "at times of relative weakness Russia has acted primarily as a "defensive positionalist"; at times of growing strength it has sought to maximize its power". This notion is obvious when looking at Russia's national interests and the dynamics of changes in these interests in the foreign and security environment. Whatever the imperatives for change are, Russian foreign policy has transformed in its dealings with the external world and in the scope of instruments used to achieve its goals. An aim of this chapter is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the development of Russian foreign policy, but rather to outline some major trends that played a role in the development of the humanitarian dimension.

Newcomer: Emerging Country, Emerging Policy

The root of Russia's use of different "humanitarian" actions can be found in the Soviet tradition of propaganda warfare and various manipulations with political forces in different countries. One of the most obvious of evidences of the humanitarian dimension is the activities surrounding a human rights issue during the Cold War. The Soviet strategy was to internationalize an issue through a network of controlled human rights movements. Organizations under the umbrella of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), until 1957, and, later on, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD) constantly voiced concerns about the rights of workers in the West or the rights of African Americans in the United States. In addition, the Soviets included those issues on the agenda of global and regional international organizations, especially the United Nations. Edward Lucas has called this kind of Soviet policy "whataboutism"; Soviet propagandists had mastered the tactic of replying to any Western criticism by asking "what about" apartheid in South Africa, or jailed trade-unionists, or the Contras in Nicaragua, etc.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, a new country emerged from the legacy of the Soviet Union. In the period of emergence (early 1990s), Russian elites were preoccupied with establishing Russia's positions as an actor in international relations; humanitarian issues were not identified as a foreign policy tool by policy makers. At the same time, the issue of the protection of human rights and compatriots were used with growing intensity. Despite attempts to "internationalize" these issues, it was regarded more as a tool for settling bilateral relations rather than a part or a separate direction of foreign policy.

The period of post-Cold War euphoria (1992–1993) introduced an extreme change of perceptions about the West and introduced Russia's aspirations to develop as one of the democracies of Europe. By this time, Russian foreign policy was reactive rather than active: it intended to adjust to the new global environment while keeping in mind the notion of Russia's once powerful role. Russia was not ready to adjust and give away its lost power. As described by Janusz Bugajski: "democratization on the inside and western economic assistance was more important that regaining lost influence in the beginning of 1990s." This lead to sense of humiliation and injustice in Russia about the attitude towards Russia as a third world country, despite its efforts for transition and stabilization, further determined the direction of Russian foreign policy. Despite its actual weakness, Russia felt equal to other "major European powers", and thus counted on integration in major international institutions according to the rationale of security and stability. When Russia recognized that it is not regarded as an equal partner, Russian leaders felt disappointed and humiliated. In mid-1992 and early 1993, expansionist positions. The stronger and foreign policy assumed more emphasis on confrontation. As an answer to the disappointment and criticism towards Yeltsin's office about the "over-Westernization" of Russia's foreign policy... Russia's claims on its "vital interest" in former Soviet territories became more open and demanding. Although the Russian population in other post-Soviet states was defined as an integral part of the Russian nation, protection of their rights was not included as a direction in official foreign policy documents.

Democratization was stimulated through the influence of the West by way of financial aid and encouragement for democratic consolidation — the process of democratization that could not be done without embedding democratic values in Russian society and structural reforms in its countries' institutional, economic, political, and social spheres. Failed reforms and insufficient securing of human rights and freedoms led to criticism from the West. Although there is no evidence, it is possible to assume that Russia learned from this criticism. First, Russia recognized the role and importance of human rights in international relations. Russia gained confidence that human rights can be used effectively to attract the attention of international society, and thus used as an effective instrument for addressing other foreign policy.

42 Ibid.
issues. Second, Russia assumed that it is possible to interpret human rights standards and the notion of democratic values according to certain boundaries.

As Janusz Bugajski notes, "Eastern Europe was neglected during the early years of Yeltsin administration, because Russia was too preoccupied with its internal transformation and the establishment of profitable relations with the West. Also, there was confusion regarding whether relations with former Soviet republics should be regarded as foreign or domestic policy." In this context, it is no wonder that the growing interest in issues of a humanitarian character was not yet regarded as a priority; except for political dialogue on a bilateral level, there was no coordinated action on these issues in Russian foreign policy.

**Going (Back) Forward: Reassertion of Russian Foreign Policy**

A reassertion of foreign policy emerged as an aftermath to unfulfilled aspirations of a "liberal" course. External factors also contributed to the dominance of the conception of Russia as a "great power", with interests that should be properly respected: the war in the former Yugoslavia created public pressure for Slavic unity; NATO declared its aim to expand, which was regarded as a direct military threat to Russia’s interests; and criticism of Russia for the war in Chechnya was growing. This period of pragmatism introduced the foreign policy course wherein the core of its doctrine was based on defending national interests in a “multi-polar” system. National interests became the primary determinants of foreign policy and were defined in terms of national security. This was stated clearly by Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, in 1996, when he claimed that “[Russia] does not have permanent friends, but permanent interests.” By emphasizing the role of these interests, Russia also wanted to be perceived as a pragmatic and predictable actor in foreign affairs. Some analyst argue that a reliance on national interests as a determinant of foreign policy didn’t change the perception of Russia “as one of the most unreliable states”. Distrust and an increasing perception of the role of force as Russia's instrument in international relations made countries of the nearer and further abroad more suspicious of Russia’s ambitions and interests.

Multi-polarity was the banner that simplified the new course in Russian foreign policy, behind the conviction of the “great power” that actually drove it. Russia’s ambition was to become a separate pole in the multi-polar world and the center of gravity for its near abroad. Therefore, foreign policy was driven by two major goals: counterbalancing the West and consolidating the C.I.S. space, which was regarded as a "Russian natural sphere of influence/interest.” The period of reassertion came with a more active pursuit of national interests in the C.I.S. and Baltic States; the use of humanitarian issues like human rights and compatriots were regarded as tools for defending interests in the near abroad. In surveys conducted from 1993 through 2000, 69—85% of respondents asserted that the defense of Russians abroad in former U.S.S.R. countries was an important foreign policy goal. Economic recovery and economic interactions with countries of the near abroad were weakened by the economic crisis of 1998, which also led to the further breakaway of countries regarded as a sphere of influence. Humanitarian issues were a tool to maintain criticism of these countries and at least in some way to resist Western expansion.

**Building Empire Again: Putin’s Foreign Policy**

A new foreign policy course was inaugurated along with Putin’s taking office and established an even “more assertive and nationalist stance within global affairs.” This policy included posing Russia as a "great power", and featured a more open confrontation with the West; it also defined nearly all of its national interests in terms of security matters.

This period was introduced by the adoption of two documents related to foreign policy planning: the Russian National Security Concept, in January of 2000, and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, on June 28, 2000.

The National Security Concept defined a new strategic environment for Russia. Despite stressing the ever increasing role of economic, political, scientific, technological, environmental, and information factors, Russia continued to place emphasis on defining its security in terms of a traditional or “hard” security framework. Among the threats to Russia’s national security, a “weakening of Russia’s interests in the world, NATO’s eastward expansion, and weakening of integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States” were also mentioned.

The Foreign Policy Concept emphasized Russia’s role in the world community as a “great power” and “as one of the most influential centers of the modern world”. In this context use, of the term “democratic” was attached to a notion of world order.
and the current state of the United States as a superpower in the world was qualified as a "growing trend towards the establishment of unipolar structure of the world". As explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, "the substance of the document reflected the truth that, no matter how deep internal changes may be the foreign policy of any state cannot begin with a clean slate, but bears the imprint of continuity determined by the country's geopolitics, history, and culture." For the first time in a foreign policy document, Russia showed an interest in a human rights issue, and defined its stance regarding compatriots: "The Russian Federation will seek to obtain adequate guarantees for the rights and freedoms of compatriots in states where they permanently reside and to maintain and develop comprehensive ties with them and their organizations." The promotion of a positive perception of Russia in the world and the popularization of Russian language and culture were also named as general principles of Russian foreign policy. The Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 can be regarded as a starting point in the development of the humanitarian dimension on an official level. An emphasis on major issues later elaborated in the concept of the humanitarian trend and the logics of soft power showed a significant shift from the previous position of force.

A combination of economic development, led by the constantly increasing price of hydrocarbon fuels in world markets, and more active participation in the international scene during recent years has led to growing self-confidence and assertiveness of the part of Russian foreign policy. Indeed, if Putin's first term in office and the Medvedev Doctrine showed "pursuit of a diverse range of interests on many fronts with little prejudice to any", then the objectives of Russia were quite clear when he left office. By the "securitization of identity" (portraying Westernization as an existential threat to society), Putin has made the Russian perception of the West more hostile than ever before during the post-Cold War period. Putin's legacy in Russian foreign policy was perpetuated in the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Review of March, 2007, and fortified in his speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in October, 2007. The Foreign Policy Review became a founding document of the humanitarian dimension in Russian foreign policy and also the most complete overview of the concept. During Putin's term as president, implementation of the humanitarian trend was at the highest degree ever experienced, and tensions regarding the rights of human rights and compatriots were raised to a political level. Also, the spread of Russian activities in the fields of culture and the promotion of language and education was broad and intensive. The basic elements of the humanitarian dimension that were outlined in the Foreign Policy Review were later embraced in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2008, signed by Russia's new president, Dmitry Medvedev.

Naive Hopes: Prospects for the Future

While the West is still waiting for an internal power struggle of two leaders, which could possibly change the design or some details of Russian foreign policy, President Medvedev continues Putin's legacy. Even the tools used to ensure the continuity of Putin's course are similar. The new Foreign Policy Concept was passed by President Medvedev in July of 2008, and was based on the Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007, and the Medvedev Doctrine, proposed in Sochi in August of 2008, follows the same rhetoric as Putin's speech in Munich.

The Medvedev Doctrine is based on five basic points:
1) primacy of the fundamental principles of international law;
2) multipolarity instead of the unipolarity of the United States;
3) non-confrontation and "friendly relations" with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as possible;
4) protection of "our citizens" (their "lives and dignity") wherever they may be, and protection of the interests of our business community abroad;
5) there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests — countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors.

The fourth and fifth points are the most relevant for the humanitarian dimension; naming these points among the five basic directions of foreign policy means increasing the role of the humanitarian dimension in the future. As stated by George Friedman, the "fourth point provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in other countries if Russia finds it necessary", and the fifth point is critical because it actually states that "Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia's "special interests." Such official announcements make countries around Russia cautious and distrustful of the good intentions of its humanitarian actions. Distrust towards Russian policies in the near abroad was not something new for these countries, and they were regarded as risks rather than direct threats. Now, after Medvedev's announcement that "We [Russia] are not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a Cold War…", and the military intervention in Georgia, the perception of threats in C.I.S. and Baltic States

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67 Ibid.
are shifting back on Russia. As stated by Alexei Arbatov and Dag Hartelius in 1999, Western countries did not expect threats from Russia in the short term, but were still taking into account possible risks coming from a "possible return of imperialist and aggressive leaders in Moscow in the long term." It is hard to say whether the changes in Russia during recent years match the situation described by these analysts, but it is obvious that Russia's leadership is more radical in its relations with the West, thus potentially possessing more serious risks.

In these conditions, Russia gives the image of typical Cold War behavior, and thus simulation of a Cold War condition where interests and power has a decisive role. Traditional "hard" policy resources are the most suitable for this purpose, but "soft" policy strategies are needed to cover all of the spheres of influence. Cooperation is acceptable only insofar as it satisfies Russia's immediate interest, and division between enemies and allies is of great importance. Russia has an advantage in this situation, because most of the other actors in the international system are trying to act by different patterns. This advantage gives Russia the ability to predict that potential moves of other actors will not be decisive, because they are not able / willing to accept the return of the Cold War. On the other hand, this can be Russia's Achilles heel, because restraints on wider cooperation create constant distrust among potential partners. The other way of viewing Russia's foreign policy is based on a rationale of Russia's "own way" or "romantic realism". This mode of behavior in international affairs states that where available resources are used in a pragmatic way to provide the most effective outcomes. Behavior of foreign policy is driven by such constructed images as "civilization", "historical interests" or "space" (mestorazvitie) and the "messianic idea", rooted in the Russian tradition of geopolitics. This should be viewed as a smart foreign policy, where its calculations include whole spectrum of resources — traditional elements of power and political position on the one hand and delicate economic schemes and campaigns of public diplomacy on the other. In this case, military strength and energy resources are important for the purpose of achieving aims, but using exclusively hard policy matters is not suitable for a broader, "romantic" purpose. Thus, Russia has learned to use the processes of globalization, which hurt it before, in its own interests — by using elements of "soft power" that promote its cultural, scientific, humanitarian, and other forms of attraction.

The tradition of humanitarian action in Russian foreign policy has roots in the traditions of the Soviet Union. Although Soviet foreign policy developed by different patterns (not an ideological struggle), certain parallels between Russian and Soviet foreign policy can be seen. When Russian foreign policy was first formulated, aspirations towards a new course were made. These aspirations grew stronger along with the intentions to for closer cooperation with the West. After the unfulfilled hopes of a "liberal" course, Russian foreign policy got its direction back from the past, following the logic of power politics and geopolitical objectives. Russian foreign policy

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3. IMAGINING AN IMAGE: SOFT POWER IN THE „HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION” OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Russia has declared it ambition to develop soft power in all of its major foreign policy planning documents. The rationale behind this ambition is not only because of the notorious assumption that hard power does not give an appropriate effect when implementing foreign policy objectives in a globalized world. Russia also recognizes that much of its geopolitical losses in the world and, most importantly, its near abroad, can be explained by its weak possession of soft power. These losses are obvious when we look at Russia’s “failed attempts to counterbalance the West – OSCE didn’t become the “main” European security institution, NATO enlargement is ongoing despite opposition of Russia, Russia’s influence in the Balkans and Middle East has decreased”. For the most part, these losses can be explained by a lack of trust in Russia, rather than its capabilities.

Another factor where Russia sees a weakness in soft power lies in its aspirations to be a great power. Russia lacks the regional authority to fulfill its ambitions of “great power”, because potential partners are moving away from Russia rather than approaching. The Baltic States see Russia as a source of major threats to their security; Ukraine and Georgia are suffering from the fulfillment of such threats; and the countries of Central Asia are self-sufficient because of their natural resources or bargaining positions. In this context, Russia has no levers to influence the political course of these countries. “The moment of truth for Russia came with the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, when the power of ideas was revealed by events”. As noted by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma, Konstantin Kosachev, “...the situation is absurd when post-Soviet states enjoy more benefits from cooperating with Russia and still they want to enter into the straitjacket of European institutions and to fall under the dictate of Brussels.”

Soft power carried out through the practical means of the humanitarian trend in foreign policy could be an answer to these challenges. Russian political scientist Vladimir Frolov points out that “for the first time in Russian history, Russia has chosen the appropriate instrument to impinge on processes in neighboring countries: cultural and humanitarian co-operation, or, soft power”. A number of Russian political scientists, such as Modest Kolerov, Tatjana Poloskova, and others, concur with Frolov’s point about the centrality of humanitarian issues in a modern strategy for the expansion of Russian influence abroad. The emphasis is carried over to the utilization of education and culture in shaping Russian influence especially in the post-Soviet area, where the resident Russian compatriots are perceived as a potential support resource.

The humanitarian dimension includes issues and features that directly comply with the original notion of soft power: the promotion of culture and language; the use of media, education, and public diplomacy; the primary aim of an attractive image; etc. At the same time, there are issues that are not contextual: criticism of target countries, “manufacturing enemy images” onto target countries, aggressive pursuing of interests on a multinational level, and blackmail by using energy resources. That is why an interesting question is whether an understanding of soft power in Russia differs from the original meaning of the concept, and if so, what are the differences.

Soft Power and the Meaning of Persuasion

The concept of soft power was originally proposed by Joseph Nye in 1990. Nye emphasizes the changing nature of power, and argued that power in international relations should not be understood narrowly as a command or coercion, but also includes an aspect of persuasion. He writes: “Power is one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what he wants. There are three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and attraction. Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction.” The concept of the “second face of power” and attraction as a tool to achieve one’s goals were recognized before Nye. But Nye was the first to conceptualize the “power of attraction” in international relations, and presented the idea of such power as an instrument for achieving foreign policy objectives. In his concept of soft power, Nye also showed that power embraced the dynamic interaction of actors, in contrast to the traditional static notion of the realists. The rationale behind the notion of soft power is that an ability to attract others can change their preferences in a way that they act in the interests of the country projecting attractiveness (so that others want what you want). For a more complete picture of how soft power resources are converted into desired outcomes and results, major elements of the concept are further revealed and explained. A comparison of soft power and the humanitarian trend in Russian foreign policy is also made through elements of both concepts.

Sources of Soft Power

The sources of soft power are the elements that differentiate it from hard power. In the broader context of the projection of power in international relations, soft power describes the opposite to traditional (hard power) means of coercion and inducement to achieve one’s objectives. As noted by Nye: “hard and soft power…are both aspects of the ability to change what others do and represent two kinds of power for reaching objectives”. If hard power is attained by force and coercion (with political or military sources) and/or inducement (positive or negative economic sanctions), then soft power operates through attraction produced by “culture (when it is pleasing to others), its values (when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its [foreign] politics (when they are seen as inclusive and legitimate)”. Culture, in this case, is defined in the broad sense where a country’s popular and “high” culture, education, science, sports, and religion are included in the sphere of the country’s culture. The nature of promoted values should be universal, but also present specific features of society and its way of life. In this sense, economic development can also be a source of attraction when it comes to the acquiescence of values embedded in a way of life. And regarding a country’s foreign policy, it should be noted that legitimacy alone does not lead to soft power; foreign policy that’s legitimate but aggressive and unilateral erodes the potential of soft power.

There are two ways that these sources are used for soft power. One way is the direct assistance of a country’s government agencies to promote its culture and values and explain its foreign policy. Another way is indirect, because it appears as a part of the social and economic by-products of the country’s society. Therefore, government is never fully in control of its soft power, because different institutions (churches, universities, companies, NGOs, etc.) create soft power themselves, and situations may arise where their actions are in contradiction to the aspirations of the country’s soft power.

Russia possesses all the sources of soft power mentioned by Nye. The humanitarian trend implies the promotion of Russian culture and language to advance its image; human rights as universal values that should be promoted; and multilateral diplomacy, the principles of autonomy, and sovereignty as major means to create the image of a legitimate foreign policy. In practice, however, of all the sources mentioned, only culture works as a source of soft power, and even then particular issues are problematic for producing soft power. One of such issues is Russia’s “war on history” with its neighbors, which only intensifies political tensions between countries. Human rights are indeed universal values, thus complying with one criterion for developing soft power. At the same time, human rights are not specific and originally developed by Russia, thus they are not perceived as a specific Russian feature that could be admired and make an attraction. Steve Fish argues that “a society can project only what it has; and if it projects something that it’s not, it is likely neither to acquire a robust soft power in any appreciable measure…Russians are projecting what they are”. In the case of human rights as a value to be promoted, Russia actually “projects something that it’s not”, because the practice of human rights is very weak in Russia. To overcome this challenge of universal and original values, the concept of a “sovereign democracy” was developed by Russia. Although analysts argue that “sovereign democracy” is a concept for domestic application, it represents Russia’s “own set of values [that] are democratic, but they emerge from Russia’s unique historical experience, and they are distinct from what the West understands as democracy”. The problem with Russian foreign policy is not related to Russia’s attempts to make it legitimate, but, rather, to its aggressive nature. The events of the last few years — the war with Georgia, manoeuvres of strategic aircraft and nuclear submarines, the rebuilding of the military, etc. — have led to a perception of Russian foreign policy as aggressive and unilateral, resulting in a substantial loss to Russia’s soft power. Russian elites also try to avoid the error described by Nye wherein the actions of other producers of soft power can be in contradiction to a country’s aspirations. Although this is not always the case, Russia tries to be in control of institutions that can shape the country’s image (media, NGOs, cultural figures, universities, Orthodox church, etc.).

Instruments Used for Soft Power

Communication on different levels of perception is a key element for making sources of soft power work. The instruments of soft power are the media and those actions and approaches by which a country sends its message to promote its culture and values and explains its foreign policy. A government’s public diplomacy is communication directed at an audience — government’s approach to influence the content of information and the form of communication. According to Nye, there are three dimensions of public diplomacy wherein a government can operate with information:

- day-to-day dimension: involves spreading government’s comments of internal and external policies to media broadcasts;
- internal and external dimension: involves spreading government’s comments of internal and external policies to media broadcasts;
- external dimension: involves spreading government’s comments of external policies to media broadcasts.
• strategic dimension: follows a logic similar to political or advertising campaigns, wherein symbolic events are chosen to promote a message for a particular aim;
• developing lasting relationships: through exchanges, conferences, development assistance, and access to media. 87

The instruments of soft power include the media, NGOs, a country’s diplomatic services and specific policies, centers of culture, science, and education, and events (arts exhibitions, concerts, festivals, conferences) through which soft power is projected to audiences. As was mentioned before, government never fully controls soft power, and certain errors in the content of information and the form of communication, as well as the actions of other actors, may influence the development of soft power. At the same time, governments can influence the course of soft power, mainly through the credibility of the information they are promoting. 88

The humanitarian trend is also implemented through communication and media, and plays a decisive role in raising and sustaining humanitarian issues. The instruments and approaches to communication are widely used and well developed by Russia. There are several government structures that work with Russian public diplomacy. 89 Russian cultural centers 90 and Moscow Houses 91 around the globe; media networks abroad; 92 internet sites; 93 and other assets for getting Russia’s message heard. Russia has developed a comprehensive set of instruments for the promotion of soft power, which are actively used in all the dimensions of communication mentioned above. At the same time, Russia uses its communication not only to promote its image, but also to make propaganda campaigns to erode an image of other countries (like “disobedient” neighboring countries or “hegemonic” United States). These campaigns produce a gap in the credibility of information, thus reducing the effectiveness of communication and, therefore, reducing Russia’s soft power.

**Targets/Subject of Soft Power**

The subject or targets of soft power are soft those countries, groups, and individuals that country applying soft power is trying to attract. According to Nye, there are two levels where the expressions of soft power can be observed: systemic and individual (country level). On the systemic level, soft power is the ability of an actor to set political agendas and influence a system by itself, in order to change the preferences of others. 87

As was noted before, a combination of sources and instruments of soft power does not convert into power in a direct way, as in the case of hard power. Soft power is attained by reaching three objectives. The first objective of soft power is an ability to attract others, which is attained through sources of soft power and ensured and reinforced with appropriate instruments (outputs). As Nye notes, “in behavioural terms soft power is attractive power [and] attraction often leads to acquiescence". 95
Thus, attraction produces the basis for a change of preferences on the part of others (outcomes). Preferences that are changed in a “proper” way, according to Nye, shift the behavior of others in a way that is favorable for a producer of a change (results). Steve Fish has proposed a thesis that shows another potential result of soft power: “all else being equal, soft power may sometimes function as a substitute for hard power in shaping the morale and self-confidence of a nation’s people...”. As was mentioned before, soft power can also be used in the domestic dimension of its producer, and can also create results that are suitable for domestic audiences.

The humanitarian trend (outputs) mentions objectives for promoting Russia’s image in the world and consolidating groups (compatriots) in particular countries (basically C.I.S. and Baltic States) that can help “to maintain the objective image of Russia”. Russia has mostly succeeded in producing desirable outputs of its humanitarian trend; Russia is heard by others and its culture is attractive. At the same time, the changing preferences and actions of others is only partly observable in the actions of those who are attracted. Only some of the major actors in the international system are acting in favor of Russia’s interests. With some exceptions, Russia’s humanitarian foreign policy actions in the near abroad has caused even more distrust of Russian aspirations than a change of preferences. The most successful results are gained by an attraction to Russia on the part of groups of compatriots, they mainly support Russia’s policies and accept its worldview.

**Context of Soft Power**

The conditions in particular situations are extremely important variables when calculating possible outputs, outcomes, and the results of soft power; “power is always dependent on the context where power relations exist”. For soft power, it is important that the background conditions are not in contradiction with the aim to get attractiveness and change preferences. Nye notes that “the possibility of successful creation of attraction is much bigger when cultures are more similar than different”. Preferences are not changed by attraction alone; affiliation, persuasion, and acquiescence of a certain degree are also needed. The background factors behind soft power can be studied only on the basis of particular cases.

The contextual factors that are important for the successful implementation of the humanitarian trend are named in Russian foreign policy documents. Friendly relations with major power and neighbors, action only through cooperation in multinational forums, and development of economic ties — these are all named as the goals and objectives of foreign policy and refer to the context of relations for humanitarian issues. In practice, however, it seems that Russia is actually missing a link in some cases between its declared position and foreign policy moves, because hostile tensions with neighbors are in place and upright relations with some of the major powers are sustained. On the other hand, Russia is actually working on developing economic ties with other countries and tightening its relations with other major powers.

**“Soul” and “Body”: the Russian Way of Soft Power**

The humanitarian dimension of Russian foreign policy is not an idea; it is a direction of policy that had already been implemented before its formulation in the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of 2007. The humanitarian dimension is a mixture of Russia’s non-military and non-economic tools for achieving, on the one hand, its foreign policy objectives and geopolitical aspirations, and, on the other hand, learning the praxis of other states in the field of soft power.

The correlation between the humanitarian dimension and soft power is self-evident. The idea of promoting culture, values, and foreign policy perceptions on an international scale, and the instruments used to that end, is identical to the notion of soft power. At the same time, when compared with the original idea of soft power proposed by Joseph Nye, the practical implementation of the humanitarian trend shows less of some elements and more of others. First, when comparing the humanitarian dimension to the original meaning of soft power, we find that the humanitarian trend does not share the same “romanticism” of cooperation and power that is evident in soft power.

The romanticism of soft power rests primary on a positive meaning of power — that it is not antagonistic by nature but, rather, based on a “win–win strategy” of cooperation and common interests. In the case of the humanitarian trend, we can recall only some nonspecific messages of cooperation and common interests. In the humanitarian dimension, power is regarded as a result of cooperation and as an instrument to attain foreign policy objectives, not vice versa. Thus, the humanitarian dimension in practice lacks the “soul” of soft power, which is essential for Nye’s concept.

Russia’s different approach to soft power is obvious if we look at the various meanings found in academic and official circles in Russia: soft power (vlast), soft force (sila), soft might (moshch), soft mightiness (moshchnost). These different meanings for the concept of soft power lead to the conclusion that the humanitarian dimension implies less of an idea of soft power and more of its practical expression. It contains same sources, instruments, and logics that construct the “body” of soft power. These differences emerge when the humanitarian dimension is brought out of the framework of soft power. The humanitarian dimension actually implies different interpretations of the sources and instruments of attraction and different approaches.
to attaining results. The promotion of culture, education, and language or multilateralism in international relations are common to both concepts, but the sources of the humanitarian dimension also include issues that are specific to a domestic audience (sovereign democracy) and particular groups (protection of the interests of compatriots). The instruments used for the humanitarian dimension are also broader in scope in their usage; communication is ensured not only through media or events promoting the image of Russia, but also through propaganda campaigns, political confrontation, hidden campaigns, and financing, which closely refers to manipulation, not persuasion. One way to explain these changes lies in the absence of a “soul” of soft power, which in the case of Russia does not restrict it from negative campaigns. In practice, Russia’s approach to soft power is grounded more in its instrumental side, and directed more precisely at particular audiences, than in the original meaning of soft power.

Like any other country, Russia has its interests that it tries to defend and promote in international politics. As noted by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma, Konstantin Kosachev: “[Russia] cannot explain the purpose of its presence in the post-Soviet Union... The West is doing this under the banner of democratisation, and one gets the impression we are doing it only for the sake of ourselves... Our activism is following too openly Russian interests. This is patriotism but not competitiveness.” Also, the methods for implementing the humanitarian dimension are not always characteristic of soft power; they do not underscore the attractiveness of Russian culture, the humanity of its social values, or the credibility of its policies. Instead, Russia tends to implement its foreign policy basically on the grounds of force and using certain (selected) approaches of soft power. The presence of traditionalism and new ideas in Russian foreign policy has also led to specific instruments employed for its objectives. One of these instruments is the geopolitical concept of the “Russian World”.

The “Russian World” — Soft Approach of Geopolitics!

Russia believes that the humanitarian approach is not causing insults to imperial ambitions, while not recognizing that its foreign policy objectives have not changed. Russia’s neighbors do not believe that the country’s behavior has changed, whatever means it uses for reaching its objectives. The humanitarian dimension is thus regarded as just an attempt to hide imperial ambitions.

Initially, the ideological concept of the Russian World developed rather independently from official Russian policy regarding compatriots residing in foreign coun-

tries. When Vladimir Putin came to power the situation changed, and the notion Russian World entered official circulation. The concept had several authors, whose opinions differed on separate issues. However, there existed a few central doctrinal common denominators that later on appeared in politicians’ speeches, foreign policy documents, and programs. The most prominent authors of the concept include Pyotr Schedrovitsky, Yefim Ostrovsky, Valery Tishkov, Vitaly Skrinnik, Tatyana Poloskova, and Natalya Narocznitskaya. Each of these authors has contributed to the formulation of ideas, and the latter four authors personally participate in the implementation of compatriots policy.

The concept was designed gradually. A number of its ideas were formulated by circles of experts back in the 1990s. In 2000, Pyotr Schedrovitsky published the article “Russian World and Transnational Russian Issues” introducing the public to the basics and objectives of the Russian World concept.

The Russian language is one of the cornerstones of the Russian World concept. Pyotr Schedrovitsky followed the ideas of 18th century German philosopher Herder on the correlation between language and the process of thinking. Similar to Herder, Schedrovitsky maintains that a culture can be comprehended only through its carrier: language. He often accentuates the idea that those who speak Russian in their everyday life also think Russian, and as the result, they act Russian. Valery Tishkov, the director of the Ethnology and Anthropology Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a member of the State Duma Public Chamber, defines the Russian World concept as follows: “A transnational and transcontinental association the members of which are united in their belonging to the particular state (Russia) and loyalty to its culture”.

The other definition, used on a broader scale by Russian Compatriots policy experts is the following: “the Russian World is a phenomenon of ethnic culture having a network structure consisting of large and small communities within the Russian culture and language environment, and taking Russia as the mental centre”.

Global processes, according to the authors of the Russian World, are to be used to strengthen the wholeness of the Russian Federation and protect its economic interests. It is stressed that if the Russian diaspora links up with Russia in the Russian World project, it might become an important player on the international scene. According to the authors of the web site Russkiy Arhipelag, which popularizes the idea of the Russian World, there are about 300 million Russian speakers in the world, who are considered potential participants in the Russian World. Of these 300 mil-

106 The Russian World is a phenomenon of ethnic culture having a network structure consisting of large and small communities within the Russian culture and language environment, and taking Russia as the mental centre.
107 Global processes, according to the authors of the Russian World, are to be used to strengthen the wholeness of the Russian Federation and protect its economic interests. It is stressed that if the Russian diaspora links up with Russia in the Russian World project, it might become an important player on the international scene.
108 Schedrovitsky P. Russian World is a phenomenon of ethnic culture having a network structure consisting of large and small communities within the Russian culture and language environment, and taking Russia as the mental centre.

lions people, approximately 25 million think and speak in Russian, and reside in Russia’s neighboring countries. It should be mentioned that the activities of the Russian World are directed not only towards Russian citizens in foreign countries, but also to the citizens of other countries whose loyalty is to be won.

Some of the authors of the Russian World consider the diaspora’s involvement in economic activities, for example, drawing investments to Russia, as one of the main tasks of the Russian World. In order to reach the abovementioned objective, the creation of communication channels between the Russian diasporas and Russia has been proposed. The internet is regarded as one of the most important means of communication.

While developing the idea of the need to expand the structure of the Russian World (by organizing, joining forces in NGOs and political organizations, establishing permanent communication routes with Russia, etc.), Tatyana Poloskova and Vitaly Skrinrik stress in the book Russian World: Myths and Reality, published in 2003, that the Russian World is to be regarded as a transnational corporation functioning on the basis of a well-organized communication system.109

The ideas of the Russian World were accepted by the Russian political elite, who considered both the definition of the status of compatriots residing abroad and the process of seeking state identity. Because the issue of the need for an overall state ideology is often raised in Russia, the development of the Russian World as a specific civilization is suitable for the Russian elite as a counterbalance to the influence of Western countries. The concept of the Russian World formulates the goal of compatriots policy in its broader meaning, accentuating the Russian people’s special mission aimed at maintaining Russian values and culture. Support for compatriots abroad is tied to the protection of the state’s interests in foreign countries, using the diaspora as a mediator or an instrument.

The formulation of Russian Compatriots policy took place hand in hand with the internal discussion on Russian identity and the essence of the status of compatriots both in the juridical sense and from an ethnic point of view. The nationalist Russian experts and politicians usually stress the ethnic aspect of membership in the compatriots community. The centrists favor the notion of belonging to a political nation and, later on, to a culture nation as the main feature of a Russian compatriot. When designing a clear definition of the ethnic affiliation of Russian compatriots (considering the multi-ethnic character of communities of Russian citizens), it was decided not to single out ethnic Russians as the only possible claimants to the status of Russian compatriots residing abroad. This was done in order not to impact the numeric strength of the Russian diaspora as an eventual resource in Russian foreign policy, as well as to avoid legal and political problems.

Therefore, the necessity arose to implement the ideological concept of the Russian World in order to join Russia with several waves of emigrant groups into a single entity.110 A person can be included in the Russian World according to his/her affiliation to the particular language, religion, and cultural community. The physical boundaries of the Russian World are not clearly defined, therefore the Kremlin has a wide range of possibilities to use the concept to achieve specific political objectives.

In October of 2001, speaking about the legal status of Russian compatriots at the Congress of Compatriots Residing Abroad, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “Compatriot is certainly not just a legal category. Furthermore, it isn’t a matter of a status or some special privileges. First of all, this is the matter of a personal choice. I would say, mental self-determination. This route is not a simple one. Because since olden times the concept of Russian World has exceeded Russia’s geographic boundaries and even the boundary of the Russian ethos”.111 Putin’s speech shows that he does not restrict affiliation to the Russian World by ethnic characteristic; he adds “metal self-determination”, thereby expanding the concept of compatriot to uncertain, legally vague limits.

Like the ideologists of the Russian World, Putin stressed in his speech that the Russian language is the basis for the entire Russian culture, therefore Russian governmental institutions have to support the maintaining of the language among compatriots. Like Schedrovitsky, the Russian President indicated that it was important that compatriots not only speak Russian, but also think and feel Russian.

One more issue touched upon by President Putin at the Congress was the compatriots’ eventual assistance for Russian economic relations with foreign countries. According to Putin, compatriots abroad must “help their motherland in its constructive dialogue with foreign partners”.112 This corresponds to Schedrovitsky’s idea of the Russian World’s economic goals: to participate in the redistribution of resources (including investments and advanced technologies) for Russia’s benefit.

One example of the implementation of the Russian World idea was the establishment of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, in 2007. The foundation was established on the decree of President Putin. The establishing of the foundation was the group effort of the Russian Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Education.

Vyacheslav Nikonov, a political scientist close to the Kremlin and president of the Politika Foundation, was appointed executive director of the new foundation. The board members at the Russkiy Mir Foundation demonstrated the President’s interest in the activities of the foundation. The board is headed by Saint-Petersburg State university rector Ludmila Verbistskaya, who maintains good relationship with the Putin family.113 The board also works with the participation of Russian Minis-


112 Ibid.

The popularization of Russian language and culture in foreign countries is one of the main goals of the foundation. The establishment of Russian centers at universities and libraries in various countries is among its major activities.

4. CASE STUDIES

ESTONIA

4.1. The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy in Estonia

When criticizing Estonia in international organizations and forums, Russia exploits two key topics to enhance its overall influence on Estonian society and to minimize Estonia’s effectiveness and credibility as a member of Western organizations in general and the Euro-Atlantic community in particular.

1) In connection with the Russian-speaking minority or so-called “compatriots”, Russia focuses on citizenship issues and criticizes Estonia for the large number of stateless persons and violations of the rights of the Russian population (Russian compatriots), condemning Estonia’s language policy and restrictions that have allegedly been imposed on the use of Russian in Estonia (Russian-language education; Russian-language media and information space).

2) In connection with different interpretations of history, the main issues include the occupation and re-occupation of Estonia in 1939–1940 and 1944, the Second World War, and its wider context. Russia accuses Estonia of falsifying “true history” and glorifying Nazism. These kinds of attacks have become more frequent since April, 2007, when a Soviet memorial statue, the Bronze Soldier, was relocated from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery.

The situation with Russian minority groups has been at the top of Russia’s foreign policy agenda for years, but the issues concerning history and the Second World War in particular have gained more attention during President Vladimir Putin’s second term of office, beginning in 2004.

There is a rational explanation for this. In 2005, 60 years passed since the end of the war, giving Russia a very good reason to emphasize the significant role it had played in the destruction of Nazi Germany. Since the enlargement of the European Union, however, new memory patterns have been introduced into the collective historical memory of the European Union by new member states from Eastern Europe. The new member states do not put Stalinist Russia into a positive context as one of the main forces in the anti-Hitler coalition; rather, they treat it as a state that was one of the architects of the war.

Before the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies admitted the existence of the secret protocol of the Molotov – Ribbentropp (Stalin – Hitler) Pact. Yet Russia’s current leaders are not willing to acknowledge the Soviet Union’s role in the annexation of the Baltic States in 1940. Instead, they have decided to enforce a nation-wide history doctrine, declaring that those who do not stick to this doctrine undermine Russian interests.

The following is an overview of the official accusations Russia has leveled against Estonia in international organizations (the U.N., the OSCE, the Council of Europe, etc.), together with examples of public statements made by top Russian politicians in connection with the above-mentioned issues.

Russian Criticism of Estonia in International Organizations

The United Nations

Since the early 1990s, Russia’s usual rhetoric in the U.N. has included accusations about violations of Russian minority rights in the Baltic States. Despite the obvious progress made with the integration of non-majority population groups in the eighteen years since the restoration of independence, Russia has continued to make these kinds of accusations up until recently.

Already since 2005, Russia has used the discussions at the U.N. General Assembly concerning the resolution on Inadmissibility of Certain Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance¹¹⁵ to highlight the problematic situation of the Russian population in the Baltic States. In addition to the usual allegations about violations of Russian minority rights in the Baltic States, the list of reasons for the adoption of the resolution has been extended in recent years by accusations about attempts to exonerate Nazi ideology.

Russian representative Maria Zakharova made the following statement at the U.N. General Assembly in October, 2007: “We must not let the memories about the people who fought against Fascism and National Socialism sink into oblivion. In this connection, we condemn the emerging trend in many countries to glorify the cronies of Nazis and to destroy statues that have been erected to honour the memory of those who fought during the war in the anti-Hitler coalition.”¹¹⁶ Zakharova repeated this statement almost verbatim in April, 2008.¹¹⁷

The U.N. Human Rights Council

Russian representatives speak regularly on issues related to Estonia at the UNHRC Standing Committee sessions every March and June. In addition, Estonia is usually criticized at the UNHRC regular sessions in October on the grounds of statelessness and alleged discrimination of stateless persons in Estonia.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko explained Russia’s position on March 16, 2006:

“...[W]e intend actively to use further the podium of the main U.N. rights body for drawing the attention of the international community to the negative humanitarian situation in Latvia and Estonia, in particular to the policy being pursued by these states’ authorities of open discrimination against Estonia’s effectiveness and credibility as a member of Western organizations in general and the Euro-Atlantic community in particular.

against the non-titular population. I shall stress that neither Russia nor international experts make any excessive requirements for Latvia and Estonia. It is about the need for these states to observe universally recognised standards in the field of human rights, in particular for the protection of minority rights”.¹¹⁸

In September 2007, Doudou Diène, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, visited Estonia. Although his recommendations contained some criticism of Estonia, his report did not satisfy Russian representatives at the U.N. either.

While presenting his advisory report at a session of the UNHRC in Geneva on March 19, 2008, Diène said that the problem had been acknowledged at a high level in Tallinn. He underlined the work of government institutions and agencies actively dealing with the respective issues in Estonia. The special rapporteur said that Estonia had acceded to all the main international human rights instruments. The report recognized tolerance of the Estonian society, on the basis of which solutions to the given questions could be further improved.

Diène said that the legacy left by the long-term occupation of the Soviet Union was contradictory. His advisory report encouraged the solving of these problems by means of consistent integration policy and social dialogue. The special rapporteur recommended that Estonia strengthen the justice chancellor’s institution, which should deal with cases of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination.

Diène also underlined two principles that should serve as guidelines in language policy. First, the Estonian government has the legitimate right to spread the Estonian language among all the people living in the country and to avoid bilingualism, which was characteristic of the Soviet occupation period. But the state must admit the existence of minority languages.

The rapporteur referred to the declaration of the rights of minorities, according to which countries must take measures to see that people belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities for studying and receiving instruction in their native language.

In his opinion of the special rapporteur, the issue of stateless persons is waiting for a solution, and this requires the government’s increased attention. Diène recommended that the government revise the terms of granting citizenship to stateless persons. In his opinion, the government should simplify citizenship procedures for more vulnerable groups of residents, such as the elderly and less privileged people. In addition, free language courses should be made available for citizenship applicants. The rapporteur pointed out that this had been foreseen in the integration program for the years 2008–2013.¹¹⁹

It is likely that what annoyed Russia the most in this report was a reference to the fact that Estonia had been occupied by the Soviet Union. On April 19, 2008, Sergey Kondratief, Russian representative to the UNHRC, made the following statement on the report:

“The Government expressed its dissatisfaction at Mr. Diène’s reports on his visits to the Baltic States. His reading of history was problematic and it was highly distressing that the Special Rapporteur had such a distorted view of history in the region”.¹²⁰

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Attention should be drawn to the following statements, submitted by Russia to the OSCE during the years under discussion.

2006

1) Statement by the Russian Federation on the adoption of the Law on the Protection of Military Burial Sites in Estonia (May 25, 2006 – PC.DEL/497/06). In this statement, the plans of Estonian political leadership to remove the monument to Soviet soldiers (Bronze Soldier) from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery were criticized.

2) Statement by the Russian Federation in response to the report by the OSCE Representative to the Estonian Commission on Military Pensioners (June 8, 2006 – PC.DEL/534/06). In this statement, Estonia was criticized for giving only temporary residence permits to Russian military pensioners. To obtain a long-term residence permit, they must submit official documentation attesting that they have at least a basic knowledge of Estonian.

2007

1) Statement by the Russian Federation on the adoption of the Law on the Protection of Military Burial Sites in Estonia (January 25, 2007 – PC.DEL/59/07). In this statement, a representative of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Voronkov, expressed his suspicion that the Law on the Protection of Military Burial Sites was adopted by Estonia only to provide a legal basis for removal of the monument to Soviet soldiers from the center of Tallinn.

2) Statement by the Russian Federation on the unlawful and inhumane actions by Estonian authorities (May 3, 2007 – PC.DEL/375/07). This state-

¹¹⁸ Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yakovenko’s interview with RIA Novosti concerning the adoption by the UN General Assembly of a resolution setting up a human rights council, March 16, 2006.


ment was made one week after the removal of the statue Bronze Soldier and mass riots in the center of Tallinn on April 26–27. Russian Representative Aleksey Borodavkin stated that the force used by Estonian authorities against protesters after the dismantling of the Bronze Soldier “exceeded all acceptable limits. Truncheons, tear gas, water cannon and rubber bullets were used. People were grabbed on the streets, beaten, placed in handcuffs and taken away to jail. ... Dmitry Ganin, a Russian citizen who was permanent resident of Estonia, died as a result of the clashes”.

3) Statement of the Russian Federation at the opening plenary session of the OSCE Conference on Combating Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and understanding (Bucharest, June 7–8, 2007). The head of the Russian delegation V. Popov stated that “we are concerned about indifference of the OSCE profile institutes towards the problem of worsening of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia, the lenient attitude towards the dismantling of the monument to the killed in WW II”.

On November 29, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged other participating states at the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers in Madrid to declare 2008 the year of mass liquidation of statelessness in Europe, thus drawing attention to the situation of stateless persons in Estonia and Latvia: “Inadmissible in contemporary Europe is the practice of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship. We will consistently seek to ensure the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia in line with the decisions and recommendations of the U.N., the Council of Europe and the OSCE”.122

2008


In all of these three statements, the Russian representative expressed disapproval with the rallies of Estonian Second World War veterans who fought on the side of fascist Germany; they also accused Estonian authorities of facilitating a glorification of the Nazis.

2009

In 2009, Russia has continued to exploit two key issues — the rights of non-citizens and different interpretations of history.

1) Statement by the Russian Federation on the observance of human rights in a number of European countries (January 29, 2009 – PC.DEL/65/09). In this statement, Russian representative Anvar Azimov raised the following problems with the observance of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia: the decreasing rates of naturalization; the attempts by the authorities to displace the Russian language from the educational sphere under the pretext of a school reform; and the increasingly severe actions of the language inspectorate.

2) Statement by the Russian Federation on the glorification of Nazis and the revision of history in a number of European countries (February 26, 2009 – PC.DEL/114/09).
3) Statement by the Russian Federation regarding the gathering of SS veterans in Estonia (July 30, 2009 – PC.DEL/659/09).

Russia expressed grave concern about a declaration adopted at the 18th annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Vilnius (from June 29 to July 3), whereby Nazi and Stalinist crimes were treated as equal. In particular, the “Resolution on Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century” states that “in the twentieth century European countries experienced two major totalitarian regimes, Nazi and Stalinist, which brought about genocide, violations of human rights and freedoms, war crimes and crimes against humanity”. The declaration supports the initiative of the European Parliament to proclaim August 23, when the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was signed, a Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. In Article 17 of the resolution, deep concern is expressed “at the glorification of the totalitarian regimes, including the holding of public demonstrations glorifying the Nazi or Stalinist past, as well as the possible spread and strengthening of various extremist movements and groups”. According to Russian officials, the wording of the declaration reflected the excessive influence of the representatives of the Baltic States and their wish to undermine Russia’s interests and image abroad.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2006

In 2006, the Russian delegation did not make any attempts to denigrate or at...
tack Estonia, with the exception of criticism directed at Latvia and Estonia during the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and the usual accusations about violating the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia made at the meetings of the Committee of Ministers.

2007

According to the comments of Estonian diplomats working in PACE, the first half of 2007 was probably the most difficult time for Estonia since its chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers in 1996. Russia launched a major offensive against Estonia in January, 2007, which had a forceful snowball effect: during the first half of 2007, Russian representatives made a total of twelve anti-Estonian statements in different formats.

The first milestone was the PACE winter session in January, 2007, during which the Russian delegation submitted a motion for an anti-Estonian resolution ("Risk of Resurgence of Nazi Ideology in Estonia"), which was motivated by the adoption of the Law on the Protection of Military Burial Sites in Estonia.24

This clearly demonstrates that Russia was making preparations for an anti-Estonian campaign at an official level even before the notorious "Bronze Soldier riots". Russia's diplomatic offensive against Estonia reached its climax after the relocation of a Soviet memorial statue — the Bronze Soldier — from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery and the mass riots for the next two nights.

On May 10, a ministerial session of the Council of Europe marked the culmination of the confrontation. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko did not use the text drafted for him; instead, he devoted his entire speech to the events in Estonia.

The half-year long debate between Estonia and Russia came to an end on July 12, when the Russian Federation made a statement in front of the Committee of Ministers in which the Russian Ambassador raised 20 key points of criticism directed at Estonia.

Russian representatives made hostile anti-Estonian announcements at PACE and CLRAE,25 and also circulated various written statements. Nonetheless, Russia did not manage to push through a single anti-Estonian resolution or decision; its only positive result was the appointment of a rapporteur on the attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in the Political Affairs Committee of the PACE. During the second half of the year, Russia's direct attacks against Estonia subsided.

In principle, all member states of the Council of Europe, excluding Russia, agreed that the removal of the Bronze Soldier was an internal matter in Estonia, and that the rights of national minorities had not been violated.

2008

The issue of EU blacklists was used to attack Estonia at the January 23 session of the PACE. Estonia had blacklisted several Russian citizens who had tried to stage unsanctioned protests in Estonia after the removal of the Bronze Soldier. The chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev, claimed at the session that new Schengen member states used the "blacklists" to exact their political revenge.26

While discussions were ongoing about Kosovo's declaration of independence on April 16, Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov denounced attempts to draw parallels between Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R., which had liberated Europe, at a time when the Estonians were destroying victory memorials and condoning Fascism.27

On June 25, during debates on the state of democracy in Europe, Russian representative Goryacheva accused the Council of Europe of excluding from monitoring countries that abuse minority rights. More specifically, she accused all the Baltic States of violating the fundamental rights of the Russian-speaking populations — they are stateless and allegedly do not have the right to vote.28

As regards developments in the field of citizenship in 2008, the PACE adopted two recommendations on migration issues during its session in June, the contents of which were quite surprising. While analyzing methods on how to improve the participation of immigrants in democratic processes, the discussion centered on two reports — one by the Political Affairs Committee and the other by the Committee on Migration — that contained several references to the situation in Estonia and Latvia. The resolutions (1617 and 1618) based on the reports were quite radical, and stipulated that there should be no differentiation between migrants who are citizens of Council of Europe member states, regardless of whether or not their country of origin is a member of the European Union.

A motion by the Estonian delegation (Kristiina Ojuland) for a resolution to deprive the Russian delegation of its voting rights, due to what had happened in Georgia in August, set the mood and provided a background to the main debate during the PACE autumn session (from September 29 to October 10). In the end, only 20 votes were cast in favor of the resolution. Still, two documents on the conflict between

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125 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.
Georgia and Russia were adopted (Resolution No. 11724 and Recommendation to the Committee of Ministers no. 1846), the harshness of which exceeded expectations, especially in comparison with the debates held at the level of the Committee of Ministers.

2009

A debate on the attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in Council of Europe member states was held at the PACE winter session on January 29.130

Russian representative Leonid Slutsky thought it necessary to reiterate Russia’s view that it was wrong to relocate the Bronze Soldier and to rebury Russian soldiers. In addition, he did not support the claims that the Baltic States had been occupied, and that an equal sign could be placed between the German National Socialist regime and the Communist regime in the U.S.S.R.

Russian attacks against Estonia and the three Baltic States were episodic at the PACE spring session (on April 27–30). Still, members of the Russian delegation continued to stress the fundamental truths about Estonia. For example, Zyuganov said that the PACE was working on the wrong problems, because the real problem was the immoral atmosphere of today’s Europe, as was demonstrated by the practice of glorification of Nazism, the removal of memorials erected to remember those who fought against Fascism, and so on.

Russian representative Sergey Markov declared that the source of Europe’s problems was Estonia, where the authorities had provoked and then brutally suppressed demonstrations against the removal of the Bronze Soldier two years ago. He claimed that there were two classes of people in Estonia — citizens and non-citizens — and that Estonia was purposefully dismantling the system of human rights protection. According to Markov, Estonia had restricted, out of deliberate cruelty, Estonian human rights activists’ access to Europe in order to prevent them from telling the truth about the glorification of Nazism in Estonia; this is why Estonia and Latvia had listed hundreds of names on the Schengen blacklist, despite the fact that the purpose of the Schengen area was to enable free movement of people.131

The European Court of Human Rights

As of the end of 2008, a total of 380 complaints from Estonia had been filed with the ECtHR and awaited its decisions; 160–170 of these complaints were filed in 2008. So far, the ECtHR has accepted a total of eleven complaints against Estonia. These complaints are not political in nature and should thus not interest Russia. The


ECHHR usually dismisses most of the complaints that await decisions without asking Estonia to provide additional information or to give its opinion.

In February, 2008, seven people filed a complaint with the ECtHR on the grounds that they had been unlawfully arrested, detained, and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police during the Bronze Soldier riots. They also claimed that the Estonian authorities had refused to initiate an investigation into their unlawful arrest and detention. Rulings in these cases are expected in 2009. It is likely that they will have an effect on Estonian — Russian relations.

Russia’s Critics About Estonia at EU — Russia Meetings

Russia continued to criticize Estonia’s and Latvia’s citizenship policies at regular summits held between the European Union and Russia. On June 27, 2008, Russian President Medvedev stated after a Russia-European Union summit that “we continue to be concerned about the situation with the rights of our compatriots in Latvia and Estonia”.

At the summits, Russia raised questions about the situation of Russian compatriots in Estonia and Latvia, grouping the two countries together. An in-depth analysis of the issue is presented in this publication by Mārtiņš Paparinskis.

The prevalent view of various EU diplomats and politicians, expressed after the riots, was that while the Bronze Soldier and the vandalism in Tallinn were Estonia’s internal affairs, Russia’s coordinated actions against Estonia — the embassy siege, the Russian government’s refusal to provide adequate security staff, and cyber attacks against Estonian government web sites — caused serious international problems that undermined the relationship between the entire European Union and Russia.

Critical Statements About Estonia in the Media by Top Russian Politicians and Officials

Although debates in diplomatic circles are indicative of the general situation, statements made by top politicians in the press provide a better account of the actual positions of the states, and have a greater impact on public opinion.

The following is a selection of frequent accusations leveled against Estonia by official Russian representatives in the press in 2007–2008. As stated above, most of the accusations were motivated by the events in Estonia in April, 2007.

It should be pointed out that Russia started to make preparations for the introduction of the Bronze Soldier issue at a time when the Estonian parliament held debates over the Law on the Protection of Military Burial Sites — that is, before the relocation of the statue. This was clearly a smear operation prepared in advance. Before the planned relocation of the Bronze Soldier to a military cemetery, people started talking and writing

Following high-level talks between Russia and the EU, Dmitry Medvedev, Javier Solana, Jose Manuel Barroso, and Janez Janša held a joint press conference in Khanty-Mansiysk on June 27, 2008.
about the intention of the Estonian government to liquidate the statue at Tõnismägi. After the Bronze Soldier riots, however, a massive smear campaign was launched, including the use of blatant lies and inaccurate facts and accusations. Estonia was accused of rehabilitating Fascist and Nazi ideology, idolizing Nazi symbols, glorifying SS veterans, brutally discriminating against the Russian-speaking population, denying the Holocaust, and Hitlerism. After the riots on April 26–28, direct threats against Estonia and insults targeting Estonians became widespread in the Russian press. Distorted versions of the names of the state and nation — e.g., "eStonia" and "eSTionians" — were used in the press, on the internet, and at demonstrations organized by pro-Kremlin forces.

Some examples of typical accusations:

Interfax, April 26 – Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov: "Estonian leaders have started to condone Fascism and to collaborate with Fascists. They have no right to rewrite history! They identify with the people against whom the entire Europe fought."

Interfax, April 26 – Speaker of the State Duma, Boris Gryzlov: "What is happening in Estonia is pure madness. What the Nazis did not manage to do to the living, the Estonian government is now trying to do to the dead."

RIA Novosti, Oslo, April 26 – Sergey Lavrov: "The situation surrounding the Bronze Soldier is despicable. It cannot be justified. It will have serious consequences for Russia — NATO and Russia — EU relations because these organizations have welcomed a new member state that has trampled on all the values that form the foundation of the EU, European culture, and democracy."

Interfax, April 26 – Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev: "In essence, Estonian authorities have taken a stand against the international public — against everyone who still remembers the price that was paid for victory. The actions of the Estonian leadership stimulate neo-Nazi and revanchist attitudes. As a result, Estonia is in opposition to modern European civilization, to the entire civilized world. Estonia is undermining its relations with all the states that hold dear the memory of victory over Nazis."

April 27 – Statement by the Russian Communist Party: "At a time when sixty years have passed since the end of the war, Fascism is reborn in Estonia! The removal of the memorial statue is a Fascist orgy. The first public battle with Fascism in the 21st century was held in Estonia."

Strana.ru, May 2 – Russian representative Boris Malakhov’s speech to the U.N. Committee on Information: "Why are memorial statues to Soviet liberators removed? This raises the issue of whether these acts constitute attempts to rehabilitate Nazi crimes. Neo-Nazism is on the rise all over the world, as is demonstrated by the removal of memorial statues dedicated to soldiers/liberators."

Interfax, May 8 – Chairman of the Council of Federation, Sergey Mironov: "What was done by the Estonian leadership shows that Fascism and Nazism are reborn in Estonia."

This salvo of statements by Russian official representatives, which use the same arguments again and again, bears witness to a well-coordinated smear operation aimed at reinforcing Estonia’s image as a state that does not support Europe’s core values. In official statements and numerous Russian-language articles and interviews, Estonia patiently and repeatedly explained its views on the issues of the Second World War, the Nazi regime, and the Soviet occupation, emphasizing that Estonia did not intend to offend or to humiliate Russia by relocating the Bronze Soldier from the center of its capital to a military cemetery; on the contrary, it celebrated the memory of those who died in the war by reburying their remains in a cemetery. When Estonian authorities removed the memorial to Red Army soldiers from the city center, they were guided by the collective historical memory of the Estonian nation and the fate of the Republic of Estonia in the Second World War — this is what Estonia has experienced and other states should treat these experiences with respect.

In addition to the issues of the Second World War and Nazism, the Bronze Soldier crisis gave Russia the opportunity to reiterate its views on the protection of human rights and the treatment of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

The Russian media focused on the campaign around the Bronze Soldier, largely ignoring the looting and stealing during the riots. It was claimed that the riots had broken out in response to police brutality. The Russian media broadcast outright lies, claiming that Estonian policemen were involved in the death of a Russian citizen, Dmitry Ganin, who was killed during the riots; that people had been beaten to death at Tallinn Ferry Port, where they were detained; that people were brutally tortured; and that psychotropic substances were administered to people during interrogations. Rumours spread that Estonian authorities wanted to send politically disloyal non-citizens and Russian citizens out of the country.

There were two processes used to draw international attention to Estonia: court proceedings against some members of an organization called Nochnoy Dozor (Night Watch), who were accused of organizing the riots; and the investigation of the circumstances of Ganin’s death during the riots.

In 2008, the Russian propaganda machine made effective use of the trial of Arnold Meri, a Hero of the Soviet Union, who was indicted for participating in the mass deportations in March, 1949.

On May 20, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry declared that the Estonian state had leveled accusations of genocide against Meri “under false pretences” (“nechistoplotnoi zateyi”) and that the “charges were fabricated” (“sfabrikovan-nogo dela”).

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement reads as follows: “Instead of persecuting those who contributed to the victory over Fascism, Estonian law enforcement agencies should fight the obvious manifestations of neo-Nazism in Estonia, which have been widely condemned all over the world.”133

Russia and the Russian mass media concentrated their attention on Meri’s trial until his death in the spring of 2009.

Unfortunately, there are other developments in Estonia that give Russia the pre-
text to accuse Estonia, at the international level, of rehabilitating Nazism.

A good excuse for accusing Estonia of glorifying Nazism was provided by the annual meeting of the Association of the Estonian Veterans of the 20th Waffen Grenadier Division at the Sinimäed Hills. In 2007, the meeting prompted a statement from the Russian Embassy in Estonia; in 2009, a similar statement was made already at the level of the Russian Foreign Ministry (on July 28, 2009). In fact, the two statements are identical: the two meetings are called “Nazi Sabbath”; the statements emphasize that the meetings were held in contravention of the conclusions of the Nuremberg trials; and the European Union is called upon to condemn the meetings.134

Every year, the Erna Raid — which has become one of the most prestigious military sports competitions in the world — also prompts similar protests from Russia. The name of the competition commemorates an historical event that can, however, be connected with Estonians who fought on the side of Nazi Germany, a circumstance which the Russian propaganda machine is only happy to underline.

4.1.2. “Compatriots” as a Tool of Russian Foreign Policy in Estonia

The objective of Russia’s new foreign policy concept is to create a global Russian diaspora.

Alexander Tschepurin, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for Compatriots Abroad, writes in his article “The “Three Whales” of the Russian Diaspora Policy” that the existence of an influential and consolidated Russian community abroad is in Russia’s national interests. The “three whales” or basic principles underpinning Russia’s foreign policy for the creation of such a diaspora are:

• to intensify efforts to consolidate the Russian community abroad;
• to conserve the Russian-speaking and pro-Russian environment in terms of ethnicity and culture;
• to strengthen the tie between Russian compatriots and their historical homeland on the basis of mutual support and partnership.135

Tschepurin claims that several factors complicate Russia’s consolidation efforts. He highlights the attempts by some host countries, in particular in the near abroad, to assimilate or to marginalize their Russian-speaking population groups and to spread anti-Russian propaganda. Tschepurin is, of course, pointing the finger at Estonia and Latvia.

Tschepurin believes that the main tools for consolidating the Russian community abroad are the Russian-language information space, which encourages mutual communication and exchange of opinions; economic prosperity, which depends on Russian businessmen who act as patrons; and capable leaders, who defend the community’s interests in their host countries.

All the above ideas could be treated as organic parts of integration programs for those citizens who belong to ethnic minority groups, were it not for the fact that Russia’s efforts to “consolidate” its compatriots in Estonia and other Baltic States could often be viewed as attempts to interfere in their internal affairs, to put pressure on their domestic politics, and to destabilize their internal situation.

In another article, Tschepurin does not beat around the bush: “The Russian diaspora abroad provides social and humanitarian support for the implementation of the interests of the Russian Federation in post-Soviet countries. As speakers of Russian and representatives of Russian culture, compatriots form outposts of their spiritual and historical homeland outside its borders.”136

Dmitry Kondrashov, editor-in-chief of the journal Baltiski mir, has offered invaluable insight into how representative bodies of Russian compatriots should be put together. When the Russian-speaking community in Estonia protested the election of compatriots’ coordination councils that were supposedly not democratic enough, claiming that the council members did not adequately represent the interests of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and that they had been appointed to the councils by the Russian Embassy, Kondrashov expressed his views on the election procedure: “Russia chooses its partners by itself and no force or institution has the power to influence its choices. ... The election of Russia’s partners as such, in particular by a third party, is out of the question.”137

Kondrashov’s thoughts about Russian-style: “...[E]xercising its sovereign right to do so, the Russian Embassy chooses its partner organizations for the implementation of the policies of the Russian Federation. The delegates to the conferences, held in host countries, are selected from among these partners. These conferences appoint members to coordination councils in specific countries and delegates to regional councils, who, in their turn, approve the members of the World Coordination Council. This clearly demonstrates that there is democracy, yet it functions in the framework of the sovereign right of the Russian Federation to choose its own partners.”138

Following this logic, the so-called Russian compatriots, or Russians who live outside the territory of the Russian Federation, are becoming one of the most important Russian foreign policy tools to exert leverage on their host countries. Russia’s activities are aimed at creating a false opposition between Russians who live in Estonia and the authority of the state. It is important to draw attention to the fact that Russian foreign policy makers officially use the notion of protecting compatriots for purely decorative purposes.

The Estonian Security Police has claimed that, since 2003, Russian special ser-

138 Ibid.
vices have managed to subject control, to a greater or lesser degree, over most of the organizations that deal with the protection of Russian compatriots living in Estonia.

Before and at the beginning of Putin’s second term as president, Moscow’s efforts targeted at Russian compatriots became more coordinated, while financial resources allocated for that purpose grew significantly. In 2003, direct aid in the amount of 160 million rubles was allocated from the Russian state budget to finance activities related to compatriots;¹³⁹ in 2006, as much as 500 million rubles was allocated for the same purpose.¹⁴⁰

Already in 2004, Russian special services carried out an analytical review of several new Russian foreign policy aims in connection with new developments following the accession of the Baltic States to NATO and the European Union. According to this review, Russia was supposed to continue a reasoned and aggressive position towards the Baltic States in order to prevent anti-Russian moods, and to secure an increase in Russian foreign policy’s influence in the world. The most important tool for the achievement of these aims was the protection of Russia’s interests in adjoining states via political, economic, religious (the Russian Orthodox Church), and other activities.¹⁴¹

The subordination of the Russian government’s Committee on Compatriots Abroad to the Foreign Minister, and the establishment of a Department for Compatriots Abroad at the Foreign Ministry in 2005, represented two significant milestones in the gradual reinforcement of state control over Russia’s compatriots policy.¹⁴²

The Russian-Speaking Population as a Part of Civil Society in Estonia

One of the main shortcomings of Russia’s compatriots policy is the presumption that the entire compatriot community is homogenous, and that its members share common “national interests of Russia” that take precedence over other social and political interests. As was demonstrated above (see Chapter 1), the Russian-speaking population in Estonia is divided into three different groups on the basis of their citizenship status. These groups have different opportunities and motives for participating in politics in Estonia.

Citizens initiatives constitute an important instrument for social consolidation and the enhancement of social cohesion. Civil society in Estonia is indeed flourishing. According to the 2008 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, recently published by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Estonia ranked first out of 29 countries, while Russia shared 23rd and 24th places, outperforming only Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus.¹⁴³

Estonia started to rebuild its civil society right after the restoration of independence, when numerous organizations that had operated during the first period of Estonian independence were re-established, including several organizations uniting non-Estonians (for example, the Union of Russian Educational and Charitable Societies in Estonia, which was re-established in 1988 as the Society of Slavic Cultures, the legal successor of an organization founded in 1923, and the Russian Academic Society, which was founded in 1921, by members of the Russian intelligentsia whom Lenin had forced to leave Russia, and re-established in 1999).

Public acknowledgement of ethnic minorities in Estonia began in 1988, when non-Estonians started to form their own cultural societies and associations. To date, they have registered more than 200 organizations in Estonia.¹⁴⁴

The largest umbrella organizations are:
- the Union of Russian Educational and Charitable Societies in Estonia, which unites 60 cultural societies and associations, including the Pushkin Society, described below in greater detail;
- the International Lyra Association of National Cultural Societies of Estonia, which comprises 35 organizations;
- the Estonian Union of Ethnic Minorities, which unites 27 cultural associations of ethnic minority groups living in Estonia;
- the Ida-Virumaa Integration Centre, which includes 19 organizations;
- the Konsul Association of Russian Creative Societies in Estonia (14 societies);
- the Sadko Association of Russian Cultural Societies in Estonia (32 societies: troupes of actors, dancers, and musicians);
- the Ruthenia Association of Russian Cultural Societies (7 organizations, including the Centre of Russian Orthodox Culture and the Russian Academic Society);
- the Estonian Old Believers Culture and Development Society (9 organizations operating in areas near Lake Peipus, where Russian settlers fleeing religious persecution have lived since the 17th century);
- the Tallinn Union of Slavic Culture (18 societies, mainly troupes of musicians, artists, and actors);
- Russkiy Dom in Estonia (13 organizations, including the Estonian — Russian Entrepreneurs Chamber and troupes of artists and actors);
- the Congress of Ukrainians in Estonia (11 organizations); and
- the TKREA Association of Turkish and Caucasian Peoples (13 organizations).

In accordance with the law, all these organizations function as non-profit organizations. State support is provided through budgetary financing, which increases every year, and targeted project funding. For example, the Foundation for the Integration of Non-Estonians, the Open Estonia Foundation, the Cultural Endowment, and the Gambling Tax Board allocate funds to finance the cultural activities of these organizations through project competitions.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.
¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 13.
¹⁴² Ibid., p. 24.
¹⁴⁴ For a full list of the cultural organizations of ethnic minorities registered in Estonia, see www.ekvere.ee.
The cultural societies of ethnic minorities mostly engage in choral and vocal singing, choreography, amateur acting, visual and media arts, literature and publishing, educational activities, decorative and applied arts, as well as club and hobby activities.

Sadly, there is still only limited contact between the non-profit organizations of Estonian- and Russian-speaking people. Most of the organizations focus more on the promotion of their national culture than on the promotion of social activities in the public interest. Although the ratio of non-governmental organizations relative to the population in Estonia is higher than in other post-Communist countries, participation in the activities of non-governmental organizations is significantly more widespread among Estonians than among the Russian-speaking population. This trend is particularly evident in organizations that operate in the public interest.

In order to overcome this problem, efforts to strengthen the cooperation between the organizations of Estonian- and Russian-speaking people have recently been stepped up. The Network of Estonian Non-profit Organizations hired an expert to work with the organizations for Russian-speaking people. The aim is to draft a joint manifesto for non-profit organizations before the local government elections in October, 2009. In its first year of operation (2008), the National Foundation of Civil Society (NFCS), which provides state grants to non-profit organizations, carried out a project competition to support joint projects between the organizations of Estonian- and Russian-speaking people.145

It is obvious that many organizations for Russian-speaking people get support from Russia through the Russian Embassy and/or project competitions. However, there is no effective cooperation between Estonia and Russia at an official level to promote the ideas of civil society among the Russian-speaking population. On the other hand, many European countries and the European Union have contributed large sums to accelerate the integration process and the development of different ethnic cultures in Estonia.

**Political Parties for Russian-Speaking People in Estonia**

Russia's attention has mostly been concentrated on organizations that could be used to influence Estonian politics. Unfortunately, the political community in Estonia continues to be ethnically split. Formally speaking, all larger political parties in Estonia are multinational. However, it is actually possible to differentiate between parties for Estonians and parties for Russian-speaking citizens. Through many years, parties for Russian-speaking people have upheld the slogan of "Russian special interests", in the promotion of which Russia is also interested. At present there are two political parties pretending to represent the special interests of Russian-speaking population in Estonia: the Russian Party in Estonia and the Estonian United Left Party (established as the Estonian United People's Party and later as the Constitution Party).

Russia has financed election campaigns for parties of Russian-speaking people in Estonia. These parties have competed among themselves to gain approval and funding from Moscow. Their key election promises have centered on the introduction of official bilingualism in Estonia, the "blanket citizenship" option, and so-called equal rights.

Yet the voting preferences of the Russian-speaking electorate have demonstrated that support for these slogans has decreased over the years. Instead of supporting Russian parties, which claim to represent the special interests of Russian-speaking people, they have turned to a party with a much broader platform — the Center Party. The latest opinion polls show that more than half of the Russian-speaking electorate would vote for the Center Party in elections. It cannot be denied that the Center Party's efforts have been specifically targeted at the Russian-speaking population, as it has concluded a cooperation agreement with the pro-Kremlin ruling party, United Russia.

Until 2003, the parties for Russian-speaking people had their own faction in the Riigikogu. They also had their own role to play in local government elections, particularly in Tallinn and Narva. At the 1999 Estonian parliamentary elections, the Estonian United People's Party got 9,682 votes (6.13% of the popular vote) and formed a six-member faction in the Riigikogu, while the Russian Party in Estonia got only 9,825 votes (2.03%). It is clear that if the parties had put forward joint candidates, there would have been more Russian-speaking MPs in the Riigikogu. However, the Riigikogu Election Act prohibits the formation of election coalitions by political parties. In addition, deep political disagreements between the two parties and the party leaders prevented them from merging into one party.

Since the 2003 Estonian parliamentary elections, the Russian parties have not passed the election threshold. In 2003, the Estonian United People's Party won 11,113 votes (2.2%) and the Russian Party in Estonia got only 990 votes (0.2%). If the two parties had joined forces for the elections, they would still not have passed the election threshold.

In 2007, the Constitution Party (previously known as the Estonian United People's Party) won 5,464 votes (1.0%) and the Russian Party in Estonia got no more than 1,084 votes (0.2%).

The Estonian Security Police claims that, in 2007, Russia offered considerable financial support to the Constitution Party. At the same time, Russia had great hopes for the media campaign built around the Bronze Soldier (the Bronze Soldier is a memorial that stood at Tõnismägi in the center of Tallinn from 1947 to 2007, and which the Estonian government relocated to a cemetery in April of 2007, shortly after the parliamentary elections were held and a new government took office). But the hoped-for breakthrough did not occur.146

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Before the 2009 European Parliament elections, Russia increased its financial support in order to renew its campaign efforts to secure a seat for a Russian-speaker in the European Parliament. The aim was to follow the example of Latvia, where Tatyana Zhdanoka had been elected to the European Parliament in 2004 (she was re-elected in 2009).

In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the following parties and independent candidates allegedly represented the interests of the Russian population in Estonia:

- The Russian Party in Estonia (six candidates) – this party’s frontrunner, Stanislav Tscherrepanov, wants the Russian population to strive for cultural autonomy in Estonia. The party got 1,267 votes (0.32%).

- The Estonian United Left Party (six candidates) – this party was established through a consolidation of the Constitution Party and the Left Party in May of 2008. The party’s frontrunner, Georgy Bystrov, ran as an independent candidate in the 2005 European Parliament elections and got 6,183 votes. The second candidate on the list was an ex-KGB officer, Vladimir Ilyashevich. This party upholds the former platform of the Constitution Party and lobbies for special rights for Russians in Estonia and in the European Union as a whole. The party won 3,519 votes (0.9%).

- Dmitry Klensky – an independent candidate who was involved in the Bronze Soldier riots in April, 2007, for which he was put on trial. He was found not guilty by the courts. His views on the rights of the Russian-speaking population are ideologically similar to those of the Left Party. There was a period when they even planned to stand together in the elections. He got 7,319 votes (1.8%).

- Yuri Zhuravlyov – an independent candidate who was involved in the Bronze Soldier riots in April, 2007. He has been charged with instigating the looting of shops. He won 585 votes (0.07%).

Instead of voting for the Russian candidates, Estonian Russian-speaking citizens mostly supported the Center Party, which got 103,542 votes (26.1%) and won the 2009 elections (two seats in the European Parliament; the ALDE faction).

Before the 2009 local government elections, plans are again being made to join forces to protect the interests of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. With the aid of compatriot organizations, Dmitry Klensky, who got the best result among the Russian-speaking candidates in the European Parliament elections, is forming an election coalition called Russkiy Tsentr, which plans to put forward its candidates at the local elections in various cities (Tallinn, Maardu, Kiviõli, Kohila-Järve, Jõhvi, Sillamäe, Narva, Narva-Jõesuu, Kallaste, Mustvee, Tartu, and Pärnu). For the first time in recent history, the Russian Party in Estonia and the United Left Party also succeeded in joining forces, and have created a common electoral union, Russian Left Union Our Town. The Union of Russian Compatriots Associations in Estonia participates as the third partner in this electoral list.

History as a Divisive Force Between Communities

Since the beginning of Putin’s second term of office (which coincided with the accession of the Baltic States to the European Union), a clear shift has occurred in Russia’s compatriots policy. Now, history has become its weapon of choice in ideological warfare.

The issue of “true history” grew ever more important in Russian politics. During Putin’s reign, the memories of World War II and, consequently, the meaning of Soviet symbols have been revived in Russia. The most characteristic example was the grandiose celebration of the 60th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, in Moscow in 2005. In addition, as a result of propaganda the Russian community in Estonia has, since 2005, begun to celebrate former Soviet red-letter days more actively and provocatively.\(^{147}\)

The issue of history was perfect for creating tensions within Estonian society. While an absolute majority of Estonians are convinced that Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940, an opinion poll carried out in 2005 revealed that 56% of the Russian population claimed that Estonia had joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940, and only 30% thought that Estonia had been occupied. There is a similar disconnect between the Estonian- and Russian-speaking population groups over the meaning of the statue of the Bronze Soldier at Tõnismägi. The question is whether it signifies the beginning of Soviet occupation or commemorates Estonia’s liberation from Nazi occupation.

It was necessary to find new strong forces to replace the Russian political establishment in Estonia, which had repeatedly failed in parliamentary elections, and to promote new symbols that would unite these forces. In this context, which Tscheputin described as a search for “new and able leaders”, it is interesting to note that a new organization, Nochnoy Dozor, was formed that concentrated its attention on the Bronze Soldier issue. A media campaign centered around the statue was already launched in 2006. It is noteworthy that the pro-Kremlin youth organization Nashi (Ours) carried out demonstrations to support the cause of Nochnoy Dozor.

According to the Estonian Security Police, Russian special services and power structures were behind the instigation of the over-emotional coverage of the Bronze Soldier conflict in the Russian media. This was one of the reasons why the events escalated into mass riots after the removal of the statue.\(^{148}\)

However, it seems that Nochnoy Dozor has not fulfilled Russia’s expectations as a breeding ground for new leaders. Although four leaders of the organization were put on trial for instigating mass riots during the Bronze Soldier conflict — which made it possible to broadcast media reports for a whole year on judicial violence directed against Russian compatriots in Estonia — the popularity and membership of the organization did not increase during this period. While Nochnoy Dozor claims that it enjoys extensive support from the Russian-speaking population, it managed ...


\(^{148}\) Ibid., p. 9.
to mobilize only a few dozens of people for the most important event in 2008, the celebration of the anniversary of the mass riots. On the anniversary of the arrival of the Red Army to Tallinn, on September 22, 2008, only about a dozen people attended the “demonstration”.149

After the events in April of 2007, Russian intelligence services dealt mainly with influencing and supporting active measures to encourage and spread propaganda among local Russian associations. The S.V.R.’s political intelligence branch had not been very active in campaigning among the Russian population in Estonia since the summer of 2006, but its activity increased right after June 1, 2007, when the Visa facilitation agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Union entered into force. Article 11 of this agreement stipulates that holders of diplomatic passports can enter and stay in EU member states without visas for 90 days per a period of 180 days. Having acquired greater freedom of movement, officers of the S.V.R.’s political intelligence branch immediately took the opportunity to participate in several events organized for Russian compatriots. For example, Vladimir Pozdorovkin, who worked at the S.V.R.’s Political Intelligence Central Administrative Board, participated as a patron in a compatriots conference held in June of 2007, introducing to its participants the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) compatriots program.150

Russkiy Mir

Since 2006, Russia’s compatriots policy has been increasingly based on the so-called Russkiy Mir concept, which emphasizes the importance of a historic Russia. This policy strives to create a collective Russian identity all over the world via culture, language, religion, etc. The Russkiy Mir Foundation was established in June, 2007, financed by Russia’s federal budget and private contributions. In the autumn of 2007, the foundation actively began to participate in and support compatriots congresses.

The following three key objectives of the foundation are defined in its mission statement:

1) Russkiy Mir promotes the teaching of the Russian language within Russia and abroad;
2) Russkiy Mir brings Russia’s rich history to life and showcases vibrant examples of Russian art and culture around the world;
3) Russkiy Mir reconnects the Russian community abroad with their homeland, by forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programs, exchanges, and relocation assistance.151

In 2008, the Russkiy Mir Foundation began intensive activity in Estonia and allocated funds to several local compatriots projects. Several extremist political figures in Estonia have ties with the foundation, for example, Andrey Zarenkov, a member of the World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots and the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia, and Andrey Krasnoglazov, a council member of the Pushkin Institute. On June 27, 2008, Vladimir Ilyashevich, a journalist, former intelligence officer of the KGB of the Estonian S.S.R., and a member of the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia, delivered a speech at the annual conference of Russian compatriots in Estonia as a representative of the Russkiy Mir Foundation.152

On December 18, 2008, a branch of the Russkiy Mir Foundation was opened in Tallinn on the premises of the Pushkin Institute.

The opening of the foundation’s Estonian branch marks the beginning of the next phase in Russia’s compatriots policy efforts. By using the foundation in Estonia, several Russian institutions can influence the processes connected with compatriots policy in Estonia.153

Rossotrudnichestvo

In May 2008, the C.I.S. Federal Board was founded in Russia. On September 6, 2008, it was renamed the Federal Agency for the C.I.S., Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). It should be emphasized that, like its predecessor, Roszarubezhcentr, this new federal agency has the right to establish its own foreign branches and to enlist the help of Russian diplomatic officials. This means that all staff employees of Russia’s foreign offices (embassies, consulates) and the federal agency’s 185 employees assigned abroad (to embassies and the federal agency’s foreign offices), as well as all the people employed in host countries, have permission to work for Rossotrudnichestvo.

Rossotrudnichestvo’s key activities are related to the C.I.S., Russian-language education and Russian culture, the popularization of cooperation in research and technology, Russian compatriots, and humanitarian cooperation.154

On July 13, 2009, an agreement was signed between the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo.

The organizations agreed to coordinate their activities aimed at strengthening the position of the Russian language, stimulating its study worldwide, and expanding the boundaries of Russian culture. The goals set for the organizations include active cooperation and support for compatriots living outside Russia, Russian-language mass media, and people interested in Russian culture and language.155

The conclusion of the Cooperation agreement between the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo provides further proof that the implementa-

150 Ibid., p. 11.
153 Ibid.
tion of Russia's compatriots policy is highly centralized. As was demonstrated by Tschepurin's quotes at the beginning of the chapter, democratic principles take second place in the implementation process. According to the Estonian Security Police, Russian agencies (including special services) have significantly strengthened their control and influence over Russian compatriots by using Russia's compatriots policy and "private" funding. Leaders of compatriots must be loyal to high-ranking Russian state officials and act exactly as they are told, in which case they receive financial support.\textsuperscript{156}

The partnership between Russkiy Mir and Rossotrudnichestvo adds a new international dimension to the compatriots policy. For example, Russian compatriots in Great Britain recently published an open letter to express support for Baltic and international dimension to the compatriots policy. For example, Russian compatriots in Great Britain recently published an open letter to express support for Baltic and international dimension to the compatriots policy. For example, Russian compatriots in Great Britain recently published an open letter to express support for Baltic and international dimension to the compatriots policy. For example, Russian compatriots in Great Britain recently published an open letter to express support for Baltic and

The letter was addressed to the Estonian Anti-Fascist Committee named after Arnold Meri, Nochnoy Dozor, and the Latvian and Finnish Anti-Fascist Committees.

The letter stated that the British compatriots organization had several members who had left the Baltic States because their rights and liberties had been restricted due to their national origin. The letter drew attention to the fact that the glorification of Nazi cronies in Estonia and Latvia is dangerous and goes against contemporary European values. The letter supports a motion to the European Parliament calling on parliament to discuss Estonia’s and Latvia’s efforts to revise history, including the results of World War II, and to deport (sic!) anti-Fascists living in those countries.\textsuperscript{157}

The letter is signed by Natalya Nikolayeva, co-chairman of the Russian-Speaking Community in the U.K. and chairman of the Russian Immigrants Association.

It seems that the Finnish Anti-Fascist Committee also takes instructions directly from Russia. The committee is led by Johan Bäckman, a lecturer at the University of Helsinki, and Leena Hietanen, a journalist. Both of them deny the occupation of the Baltic States in 1940 and condone mass deportations.

In March of 2009, together with members of the Russian organizations Nashi and Nochnoy Dozor, Bäckman organized a protest in Helsinki when Imbi Paju and Sofi Oksanen held a presentation for their book about Stalinist repressions, Fear Behind Us All. Bäckman is the author of a book titled Pronssisoturi – Viron patsaskiistan tausta ja sisälö (The Bronze Soldier: The Background and Meaning of the Monument Conflict in Estonia), wherein he criticizes Estonian authorities for relocating the Bronze Soldier.

The Legal Information Center for Human Rights (L.I.C.H.R.)

The L.I.C.H.R. is another important organization that represents the interests of the Russian community in Estonia. The director of the L.I.C.H.R. is Alexey Semyonov, a social scientist, who is greatly respected in the Russian-speaking community. The L.I.C.H.R. cooperates with Amnesty International on a permanent basis. Amnesty International’s reports on Estonia are sometimes not that favorable. For example, its 2008 report on Estonia reads as follows: “Linguistic minorities continued to face discrimination in a number of areas, particularly in the fields of employment and education. Migrants were exposed to harassment by state officials and attacks by extremist groups. Criminal investigations into allegations of excessive use of force by law enforcement officials were dismissed. A human rights organization continued to be harassed by the government.”\textsuperscript{158} Estonia has never received this kind of harsh criticism from commissions set up by the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Union to monitor the human rights situation in Estonia.

The Estonian Security Police claims that the L.I.C.H.R. has close contacts with Russian diplomatic circles and special services. The Estonian Security Police wrote in its Annual Review 2007 that, in the beginning, the L.I.C.H.R. received funds directly from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Tallinn. When the Security Police disclosed this fact in its Annual Review, payments from the embassy were largely discontinued. The L.I.C.H.R. started to receive finances from Moscow via an international support foundation, Euroregion Livonia, which operated under the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. When this connection was disclosed too, a new foundation, Euroregion Livonia–Tallinn, was established with the participation of leaders from the non-profit association L.I.C.H.R., through which Moscow continued its financing activities.\textsuperscript{159}

Compatriot Resettlement Program

Since 2006, Russia has paid increasing attention to the resettlement program for compatriots living abroad. The program was approved by Presidential Decree no. 637, dated June 22, 2006, followed by numerous legislative acts by the government. Nonetheless, Russians who live in Estonia have not been very eager to resettle in Russia. According to the Agency of Statistics Estonia, migration flows from Russia to Estonia in 2005–2007 have been larger than in the opposite direction, i.e., from Estonia to Russia.\textsuperscript{160}

Of course, the program was launched only recently, and major introductory events in Estonia are still being organized. In three years, only 20 families in Estonia have returned to Russia as part of this program.\textsuperscript{161} One of the leaders of the resettlement program, Alexander Kornilov, writes in an article in the journal Baltiiski Mir that there is great potential for resettlement: opinion polls show that 15% of Russian


com patriots living in Estonia are ready to resettle permanently in Russia; 8% would be willing to work in Russia, while retaining a place of residence in Estonia; 10% would definitely not resettle; and as many as 55% would be willing to think about it, if they could find a decent job and a place to live.

Kornilov does not name the organization that conducted the poll, nor does he offer any evidence of its accuracy. Even so, he suggests that so-called preparatory job assignments of up to three years should be used to launch the resettlement program, and an introductory period should be followed by permanent resettlement. The Port of Ust-Luga, soon to be completed, provides a good opportunity to try out his suggestion; the port is only 50 kilometers from the border town of Narva, and plans are being made to build a city there for 35,000 residents.

It is clear that the global economic crisis has not had a positive effect on the resettlement program, whose budget has been cut four times in 2009.

**The Impressum Media Club**

Russia has made consistent efforts to assert its authority on the media landscape by trying to win the hearts and minds of Russian compatriots via information campaigns. One step along the way was the founding of a media club called Impressum in Estonia in October 2008. The official name of the non-profit organization is MTÜ Impressum. Its headquarters are in Tallinn and its area of operation covers the EU, the Baltic States, the C.I.S., and Russia.

The media club was founded by journalists from the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in Northern Europe. Impressum’s key task is to support citizens’ and social initiatives using the potentials of modern media. Its activities include the promotion of international information exchanges based on European good practice and norms relating to civil liberties; the training of journalists; and other research, educational, publishing, and social activities in the media sector.

Amazingly, on the very same day Impressum was founded, October 28, 2008, a foundation called Historical Memory was established in Moscow. Its director is a well-known forger of history, Alexander Dyukov. The purpose of the foundation is to fight the “rewriting of the history” of the 20th century in the Baltic States and Ukraine.

The first projects carried out by Impressum in Estonia were quite neutral. The week after the media club was established, on November 6, 2008, Impressum hosted its first event, with the writer Polina Dashkova. On November 27, 2008, Impressum hosted a presentation by Giulietto Chiesa, an Italian political analyst, who introduced his book Zero and a documentary based on the book, An Investigation into 9/11. The documentary reveals the lies and distorted facts allegedly made during the official investigation of the tragedy in New York in 2001. Later on, Impressum organized events that became increasingly more anti-Estonian, targeting Estonia’s official policies and history.

In March, 2009, Dyukov, the director of the Historical Memory Foundation, visited the media club, where he held a provocative presentation of his book The Genocide Myth: Soviet Repressions in Estonia (1940–1953) on the very day that marked the 60th anniversary of the 1949 mass deportations. The Estonian version of his book was published by Vladimir Ilyashevich, a former KGB officer, who is also a member of the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia and a representative of the Russkiy Mir Foundation.

On May 7, 2009, Impressum made another provocative step by organizing a commemorative event in honor of Arnold Meri, a Hero of the Soviet Union, which included the presentation of his biography “Arnold Meri: The Last Hero of Estonia. A Man’s Fate as a Guide to Modern History”. The biography was written by Galina Sapozhnikova, a columnist for the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, based on interviews with Meri over the last ten years. The same event included the premier of a documentary by Oleg Bessedin and Nikolay Pechatnov, “The 70-Year Long Heroic Deed”, presented by AB Media Group. At this point, it should be emphasized that Arnold Meri had been put on trial for participating in mass deportations in Hiiumaa, and that he died in the spring of 2009 before his long trial had come to an end.

Undoubtedly, in order to spread propaganda, it is necessary to have more tools than a single club — the mass media must be used to disseminate information and to shape the views of target groups. The media consumption patterns of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Russia’s purposeful information campaigns are analyzed in one of the next chapters.

### 4.1.3. Consular Issues of Russian Foreign Policy in Estonia

On February 2, 1920, Estonia and Russia (then the Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) signed the Tartu Peace Treaty, by which Russia recognized the independence of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia lost its independence when it was occupied by the Soviet Union in June of 1940. After the restoration of independence of the Republic of Estonia, in 1991, Russia re-recognized Estonia’s independence on August 24, 1991. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored on October 24, 1991.

In addition to the Estonian Embassy in Moscow, there are Consulates general in Saint Petersburg and a Chancellery of the Consulate-General in Pskov. Russia has, in addition to its Embassy in Tallinn, a Consulate-General in Narva and a Consular section for visas in Tartu.

Although the two countries have established diplomatic relations and carry out negotiations on economic and cultural matters, there is no border treaty between Estonia and Russia, mostly due to different interpretations of the issue of the continuity.
of Estonian independence. Russia wants to treat Estonia as a new state that became independent in 1991, without making any references to the fact that it had already recognized Estonia’s independence by concluding the Tartu Peace Treaty. Estonia, on the other hand, restored its independence following the principle of legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia, which was founded in 1918. The Tartu Peace Treaty is thus the cornerstone of Estonian statehood.

On May 18, 2005, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow. The Estonian-Russian border treaties were signed at the meeting. The treaties were ratified by the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) on June 20, 2005, and the Estonian President proclaimed the treaties on June 22, 2005. However, the Riigikogu added a preamble to the treaties, which contained references to the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty.

The preamble was not to Russia’s liking. As a result, the Russian Foreign Ministry delivered a note to Estonia on September 6, 2005, communicating that Russia has no intention of becoming a party to the Estonian-Russian border treaties and will not consider itself bound by the circumstances concerning the object and the objectives of the treaties.

Given the historical background, it is understandable why one of the main problems in Estonian — Russian consular relations is the division of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia (Russian compatriots) into three different groups: approximately one half of the Russians living in Estonia are Estonian citizens, a quarter of them are Russian citizens, and another quarter have not determined their citizenship status.

When in February, 1992, the 1938 Citizenship Act, based on the principle of ius sanguinis (blood relationship), was re-enforced in Estonia, people were divided into citizens by succession (68%) and non-citizens (32%). Non-citizens could obtain Estonian citizenship through the naturalization process. At the same time, all Estonian residents who had been Soviet citizens had the right to register themselves as citizens of Russia, the U.S.S.R.’s successor state, or to choose any other citizenship. As a result, in June, 2009, 84 per cent of the Estonian population held Estonian citizenship (1,145,792 persons total); 8.4 per cent were citizens of other countries (114,987 persons, including 95,193 citizens of the Russian Federation); and 7.6 per cent were of undetermined citizenship (103,454 stateless persons).164 The Citizenship and Migration Board in Estonia issues alien’s passports to stateless persons, so that they can use them as travel documents.

During the 17 years since the restoration of Estonian independence, 148,000 persons have been granted Estonian citizenship through the naturalization process. The proportion of citizens in the population has thus risen from 68 per cent to 84 per cent, and the number of stateless persons has fallen from 32 per cent to 7.6 per cent.

From 1992 to 2009, the following number of persons submitted naturalization applications.165 People were most active in applying for Estonian citizenship during the first half of the 1990s, when citizenship was granted under favorable conditions to those non-citizens who had supported Estonia’s efforts in regaining independence and had registered themselves as applicants for Estonian citizenship before March 1, 1990. Registration had been organized by a grassroots movement — the Estonian Citizens’ Committees — which played an important role in the restoration of Estonian independence according to the principle of legal continuity.

In 1995, the Riigikogu adopted a new Citizenship Act, which increased the stringency of the requirements for gaining Estonian citizenship; the residential qualification period was extended from two years to five, and people were required to pass an examination on the Citizenship Act in addition to the Estonian language examination. The number of people gaining citizenship fell sharply in 1997. Around that time, many stateless persons took the opportunity to undergo a simplified procedure for gaining Russian citizenship. Some preferred Russian citizenship for practical reasons — for example, people who lived near the border (in Narva and Setumaa) and had relatives in Russia. It was much easier (and cheaper) to travel from Estonia to Russia if you had Russian citizenship.

For historical reasons, Estonia has had to naturalize an unprecedented number of non-citizens. Of course, Estonia’s success in doing so could be evaluated in different ways, which is why Russia has attacked Estonia in various international forums by claiming that when Estonia became independent, in 1991, it should have granted Estonian citizenship to all permanent residents (the so-called “blanket citizenship” option). However, this would have been in contravention of the principle of legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia is of the opinion that citizenship cannot be imposed on anyone — it is up to each individual’s choice (the more so as one has to apply for Russian citizenship and to prove one’s Russian language skills as well). Obviously, Estonia is not happy about the large number of non-citizens. One of Estonia’s priorities is to reduce the number of stateless persons and to promote the acquisition of Estonian citizenship. Accordingly, the Estonian government has facilitated the naturalization procedure for all legal residents who wish to acquire Estonian citizenship.

The most essential amendment to the Citizenship Act was passed by the Riigikogu in December, 1998. According to this amendment, children born in Estonia after February, 1992, whose parents are stateless and have lived in Estonia for at least five years, are eligible to gain Estonian citizenship, at their parents’ request, through naturalization without the precondition of passing citizenship examinations.

Other important amendments to the Citizenship Act were the following:

- The naturalization process was significantly simplified for disabled persons and persons with a restricted active legal capacity.
- Since 2001, citizenship applicants who have previously passed the basic level of the Estonian language proficiency examination or the basic school final examination for Estonian as a second language, no longer have to take the citizenship language exam.
- The period for obtaining Estonian citizenship was considerably shortened.
- The costs of the language courses are reimbursed to those who pass the

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165 Ibid.
citizenship language exam and the exam on the Constitution and the Citizenship Act. There is no charge for taking either examination.

Interest in obtaining Estonian citizenship grew after Estonia’s accession to the European Union. Unfortunately, when the EU granted the right for visa-free travel to permanent residents (an alien’s passport given to non-citizens is recognized by the EU as valid for visa-free travel according to Regulation 1932/2006/EC), this interest dwindled again. In 2007, Russia allowed its compatriots living in Estonia and Latvia to enter Russia without a visa (by a Russian Presidential Decree, dated June 17, 2007), which decreased the interest to determine one’s citizenship even further.

Since December of 2007, Estonia has belonged to the Schengen area. Citizens of non-Schengen countries and stateless persons who have a residence permit in a Schengen country, do not need a visa for entering the Schengen area. So, at the moment, those who have a Russian or an alien’s passport in Estonia can enjoy visa-free travel to both the EU and Russia, while Estonian citizens who want to go to Russia have to apply for a visa, which costs 550 kroons (USD 50).

This means that practical and travel-related reasons for determining one’s citizenship have lost their significance. For Estonians, citizenship provides an important emotional linkage with their state; yet the Russian-speaking people in Estonia identify themselves with the state to a much lesser degree. The findings of the study "Integration of Estonian Society: Monitoring 2008" indicated that, while the majority of Estonians feel they are part of the Estonian nation in a constitutional sense, this opinion is shared by only a half of the Russian-speaking population as a whole and by two-thirds of Russian-speaking Estonian citizens. During 2008, the percentage of the Russian-speaking population who identify with the Estonian state decreased significantly as a result of the events in April, 2007, which seriously undermined their confidence in the state authorities of Estonia. This also explains why the interest in applying for Estonian citizenship fell steeply in 2008, while the interest in Russian citizenship only grew. (The Russian Embassy has not released any specific data, but some sources claim that up to 3,700 applicants were granted Russian citizenship in 2008.)

Hopefully, all the emotional tensions and sulking will not last for long; efforts toward the creation of a common national identity for Estonian- and Russian-speaking citizens, set out in the new integration program, will be fruitful in the near future. Before 2007, 61 per cent of stateless persons wanted to become Estonian citizens, 13 per cent wanted Russian citizenship, and 6 per cent preferred to become citizens of other countries. 17 per cent were not interested in getting any citizenship at all, and were satisfied with their present status.

Russia does not offer any special benefits to its citizens in Estonia. They have the same rights as Russian citizens in Russia. They can travel to Russia without a visa and vote in Russian elections.

Russian citizens in Estonia have not participated very actively in Russian elections — about one quarter of their total population usually cast votes.

More than 23,000 Russian citizens living in Estonia participated in the 2004 Russian presidential elections, most of whom voted for Vladimir Putin.

In 2008, more than 26,500 Russian citizens cast their votes in the presidential elections. 86 per cent voted for Dmitry Medvedev, 9.91 per cent for Gennady Zyuganov, 2.9 per cent for Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and 0.45 per cent for Andrey Bogdanov.

In addition, Russian citizens and non-citizens have the right to take part in the elections of local government councils in Estonia. Estonia is one of the few countries in the world where all legal residents, regardless of their citizenship, have the right to vote in local government elections.

According to the Local Government Council Election Act of May, 1996, citizens of other states and residents who have not yet chosen their citizenship have the right to vote in local administration elections. They must be over 18 years of age and have been permanent residents for at least five years in the territory of the respective local government as of January 1 of the local government election year.

The Union of Russian Citizens is an organization in Estonia that claims to represent the interests of Russian citizens. It has opened up centers in Narva and Tallinn. It organizes demonstrations and protests on days of historic importance (e.g., Victory Day, on May 9; May 1; and Russia Day, on June 12), but it does not have significant impact on the Russian-speaking population or Estonian politics.

Russian authorities are more interested in cooperating with those organizations of Russian citizens (compatriots) that are players in Estonian politics and can actually influence on-going processes in society. An in-depth analysis of this topic is presented in the third section of this overview.

If Russia were sincerely interested in improving the situation of its compatriots and in empowering them to play a more active role in social and political life in Estonia, it would help them integrate into Estonian society. Unfortunately, as is demonstrated in the next section, Russia seems to prefer to maintain the status quo (i.e., the division of the Russian-speaking population into different groups in terms of citizenship), so that it can use this issue to attack Estonia in various international organizations and to escalate tensions in Estonian politics.

Complaints about the alleged mistreatment of Russians have been a permanent feature in Russia’s arsenal of rhetoric against former Soviet republics that have taken a pro-Western stance.

Latvia and Estonia, which did not automatically grant citizenship to Soviet-era immigrants, have been the object of the fiercest criticism, although their citizenship policies and practices have passed the scrutiny of all relevant Western organizations. In addition to wounded pride, Moscow’s real problem with Latvia and Estonia (but also Lithuania) is their legal concept of restored statehood and everything this brings: citizenship laws and (now abandoned) calls to return to pre-war borders; concepts of history that are increasingly at odds with those of Russia; and calls to compensate for the occupation. Russia’s aim is to treat all post-Soviet countries as new countries that became independent in 1991. Thus it has become almost obligatory for Russia to bring up the status of Russians in Estonia and Latvia, and it does not agree with the causes and implications of that status.
4.1.4. Culture, Education

Cultural contacts between Estonia and Russia are intensive and thriving, free of complications. A strong institutional framework has been created for this purpose – the Cultural Ministries of the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation signed a cooperation agreement back in 1992. This relationship has been solidified by cooperation programmes.

Over the years, Estonia and Russia have concluded the following bilateral agreements on cultural cooperation:


Estonian Minister of Culture Laine Jänes and Russian Minister of Culture Alexander Sokolov concluded a cooperation agreement in the areas of culture and mass communication in Moscow on February 10, 2008. The cultural cooperation programme for the years 2009–2011 was signed by Estonian Minister of Culture Laine Jänes and Russian Minister of Culture Alexander Aveyev on January 26, 2009.

In 2008, there was very active cultural cooperation between Estonia and Russia, especially in the fields of theatre, music and film. For example, the following traditional events were organised in Estonia: in October, the Golden Mask theatre festival in Estonia was held for the fourth year in a row; September saw the International Festival of Orthodox Sacred Music CREDO with a history of more than ten years; in August, soloists from the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow performed both at the Birgitta Theatre Festival in Moscow; the theatre festivals of Finno-Ugric peoples in Syktyvkar and Yoshkar-Ola; the Kovchev Festival for puppet theatres; the Midwinter Night’s Dream theatre festival in Tallinn, etc. Plans are being made to strengthen ties between theatres via exchange programmes for directors, artists, theatre critics and scholars.

In 2009, the Golden Mask festival in Estonia will be held for the fifth year in a row with the participation of the Tovstonogov Theatre from St. Petersburg and the Theatre of Nations from Moscow. In addition to this festival, the three-year cultural cooperation programme, which was launched at the beginning of 2009, provides opportunities for troupes to participate in the following theatre festivals: the Baltiyskiy Dom and Meetings in Russia festivals in St. Petersburg; the Chekhov International Theatre Festival in Moscow; the theatre festivals of Finno-Ugric peoples in Syktyvkar and Yoshkar-Ola; the Kovchev Festival for puppet theatres; the Midwinter Night’s Dream theatre festival in Tallinn, etc. Plans are being made to strengthen ties between theatres via exchange programmes for directors, artists, theatre critics and scholars.

Musicians, museums, libraries and literary translators also pursue active cooperation and participation at festivals in both Estonia and Russia. For example, in 2009, the journal Druzba narodov published a special issue on Estonian – Russian literature, providing an extensive overview of the latest developments in Estonian literature on 220 pages.

Filmmakers are also involved in close cooperation. In the summer of 2009, two Estonian-Russian movies were shot in Tallinn: The Magic Goblet and Red Mercury.

Russian Culture in Estonia

After the restoration of Estonia’s independence, numerous Russian cultural associations have been established in Estonia. The largest of them – the Union of Rus-
sian Educational and Charitable Societies in Estonia – had originally been set up in 1923. This process seems to indicate the continuing interest in the survival of Russian national culture in Estonia.

The Slavyanskiy Venok (Slavic Chaplet) national cultural festival became a grand undertaking in the 1990s, resembling Estonian song and dance festivals. It usually starts with a festive procession in national costumes along the streets of Old Tallinn. People come from Russia and other countries with Slavic culture to perform in Tallinn.

One of the centres of Russian culture in Estonia is the Russian Drama Theatre, which stages plays by the best Russian, Estonian and world authors. The theatre has a long tradition of inviting guest performers from Russian theatres, mainly from Moscow and St. Petersburg. In addition, several private Russian-speaking theatre troupes exist in Estonia, for example, the Russian Youth Theatre and the Drugoy Theatre (Other Theatre) in Tallinn, the Ilmarine Theatre in Narva and the Melnitsa Theatre (Windmill Theatre) in Jõhv.

There are many Russian dance studios in Estonia. Young Russian dancers regularly achieve outstanding results in competitions held by the International Dance Organisation (IDO) and at the Estonian School Dance Festival.

A large number of talented Russian artists practise the fine arts. Some have acquired higher education in Estonia and the influence of, for example, Estonian graphic art is clearly evident in their work. The contact between and merging of Estonian and Russian traditions have yielded interesting results in the output of several artists, including Nikolai Kormashov (b. 1929), Vera Stanishevskaya (b. 1953), Vladislav Stanishevsky (b. 1947), Anatoly Strakhov (b. 1946), Victor Sinyukayev (b. 1941) and sculptor Mikhail Dukhomyonok (b. 1950).

In 2002, the Cultural Endowment of Estonia issued its literature award for the first time to an author writing in Russian – Larissa Vaneveya (b. 1955). Various other Russian writers live or work in Estonia, for example, writer Mikhail Veller (b. 1948), an Estonian citizen, who lives in St. Petersburg, Tallinn and Israel and whose works are published in Russia in hundreds of thousands of copies and Yelena Skulskaya (b. 1950), a poet and a prose writer, whose poems have considerably been influenced by the Estonian poetry of the 1960s.

In the field of music, a symphony orchestra was founded in Narva, there is a Russian Philharmonic Society – in Tallinn and various Russian rock bands are active in Tallinn, gaining popularity among young Estonians as well.

The Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia

Most Estonians have no religious affiliation. Orthodoxy, however, is an important aspect of the national identity of the Russian-speaking population. Although more than 60% of Estonians and non-Estonians, aged 70 or older, are followers of a particular faith, there are twice as many religious people among Russians than among Estonians in younger age groups. For example, less than 20% of Estonians, who are younger than 40, are followers of a particular faith, while about 40% of non-Estonians in the same age group have a religious affiliation.

Today, the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (EOC MP) comprises 31 parishes. The parish of the Cathedral of St. Alexander Nevsky in Tallinn is affiliated to it. Another Russian Orthodox stavropegial institution in Estonia is the Pyhittsa Convent of the Dormition of the Mother of God at Kuremäe (founded in 1891). The clergy of the EOC MP consists of 57 men: 43 priests and 14 deacons.

The EOC MP’s official publication is the monthly newspaper Mir Pravoslaviya (The World of Orthodoxy). The address of its official web site is http://www.orthodox.ee. Its television programme, “An Hour with Orthodoxy,” is weekly broadcast by the STV channel.

Patriarch Alexy II (secular name: Alexey Ridiger), who served for a long time as the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, was born in Estonia and held the rank of Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia from 1968 to 1992.

Despite that, the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and Estonian authorities has been tense, which has indirectly influenced the attitudes and views of its parishioners.

The controversy started in 1993, when the Estonian Interior Ministry entered the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC), which had maintained its legal continuity in emigration since 1944, into the Registry of Churches and Congregations and refused to enter into the registry the Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate under the same name.

The Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia was officially registered in the Registry of Churches only in April 2002 as the Stavropegial Alexander Nevsky Congregation in Tallinn (founded in 1999). Yet tensions between the two Orthodox churches have not disappeared even today.

One of the key undertakings in Russian church life in Estonia has been the establishment of a new church (the Lasnamäe Church of the Icon of the Mother of God ‘Quick to Hearken’) in Tallinn in the Lasnamäe District, where the numbers of Russian-speaking residents are higher than average. The church’s cornerstone was laid in 2003 with the participation of Patriarch Alexy II at the ceremony. The construction works began in November 2006, but progress has been slow mostly due to lack of money. The building of the whole church will cost around 40 — 50 million kroons. By now, about 40% of the works have been completed. The area in front of the church, the construction of which is sponsored by the Tallinn City Government, will be completed in September 2009 and it will be named the Square of Patriarch Alexy II.

Recently, on August 6, 2009, a representative of the Yuri Dolgorukiy Foundation operating under the Moscow City Government handed over church utensils, costing more than 400,000 roubles or about 140,000 kroons, donated by the foundation to the Lasnamäe Orthodox church.


Estonian – Russian Relations in the Education Sector

The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Educational Cooperation, concluded in October 1994, is the basic agreement that governs Estonian – Russian relations in the education sector.178 The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Recognition and Equivalence of Documents Certifying Education and Academic Degrees, concluded in December 1998, was unilaterally terminated by Estonia in the spring of 2004 for the reason that Estonia recognises higher education diplomas, which are issued in and recognised by the Russian Federation, on the basis of the Lisbon Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education. As both Estonia and Russia have ratified this convention, the bilateral agreement became redundant.

In March 2003, Russia expressed its desire to negotiate an additional protocol to the agreement on educational cooperation to regulate student, lecturer and researcher exchange programmes and the operations of Russian institutions of higher education in Estonia. The Estonian Ministry of Education, however, was of the opinion that it was unnecessary to cover these issues in the protocol. After the making of this suggestion and the termination of the agreement on higher education qualifications on Estonia’s initiative a year later, further efforts to develop the relations in the education sector were discontinued. Undoubtedly, as the relationship between the two countries deteriorated, the overall political context contributed to the slowdown in educational cooperation. Only in 2009, when the Estonian side had invited the Russians back to the negotiating table, talks over the protocol have been re-launched.

Of course, historical contacts between Estonian and Russian scientists and institutions of higher education have been maintained and are still being developed. Research cooperation projects are carried out in the framework of agreements that have been concluded between the Estonian and Russian Academy of Sciences and between the Estonian Science Foundation and the Russian Foundation for Humanities. Estonian universities that are governed by public law have several agreements for exchanging students and scientists/academic staff with Russian top universities (e.g. the university of Tartu cooperates with St. Petersburg State university, Moscow State university and others; Tallinn university cooperates with the Herzen university, Moscow State university and others).

Every year the Government of the Russian Federation awards study grants to Estonian students at Russian institutions of higher education. Up to 2005, the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research shortlisted candidates for the Russian side. Since 2005, a non-profit organisation, the Pushkin Institute,179 deals with the candidates. The decision-makers in the selection process – the Russian Embassy and the Pushkin Institute – have ceased to provide official information to the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research on the selection criteria and results.

According to the news agency BNS, 60 Russian compatriots, who graduated from high schools in Estonia, are to be admitted to Russian institutions of higher education free of charge in 2009. They were selected from among 150 candidates. More than 20 successful candidates had graduated with a medal. In the framework of the same programme, Russia awarded study grants to about 30 high school graduates in 2008. Successful candidates do not have to pass entrance exams and Russia does not impose any obligations upon them. Estonian and Russian citizens and stateless persons are eligible for the programme.180

A similar programme for postgraduate studies at Russian institutions of higher education has been set up for graduates of Estonian institutions of higher education.

In 2006, 812 students from Estonia studied at Russian institutions of higher education (1% of all foreign students in Russia; 18% of all students from Estonia who studied abroad). In the 2008/2009 academic year, 46 students from Russia who were Russian citizens studied in Estonia.181

It is possible to apply for study grants in Russia through programmes administered by the Archimedes Foundation (for example, state-commissioned education abroad and the Kristjan Jaagu scholarship programme). Art students are quite interested in studying in Russia.

In 2008, Estonia launched a programme to facilitate the admission of highly-motivated and talented foreign students to doctoral programmes at Estonian universities (the DoRa programme). In the 2008/2009 academic year, three doctoral students from Russia were studying in Estonia in the framework of the DoRa programme.

In accordance with the cooperation agreement between the Estonian Ministry of Education and St. Petersburg university, a lecturer from Estonia is working at the university since the 2002/2003 academic year; in the autumn of 2007, the university began to offer students the opportunity to specialise in Estonian language.

Estonian language lessons are provided by the St. Petersburg Estonian Association, the Moscow Estonian Association, the Krasnoyarsk Estonian Cultural Association "Eesti", the Cherepovets Estonian Association, etc. On the basis of local financing, Estonian language lessons are offered at the Pskov Volny Institute, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Mari State university and Moscow State university. The Estonian Ministry of Education and Research supports Estonian language studies in Russia through the Estonian Institute by handing out Estonian textbooks. In cooperation with the Estonian Mother Tongue Society, the Ministry of Education and Research has regularly organised Estonian language days in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In the last few years, children of Estonian origin, who live in Russia, have been invited to attend Estonian language camps in summer. This experience has inspired many
of them to include Estonia in their plans for the future. In addition, students who study Estonian at St. Petersburg university participate regularly in language courses in Estonia.

**Problems with Russian-language Education in Estonia**

As the above examples demonstrated, educational cooperation is fruitful. Sadly, cooperation in the field of education is undermined by various disagreements over alleged restrictions on the use of the Russian language, which Russia tends to treat as violations of the rights of compatriots.

Comparisons of statistical data of the education sector across different language groups substantiate this view to a certain extent. The share of Russian as a language of tuition in schools of general education has, indeed, been decreasing year by year. One objective reason for this tendency is the decreasing numbers of students; another reason is the fact that young people from Russian-speaking families increasingly prefer to study in Estonian-language educational institutions (in 2008/2009, the number of students who received Estonian-language education, but whose mother tongue was not Estonian, was 5,989, including 5,745 students whose mother tongue was Russian) or in language immersion classes.

Of course, it is not only the numbers of Russian-speaking students that are falling, but of Estonian-speaking students as well: the numbers of Estonian-speaking students have fallen from the level of 149,857 in 2002/2003 to 119,373 in 2008/2009 and the downward trend is continuing.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that young people who have graduated from Russian-language schools of general education have fewer education opportunities because the main language of tuition in institutions of higher education is Estonian.

In the higher education sector, the share of students whose language of tuition is Russian is very small (12% in professional higher education, 7.6% at Bachelor’s level and only 2.8% at Master’s level). In addition, most Russian-language institutions of higher education are private institutions, meaning that tuition is not free. Only 14.6% of students who study in Estonian receive higher education in private institutions, while the same figure for students who study in Russian is 72% (!). Taking into account the current Estonian language skills of Russian-speaking students, it is obvious that the demand for higher education, provided either completely or partially in Russian, is much higher than the higher education system in Estonia is offering at the moment. On the other hand, it would be asking too much from a small state like Estonia to be able to develop Estonian- and Russian-language higher education at an equal pace.

Problems with education opportunities of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia do not stem mostly from limited opportunities to study in Russian-language institutions of higher education, but rather from the fact that the level of teaching in Russian-language schools of general education has been low during the 18 years of independence. Their deficient Estonian language skills are the reason why most Russian speakers do not consider their education opportunities to be equal to those of Estonians. At the same time, the support measures, planned by Estonian authorities in the field of education policy to increase the competitiveness of non-Estonians, have raised suspicions among the Russian-speaking population, which are confirmed by the information and views spread by the Russian mass media. The provision of upper secondary education partially in Estonian is perceived as a threat – the Russian-speaking population has a fear of assimilation, of the Russian students’ exam results worsening and, consequently, of them not having equal study opportunities and of Russian young people emigrating.

In 2007, the transition to partial teaching of subjects in Estonian began in Russian upper secondary schools (years 10—12). One subject taught in Estonian is introduced every year. Ultimately (in 2011), up to 60% of the curriculum will be taught in Estonian. The transition is demand-driven and aims at offering and guaranteeing equal study and working opportunities for graduates of all state schools. The transition does not affect basic education (years 1—9).

Unfortunately, by the time they graduate from basic schools, many Russian students fail to acquire the language skills necessary in upper secondary schools for studying in Estonian, especially for understanding more complex subjects. This is why fears have surfaced that their knowledge in the subject areas taught in Estonian will be deficient, which will affect their further education opportunities. In addition, due to insufficient preparation for the transition to Estonian-language tuition, the Russian-speaking population has a psychological block – they feel that they are transformed into Estonians by force.

By now, however, all 63 Russian-language secondary schools have confirmed their readiness for the transition. It is probable that the frightful example of Latvia, where mass demonstrations were held during the implementation of similar reforms, led Estonia to opt for a gradual implementation process and making the transition as flexible as possible.

One of the most extensive activities, aimed at helping to prepare Russian-language secondary schools for the transition, is the project “The Increasing of Teachers’ Competitiveness in Other-Language Schools”, which was launched with the support of the European Social Fund. In the framework of the project, teachers are offered free training to improve their subject-specific Estonian language skills.

Of course, no reform can be implemented without some problems or setbacks, which anti-reformist forces are eager to exploit to their advantage. It is a sad truth that the issues concerning the development of Russian-language schools have been over-politicised. As the education reform was hurriedly implemented and poorly prepared,

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183 Ibid.


a non-profit-organisation – Russkaya Shkola v Estonii¹⁸⁶ – has been established to protest against it. The chairman of the organisation is Valery Kantchukov, a member of the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia.

In addition, the LICHR has included in its action plan for the nearest future the problems connected with the transition to partial teaching of subjects in Estonian in Russian-language general education, for which it receives financial support from the Russkiy Mir Foundation. In the framework of the project ‘The Creation of Suitable Conditions for Maintaining Russian-Language Education in Estonia by Promoting European Anti-Discriminatory Practice’, plans have been made to analyse the situation of Russian-language education, to offer legal aid and to spread information through mass media channels, lectures and seminars.¹⁸⁷

Another important institution that affects the solving of the problems of Russian-language schools and tuition in Estonia is the Pushkin Institute, a non-profit licensed educational institution. The institute considers its key task to be the uniting of the efforts of Russianists in Estonia and Russia in the field of Russian-language tuition and certification of Russian language skills. The institute runs Russian language courses at different levels. In 2005, the institute began to offer refresher courses in Russian language, culture and history for Russian speakers who study at Estonian-language schools. For the ninth year, the institute sent the best speakers of Russian in Estonia visited cities along the Golden Ring route in Russia.

It is clear that the Pushkin Institute represents Russian interests in the Estonian education sector. The institute’s partners include Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian Ministry of Education, Lomonosov Moscow State university, the State Pushkin Institute of Russian Language, the Russian university of National Friendship and other Russian agencies and research institutions. In December 2008, the Estonian representative of the Russkiy Mir Foundation was established under the Pushkin Institute. The institute’s director, Andrey Krasnoglazov, is also secretary of the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia.

### 4.1.5. Mass Media: Consumption and Confidence

Estonians and non-Estonians live in different information spaces (often contrasting in terms of content) and receive their information from different sources, in different languages, and through different media channels. Most of the Russian-language population derives its information and views on history and current events from Russian television channels that are directly subordinate to the Kremlin.

This distribution of the information space has a long tradition. As early as the 1970s and 1980s, studies on media use revealed the smaller impact of periodicals and radio and the greater impact of television on the lives of Russians living in Estonia, compared with ethnic Estonians. These trends continued and even increased during the 1990s. Media use by Russians in Estonia was already characterized in the 1970s and 1980s by a strong orientation toward so-called pan-Soviet newspapers and magazines published in Moscow and the similarly Moscow-based Central Television.

Subsequent to the restoration of Estonian independence, the availability of Russian newspapers and magazines fell sharply and Estonian Russians became significantly less interested in them. Russian television channels became much more important for this segment of the population.¹⁸⁸

As of 2008, there were 34 Russian-language newspapers and 14 magazines being published in Estonia. Out of the three nationwide Estonian TV channels, two offered regular programming in Russian. On Estonian television, Russian-language news programs are broadcast daily. Seven radio stations broadcast in Russian; one of them is Radio-4, a public radio station that offers broadcasts in Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenian, and Yiddish, among other languages. A large number of internet portals and web media publications are also available in Russian.¹⁸⁹

On the one hand, the situation is worse today: due to the economic recession, two Russian dailies went bankrupt in 2009. (On June 12, the foundation that published the newspaper Vestidnya, Jüri Vilmsi Sihtkapital, was declared bankrupt, and on July 8, the publisher of the Russian-language daily Molodyozh Estonii, Moles OÜ, went bankrupt). On the other hand, there has been improvement, as in 2008, Eesti Television’s second channel was launched, which increased the amount of Russian-language programming and broadcasts Estonian-language programs accompanied by a Russian translation. Unfortunately, this channel still has a small viewership.

#### Media Use by Estonian Russians

The main source of information for the local Russian-speaking population is the First Baltic Channel (Pervyi Baltiski Kanal). Operating since 2004 and targeted at Russian-speaking viewers in the Baltic States, PBK is a version of Pervyi Kanal, a leading Russian TV 5 channel controlled by the central authorities. PBK features news programs covering Estonian events, but the guidelines and instructions for producing and editing the segments come from Moscow.

In July of 2009, Estonian inhabitants watched an average of 3 hours and 9 minutes of television per day. Estonians spent 2 hours and 54 minutes in front of the TV screen each day; non-Estonians spent 3 hours and 46 minutes watching TV. For Estonians, the time spent in front of the screen was distributed primarily between three Estonian-language channels: Kanal 2 (29.3%), TV3 (22.4%), and ETV (21.1%). For non-Estonians, the three most important television channels were PBK (31.6%), RTR Pla-

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neta Baltic (8.4%), and 3+, the entertainment channel distributed by Viasat (7.0%).

In connection with this research project, ICDS contacted TNS Emor to commission an overview of information consumption by Russian-language audiences in 2008. The following is a short overview of the primary findings.

Press

There are significantly fewer readers of newspapers and magazines among the Russian-speaking population compared to Estonian readers. The Russian-language paper Linnaleht, distributed for free in Tallinn, has the most readers (23.3% of all Russian-speakers), followed by the Russian-language Postimees (17.6%) and Narva’s free city paper, Gorod (13.8%). The readership of the Russian-language Molodyozh Estonii (10.9%) and Vesti Dnya (8.3%) decreased during this period, and in 2009 their publishers were declared bankrupt due to economic difficulties. Consumption of periodicals published in Russia is low in Estonia.

The content of Estonia’s Russian-language printed press can be seen as relatively out of balance. One can find viewpoints critical of the Estonian state (especially after the Bronze Soldier crisis) more often than in Estonian newspapers, but these pieces proceed from the point of view of Estonian society, not Russian interests.

Radio

There are two clear leaders among radio stations broadcasting to Russian-language audiences: Raadio 4 (part of the Estonian national broadcasting system) and Russkoye Radio, part of Sky Media Group. The weekly reach of both extends over 50%. The other radio stations have fewer listeners; they are primarily stations that play music and have a lower social and political significance.

Television

Television is a primary information channel that takes in a noteworthy part of the Estonian population’s daily time budget, and is undoubtedly the most important factor shaping views and opinions.

While the press and radio are linguistically separate but nevertheless Estonian-oriented media spaces, we see that television channels involve an influx of information streams from other countries. International news channels (CNN, Euronews) are not watched all that much in Estonia; the influence of Finnish television on northern Estonian viewers has also dropped. However, Russian-language audiences lie predominantly in the sphere of influence of television stations originating in Russia.

In 2008, the daily reach of Estonian Television was only 10.5% and its daily share was 1.7% (which comes to 4 minutes a day). The other primary Estonian-language channels watched were Kanal 2 (5.1% daily reach) and TV3 (4.9%). ETV2, launched in autumn of 2008, had a daily reach of 0.9% — an average daily audience of 3,000 Russian-language viewers.

The Estonian news transmitted by the First Baltic Channel after the evening’s main news program, “Vremya”, garners an average viewership of 105,000 (a daily reach of 26.0%), which means that nearly one-half — a daily share of 48.3% — of Russian-language viewers watch PBK Estonian news during this time segment.

In the EU – Russia Review of June, 2007, media analyst Elena Prokhorova comments the situation in the Russian TV market as follows: “Russia’s three national television networks hold a virtually unbeatable monopoly on providing and interpreting information – a drastic change compared with the early nineties, when pluralism and glasnost gave rise to a plethora of independent media outlets. Two main TV channels (“First Channel” and RTR) are directly owned and controlled by the state. The third one, NTV (nezavisimoje – independent TV)...is formally owned by Gazprom’s media holding in which the Kremlin has a controlling share”.

In the same report, the chairman of the New Europa Initiative, Arturas Jonkus, describes the biased content of Russian TV channels using the example of the events surrounding the Bronze Soldier in Estonia in April, 2007: “The fact that the Russian media is a propaganda tool of Russian authorities was clearly demonstrated by the recent events in Estonia. ... The Russian media was highly selective in its reporting with little analysis of the background to what was taking place, or the motives and goals of the people who took part in the riots. Pictures of young people looting shops during the riots were published only by Estonian and Western media and on the internet”.

Internet

TNS Emor’s regular survey of internet use certainly does not reflect Russian-language audiences, because it encompasses sites only in Estonia. A very large part
of the Russian-language population uses Russian-language sites (such as gazeta.ru, which receives very high visitor traffic, and other sites).

Internet use among non-Estonians is quite high. According to data from a survey conducted by TSM Emor from September to November of 2008, 62% of non-Estonians have used the internet within the last six months and 54% had used it in the past week.

Of the Estonian informational web sites with news content, the site used the most was Delfi (rus.delfi.ee), which covers all three of the Baltic States. In the period studied, Delfi was visited by 60,000 people per day, i.e., 29% of all people who used the internet in the past six months.

Along with the creation of a second national broadcasting channel, the Russian-language news site novosti.err.ee was launched, and is gradually gaining more users. For instance, during 2009 the average weekly number of visitors to the site has been about 20,000.

Public Confidence in Media Channels

A comprehensive Estonia-wide survey conducted by the University of Tartu in June, 2007, showed that the Russian-language population’s confidence in the Estonian-language media was very low, especially in regard to newspapers. 18% of the sample said they trusted the Estonian language media and 49% said they did not. Incidentally, Estonians had an even greater lack of confidence in the media of the Russian Federation and in Estonia’s Russian-language media.

Passions abated after one year, and the percentage of non-Estonians who “did not trust” the Estonian-language media fell to 10%, meaning that, on average, only one in four people who followed the Estonian-language media did not trust it.

However, confidence in media from the Russian Federation has grown strongly. During the events of April, 2007, the ratio of those who did have confidence in the Russian Federation’s media to those who did not was 38:55 among Estonia’s Russians. But by April of 2008, this ratio had turned in favor of greater confidence, 75:15. In June of 2007, local Russians placed much more confidence in Estonia’s Russian-language media than they did in the Russian Federation’s media, but in April of 2008 the level of confidence was equal. Thus, for instance, during the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008, Estonia’s Russian-language audience had significantly greater perceived confidence in information sources originating in Russia than they did in local Estonian channels.

Media confidence data from the integration monitoring performed in 2008 are shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trusts the Media</th>
<th>Does Not Trust the Media</th>
<th>Does Not Follow the Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian-Language Media</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian-Russian-Language Media</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation Media</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Media</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian-Language Internet Sites</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-Language Internet Sites</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. 3. The Estonian Russian-Language Population’s Confidence in the Media.

New Developments in Media Offered to Russians Living Outside the Russian Federation

Different information spheres lead to different worldviews — not only in regard to historical interpretation but also in fields related to perceptions of risk and security. For instance, in the case of Estonian/Western and Russian media channels, the diametrically opposed coverage of the August, 2008, war between Russia and Georgia automatically becomes a potentially divisive topic in Estonia, without necessitating any specific Kremlin propaganda operations aimed at Estonia.

Whereas in August of 2008, 77% of Estonians denounced Russia’s invasion of Georgia, only 11% of Russian-language respondents shared that view, while 45% considered Russia’s actions justified and 29% thought both sides were to blame for the war. 194

A survey conducted by the Estonian Ministry of Defense entitled Public Opinion and National Defense found that the Estonian- and Russian-speaking populations had significantly different views of the primary security guarantee for Estonia. Estonians believe that the primary guarantee is NATO membership (78%), while Russophone respondents found that it was cooperation and good-neighborly relations with Russia (75%). Only 25% of non-Estonians consider NATO membership important, while 30% of Estonians place hopes in the development of relations with Russia when it comes to ensuring security. 195

The use of the media, information, and psychological operations as a means of political influence was a growing trend throughout Putin’s term in office. Russia’s information security doctrine, adopted in 2000, states the following: “Russia’s national security depends to a great extent on ensuring information security and its


significance at a time of technological progress is starting to grow”. The Russian Federation's national security strategy up to the year 2020, adopted in May of 2008, makes repeated mention of television, production of state-commissioned films, and “patriotic education” as a part of national security.

The same document talks about the need to integrate the activities of non-profit associations, media enterprises, and the cultural sphere, along with activities by Russian authorities, into a single package of measures for promoting Russian security interests both domestically and in the near abroad.

In addition to viewpoints influenced by Russia's official positions, which are conveyed on a regular basis by Russian-language television channels, the most visible trend concerning programs for Russians living abroad is the powerful expansion of internet activities. The site www.baltija.eu has become very important; it is produced by MTÜ Rahva Õiglustunne, People’s Sense of Justness (registered on March 10, 2009, in an apartment in Tallinn's Lasnamäe district). Considering the large output and frequency with which articles are published, it seems that the portal is receiving funding from sources that we will likely read about in next year's Security Police yearbook.

The reasons for the creation of the site, noted in a message by the editorial office, are the same as the goals specified in Russian-coordinated policy on Russians abroad: to contribute to a sense of community among the Russian-language population, to overcome the (alleged) one-sidedness of coverage of public issues cultivated by Estonian mass media, to ensure protection of the Russian-language population’s rights, and to contribute to the preservation of Russian language and culture in the Republic of Estonia.

A key channel for shaping the views of Russians living in the Baltic States is the magazine Baltiiski Mir, published with the support of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for Russians Abroad. The magazine is distributed free of charge by diplomatic offices and Russian community organizations in the three Baltic States, and can also be downloaded from the internet. The first issue of Baltiiski Mir was published in July of 2007 by the non-profit association Integration Media Group (members of the board: Andrei Zarenkov and Valeri Ilchenko). The editor-in-chief is Regnum’s former Estonia correspondent, Dmitri Kondrashov, a relative of Zarenkov, who, according to the Estonian Security Police, has contacts with the Russian special services. The magazine is printed in Riga (the print run is 3,000 copies).
4.2.1. Russian Human Rights Practice 2006–2008: Georgia

Introduction

In spite of the historical, cultural, and economic ties between Georgia and the Russian Federation, tensions between the two states amount to a long-standing political problem that has various sources. For years, Russia has attempted to sell the conflicts within the territory of Georgia as inter-national standoff and “ethnic conflicts”.

The discussion will focus not only on Russian arguments, but also on Georgian arguments and the reactions of international judicial and political institutions. The study will begin with a short historical account of Russian and Georgian relations, which is crucial to understanding the present day realities. It will be followed by a discussion of the two most striking examples of Russian policies and how they were addressed by different international organizations, i.e., massive deportation of Georgians from Russia and the Russian war against Georgia in 2008. Finally, some comments will be made on the success of Russian policies in relation to Georgia.

Context of Russian — Georgian Relations

The main issue in Russian — Georgian relations regarding human rights is connected with both countries. First, Russia’s interest to preserve its control in C.I.S. countries; and second, its interests to maintain control in two separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia.

In the last official census of South Ossetia, conducted in 1989, before the outbreak of hostilities, the South Ossetian Autonomous District had a population of just under 100,000 people, with 66% ethnic Ossetians and 29% ethnic Georgians. Historically, Ossetians and Georgians lived together in peace.

According to the 1989 Soviet Census, the Abkhaz population was approximately 525,100, and consisted of the following ethnic groups: 45.7% Georgians, 17.8% Abkhazians, 14.6% Armenians, 14.2% Russians, 2.8% Greeks, 2.2% Ukrainians, and 0.1% Byelorussians. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, Abkhaz separatists sought to secede from Georgia by force. As there were less than 100,000 Abkhaz in the region, the Abkhaz separatists could not have succeeded in expelling the 240,000-people Georgian majority and eliminating the Georgian state’s authority in Abkhazia without Russian external assistance. The Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared its sovereignty on July 23, 1992. Abkhaz separatists had procured the support of Russian forces stationed in military bases located in the territory of Georgia. Despite considerable resistance by the majority ethnic Georgian popu-

lation, Abkhaz separatist forces succeeded in defeating Georgian forces in Abkhazia.

A report by Human Rights Watch noted the following:

“The Russian military took a direct role in hostilities on several occasions, and appears to have provided logistical support and supplies to the Abkhaz.”

The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially during the war’s initial stages. Where-as Russia has endorsed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, [and] Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available to shell Georgian-held Sukhumi…”

Having sustained heavy losses and the forcible expulsion of approximately 300,000 of its citizens from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the years after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Georgia was left with no practical option but to accept Russian demands and to join the C.I.S. in order to end the conflict.

On June 24, 1992, Georgia and the South Ossetian insurgents signed the Sochi Agreement. On December 1, 1993, Georgia and the Abkhaz insurgents signed a Memorandum of understanding in Geneva, and on December 9, 1993, Georgia became an official member of the C.I.S.

This was followed by a cessation of hostilities with Abkhaz forces. On May 14, 1994, the Abkhaz separatists and the Georgian government signed the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces. This agreement was endorsed by a decision of the heads of state of the C.I.S. on August 22, 1994, which prescribed that Russian C.I.S. peacekeepers “facilitate the safe and dignified return of persons displaced from the conflict zone to the places of their former permanent residence.” Along with Russian peacekeepers, un forces were stationed according to Security Council Resolution No. 858 (1993), adopted in August of 1993. On April 4, 1994, Georgia, Abkhazia, the Russian Federation, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees signed a quadripartite agreement on the voluntary return of displaced persons.

Since that time, Russia has increased its influence in separatist regions. It is estimated that Russia has unilaterally conferred citizenship to over 90% of the population in South Ossetia and to approximately 100,000 people in Abkhazia. The security situation in South Ossetia was relatively stable during the 12 years between 1992 and 2004. In 2004, however, the situation became increasingly tense.

The international recognition of Kosovo in February 2008, combined with Georgia’s expression of its intention to seek NATO membership at the Bucharest Summit in April of 2008, intensified efforts by the Russian Federation to establish
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent, ethnically homogenous territories. In early 2008, tensions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia significantly escalated. Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. At a press conference on February 14, 2008, then Russian President Vladimir Putin explained that, if Kosovo was recognized as an independent state, there would be reason for the international community to grant South Ossetia and Abkhazia the same status.

These hostile statements were followed by a significant escalation of Russia’s military presence.

During the military attack that began on August 8, 2008, Russian forces occupied more than half of Georgia and attacked civilians and civilian objects, resulting in significant casualties, destruction, and thousands of IDPs. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the correct title for the war in Georgia is a “peacekeeping operation of peace enforcement in Georgia.” A cease-fire was reached on August 12, 2008. After the Russian bombing, there followed widespread looting, deliberate destruction of civilian property, and harassment of the civilian populations in South Ossetia, in adjacent regions, and in Upper Abkhazia. The independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was officially recognized by a decree of the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, on August 26, 2008, following an unanimous vote of the Russian Federal Assembly urging this move on August 25, 2008. Mr. Medvedev’s decree was condemned by the international community.

**Human Rights Practice**

The OSCE Mission to Georgia, established in 1992, assisted the Georgian Government with conflict settlement, democratization, human rights, and the rule of law. No consensus was reached on the extension of the Mission’s mandate at the end of 2008. The OSCE Mission had some 200 staff. The OSCE had widespread activities in various sectors of society in Georgia, including military monitoring, freedom of media, NGOs, good governance, environmental protection, and training for a wide range of specialists. Since 2006, the OSCE has also been conducting an Economic Rehabilitation Program in the zone of the Georgian—Ossetian conflict.

The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, expressed deep regret that the Member States had failed to reach consensus on the future of the OSCE Mission to Georgia.

I deeply regret the situation. Finland has put a lot of effort into finding a solution. The OSCE still has much work to do in the region. Despite the situation today, I hope that negotiations on future OSCE activities in Georgia can be continued next year.

The closing down of the mission was due to start in the beginning of 2009. Finland proposed a package deal that included parallel, mutually independent field offices to Georgia and South Ossetia. The field offices would have been directed by a special representative of the chairman-in-office, headquartered in Vienna. As an alternative, Finland proposed that the current mandate be prolonged by three months, to allow more time for negotiations.

Russia could not accept any link between the OSCE activities in South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, because Moscow has recognized the independence of South Ossetia as well as Abkhazia. No other OSCE participating state has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

According to Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov:

The presence of U.N. and OSCE observers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is only possible on the basis of the new situation [whereby] South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become independent states. If the OSCE and un accept those “realities” then their mandates regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively, can be agreed upon [i.e., Russia would not veto]. But, if the two organizations “stick to Georgia’s territorial integrity within its former borders, then they will get no results [on the mandates]”.

However, on February 12, 2009, the OSCE States agreed to extend the presence of the organization’s unarmed military monitoring officers in Georgia to June 30. The mandate of the OSCE mission to Georgia, however, ended on December 31, 2008, and was not affected by the decision.

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213 Interfax, June 11. Quoted by V.Socor “Moscow Ready to Scuttle un and OSCE Missions in Georgia”. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35784&tx_ttnews%5Bcontroller%5D=ttnews&cHash=35784&site=6413/20080709/2129059962.html. Last accessed on 13 July, 2009.

During the post-war period, OSCE officers were constantly attacked by separatists and even detained in violation of their diplomatic immunity. They were also limited to access territories of separatists and re-open their office in Tskhinvali.

In the United Nations

Russia has used the United Nations to articulate its position concerning “violent” Georgian behavior in relation to separatist republics and to show the incapacity of Georgia to effectively control the situation. The main institutions in which the Georgian case has been discussed are the Security Council and International Court of Justice.

General Assembly

For the last few years, particularly since the Russian — Georgian war of August, 2008, the Russian Federation has continually attempted to accuse Georgia of genocide, ethnic cleansing, chauvinism, etc. For instance, at the 63rd U.N. General Assembly, on September 27, 2008, Sergey Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, made the following statement:

Russia helped South Ossetia to repel its citizens and fulfill its peacekeeping commitments. The recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia was the only possible measure to ensure their security and the very survival of their peoples, taking into account all previous record of the chauvinistic attitude of the Georgian leaders — starting with the Georgian leader Z. Gamsakhurdia who, in 1991 under the slogan of “Georgia for Georgians” ordered the deportation of Ossetians to Russia, abolished the autonomous status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and later unleashed war.

According to Lavrov, in South Ossetia, his government had defended the right to life — the most essential human right. The existing architecture in Europe had not passed the “strength test”; it had proven incapable of containing an aggressor, he said, proposing to look at the situation in a comprehensive way. The treaty on European security proposed by President Medvedev could be “a kind of “Helsinki 2,”” in that it meant to create a reliable security system in a legally binding form, to promote integrated management across a vast region.

Security Council

The United Nations Security Council has been regularly following situation in Georgia. The U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has been stationed in Georgia since 1993 along with the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In general, resolutions constantly prolonged the mandate of the UNOMIG and gave general recommendations for solving the conflicts with separatists. However, Resolution 1839 (2008), adopted soon after the war, was very short, and did not qualify the ongoing events in Georgia. The same can be said about Resolution 1866 (2009), which only welcomes the so-called Six-Point Agreement of August 12, 2008, and requests that the Secretary General report to the Council. This is so because of the Russian threats to use a veto. Initially, a draft resolution was prepared that required Russia to pull back its military forces. However, Russia refused to support such a text. They argued that their forces are leaving Georgia and the resolution should repeat only what was said in the Six-Point Agreement, which allows them to stay in buffer zones near conflict areas.

At that time, the outlining of elements was planned for a future un presence in the region by June 15, 2009. However, this did not materialize. The Washington Post reported on June 15, 2009, that Russia had vetoed a U.N. resolution authorizing the continuation of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Georgia. The story says the veto by Russia “...set the stage for a rift in diplomatic relations with the United States and its European allies, which have vigorously supported Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia. It raised concerns about a new flare-up of violence in Georgia.”

In casting its veto, Russia effectively blocked a U.S. and European draft resolution extending the mission’s mandate for 15 days, to allow the two sides to negotiate a compromise over the future of the United Nations in Georgia. But Russia rejected the draft on the grounds that it continued to endorse Georgia’s claim to Abkhazia, which the Russian ambassador to the U.N., Vitaly I. Churkin, said is “based on old realities”. The 15-nation council voted 10-1 for the Western-backed resolution. According to Churkin, the government of Georgian President Mikhail Sakaashvili had lost its moral claim to sovereignty over pro-Russian Abkhazia and separatist South Ossetia by launching a military strike against Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, last August. “The Sakaashvili regime put an end to the territorial integrity of his country, and on the world map two new states emerged, the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia”, Churkin said.

Rosemary Di Carlo, the third-ranking U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said that Washington “deeply regrets” the Russian veto, and that it reaffirms its commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. “It is the civilian popula-

tion that suffers by facing a tenuous security environment without an international presence in Abkhazia, Georgia”.

According to the Russian MFA, there is a need to sign documents on a cease-fire between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Those documents should be based on the Russian principles presented in May of 2009 and an analogous draft circulated by South Ossetia. In the opinion of Russia, this is even more acute due to withdrawal of the OSCE and U.N. missions. It should be noted that withdrawal took place because of the Russian veto for prolongation of the respective missions. In the Russian view, however, the withdrawal was caused by the fact that neither Georgia nor a number of Western States were ready to acknowledge the “qualitatively new political and diplomatic situation”. This new situation required new mechanisms to ensure stability. Those mechanisms are already in place in South Ossetia and will soon be implemented in Abkhazia. At the end of its statement, the Russian MFA notes that talks in Geneva should avoid politics based on an ignorance of the tragic events of August, 2008.222 Thus, Russia is trying once again to convince the world that it reacted to an armed Georgian attack by stepping in to protect the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

International Court of Justice

On August 12, 2008, Georgia submitted an application to the International Court of Justice against Russia for violations of the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and requested the order of provisional measures.223 Georgia asserted that “the de facto separatist authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia enjoy unprecedented and far-reaching support from the Russian Federation in the implementation of discriminatory policies against the ethnic Georgian population”, and that this support “has the effect of denying the right of self-determination to the ethnic Georgians remaining in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and those seeking to return to their homes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the ceasefires of 1992 and 1994, respectively”. Georgia claimed that “by recognizing and supporting South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s separatist authorities, the Russian Federation is also preventing Georgia from implementing its obligations under CERD, by assuming control over its territory”.224

Russia argued that the hostilities in Abkhazia were for the most part halted following the deployment of a Russian contingent acting as the Collective Peacekeeping force of the C.I.S. and set up according to the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, signed between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1994 “under the aegis of Russia”. Russian peacekeeping has been supported by international organizations and by Georgia itself.225 Russia insisted on acting only as a mediator in the conflict, and that it continued to recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia while aware that, in referendums, the two regions majority of Ossetians and Abkhazians voted for independence.226

Russia maintained that “progress was made in the peace process until Mr. Saakashvili came to power at the end of 2003”, and that, in May of 2004, troops and special units of the Georgian Ministry of Interior were moved into the Georgian—Ossetian zone of conflict. Russia claimed that, in February of 2005, Saakashvili formally renounced ceasefire and in violation of all agreements placed a Georgian contingent in the Kodori gorge in 2006.227 They claimed that Georgian attacks on August 2, 2008, caused a “real humanitarian disaster”, as a result of which, in just two days, 34,000 refugees were forced to flee towards North Ossetia and to Russia.228

The Russian Federation contended that “no one now disputes that the crisis in August was caused by the attack of the Georgian forces” and claimed that “faced with this situation, it made every effort in its power to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means”. Russia explained that it immediately requested a meeting of the Security Council to bring the crisis to the international community’s attention, but that this demarche was “to no avail”. Consequently, “Russia had no choice but to send reinforcements to the conflict zone in order to prevent further casualties among civilians and [Russian] peacekeeping soldiers”. Russia invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, and addressed a notification to this effect to the Security Council.229

During the oral proceedings, Russian representative Mr. Kolodkin stated: Already in the beginning of the 1990s, the Georgian authorities embarked on a manifestly nationalistic political course which was commonly labelled “Georgia for Georgians”. In 1990, the autonomous status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parts of Georgia – that, in its turn, was part of the USSR – was revoked by the Georgian Government. From that time, the Government of Georgia repeatedly used force against South Ossetia ad Abkhazia. It was the way the Georgian Government considered appropriate to solve the questions of territorial integrity of its country and the long term ethnic conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia, Georgia and Abkhazia. Each time such use of force resulted in grave humanitarian consequences for the people living in these territories, including people of Georgian origin as well.230

Russian armed forces were present and are now present on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, this presence was not and is not occupation, as Georgia claims. Russian military forces and therefore, Russia itself, did not and do not control either the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or the authorities or armed units of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has not exercised jurisdiction

224 Paragraph 13 of the Order.
225 Ibid., para 40 and 61.
226 Ibid., para 63.
227 See paragraph 62 of the Order.
228 See paragraph 64.
229 Ibid., para 66.
with respect to the territory or population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This allegation is absurd. This is no less true now, given that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are independent States, as recognised by Russia.\textsuperscript{231}

Russia argued that Articles 2 and 5 of CERD did not apply extraterritorially. They have already concluded the ceasefire agreement. They do not exercise effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the case.

The court found that CERD applied to the actions of a state party when acting beyond its territory, and it has prima facie jurisdiction to proceed with ordering provisional measures.\textsuperscript{232} The court overruled the Russian argument that there is no need for provisional measures, and pronounced that it still considers the Georgian population in areas affected by the conflict as vulnerable as the ethnic Ossetian and Abkhazian populations. With a vote of 8 to 7, the court ordered provisional measures to both parties.\textsuperscript{233}

Regarding the ICJ order of provisional measures, the Russia MFA issued a press statement.\textsuperscript{234} It stated that:

\textit{The judges did not find reasons why to order provisional measures, requested by Georgia, nor did they find reason to address them solely to Russia. The Court addressed measures to both parties. They are general in nature and state that Parties are bound to observe the obligations of the Convention mentioned. Moreover, even such decision had been reached with majority of only one judge. 7 of 15 judges agreed with the Russian position that the Court lacks jurisdiction in the specific case. Russia confirms its adherence to the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes and is committed in the future to implement in good faith CERD. Moreover, the need for strict observance of the Convention by us is evident. We are expecting that Georgian party will be strongly observing the norms of the Convention. Taking into account the fact, that order of the Court on jurisdiction in the context of provisional measures has preliminary nature, we are committed to continue to prove that the Court does not have jurisdiction in a given case during the further stages of pleadings.}

\textbf{In the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly}

The Parliamentary Assembly (PA) was involved in a case where a large number of Georgians were deported. It has also reacted to the war situation in Georgia.

In the case of the deportations, the attention of the Parliamentary Assembly was less intense. They managed to establish a Monitoring Committee, which produced a report on the situation of Georgian migrants; this was followed by a motion for recommendation, which was signed by a group of parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{235} The parliamentarians invited different institutions to monitor the situation closely. In general, the case of expulsions has not attracted more serious attention from the Council of Europe. At the same time, it does not mean that Russia has managed to convince parliamentarians that this was merely an application of national immigration law, and that the judicial system is efficient in cases of legal abuses by authorities.\textsuperscript{236}

In relation to the war in Georgia, the Parliamentary Assembly has adopted two main resolutions. One was adopted soon after the war in Georgia; the other took account of Russia’s attempts to live up to recommendations. Both of them showed that Russia ignores the obligations it undertook when joining the Council of Europe.

In Resolution 1653 (2008), the PA states that it “regrets that earlier calls to discuss a change in the format of the peacekeeping and conflict resolution process were rejected by South Ossetia and Russia”.\textsuperscript{237} The Parliamentary Assembly noted that this constituted a disproportionate use of armed force by Georgia, albeit within its own territory. However, the PA also noted that:

\textit{[T]he Russian counter-attack, including large-scale military actions in central and western Georgia and in Abkhazia, equally failed to respect the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law and constituted a violation of Council of Europe principles, as well as of the statutory obligations and specific accession commitments of Russia as a member state. It can be deemed to be either a direct attack on the sovereignty of Georgia and thus a violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe, or an attempt by Russia to extend its influence over a “near abroad” state in violation of its accession commitment to denounce such a concept. The Assembly considers that, from the point of view of international law, the notion of “protecting citizens abroad” is not acceptable and is concerned by the political implications of such a policy by the Russian authorities for other member states where a substantial number of Russian citizens reside.}

The PA condemned Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a violation of international law and Council of Europe statutory principles. The PA was also concerned about the human rights and humanitarian law violations — including war crimes — committed by both sides in the context of the war. In the view of the PA, Russia was in de facto control of separatist regions, includ-

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\textsuperscript{233}See paragraphs 109, 112 of the Order.
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\textsuperscript{234}It is interesting to note that the vote had political tenors. Thus, judges from the U.S., U.K., Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Mexico, and France, and an ad hoc judge from Italy, voted in favor while judges from Jordan, China, Slovakia, Madagascar, Morocco, and Russia voted against.
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\textsuperscript{237}Resolution 1633 (2008), October 2, 2008.
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ing Tskhinvali. The PA noted its awareness of acts of ethnic cleansing committed in ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia, and the "buffer zone" that took place after the signing of the ceasefire agreement on August 12, 2008, and continues.

At the time, the PA requested that Russia and Georgia undertake a number of actions. For instance, Russia was requested inter alia to (1) enable OSCE and European Union observers to be deployed into South Ossetia and Abkhazia; (2) withdraw its recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; (3) work towards the creation of a new peacekeeping format and to internationalize the peacekeeping force; (4) ensure effective respect for all human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and humanitarian norms under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols on the territories under their de facto control; (5) cooperate fully with all international monitoring missions, whether from the United Nations (U.N.), the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe, or any other international body, and grant these organizations full access to the conflict regions.

PA Resolution 1647 (2009) notes that most of the recommendations were not followed by Russia. The PA condemns Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and considers it to be a violation of international law and of the Council of Europe's statutory principles. In the view of the PA, international monitors are essential for guaranteeing stability, which contradicts Russia's latest decisions to veto UN and OSCE presence in the region. This does not correspond by far to the Russian argument that the only misunderstanding comes from several Western states. According to point 5.2 of the resolution, the PA regrets the closure of the OSCE mission as a result of Russian objections, and invites Russians to agree on military monitoring without prejudice to the status of break-away regions. The PA also welcomed the continuous presence of the UN in the region.

Contrary to Russian claims in the ICJ, in point 5.4 the PA condemned the non-mandated Russian military presence and the building of new military bases within the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as in Akhalgori, Perevi, Upper Abkhazia, and in villages controlled by the central government of Georgia before the breakout of the conflict. It regretted that both houses of the Russian Parliament had unanimously ratified the "Friendship and Co-operation" treaties between Russia and the two break-away regions, in violation of these principles, as well as of the ceasefire agreement of August 12, 2008.

The PA condemned the ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations in South Ossetia, as well as the failure of Russia and the de facto authorities to bring these practices to a halt and their perpetrators to justice. The PA noted that, under international law, Russia bears responsibility for violations of human rights and humanitarian law in these areas which are under its de facto control.

In Point 9.8, the PA demanded that Russia renew the mandate of the OSCE mission and renew the UNOMIG mandate, as well as allow full access for all international monitors into separatist regions. In points 9.8 and 9.9, the PA also requested that Russia ensure no ethnic cleansing and human rights violations, as well as bring the perpetrators to justice. In Point 9.11, the PA addressed the issue of the returning of I.D.P.s.

In respect to Georgia, quite the opposite was the case. The PA welcomed the constructive approach and clear political will of the Georgian authorities to comply with the demands of the Assembly, as expressed in previous resolutions, and considered that Georgia has complied with many, but not all, of its demands.

Thus, it seems that Russia was incapable of convincing the PA of its marginal role in the conflict. At the same time, it has brought minimal results, as Russia ignores the recommendations of the PA.

**European Court of Human Rights**

Georgia has approached the ECHR in the two contexts, i.e., the war between Georgia and Russia and the expulsion of Georgians from Russia. Since only the first proceedings have advanced to a certain stage, this study will concentrate on the case of expulsion. The application for expulsion originated from events following the arrest of four Russian officers, in Tbilisi on September 27, 2006, on suspicion of espionage. On October 4, 2006, these officers were released. Eleven Georgian citizens were arrested on the same charges, and this was followed by more dramatic events on the part of Russia.

On October 3, 2006, the Russian Federation suspended all aerial, road, maritime, railway, postal, and financial links with Georgia. In the meantime, the actions by Russia were related to the alleged harassment of the Georgian population in the Russian Federation, particularly through widespread arrests and detention, which amounted to a generalized threat to the security of those persons and multiple interferences with the right to liberty on arbitrary grounds. The Georgian government complained of the bad conditions of detention in which at least 2,380 Georgian nationals were held.

The Georgian government referred to the instructions issued by the heads of the Russian Directorate of Internal Affairs, in September/October of 2006, to certain schools and universities for the purpose of identifying Georgian pupils and students; and to a letter sent in reply by the director of one of those establishments on October 4, 2006, indicating that the children had not been registered on the basis of their ethnic origin.

According to Georgian representatives, the remedies available under Russian law were unavailable to Georgian nationals, or had proved ineffective, and Russian officials had effectively prevented them from exercising such remedies. In addition,
the closure of the land, aerial, and maritime borders between the Russian Federation and Georgia had also deprived those Georgian nationals who had been rapidly deported to Georgia from access to such remedies. The Georgian government alleged that, following their arrest, the Georgian nationals were held for one or two days in police custody in local police stations, before being transferred to temporary detention centers with a view to their expulsion. The length of detention in these centers varied between five and fifty-six days. Some of them died because medical assistance was not provided.

Georgia has argued that Russian actions should be seen as collective measures targeted at Georgian nationals who were residents of Russia. First, during the period in question, the measures included approximately 4,630 deportation orders and the expulsion of 2,380 individuals who passed through the detention centers. Although the number of expulsions of nationals of other states mentioned by the Russians had fallen in comparison to the previous year, the number of Georgian nationals deported had risen by about 160%, from 2,879 in 2005 to 4,022 in 2006. The increase was particularly striking in the period from October 2006 to January 2007, when the number of expelled Georgian nationals rose from about 80—100 persons per month, in July to September of 2006, to about 700—800 persons per month, in the period from October 2006 to January 2007. These expulsions had been preceded by announcements and instructions from Russian political authorities directly targeting Georgian nationals, although the nationals of other states, even those who were illegal residents, had not been targeted by such measures. The Russian authorities had relied heavily on the mass media in support of this anti-Georgian policy; thus, in his report of May 30, 2007, the Special Rapporteur of the General Assembly of the United Nations cited the Russian mass media as one of the key sources for the spread of xenophobic documents.

Furthermore, although in many instances expulsion was based on a judicial decision, the conduct of the judicial proceedings ruled out any examination on the merits of each case; thus, the length of the hearings had frequently not exceeded five minutes. Georgian nationals had been transported in humiliating and degrading conditions, in cargo planes designed for carrying freight (merchandise, humanitarian materials, and even corpses) rather than passengers.

Russia argued that their authorities had not adopted reprisal measures against Georgian nationals, but had merely continued to apply the ordinary law aimed at preventing illegal immigration. Moreover, Russia claimed that Georgia had abused the right of application before the court by submitting insufficient and erroneous information and by relying on inaccurate data and entirely fabricated evidence, which represented a deliberate attempt to mislead the court. At the same time, Russia was unable to present data by itself. According to Russia, the victims of the alleged violations of the Convention had applied to the competent authorities, with only one exception. At the same time, Russia acknowledged that ordinary courts had dealt with administrative disputes concerning more than 7,500 Georgian nationals. They were also not able to present accurate monthly statistics on deportations. They argued that each case was subject to a “most detailed examination” and subject to appeal, without going into more detail.

Although the Georgian government submitted all information to substantiate the claim, Russia argued that it had not submitted any evidence in support of their allegations. In Russia’s opinion, the description of the content of these circulars by the Georgian government was inexact, and the documents allegedly based on these circulars and submitted by the applicant government had been fabricated.

Russia also argued that Georgian reference to the Special Rapporteur of the General Assembly of the U.N. is unfounded. They mistakenly claimed that the Rapporteur’s conclusions referred to the fact that there was no state policy of racism or xenophobia. In fact, the report stated:

“The Special Rapporteur concluded that while there is no State policy of racism in the Russian Federation, the Russian society is facing an alarming trend of racism and xenophobia, the most striking manifestations of which are the increasing number of racially motivated crimes and attacks, including by neo-Nazi groups, particularly against people of non-Slav appearance originating from the Caucasus, Africa, Asia or the Arab world.”

The rapporteur also recommended the official and formal recognition of the existence of racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia, and the expression of the political will to combat it.

The court disagreed with Russia’s claims, and stated that Georgians have submitted a number of documents — including statements by Georgian nationals, instructions from the Russian authorities, and statistical data — in support of their allegations about the existence of an administrative practice involving a repetition of acts and official tolerance. They also referred to reports by international organizations. The court declared the case admissible on July 3, 2009, and it will proceed to the merits stage.

**The Nature and Degree of Success of the Russian Practice**

Contrary to the Baltic States, where Russian rhetoric concerns the protection of non-citizens and compatriots, in the case of Georgia, Russia acts on behalf of separatists and finds itself in a situation where it is accused of violating international and human rights law against the Georgian people. At the same time, Russia feels strong enough to disregard various recommendations and mediation offered by international organizations.

243 Paragraph 22 of the Court’s decision.
244 Paragraph 14 of the Court’s decision.
245 Ibid. paragraphs 14 and 23.
246 Of the Court’s decision. Paragraph 23.
247 Ibid.
249 Application no. 13255/07 Georgia vs Russia, decision on admissibility, June 30, 2009.
The framework for the Russian practice can be traced back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and attempts to preserve Russian influence in the so-called “near abroad”, outlawed by the Council of Europe250 and the C.I.S. region in general. Russian policies “to enforce peace” in Georgia have become more aggressive in recent years. This has not gone unnoticed by international organizations, which, however, have largely remained ineffective due to Russia’s power to veto important decisions. At the same time, Georgia has been active in exploring “counter-measures”, including approach to international judicial settlement procedures.

The overall background looks more political than legal, based on a concern for human rights protections in the C.I.S. region. If one looks at the timing of Russian activities, there is strong evidence of a coincidence in respective decisions made by recognizing Kosovo, or plans made by NATO in relation to Georgia, and Russia’s reactions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian activities, there is strong evidence of a coincidence in respective decisions made by recognizing Kosovo, or plans made by NATO in relation to Georgia, and Russia’s reactions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disregard the personal dislike for Georgian actions. In more general terms, Russia is not interested in losing its influence in the C.I.S. region. In passing, one can also not disreg
recommended the applicants before the competent authorities of Russia. The Congress of Russian Communities\textsuperscript{252} is a nationalistic political association spearheaded by Dmitry Rogozin, the current Permanent representative of the Russian Federation to NATO. Rogozin’s views and judgments are the true essence, goals, and aspirations behind Russia’s “humanitarian policy” to provide “support to compatriots”. In Rogozin’s opinion, the fact that “compatriots” live “on the territory of the states emerging within the territory of the former Soviet Union, does not mean that they must receive the citizenship of such states\textsuperscript{253} Therefore, Russian policy completely fits the logic of humanitarian efforts aimed at supporting compatriots: “the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the citizens of the former Soviet Union who have not received Georgian citizenship. That’s why Russia as a legal successor to the Soviet Union was obliged to grant these people with citizenship and rights under the Constitution of Russian”.\textsuperscript{254} Being absolutely convinced of the validity of such arguments, Russia has no qualms to issue threats: “even a single hair drops off the head of a Russian citizen, Russia will be obliged to make use of her entire arsenal to protect her citizens”.

Ostensibly to protect the interests of compatriots in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian Federation has for the last few months:

1) carried out wast issuance of passports;
2) restored tourist travel in gross violation of international agreements;
3) set up illegal border checkpoints in the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, through which Russian citizens, including officials, entered the territory of Georgia without a visa;
4) signed, in gross violation of international agreements, contracts and agreements between certain Russian entities and separatist governments;
5) purchased health resorts and other real estate in the territory of Abkhazia, in utter ignorance and gross violation of international commitments;
6) illegally restored, without any agreement with the government of Georgia, railway, road, and sea traffic with the separatist regions.

This is just an incomplete list of the illegal acts carried out by the Russian Federation in relation to Georgia, with the motive of assisting and protecting compatriots. The peak of these efforts was Russia’s occupation and annexation of the territory of Georgia in August, 2008, and the subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

On April 16, 2008, ostensibly to protect and assist the so-called compatriots, Russian President Vladimir Putin assigned the Russian government to work out a package of measures aimed at developing direct economic and legal relations with unrecognized republics. President Putin’s Decree on the Main Directions of the Development of Relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia talks about close and specific cooperation in trade and economic, as well as in social, scientific-technical, informational, educational, and cultural spheres, formulating the list of documents to be issued to Abkhazian and South Ossetian citizens and recognized by the Russian Federation. In addition, federal executive authorities were assigned to cooperate with the unrecognized republics to provide legal assistance in civil, family, and criminal cases. To fulfill the above decree, the territorial authorities (Krasnodarsky Kray and Republic Alania in North Ossetia) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation were assigned to provide effective consular assistance to the citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, under the motive of protecting the interests of compatriots, Russia started establishing direct official relations with the separatist regions by sidestepping the government authorities of Georgia. With these steps, Russia actually launched a serious effort to prepare the basis for further recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The above decree of President Putin was highlighted by the Russian media as a principled step for the protection of “the legitimate interests” of the Russian citizens “residing in so far unrecognized republics”\textsuperscript{255}

Reports by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluate the step as “rendering assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in solving their social-economic problems and protecting the rights of the Russian citizens living there. As a result, it has been possible to avoid destabilization on our southern borders and derail the plans of the Georgian leadership to take advantage of the situation in the conflict zones”.\textsuperscript{256}

It is important to note that ethnic Russians within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not make up a majority of the population. In connection with the condition of the Russian “compatriots” in South Ossetia, it is interesting to see what Irina Janayeva, the leader of the ROS, says in one of her interviews: “The situation in South Ossetia is unique. The Russian-language diaspora in South Ossetia makes up only 2% of the entire population. However, the majority of the population thinks they are Russian compatriots”.\textsuperscript{257}

At present, along with Ossetian, Russian is a national language in the territory of South Ossetia. Teaching in virtually all schools and higher education institutions takes place in Russian. Russian TV channels are broadcast without interruption. The situation is similar in Abkhazia as well.

Support of Pro-Russian Organizations (NGOs) and Their Consolidation in Georgia (Organizations and Their Objectives within the Russkiy Mir Network)

According to the results of 2002 the census, the number of Russians living in Georgia amounted to 68,000, half of the number living in Tbilisi. Unlike other ethnic

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{255} Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Decree on the Main Directions of the Development of Relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 6) illegally restored, without any agreement with the government of Georgia, railway, road, and sea traffic with the separatist regions.
There are dozens of non-governmental organizations registered in Georgia. The goal of their activities is to promote the development of Russian — Georgian relations and protect the interests of Russian citizens. The media has never been seriously interested in highlighting their activities. The only event that attracted the attention of all the media outlets was the presentation of a book, in March of 2009, dedicated to Georgian — Russian relations, to which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded in a letter. The addressee of the letter is an NGO, Historical Heritage, which dedicated Time of Salvation, three collections of rare documentary materials, to the centuries-old Georgian — Russian relationship. Publication of the collections will continue, and, since the absolute majority of historical documents are located in Russian archives, the founders of Historical Heritage sent a letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asking the Russian government to allow, now that the two countries are actually at war, Georgian researchers to locate the necessary materials in the Russian archives and to conduct research there. President Medvedev responded to the request of the Historical Heritage with enviable promptness. The ethos of his letter is such: “we must not cross over the centuries-old Russian — Georgian friendship, old ties need to be preserved restored, etc.”

The Russian-language diaspora in Georgia has formed a number of non-governmental organizations or public associations. Some of them are listed in the reference publication of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation called Towards Assisting Russian Compatriots Abroad.260

- FIDAT Association of Ossetians in Georgia
- Association for Georgian — Russian Relations in Ajaria.
- Association of Russian Compatriots in Ajara (branches of the association operate in Kobuleti, RNZ, Khelvachauri, and the approximate number of association members is 16,000).
- FRIENDSHIP Association of Russians of Ajara (ARA Friendship). Main area of activity: strengthening good neighbourly relations with Russia and Georgia, preservation of the cultural identity of the Russian-language population in Ajara, and cultural-educational activities. Branches of the association operate in Kobuleti, Chakvi, Khelvachauri, and the approximate number of association members is 7,000.
- Association of Russian-language journalists of Georgia (ARJG). Main area of activity is the preservation and reinforcement of the Russian-language information system. The association publishes the newspaper Russkoye Veche.
- Kvemo Kartli Regional Russian Community RODNIK. Main areas (goals) of activity: protection of the rights and interests of the community members; harmonious development of individuals of Slavonic origin in Kvemo Kartli; organization of meetings with renowned public figures of Georgia and guests invited from foreign countries; establishment of cultural relations with foreign countries in order to develop such fields as science, literature, sports, etc.; active participation in the training and retraining of young people, as well as in their application to higher educational institutions abroad. Membership in the association is voluntary, with a fixed number of members set at 520 and non-fixed number of members totaling 1,130 persons. The association runs six Russian schools, a theater studio, and a dance company. The association publishes the newspaper Rodnik.
- RADUGA, a cultural-charitable and scientific-educational union of the Russian community in Georgia. The organization has 480 members.
- International Humanitarian-Charitable union NADEZHDA (IHCU NADEZHDA). Main areas of activity: preservation and development of the Russian language, provision of assistance to the Russian-language population in Georgia, protection of the rights of compatriots. The union operates branches in Tetritskaro, Khashuri, Borjomi, Lagodekhi, and Akhaltsikhe. The approximate number of members of the organization is 18,000.
- International Cultural-Educational union RUSSIAN CLUB.
- International union – Russian Community COMPATRIOTS (RCC). Main area (goals) of activity is daily work with compatriots.
- Youth Section PHOENIX of RODNIK Community. Main areas (goals) of activity are the cultural development of young people in the Kvemo Kartli Region assistance in sending children to the Russian Federation to study. The organization has 30 members. The section operates five schools and publishes the newspaper Rodnik.
- Russian Home Society of Ajara. The organization has about 200 members.
- KALINA Society of the Russian-language Population of Gori. The organization has about 100 members.
- Slavonic Home Society.
- ETHNO Rights Center.
- Russian Cultural-Educational Society (RCES). Main areas (goals) of activity: meeting the spiritual, cultural, and lingual needs of Russian citizens of Georgia; tending to the Russian cultural monuments in Georgia; protection of the members of the society; provision of charitable assistance to the vulnerable; provision of assistance in acquiring an education in the Russian Federation. The organization has approximately 16,000 members. The society runs branches in Kutaisi, Gori, Telavi, Rustavi, and Zugdidi, and has units in Tkaltubo, Senaki, Tkibuli, Zugdidi, and in the Ulyanovka Village of Signagi Region, in all ten subdivisions. As stated in the ref-

• Zhiuli Shartava Social-Cultural-Educational Center (Zhiuli Shartava SCE Center). Main areas (goals) of activity: the preservation and development of cultural and educational ties between Russia and Georgia. The center has acceded to OTCHIZNA union of Russian Compatriots in Georgia (URCG). The center has 2,903 members, operates a branch in Akhaltsikhe, and has collective members and nine organizations (schools, production teams). Publishes the newspaper Mi. Vmeste (We, Together).

• Union of Journalists of Multinational Georgia.

• Union of the Cossacks of Georgia (UKG), supported by government authorities and Association of the Cossacks of U.S.A. (New-Jersey). The union avoids making anti-Russian statements. Many of the party leaders of UKG, heads of government agencies, are declared as Kazaks, and have acquired higher education.

• OTCHIZNA Union of Russian Compatriots in Georgia (URCG). Main areas (goals) of activity: the preservation and development of the Russian language, the provision of assistance to the Russian-language population in Georgia, and the protection of the rights of compatriots. The union operates branches in Batumi, Kobuleti, Poti, Zugdidi, Gori, Tbilisi, Rustavi, etc. The approximate number of members of the organization is 40,000. The organization issues the newspapers Russkoye Veche and the Istoriki.

• YAROSLAVNA Union of Russian Women in Georgia (URWG). Main areas (goals) of activity: cultural enlightening; educational, legal, and humanitarian-charitable activities; protection of the rights of women; and preservation of the Russian language. The organization has 800 members, and operates in Batumi, Gori, Ninotsminda, and Akhaltsikhe. The organization is open to cooperation and joint measures.

• Union of Russian Youth of Georgia (URYG). Main areas (goals) of activity: cultural enlightening; educational, legal, humanitarian-charitable, and sports activities; promotion of improved civil education for Russian youth; provision of assistance in the protection of rights on all levels; preservation of the Russian language; and establishment of contacts with the historical homeland. The organization has 650 members and operates in Batumi, Gori, Ninotsminda, and Akhaltsikhe. The organization is open to cooperation and joint measures, and interested in registration in Russia.

• Union Slavonic Home of Georgia (USHG). Main areas (goals) of activity: promotion of the Russian language and culture, protection of the rights of compatriots, strengthening of ties to Slavonic organizations through dialogue between cultures. The approximate number of members is 3,000.

• ZHEMCHUZHINA Russian-language Cultural Center of Marneuli Region of Georgia. Main areas (goals) of activity: cultural enlightening, mass sporting events, promotion of Russian language and culture. The non-registered number of members is estimated at 2,000.

These organizations are also members of the Russkiy Mir network. Nevertheless, the Russian organizations operating within the territory of Georgia (other than those within the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) cannot be regarded as acting to the detriment of Georgian national interests or as an instrument of Russian ideology or Russian policy in Georgia. Moreover, during the war of August, 2008, representatives of the Russian diaspora protested against Russian military aggression as strongly as other Georgian citizens did. The activities of these organizations are primarily aimed at integrating and adapting the Russian diaspora to the Georgian community.

The activities of Russian youth organizations in Georgia are virtually unnoticeable. Moreover, one can say there is no such activity at all in Georgia (unlike the situation in the Baltic States, where Russian youth organizations are quite active).

At the present time, the Georgian community is unaware of the names of any large Russian foundation or NGO that could be used to lobby Russian interests in Georgia.

The compatriots support program that the Russian government has declared a top priority is unnoticeable in Georgia. This may also be the case because the Russian population is well integrated into Georgian society, perhaps even better than other non-Georgian minorities. Most of the Russians living in Georgia speak Georgian. If Georgia had carried out an aggressive language policy, the situation would have been similar to the situation in other countries where knowledge of the state language is directly related to the issue of citizenship.

Informative Support for Russian Compatriots in Georgia

The Georgian TV broadcasting area (with the exception of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) was lost by Russian TV channels in the 1990s. Before August of 2008, Russian TV channels were translated through a commercial cable network and were not accessible for most of the population. As soon as the war broke out, the channels were removed from the service package by request of the government, as Russia was waging an information war against the Georgian population.

At this point, Russian TV channels are translated in the territory of Georgia (with the exception of the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) only by commercial cable channels. As a rule, this is done without any information block, with only rare exceptions. No Russian radio translation takes place.

The sanctions that Russia imposed on Georgia in 2006 (including sanctions on
the opening of a section for the Russian Federation at the Embassy of Switzerland in Georgia. A section for Georgia at the Embassy of Switzerland in the Russian Federation was opened the same day.

Number of Russian Citizens in Georgia and the Major Trends of Russian Citizenship in Georgia. Is Russia promoting its Citizenship and/or Russian Foreign Passports?

The exact number of Russian citizens in Georgia is unknown, as the majority of them live in conflict zones within the territory of Georgia, namely in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian citizens in Georgia can be divided into the following three categories:

1) Ethnic Georgians who work mostly in Russia but have not cut ties with Georgia. Within the territory of Georgia, they have real estate, a place of residence, and close relatives. These people traveled to Russia chiefly in search of jobs and due to economic hardship. The 1990s witnessed a mass exodus of Georgians to Russia in search of jobs. At present, the vast Russian territory hosts approximately 900,000 – 1,000,000 ethnic Georgians. The majority of these Georgians have dual citizenship (Georgian and Russian).

2) Russian citizens married to Georgian citizens. These Russian citizens live in Georgia but have Russian citizenship;

3) The populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the overwhelming majority of whom have obtained Russian citizenship.

The first two of the above categories have been fully integrated into Georgian life. Therefore, the core object of our study is the third category, as it includes those who received Russian citizenship in the wake of the anti-Georgian policy vehemently pursued by Russia and have unwillingly turned themselves into instruments of Kremlin policy.

In 2002, the Russian Federation launched a campaign of distributing foreign Russian passports to people within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is noteworthy that the primary reason that Russia claimed it broke into the territory of Georgia was to protect Russian citizens. Therefore, the passport-distribution process, or “passportization”, truly demands our attention in this study. Passportization started after Russia introduced a visa regime with Georgia.263 The privilege of free movement in Russian territory that Russia deprived Georgian citizens was granted to Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist regimes loyal to Russia and their supporters. Interestingly, in recent years, the separatist regime of South Ossetia has been talking about accession to Russia more than it has about independence. The “government” of South Ossetia stressed that more than 90% of the population had re-

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263 In 2000, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the October 9, 1992 Agreement on Visa-free Traffic of Citizens in C.I.S. Member States. On December 5, 2000, a visa regime between Russian Federation and Georgia was introduced on the official initiative of Moscow.
ceived Russian citizenship. The same percentage of the population received Russian citizenship in the territory of Abkhazia as well. Passports were handed out far and wide. Anyone producing a photo and a certificate of residence within the territory of Abkhazia or South Ossetia was given a foreign Russian passport within just a few days. As a result of the process, nearly 80—90% of the population of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were turned into Russian citizens.

The mass passportization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia started on June 1, 2002, after Russia passed a new Citizenship Law. Under the law, citizens of the former Soviet Union not acquiring the citizenship of any other country were allowed to hand in their Soviet passports in return for those of the Russian Federation. Within just one month after the enactment of the law, application centers were set up in six out of seven regions in Abkhazia. Mountainous and remote villages of Abkhazia were visited by special field brigades. The documents were distributed within just 3—8 days. The situation was pretty much the same in South Ossetia. According to official Russian sources, if the number of Russian citizens was approximately 30% in Abkhazia and 40% in South Ossetia before the enactment of the new law, in the year 2006 these figures increased to 80% and 90%, respectively.

The expedited procedure for the distribution of Russian passports was introduced in the wake of tensions in Georgian—Russian relations. The visa regime that Russia introduced in relation to Georgia did not apply to the separatist regions, despite protests from the Georgian party: Russia had been displeased with Georgia’s foreign policy, relationship with the United States, and aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The Georgian parliament had already demanded the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from the conflict zones, and a decision had to be made on a time frame for the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. It was clear to Russia that Georgia was slipping out of its control and influence. The conflict zones remained Russia’s only leverage in Georgia. Therefore, with massive and all-out passportization in these regions, Russia was trying to build a foothold for bolstering its influence and a basis for justifying its future actions. Altering the population structure in the conflict zones and artificially increasing the number of Russian citizens living there offered Russia the opportunity to declare, if the situation arose, a need to “protect its citizens”.

The Russian Federation categorically denied passportization as such. On January 29, 2003, when asked about passportization in the conflict zone of Abkhazia, the Russian President answered: “as you know, in July 2002, Russia enacted the new law of citizenship that complicates the procedure for acquisition of Russian citizenship. Of course, this has drawn quite an interest among those in the C.I.S. countries wishing to receive Russian citizenship. Obviously, the issue has had its repercussions in Abkhazia as well. I’d like to note that it was acceptance of applications, not passportization. We did not issue passports, we just accepted applications for Russian citizenship under the Russian law, we had no right not to accept applications”.

Interestingly, Mr. Putin brings legal norms as an argument but the above passportization was carried out in violation of the Russian laws, to say nothing about the Georgian laws. The thing is that foreign Russian passports were handed out to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian populations. According to the information of the Russian Embassy in Georgia, to obtain a foreign passport, one has to produce certain documents, including a notice of no criminal record issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and an ID of a citizen of Georgia or a certificate of permanent residence. However, none of those obtaining Russian passports within the territory of Abkhazia or South Ossetia had produced any such document.

Issuing foreign passports on the territory of a foreign country falls within the prerogative of the consular sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One cannot help wondering how and on what basis Russia opened such consular establishments within the territory of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. No legal document whatsoever has been created about it. Thus, the application centers set up and field brigades operating within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were illegal and, consequently, had no right to consider documents or issue passports. Such activity amounts to nothing but document forging, a penal crime punishable in Georgia as well as in Russian Federation.

The passportization process was in full swing during the days of the Russian—Georgian war of August 2008. This is evidenced with the fact that approximately 2,000 Russian passports were discovered in the vehicle of one of the Russian officers in Tskhinvali. These passports had been preliminarily filled in on behalf of ethnic Ossetians. The passports were numbered in a row but issue dates were absolutely different. What also raises questions is that none of the passports bore the holder’s signature.

The passportization process continued even after the war of August 2008, now on the territories officially annexed by Russia. One of the examples of the above is the information spread by Ossetian radio on 11 June 2009 that “documents are accepted for the execution of foreign Russian passports in the temporary consular point of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in South Ossetia”.

The facts of special pressure and compulsion have been registered in the Gali and Akhalgori regions, where the populations were forced into obtaining Abkhazian (in Gali) and Ossetian (in Akhalgori) passports along with Russian passports.

What are the Benefits and Political Activities of Russian Citizens in Georgia?
Participation Levels in Russian Elections

The socioeconomic condition in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is extremely critical. It is rather difficult to find a decent job locally, and the people live in dire...
militaries on charges of espionage against Georgia. The arrested Russian militaries
Russia has been applying in relation to Georgian citizens from 2006 to 2009.

By employing these methods, the number of Russian citizens within the ter-

tories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were artificially increased to allow Moscow to
later carry out acts "for the protection of her citizens". Now, the results of such acts
is abundantly obvious. The passportization carried out by Moscow in the separatist
regions was aimed to further heat up the existing conflicts, to create a pretext for Rus-
sia's open involvement in the conflicts, and to justify annexation of the territories of
the other country. Thus, the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have turned
themselves into a political instrument in the hands of Russia.

The populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were actively involved in the
Russian Presidential and State Duma Elections. In glaring violation of international
laws and Georgian laws, election precincts were set up in both separatist regions. The
Georgian party repeatedly requested that Russia halt the unlawful process. The
Russian ambassador in Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, was even given a protest note
about the matter. However, as had been the case with other requests and protests
from Georgia, this note was utterly ignored, too.

After the passportization and artificial alteration of the population structure, a
referendum for independence was held in South Ossetia on November 12, 2006. The
results of the referendum were immediately recognized by the Russian Duma. The
attitude of the international community to the event had been negative ab initio, with
no subsequent recognition of the results by the international community. However,
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "whether the results of the refer-
endum gain international recognition or not, they will become the indicators of
South Ossetia's sentiments and choice, the consideration of which will be necessary
in real politics".

**Russian Visa Policy**

Against the background of these events, it is interesting to look at the policy that
Russia has been applying in relation to Georgian citizens from 2006 to 2009.

In September of 2006, Georgian law-enforcement authorities arrested Russian
militaries on charges of espionage against Georgia. The arrested Russian militaries
were handed over to OSCE, after which they were extradited to Russia. Despite the above
event, Russia's reaction was of complete hysteria. Russian President Vladimir Putin
called the acts of Georgia "Lavrenti Beria's legacy". However, what the Russian gov-
ernment carried out against Georgia is more reminiscent of Joseph Stalin and Lavrenti
Beria's epoch. The Kremlin imposed punitive sanctions on Georgia. In particular:

- The Russian Ministry of Transport made a decision to halt any air, road,
railway, and sea traffic with Georgia, imposing a full transport blockade against
Georgia.
- The Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications made a
decision to halt all postal operations with Georgia.
- The Embassy of Russia in Georgia stopped visa extensions to persons of
Georgian nationality, imposing a full ban with no exception whatsoever.
- The Director of the Russian Federal Immigration Service made a decision
to halt job quotas for Georgian citizens in Russia. He also launched con-
sultations with the Belarusian government to convince Belarus of making
the same decision.
- The Russian State Duma issued a special statement on "Anti-Russian and
Anti-Democratic Policy of the Government of Georgia", obligating and au-
thorizing the Russian government to take all the necessary actions against
Georgia.
- With no prior notice to Georgia, large-scale naval operations were car-
ried out within immediate proximity to the territorial waters of Georgia
(within just 0.7 sea miles off territorial waters).
- The President of Russian Railway, Mr. V. Yakunin, "advised" his own com-
pany not to purchase spare parts from Georgia (the purchase of spare parts
for 100 million Russian rubles had already been agreed upon).
- Russian commercial and state-owned companies were given instructions
from the government to halt wheat export to Georgia.
- The Russian ambassador to Georgia as well as embassy personnel and
their family members were evacuated from Tbilisi in an demonstrative and
unfriendly manner.
- The representatives of the de-facto governments of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia were officially invited to Sochi, Russia, to take part in the 2006
Kubani International Economic Forum (September 29 – October 1). They
met with President Putin in a demonstrative fashion. Thereafter, at the
official meeting with the press, Mr. Bagapshi and Mr. Kokoiti were respec-
tively referred to as the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
- Egged on with direct support from Russia, the de facto governments of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared that they were terminating the pro-
cess of negotiations with Georgia.

269 Заявление на совещании с постоянными членами Совета Безопасности, 1 октября 2006 года. See http://www.
Parallel to these activities, the wave of persecutions, arrests, and deportations of Georgian citizens spread across the whole territory of Georgia. Thousands of Georgian citizens found themselves in a deplorable and degrading state. Repressions and sanctions affected not only Georgian citizens but also Georgians with Russian citizenship, including such public figures and celebrities as the writer Boris Akunin, Bolshoi Theater soloist Zurab Soktilava, etc. The hysteria heated up to such a point that even the books of Bulat Okujava were removed from bookstores. As a result of the repressions, thousands of Georgian citizens and ethnic Georgians were arrested, abused, and deported for no reason whatsoever. With no explanations or notice, citizens lost jobs and children were kicked out of schools. Several citizens died as a result of this inhuman treatment. From September 30 to October 7, 2006, the Embassy of Georgia in the Russian Federation registered a number of acts of violence, injustice, and xenophobia:

- On October 5, 2006, the Russian Interior Ministry sent an official request to all Russian secondary schools to provide local police precincts with lists of ethnic Georgian pupils. The police were to use the lists of children to work out special control procedures for ethnic Georgian children and their families.

- In Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 4, the pupils and teachers studying and working at school in Tbilisi run by the Russian Ministry of Defense saw a notice on the school building that stated: Dear parents, Beginning October 4, 2006, Georgian citizens will no longer be taught at our school. 70 pupils who were Georgian citizens and 25 teachers were immediately dismissed from the school. Besides, 30 pupils were dismissed without any explanation from 17 schools in Batumi. These facts prove compelling evidence of ethnic discrimination against Georgian citizens studying at Russians schools.

- In the first few days after the sanctions were introduced, more than 100 Georgian citizens, predominantly women and children, were deported from Russia. The majority of the deportees held a valid visa and had been duly registered. These people were first held under arrest in local police precincts, without being told what awaited them. Later on, the Georgian citizens were deported to Georgia on a cargo airplane with inadequate travel conditions — the airplane had no seats, no toilet, and no windows. The safety standards of passenger travel were utterly disregarded.

- In Moscow, Russian Special Police Forces (OMON) broke into the Tbilisi Hotel, part of the complex jointly owned by the Embassy of Georgia, on the pretext of evicting illegal residents. The police officers encircled the hotel rooms, called on all hotel residents to leave their rooms, and subjected residents to a search. The operation was carried out in a degrading fashion, in front of TV cameras and printed media. Diplomats and technical personnel from the Embassy of Georgia in Russia were prohibited from entering the building.

- With no particular justification, Russian Special Police Forces (OMON) also broke into the Georgian Cultural Center Mziuri, a facility based in Moscow.

- Two ships sailing under the Georgian flag were stopped in Novorossiysk. Ships sailing under the Georgian flag were banned from entering Taganrog Seaport. Georgian nationals onboard ships sailing under the flags of other countries were prohibited from disembarking in Russian territory.

- Boris Akunin (Giorgi Chkhartishvili), the well-known Russian writer born in Georgia, was searched by the Russian police on the pretext of illegality. Mr. Zurab Soktilava (ethnically Georgian), the renowned tenor of the Bolshoi Theatre, was searched by the Russian police during a concert. Mr. Zurab Tsereteli (ethnically Georgian), the Rector of the Russian Academy of Arts, was searched by the police on the pretext of illegal business. All of these renowned and formerly highly respected persons were searched on the same day.

- The deputy director of the Federal Immigration Service of Russia made the following public statement: "Russia has no need for Georgians either as a workforce or as visitors".

- More than a dozen Georgian citizens were deported from Moscow, most of them were women and children. Deportations were carried out in a degrading manner, in front of TV cameras and media; the women were transferred to a hospital to publicly examine them for sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS/HIV, and the children were held in various hospitals alone, without parental attendance, for a prolonged period of time.

- Russian Interior Ministry officers made frequent inspections in restaurants and other companies owned by Georgians in and around Moscow.

- Five families who are refugees from Abkhazia and have lived in Georgia for the last fifteen years were taken to the police without allegations of any wrongdoing.

- Mr. G. Gvichiani, an arm-wrestling champion in Georgia, was murdered in Russia on ethnic grounds.

- Russian police arrested ethnic Georgians in the streets of Moscow and other major Russian cities for no particular reason. What sufficed for their arrest was that they were "persons of Caucasian nationality", a degrading term used by Russians in relation to Caucasian ethnic non-Russians. And all of this was accompanied by degrading, uncensored expressions about Georgia and Georgians.

- Georgian students at various Russian universities were sought by Russian police during lectures and in auditoriums. Georgian students were ar-

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rested, searched, and taken to police precincts without allegations of any particular wrongdoing.

- Various political groups (including pro-presidential political groups) organized protest actions in front of the Embassy of Georgia in Moscow. The participants cast stones and other items at the embassy, smashed windows, and hurled insults and disparaging words about Georgia.

- Obscene and disparaging expressions about the Georgian government and Georgian people were regularly and publicly issued by Russian politicians and members of the Russian State Duma.

- High-ranking officials from Russian law-enforcement agencies made regular public statements against ethnic Georgians now living in Russia. On no specific basis, they charged the entire Georgian diaspora with involvement in criminal and terrorist acts.

A few months before these events, on the pretext of "repairs", Russia closed down the only legitimate visa checkpoint (Kazbegi-Zemo Larsi) with Georgia.

It is important to note that, in a report published in 2007, after all of the above had occurred, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that its government "consistently push ahead with the principle line in relation with Georgia". The "core goal" identified in the report is to neutralize in advance acts "that prejudice the long-term national interests of the Georgian people". Based on these facts, it is clear that the Russian Ministry of Foreign regards the above-mentioned acts of repression and xenophobia as a policy to safeguard "the long-term national interests of the Georgian people".[1]

In April of 2008, three months before the August war, President Putin assigned the government of Russia to lift economic sanctions and visa restrictions on Georgian citizens. This was done after Russia had established direct legal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the act that provoked a severe international reaction.

In August, 2008, Russia renewed sanctions with Georgia, re-introducing the visa restrictions.

4.2.4. Culture

In 1994, the governments of the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation signed an agreement regarding cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and education.[2]

The agreement provides for creative cooperation in the field of culture and art, including:

- cooperation between creative unions of artists and cultural institutions;
- development of business contacts between organizations and cultural figures;
- organization of festivals, exhibitions, concerts, and theatrical plays;
- organization of lectures, workshops, and conferences;
- exchange of publications in the field of culture.

The parties warrant the free and equal development of the culture of Georgian national minorities living within the territory of the Russian Federation and the culture of Russian national minorities living within the territory of Georgia. In particular, they shall provide conditions conducive to the preservation of the national identity, culture, and language of the minorities of the Republic of Georgia and Russia, and to the fulfillment of their spiritual and religious needs.

Cultural relations between Georgia and Russia have a rich, centuries-old tradition. Such well-known Russian poets and writers as Alexander Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, and others were closely related to Georgia. A number of Georgian artists worked in Russia during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, including Zurab Sotkilava, Nino Ananchashvili, Niko Ziskaridze, Giorgi Danelia, Nani Bregvadze, Tamar Gverдskieli, Vakhtang Kikabidze, etc.

For the last few years, the Alexander Griboyedov Russian State Dramatic Theatre of Tbilisi, the Shota Rustaveli Georgian Academic Theatre, and the Sukhishvili and Ramishvili Georgian National Ballet have toured and staged guest performances in the Russian Federation. In April of 2007, artists from the Alexander Griboyedov Russian State Dramatic Theatre of Tbilisi took part in the 9th Annual St. Petersburg Theater Festival.

In 2007, M. Korakova, a well-known Russian director, staged a play called Chaika (The Seagull) at the Kote Marjanishvili Theatre of Tbilisi.

In May of 2007, New Names, a Moscow-based foundation, held an event (concerts and master classes) in Georgia in support of talented children.

In 2007, Batumi hosted the 1st International Georgian — Russian Poetry Festival. Griboyedov's Days were held in Tbilisi and Tsintandali in 2007.

In 2007, Tbilisi hosted an exhibition dedicated to the friendship between Elene Akhvediani and Basil Si Shukhaev, well-known artists.

In addition, Georgia rarely hosts concerts and variety shows with Russian performers.

As these dynamics show, Russian — Georgian cultural relations are getting manifestly weaker. At the same time, Georgia does harbor sympathies for the creative intelligentsia standing in opposition to Kremlin policies. Due to the solidarity expressed for Georgians following the deportations of 2006, President Saakashvili granted Georgian citizenship to Stanislav Sadalskiy, a Russian movie actor.

Despite the above-mentioned facts, it should be mentioned that Russian "soft power" has not yet gained strong support in Georgia. The above-mentioned cultural events have not become a subject of any deep interest for the Georgian population. They have not had repercussions similar to those of Novaja Volna, Slavjanskij Bazar, or other similar events held in other countries.


As for visits from representatives of the Russian cultural intelligentsia, it should be mentioned that, back in the period of the Russian Empire and later during the Soviet era, a tradition was begun where the creative elite condemned by the Russian metropolis found refuge in Georgia. Therefore, the current situation in which Tbilisi (and, interestingly, the provinces as well) welcomes the critically minded creative or journalistic elite (V. Shenderovich, M. Ganapolskiy, etc.) is in the tradition of that time. It is also important to mention that the role of kindred ties in these cultural relations is quite noticeable, for example, Mikhail Kazakov has a child and a grandchild in Tbilisi, Matveiy Ganapolskey is married to Zurab Zhvania’s sister-in-law, etc.

In addition, though the level of Russian integration in Georgia is high, the activity of Russian organizations in Georgia is quite low. Thus the Kremlin “soft power” policy has so far failed to gain support in Georgia.

**Religion**

Orthodox believers make up the majority of the population in Russia and in Georgia. The ties between the Georgian and Russian churches are centuries old. It should also be mentioned that the majority of the population in Georgia are Orthodox Christians.

As a result of the negotiations between the Georgian Patriarch and the Russian Orthodox Church following the events of August, 2008, the latter did not recognize the independence of the Abkhazian Eparchy. In October, 2008, the Synod ignored the applications of the churches of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for entry into the Russian Orthodox Church.

It should be mentioned that this agreement has never been implemented in practice.

In 1994, the governments of the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation signed an agreement regarding cooperation in science and technology as well as an agreement regarding cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and education. The agreement of 1994 recognized that cooperation in science and technology is the necessary component in the entire complex of bilateral relations. The agreement also defined the priority areas in joint scientific research activities. These included the following: physics of high energies; high-temperature superconductivity; environmental-free power engineering; perspective science technologies; human genome; safety of population and national economic facilities against the risks of natural and technological disasters; state-of-the-art methods of bioenergy; multiple utilization of natural resources; global changes in environment and climate; seismology and seismically stable construction; and study of materials.

### Primary Education

History is taught in Georgian schools as part of a curriculum and with textbooks approved by the Georgian Ministry of Education. Teaching in Russian and Georgian — Russian schools take place with this curriculum and textbooks. The situation is radically different in conflict zones. Teaching within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia takes place with the curriculum and textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, which fully complies with official Moscow ideology. Due to the current political situation, no additional information on the curricula and teaching methods at schools within the conflict zones can be obtained.

### Higher Education

Based on official Russian sources, up to 600 Georgian students and graduate students learn at government-funded higher education institutions in Rus-

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They are mostly the representatives of the Georgian Diaspora in Russia. As for students officially sent from Georgia, according to estimates by the Georgian Ministry of Education, 15 persons traveled to Russia to study in 2005, accounting for just 4.8% of the total number of students (331) traveling abroad from Georgia to study. Not a single student was sent to the Russian Federation for advancement of education in 2006—2008. These figures clearly evidence that Russia's aggressive policy toward Georgia was reflected in the field of education as well. In this respect, it is interesting to look into Order No. 1143 (December 23, 2008) of the Georgian Minister of Education and Science Regarding the Procedure for Georgian Citizens Living in the Russian Federation before August 7, 2008, to Acquire the Right to Continue Studies in Accredited Higher Education Institutions in Georgia. This procedure governs matters related to the enrollment of Georgian citizens living in the Russian Federation before August 7, 2008, in accredited Georgian higher education institutions without taking combined national exams. Under the above order, Georgian citizens in Russia before the war of August, 2008, were allowed to continue their studies in Georgian higher education institutions. This is undoubtedly a welcome step, but it should be mentioned that this order could have been issued in 2006 too, after the Georgians had been deported on a mass scale from the territory of the Russian Federation and the Kremlin repressions had affected Georgian students in both higher education institutions and secondary schools.

Under Article 4 of the Education Law of Georgia, teaching in Georgian higher education institutions shall take place in the Georgian language (and in the Georgian and Abkhazian languages in the territory of Abkhazia). The law permits education in other languages, if it is provided by an international agreement or agreed upon with the Georgian Ministry of Education and Science. To date, Russian or Russian-language higher education institutions have not obtained any accreditation by the Georgian Ministry of Education and Science. Thus, instruction in Russian in Georgian higher education state institutions has not taken place for the last few years. In private education institutions, instruction in Russian takes place at the Tbilisi Humanitarian Institute and the Tbilisi Academy of Economics and Law. However, these institutions have a low rating, and fail to enjoy any impressive popularity.

Contacts between the Ivane Javakhishvili State university of Tbilisi and the Moscow State university have been maintained on a formal level only.

The educational center Russkiy Dom operates in Georgia with the assistance of the Russkiy Mir Foundation. The center teaches the Russian language in Tbilisi. The language certificate is issued after students have passed tests organized by specialists from Russia.

Language

Certain statistical information on the community's attitude toward the Russian language can be gleaned from the Georgian printed media: in Georgia, around 1.5 million people speak Russian and 163,000 people speak English. However, young people account for nearly 80 — 90% of the English-speaking population. Only about 10 — 12% of the 1.5-million people who speak Russian are young people. This means that the figures are equal with respect to young people.

According to Georgian sociologist Iago Kachkachishvili, chairman of the Georgian Institute for Social Studies and Analysis, 55% of the Georgian population believes that they speak Russian fluently, and 70% of those surveyed said that they do not need to improve their knowledge of Russian, as they have no need to use Russian at work or in college. 10% of respondents regularly read books in Russian.

According to the results of the survey conducted under the Eurasian Monitoring Project, Russian policy in Georgia, where Russian used to be quite popular, has dramatically changed the attitude toward the language. It should also be taken into account that, as a result of Russia’s aggressive anti-Georgian policy, Russian has been declared the language of public and other institutions within the territory of Abkhazia, and within the territory of South Ossetia. It has been accorded the status of an official language. Proceeding from the above, it is manifestly clear that Russia’s language policy is a precondition for military conflicts. Thus, on the one hand, the European Convention on National Minorities that Georgia acceded to in 2005 serves the cultural development of languages in the state; but on the other hand, Russia conducts political manipulations with the Russian-speaking population aimed at recognizing and gradually annexing the Russian-speaking separatist regions, with the motive of protecting compatriots. The legal status of Russian compatriots abroad is defined in a special law of the Russian Federation. This law on the protection of compatriots and the language policy pursued by Russia are directly related to the implementation of Russian military goals in Georgia.

Regardless of the decrease in the Russian-speaking population or in the teaching of Russian in Georgia, this does not signify complete success on the part of a Western orientation in the field of education.

General education institutions (general education institutions and sectors) where teaching is conducted in a non-Georgian language will fully embark on the 12-year general education program under the national curriculum by no later than 2021.

279 Ibid.
280 Ibid.
soon after the Gallup Poll had been conducted, the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi dem-
Russian; in 2006, only 43% of respondents expressed the same view. In March, 2007,
polling in Georgia stated that it was very important for Georgian children to learn
waning interest in the language among the Georgian youth.

...onstrated its interest in opening a Russian-language school in hopes of rekindling
studying Russian to the conditions for studying any other foreign language, in
language must be equal. Although the new standard has reduced the conditions for

...econd foreign language to its pupils. In addition, a school may teach more than two for-
egn languages to its pupils.

Now we will examine Russian policy aimed at preserving the status of an off-
former Russian President Vladimir Putin declared 2007 the "Year of the Russian Language". The decision was far from purely formal, as the number of Russian-speaking people has dropped from year to year ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gallup Polls show a growth in a positive attitude toward learning the Russian language in some post-Soviet states, particularly in Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia. The Year of the Russian Language was an outstanding attempt to preserve the current status of the language of Dostoyevsky. Besides, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian language has significantly lost its status as an official language.

Despite the long-standing friction between Moscow and Tbilisi, 64% of those polled in Georgia stated that it was very important for children to learn Russian; in 2006, only 43% of respondents expressed the same view. In March, 2007, soon after the Gallup Poll had been conducted, the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi demonstrated its interest in opening a Russian-language school in hopes of rekindling waning interest in the language among the Georgian youth.

In comparison with other foreign languages, the study of Russian is given more time. By the new standard, the time given to the study of any foreign language, in


4.2.6. Russian Mass Media in Georgia

Russia lost the Georgian information space (with the exception of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in the 1990s. Aggressive Russian policy and its sanctions against Georgia (since 2006) have also adversely affected Russian interests. Russian newspapers and periodicals or Russian literature cannot be directly imported to Georgia. Moscow has closed all direct transport links with Georgia. That makes Russian products too expensive to purchase. Consequently, the number of consumers of Russian-language products is decreasing.

Year of 2008 saw many reports on cyber attacks coming from Russia and di-
rected at Georgia. The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by intensive cyber attacks designed to disrupt, deface, or knock down critical Georgian governmental and civilian online infrastructure. This information war is the subject of a special separate study. But it totally destroyed the credibility of the Russian media (except for some channels, like Echo Moskvy).

Today, Russian TV channels within the territory of Georgia (other than in the conflict zones) can be broadcast only by private commercial channels. No Russian radio is retranslated. Russian newspapers and periodicals come to Georgia in small, almost insignificant quantities. Therefore, the influence of the Russian media in Georgia can be considered very slight.

The situation in the occupied Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is absolutely and radically different.

South Ossetia

In October, 2006, President Eduard Kokoiti of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia issued an order to jam the broadcasting of Georgian channels within the terri-
tory of South Ossetia. The decision was made when the government of the separatist Republic of South Ossetia started making preparations for the referendum of November 12, 2006, on the independence of South Ossetia. In addition, presidential elections were also planned on that day in South Ossetia. Parallel to the elections, on the initiative of the Georgian government, temporary administration elections were scheduled to be held in South Ossetia, with Dimitri Sanakoyev nominated as the candidate. In this context, the translation of Georgian channels endangered the intentions of the separatists. Eduard Kokoiti openly declared that Dimitri Sanakoyev was expected to appeal, on Georgian channels, to the population of South Ossetia to participate in the alternative elections.

According to current estimates, there are a few local TV and radio companies operating in Abkhazia, including AGTRK (Abkhazian State TV Company), Abaza TV and Inter TV, and Abkhazian Radio and Radio Soma. Local TV and radio channels in Abkhazia are broadcasted in Russian and Russian-Abkhazian.

Printed media are represented with The Respublika Abkhazia, The Echo Abkhazii, The Nuzhnaya Gazeta, The Forum, The Bzib, The Chegemskaya Pravda, and The Novy Dzen. Some of these publication have an Abkhazian version as well, but overall the local printed media are published mostly in Russian.

Apsnipres, a state information agency operating in Abkhazia, spreads information mainly in Russian and based on Russian sources.

Television in Abkhazia is brought under the complete and strict control of the government and ruling elite, as it is the most usable and cheapest form of information. Newspapers in Abkhazia are expensive, costing approximately 10 — 12 roubles, which most of the population can hardly afford.

The more or less independent media in Abkhazia are kept under extremely harsh conditions. They are circulated in small quantities, and the existing advertising market is too small to provide any stable financial basis for the media’s survival. In 2008, the Abkhazian separatist government passed a law requiring the media to publish at least half of their information in the Abkhazian language. The problem is that only a small number of the Abkhazian population speaks Abkhazian and, therefore, the Abkhazian information market is very small. Thus, under such circumstances, only the government-supported media can remain in the market.

Media within the territory of Abkhazia fully reflect the course pursued and the ideology espoused by the separatist government of Abkhazia. Considering that the separatist governements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are supported by Moscow, it is represent views favourable to Russia.

It should also be taken into account that the majority of the South Ossetian population speaks fluent Georgian. In addition, Georgian television (Public Broadcaster) broadcasts daily news in the Ossetian and Abkhazian languages. Furthermore, Alania, a Russian-language TV company operating in Georgia, highlighted the events unfolding within the territory of South Ossetia. Thus, Georgian television in the territory of South Ossetia competes with the Russian media. This clashed directly with the interests of Kokoiti and the interests of Moscow. To achieve their goals, the separatists needed adequate information backing. This task was filled by the Russian channels as well as by the media controlled by Eduard Kokoiti. Therefore, the decision was made to jam Georgian channels.

At present, the territory of South Ossetia is completely covered by Russian TV channels. Such channels as Rossia, Pervyi Kanal, NTV, Kultura, STS, and others are freely broadcast across the entire territory of South Ossetia.

In addition to the Russian channels, almost all the South Ossetian media are in Russian. State TV-Company IR is broadcast for only three hours a day. The programs are broadcast mainly in Russian and in Ossetian. Regulations require that Georgian broadcasting also be provided, but so far cannot be translated "for technical reasons".

The main media of South Ossetia include Osetia.ru, Ossetia.kvaisa (Osetia.kvaisa.ru), Osinform Information Agency (Osinform.ru), and the information-analytical issue Uznhaya Osetia (ugo-osetia.ru). All these media are in Russian, and fully reflect Kremlin rhetoric and ideology. It should also be mentioned that the sites of the so-called President of South Ossetia and other official sites are Russian or Russian-English. There is almost no media operating in the Ossetian language.

Abkhazia

In one of her articles, journalist Yulia Latinina states: "Rossiya dlya Abhasii — also chto SSSR dlya Kubi. Starshiy brat" (Russia is for Abkhazia what the U.S.S.R. was for Cuba: eldest brother). The phrase reflects the true situation in Abkhazia. Russian TV channels have fully covered the media territory of Abkhazia. Such Russian TV channels as Perviy Kanal, NTV, TV-Centur, RENTV, and Kultura are freely broadcast in the territory of Abkhazia. In October, 2008, the Georgian Telecommunications Regulation Commission fined Russian TV companies such as Perviy Kanal and Vesti FM for broadcasting within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Broadcasting within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia grossly violates Georgian law. A special license is required to broadcast within the territory of Georgia, particularly within the occupied territories. The Russian channels hold no such license.

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290 The Russian rouble is used as a means of payment within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
4.3. The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy in Latvia
4.3.1. Russian Human Rights Practice 2006–2008: Latvia Introduction

As Professor Ziemele wrote in the introduction to her authoritative 2005 book, State Continuity and Nationality: the Baltic States and Russia, “[the Russian Federation has] continuously argued that the rights of the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia were violated, based on a broad definition of the Russian minority and of the applicable rights.” The purpose of the present chapter is to take stock of the developments that have taken place since these words were written, discussing Russia’s practice of human rights from 2006 to 2008 as it relates to Latvia.

The discussion will take place in three steps. First, an overview of the Russian practice of human rights will be given, discussing the instances of human rights arguments regarding Latvia in the United Nations (U.N.), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (C.E.), and in Russia’s cooperation with the European Union (EU). Second, some observations about the nature of Russia’s practice of human rights will be made. Third, the degree of success in Russia’s practice of human rights will be considered.

The broader framework for Russia’s practice of human rights may be traced back to the disagreement between Russia and Baltic States about the legal aspects of the de facto extinction of the Baltic States in 1940, due to their incorporation in the Soviet Union. Russia takes the view that the incorporation took place in accordance with the international law in force at the time, and that in any event it was recognized by the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in the Helsinki Final Act. As a result, Russia considers that, in 1990–1991, the Baltic States gained independence as new states that were under a legal obligation to grant nationality to residents of the Baltic Soviet Socialist Republic. Russia considers the failure to do so as a principal problem in their bilateral relations, “linked to the imaginary interpretation by the Latvian authorities of the Latvian membership in the USSR as "occupation,” and necessary to be addressed “at the bilateral and multilateral levels.”

The Latvian position was stated by the Latvian Constitutional Court in the 2007 Russian Border Treaty Case in the following terms:

The USSR in 1940 committed an act of aggression against the Republic of Latvia (and subsequent unlawful occupation of the Republic of Latvia), unlawfully intervened in the internal affairs of the Republic of Latvia, as well as unlawfully annexed the Republic of Latvia, ignoring the rules of international law and fundamental rules of domestic law of Latvia. … The international community does not recognize illegal annexation of a State or a part thereof to the territory of other state as accomplished. It means that the unlawfully destroyed state de jure continues existing and there consequently also exists a legal possibility to restore the respective state de facto in accordance with the rules of international law. If such state is de facto restored, it does not form a new State but continues its de facto interrupted statehood. This is the essence of the doctrine of legal continuity. … Continuity of Latvia has … been recognized by the international community. Initially this recognition manifested itself as non-recognition of the illegal incorporation of Latvia into the U.S.S.R., but after restoration of independence of Latvia it turned into recognition of continuity of the State of Latvia, namely, the international community recognized the State restored on May 4, 1990, to be the same State, independence of which had been unlawfully terminated in 1940.

Latvia therefore takes the view that it is a continuation of the Latvian state of 1940, and since “[r]ights and duties of a state follow from its legal identity,” its rights and obligations should be identified in reference to the 1940 situation. Accordingly, at least in the first instance, the residents of Soviet Latvia would not be entitled to Latvian nation-
ality, because there was no lawful legal nexus between the Soviet Union and Latvia.297

The framework within which Russian practice operates therefore consists of at least two argumentative strata: the broader argument flows from the dispute about general international law (particularly regarding the Russian argument about arbitrary deprivation of nationality) and the narrower argument flows from more particular human rights considerations (whatever the general situation, particularly regarding the procedures for naturalization and minority rights to language and education). It would seem that it is the failure to clearly distinguish between these types of arguments that makes Russian practice controversial. The content of the Russian argument is often less objectionable than the apparent implication (or express suggestion) that criticisms of human rights support or follow from its broader position regarding the lawfulness of 1940. It should be emphasized at the outset that the present contribution does not even think of going in the direction of substantively critiquing the human rights recommendations and arguments — the internalization of human rights norms and values into the domestic rules and discourses is undoubtedly a positive dynamic that should assist in facing and solving controversial issues. Rather, it only queries whether the form, content, and structure through which Russia formulates its practice is genuinely helpful at either the inter-state or intra-state level.

**Russian Human Rights Practice**

Over the years, Russia has explored different mechanisms available in the frameworks of international organizations to voice its human rights concerns. The activities peaked at the time of the withdrawal of the Russian army, in the early 1990s, and when the Baltic States joined the EU and NATO in the early 2000s. Speaking in 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made the following observation:

> As for the ways in which we plan to protect the rights of Russian-speaking people in the former Soviet Union countries, they are well known: international law and the need to comply with the relevant obligations and appropriate norms and standards. In Latvia's and Estonia's case these are primarily the recommendations approved by the commissioner of the Council of Europe for Human Rights and the OSCE Commissioner for National Minorities. Apart from that, we are pressing for Latvia's and Estonia's compliance with these recommendations within the framework of our partnership with the European Union.298

The next sections will address the Russian practice of human rights issues in these forums. It should be noted that only the Russian practice that has been formally put forward on behalf of Russia will be documented. The possible influence that Russian experts may have had in their non-official capacity in the process of the formulation of documents, e.g., in U.N. human right bodies, will not be considered. Similarly, the activities of some Latvian representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the C.E. and the European Parliament of the EU regarding human rights will not be dealt with.

**In the United Nations Human Rights Council**

On March 16, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yakovenko explained the Russian position regarding the Human Rights Council:

> Russian delegations at HRC sessions will...have tasks of their own, dictated by our national interests. In particular, we intend actively to use further the podium of the main U.N. rights body for drawing the attention of the international community to the negative humanitarian situation in Latvia and Estonia, in particular to the policy being pursued by these states’ authorities of open discrimination against the non-titular population. I shall stress that neither Russia, nor international experts make any excessive requirements for Latvia and Estonia. It is about the need for these states to observe universally recognized standards in the field of human rights, in particular for the protection of minority rights.299

On April 19, 2008, a Russian representative to the Human Rights Council, Sergey Kondratieff, made the following statement regarding a report by Special Rapporteur Doudou Diène on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.


298 Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Press Conference on the Results of the Activities of Russian Diplomacy in 2006, Moscow, December 20, 2006; see also Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy, May 10, 2007 ("Still urgently relevant is the implementation by the European Union of the part of its commitments under the Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and Russia — EU Relations, adopted in Luxembourg on April 27, 2004, concerning the due observance of national minority rights in Latvia and Estonia. ... It remains a principled task for Russia to defend the rights of Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia... Outbursts of the "occupation" rhetoric, manifestations of neonazism in these countries and plans of Estonian national radicals to dismantle Soviet soldiers' monuments should further be consistently opposed.")

299 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Yakovenko’s Interview with RIA Novosti Concerning Adoption by the General Assembly of a Resolution Setting up a Human Rights Council, March 16, 2006.

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said that this draft resolution was the result of a number of rounds of discussions. From the point of view of international law, this was an attempt to set the norms on human rights law and of stateless people in one document. It ensured the right to citizenship. The Russian Federation hoped that this draft would be adopted without a vote. The resolution would be a basis to combat the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship.  

This resolution was adopted without a vote. Latvia was not expressly mentioned, but it can be reasonably assumed that from the Russian perspective the resolution supported its general position regarding arbitrary deprivation of nationality. From the Latvian perspective, no issue of arbitrary deprivation would arise since Latvia was not a successor state of the Soviet Union, and therefore had no legal obligation to grant nationality.

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300 Human Rights Council Hears Addresses by Special Procedures on Durban Declaration, Racism, Minority Issues and People of African Descent, 19 March 2008. Available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/F79D22CB3C652052C026C1257411004A80D5?opendocument. Last accessed on June 1, 2009. The Special Rapporteur’s Report on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance in its Third Addendum of March 5, 2008, discussed the Latvian situation and, even though making numerous far-reaching suggestions regarding the improvement of the treatment of minorities, clearly proceeded from the generally accepted premise about the general international law context: “Latvia, like the other Baltic countries, is currently at a turning point in its history. The central challenge it faces is to build a democratic, egalitarian, and interactive society by taking into account both the need to reassert the continuity of its national identity—shaken and eroded by occupation but deeply rooted in memory—and the recognition and respect of the rights of all minorities including those resulting from the occupation. Two principles should guide this process: respect for historical truth in the construction of the new national identity and non-discrimination of minorities,” A/HRC/9/Add. 3, also 6.


303 A/RES/63/162; A/RES/62/142; A/RES/61/147; A/RES/60/143.


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General Assembly

In 2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006 the General Assembly adopted Russian-sponsored resolutions on the “Inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.” While not mentioning Latvia in express terms and not being directed at the protection of human rights stricto sensu, Russia appears to have perceived it as furthering its position against Latvia. As the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yakovenko explained, “[i]t has a direct bearing on the processes in Latvia and Estonia, where they pursue at the state level a policy towards the heroization of Nazism and justification of its ideology.” The reason for this position is the yearly exercise of freedom of assembly in the centre of Riga on March 16 by Latvians (forcibly) drafted into Waffen SS, which Russia characterizes as state-sponsored or at least supported display of Nazi behavior.

In the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCE has historically been an important element in the relationship between Latvia and Russia, particularly regarding the withdrawal of the Russian army and the role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel. After Latvian accession to the EU, the importance of OSCE appears to have decreased.

Ministerial Council

On November 29, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made the following statement at the meeting of the Ministerial Council:

The practice of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship is unacceptable in modern-day Europe. We shall systematically work to guarantee the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia in accordance with the decisions and recommendations of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The current chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe — Slovakia — has proclaimed the building of a "citizens’ Europe" as one of the priorities of its chairmanship. Through joint efforts, including those involving the active participation of the OSCE, let us make 2008 the year in which massive statelessness is eliminated in Europe.
Permanent Council

On July 31, 2009, Russia made observations regarding The Case of Kononov versus Latvia in the European Court of Human Rights. to which Latvia responded.

In the Council of Europe

Parliamentary Assembly

In 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1572 (2006) and Recommendation 1772 (2006) on the “Rights of National Minorities in Latvia”, calling for improvement of the treatment of national minorities. These documents were based on drafts and an explanatory memorandum by Rapporteur Severin. Severin’s work was based on fact-finding visits to Latvia and Russia, and the idea of the report built upon earlier motions that had also been signed by the Russian representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly.

On October 4, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov addressed the Parliamentary Assembly, remarking that “[t]he extremely high attention paid to the presidential elections held in Belarus on 19 March is in striking contrast to the lack of any substantial interest for the parliamentary elections to take place on 7 October in Latvia, where tens of thousands of so-called “non-citizens” are deprived of voting rights.”

Committee of Ministers

In 2007 and 2008, the Committee of Ministers was preparing a reply to the Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution 1772 (2006) on the “Rights of National Minorities in Latvia”, finally adopting it on October 13, 2008. At the discussion of the draft reply, Russia proposed some amendments, generally attempting to strengthen the language of the reply. In particular, Russia proposed an alternative paragraph 9 (not included in the final reply):

On September 22, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (as Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the C.E.) participated in a meeting of the leaders of the C.E. and OSCE, and drew their attention to an unprecedented problem for contemporary Europe of the mass noncitizenship in Latvia and Estonia. The Russian side also gave a principled assessment of the unpreparedness of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to organize a full-format mission to observe the upcoming parliamentary elections in Latvia on October 7, in which hundreds of thousands of members of the Russian-speaking population, that is “noncitizens”, will not be eligible to vote.

European Court of Human Rights

In accordance with Article 36(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Russia has intervened in a number of cases brought by individual claimants against Latvia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In the case Sissojeva vs Latvia, considered by the Grand Chamber, Russia supported the claimant’s view that her Article 8 (private and family life) and Article 34 (no hindrance of the right of application) rights had been breached through proceedings regarding the deportation of a family of a Russian officer pursuant to a Latvian – Russian treaty of 1991 on the basis of Regulation N 2391-1 of 5 September 1991 of the Fifth Congress of People’s Deputies (parliament) of the USSR.

the applicants were the victims of political changes beyond their control, and the ordeals they had endured had to be seen in the wider context of an anti-Russian policy on the part of the Latvian authorities since the country’s return to independence.319

The Grand Chamber reversed the chamber’s finding against Latvia and struck the case out of the list because the claimants had lost their status as victims. After the judgment, Russia commented that “[t]he tendency for a revision by ECHR of the rulings made on its behalf and the adoption of decisions based on bias and lop-sided approaches, to the detriment of a comprehensive analysis of the juridical facts and of the principle of impartiality of the Court, cannot but worry us. ... The logic of action chosen by ECHR evokes regret. It not only does not strengthen the authority of the Court as a body of international justice, but also, in essence, makes possible its use for purposes incompatible with the letter and spirit of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and gives carte blanche for the application of double standards and the pursuit of a discriminatory policy by member countries of the Council of Europe”.320

In the case Kononov vs Latvia, Russia supported the claimant’s view that his Article 7 (nullum crimen sine lege) rights were breached by his prosecution by Latvian authorities for war crimes he allegedly committed as a commander of Soviet guerrilla forces during the Second World War. The events took place in 1944 against the background of occupying German forces fighting occupying Soviet forces across the territory of Latvia. Some villagers had allegedly informed the German forces about the whereabouts of another guerrilla group, leading to its destruction. In response, a guerrilla group led by Mr. Kononov (who stayed in the forest during the operation) killed the defenseless villagers, including burning alive a pregnant woman. Latvian courts found the claimant guilty for the war crime of killing civilians. The proceedings were extremely controversial, constituting from the Russian perspective an attempt to prosecute an anti-Axis veteran for his heroic war-time actions. As Russia explained, “[t]he future judgment of the ECHR in Kononov’s case is particularly important in view of the policy being pursued by the Latvian authorities of reviewing the results of the Second World War and of prosecuting veterans who fought on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition forces”.321 In the proceedings, Russia inter alia submitted that:

the Latvian courts should not have applied by analogy the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal – whose purpose was to punish crimes committed by the Axis powers in the occupied territories – to the applicant, who had fought alongside the anti-Hitler coalition in his own country, the USSR. Such an extension was unacceptable and manifestly contrary to the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal on which the entire post-war legal and political system was based.322

The chamber found, with three judges out of seven dissenting, that Latvia had breached Article 7 because the villagers had become combatants and therefore were legitimate targets for attack. The judgments of the Latvian courts and the Latvian submissions to the ECtHR are not models of clarity and persuasiveness, but neither is the ECtHR’s position. In particular, the court appears to be unaware about (or implicitly rejects) such aspects of international humanitarian law as the applicability of the laws of war to all parties in conflict, and the impermissibility of killing of defenseless people, whether civilians (as per war crimes of murder of civilians) or combatants (as per war crimes of giving no quarter).323 The case has been now referred to the Grand Chamber.

Commissioner for Human Rights

On April 25, 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov met Commissioner Hammarberg and “voiced concern about the continuing discrimination against the Russian-speaking residents of Latvia and Estonia and about the infringements of their political, socioeconomic, linguistic and educational rights”.324

In Cooperation with the European Union325

Russia has consistently raised human rights issues during discussions with the European Union, particularly in the period leading to Latvian accession to the EU. However, with the relatively diminishing role of the OSCE, the EU is now becoming, both internally and externally, an important actor in human rights issues. On February 15, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made the following statement in a press conference after a session of the Russia — EU Permanent Partnership Council, in the context of EU accusations of human rights violations in Russia:

We examined the situation with the rights of the national minorities in a number of EU countries, primarily Latvia and Estonia. ... [W]e are going to talk about the glaring problems of the more than half a million people, if we

319 Sisojeva vs Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, [88], 15 January 2007.
320 Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding Examination in European Court of Human Rights of the Sisojeva vs. Latvia Case, 9 June 2006.
322 Kononov v Latvia, no. 36376/04, [104], 24 July 2008.
324 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg, April 25, 2008.
put together the persons living in Latvia and Estonia, who are not citizens, but are considered "aliens" in accordance with the documents that have been issued to them. If there is some state where such practice also takes place, I would be very interested to know what state that is. Today raised this question before my colleagues. They were unable to explain to me how they treat this issue. But we agreed that it would be discussed in consultations...

On March 4, 2006, Russian Foreign Ministry published the following press release regarding the Russia — EU Human Rights Consultations:

The Russian side cited concrete facts attesting to the recently emergent tendencies toward deterioration of the human rights situation in the EU space, and drew the European partners' special attention to the fact that the systematic violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia and Estonia, as revealed during the previous rounds of consultations, still have not been corrected, and that the measures taken in this direction are insufficient. 326

On September 23, 2006, Lavrov met with foreign ministers of the EU, "and the status of the national minorities in Latvia and Estonia also were examined". 328 On November 4, 2006, Lavrov participated in a meeting of the Permanent Council of the Russia — EU Partnership, explaining after the meeting that:

[We believe that attention should not slacken to such issues as the status of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia. ... [J]ust as the Russia — EU Joint Statement of April 2004 says, we want Latvia and Estonia to respect human rights, minority rights. Specifically, we want both countries to comply with the recommendations formulated in this connection by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. These are very concrete and exclusively practical recommendations. There are no ambiguities in this matter. ... I fully agree with you that the process of naturalization should be accelerated and that people should be encouraged to become integrated in those societies. As a matter of fact, no encouragement is needed because the overwhelming majority of non-citizens, who have in their pockets shameful documents labeling them as "aliens" in the countries where they were born and for whose welfare they have been working, have no other ambition except being loyal citizens of Latvia and Estonia, respectively, with equal rights. 329

On November 8, 2006, Russia — EU Consultations on Human Rights took place, and "the delegation of the Russian Federation raised the question of the observance of national minority rights in the EU space, including those of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia". 330 On April 23, 2007, Russia — EU Permanent Partnership Council took place, Lavrov stating that "[w]e expect that the questions still outstanding on the EU part will be settled. In the first place, I mean the situation of the national minorities in Latvia and Estonia". 331 On December 14, 2007, Russian Foreign Ministry stated that "the subject of discussions by Russian experts and EU representatives traditionally is the situation with the realization of fundamental rights and freedoms both in Russia and in the EU member states. ... We express our special concern over the systemic violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia and Estonia, including the groundless refusal by the governments of these countries to grant citizenship to hundreds of thousands of compatriots". 332 On June 28, 2008, Russian President Medvedev talked after the Russia — European Union summit, stating that "[w]e continue to be concerned about the situation with the rights of our compatriots in Latvia and Estonia". 333

The Nature of the Russian Practice

Considering the broad and multi-textured nature of Russian human rights practice regarding Latvia, which addresses different matters in different contexts, one should be mindful of the pitfalls of generalizing the anecdotal. Nevertheless, a number of cautious and tentative propositions may be made. First, and probably least importantly, one cannot help but be baffled by the form in which Russia often chooses to express its practice. To consider as examples the Russian reactions to Special Rapporteur Diène’s Report and the ECtHR Grand Chamber's judgment in Sisojeva, one is struck by the ad hominem nature of the argument and the immediate readiness to expressly suggest individual or institutional incompetence or bias — something quite different from the way respectful disagreement would usually be expressed in inter-

326 Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov After the Russia — EU Troika Session Held in Vienna, February 15, 2006.
329 Transcript of Remarks and Answers to Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov on the Results of the Meeting of the Permanent Council of the Russia — EU Partnership at the Foreign Minister Level, Brussels, November 3, 2006.
332 Russian MFA Spokesman Mikhail Kanyunin commentary regarding the EU Council Conclusions on the implementation of the EU policy on human rights and democratization in third countries, of December 10, 2007, and December 14, 2007.
333 Following high-level talks between Russia and the EU, Dmitry Medvedev, Javier Solana, Jose Manuel Barroso, and Janez Janša held a joint press conference, Khanty-Mansiysk, June 27, 2008.
national practice. The same observation applied, if only a fortiori, to the somewhat intemperate form in which the Russia often voices its critique of the Latvian description of 1940 events as occupation. Even if not a totally unobjectionable point, it is an established position taken by the majority of authorities from Lemkin himself, back in 1944, to Benvenisti and Crawford in more recent times.

The second point is a more substantive one. It seems that Russia attempts to merge (or at the very least fails to make any clear distinction between) the different causes and objects of the human rights critiques it makes. There is a normative mismatch between the Russian premise — that Latvia is a new state which has arbitrarily deprived some of the Soviet Latvia’s residents of nationality — and the particular and rather narrow claims taken from the recommendations of the human rights bodies (municipality voting rights and easier naturalization for children and the elderly). Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has recently stated that “Russia isn’t putting any special claims against Latvia and Estonia in this regard, but supports the recommendations of specialized international organizations for broadening the rights of the national minorities and for a European solution to the problem of noncitizenship.” However, the logical conclusion of his broader critique should be a *restitutio ad integrum* in the form of a comprehensive grant of nationality and not merely changes to the process of naturalization.

An overview of the practice seems to suggest that the relationship between the broader and narrower critiques is not one of particular recommendations being supported by the general arguments, but rather the general arguments becoming the particular human rights considerations, implicitly or explicitly used to buttress the Russian view about the lawfulness of 1940–1991. The sharp personal critique of Special Rapporteur Diène reflects this kind of thinking. Even though particular recommendations were very similar to those given by the other bodies usually relied on by Russia (easier naturalization of children and elderly people and municipal voting rights), the objectionable part was the Rapporteur’s premise about the international wrongfulness of 1940.

One can only speculate about the reasons for this confusion. One (and the most mundane) possibility is simple inertia, with the long-standing position in the dispute with the Baltic States about the lawfulness of 1940–1991 having been internalized in the bureaucratic apparatus, and new arguments addressing broadly similar issues therefore being instinctively conceptualized and applied through the established intellectual framework. To put the same point in slightly more sophisticated terms, there may (and surely should) be an awareness that most states, courts, and legal writers have taken the side of the Baltic States in the dispute about the lawfulness of 1940–1991. A more promising way of presenting the argument would therefore proceed in strictly human rights terms, at the same time keeping both the general and particular arguments loosely linked together, in the hope that a success on the human rights front would help in unraveling (or at least confusing) the view of states on the broader issue. Another possibility is linked to the Russian practice in the context of negotiations with the European Union. The Latvian and Estonian human rights issue seems to be the only genuine *tu quoque* argument that Russia can present to European criticisms (of human rights, rule of law, Chechnya, Georgia, freedom of the press, the judicial system, etc.). While the argument would not be successful in legal terms — human right obligations operate *erga omnes partes* and a breach by one party does not excuse a breach by another — the mixture of controversial broader argument with narrower human rights recommendations appears to provide an attractive point that is sufficiently complicated for the other side to quickly untangle.

The third, broader aspect of Russian practice is its emphasis on informality. Russia has focused on those dispute settlement procedures where its “real world” powers would play a more efficient role. As shown above, most of Russian practice has been expressed in the settings of negotiations and multilateral diplomacy. Russia has not been an active user of direct inter-state judicial dispute settlement. As the recent Russian position indicates, Russian contemporary international law provides a variety of ways of bringing state-to-state international claims regarding actual or ostensible human rights disputes, whether in the ECtHR or the International Court of Justice. One can only speculate whether the aversion of judicial dispute settlement exhibits uncertainty about the merits of the arguments confidently espoused in other settings, or merely the institutional legal culture with a long-established and clear preference for non-judicial settlement of international disputes. It is questionable whether the Russian interventions in the ECtHR will lead to a reappraisal of the value of formalized dispute settlement. The Russian arguments in Sisojeva implying a general system of discrimination were not even considered. The Russian argument in Kononov that the law of the Nuremberg Tribunal can be applied only to the crimes by Axis States ignores the express confirmation by the Tribunal that it was applying customary international law. The Russian claims in Zhdanok vs. Latvia and, unfortunately, not only in it used as supposedly legal arguments the terms and conclusions that are at variance with historical facts. On the whole we cannot but be disturbed by the tendency for an increase of the share of the political component in the activities of the European Court of Human Rights, Mikhail Kamynin, the Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from ITAR-TASS News Agency Regarding a Revision by European Court of Human Rights of the Decision in the Case of T. Zhdanok vs. Latvia, March 22, 2006.

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violations, in particular regarding the right to life and the right not to be tortured in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{341} The refusal to ratify Protocol 14 of the ECHR meant to reform the ECtHR appears to suggest a disapproval of a strong law-based system of dispute settlement rather than a willingness to embrace it.\textsuperscript{342}

The Degree of Success of the Russian Practice

At the end of 2006, Russia viewed its human rights practice as generally successful:

In order to encourage the authorities of these Baltic States to revisit their current discriminatory policy and practices with regard to the Russian-language minority, including veterans of the Great Patriotic War and law enforcement agencies of the former Soviet Union, Russia actively used bilateral and multilateral contacts at different levels with representatives of the Baltic States, and European Union, NATO, Council of Europe, and OSCE member states. The question of continued discrimination of the Russian-language population in Latvia and Estonia were regularly raised both with authoritative international organizations (the U.N., the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, etc.) and at the bilateral level (for example during expert consultations with the European Union on human rights). ECHR capabilities were actively used on this track.

The growing understanding by the international community of the legitimacy of relevant Russian concerns became an indisputable result of Russia’s purposeful efforts. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres repeatedly gave recommendations to Latvian and Estonian authorities on such key issues as the simplified and accelerated naturalization of stateless persons, education reform that would take into account the opinion of the Russian-language population, including teachers, and broader possibilities for the use of the native language in places of compact residence of the Russian-language population.\textsuperscript{343}

It is complicated to assess whether the view of the success of the practice is substantiated or not. For the sake of convenience, it may be preferable to distinguish different strands of practice. At the most specific level, it does not seem that the suggestions regarding simplified naturalization procedures for certain groups and municipal voting rights can be traced back to Russian practice and efforts. A more plausible explanation would see the Russian practice as borrowing on the reports.

At a more general level, the critique of the use of international criminal law to prosecute crimes committed by Soviet forces and authorities seems to misstate elementary propositions of international law (impermissibility of war crimes and crimes against humanity for any party to the conflict, etc.). Still, even though substantively unpersuasive and presented in rather uninspiring terms, the Russian position may have been partly successful in the Kononov case where the ECtHR found for the claimant.\textsuperscript{344} Since pleadings by the parties and Russia, the judgment itself, and the separate opinions are equally confusing, it is complicated to trace back particular arguments to their sources. It remains to be seen what position the Grand Chamber will take on the issue.

At the most general level, while the way of pressing the arguments about 1940—1991 and human rights together may have muddled the intellectual waters a little bit, it does not seem that Russia has been successful in deconstructing the consensus of the unlawfulness of the Soviet Union’s conduct through the backdoor. As Diène’s recent 2008 report shows, the accepted framework of thinking about the issue is that “the central challenge [Latvia] faces is to build a democratic, egalitarian and interactive society by taking into account both the need to reassert the continuity of its national identity — shaken and eroded by occupation but deeply rooted in memory — and the recognition and respect of the rights of all minorities including those resulting from the occupation, composed of the ethnic Russians who immigrated to Latvia during the Soviet occupation, many of whom have yet to acquire Latvian citizenship and are living under the status of non-citizens”.\textsuperscript{345} The issues of human rights, minority rights, and discrimination may be controversial and will have to be dealt with, but the critique and the debate does not challenge the place Latvia occupies in the international community.

4.3.2. Russian Compatriots Policy in Latvia

General description

In the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of 2007, the section “Protection of Compatriots’ Interests Abroad” states that tens of millions of our people have remained outside state borders as a result of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Therefore, according to the document, the protection of compatriots’ interests is a natural priority

\textsuperscript{343} Report, 2.
\textsuperscript{344} Report, 2.
\textsuperscript{345} Report, 2.
for foreign policy. This shows that the Russian Federation wants to cast its activities in compatriots’ policy as a moral obligation towards its people. We must recall that, in accordance with the official Russian definition of “compatriots abroad”, about 28% of the Latvian population (including Latvian citizens) could be considered compatriots. In practice we have seen that a large portion of Russians living abroad do not consider themselves as affiliated with Russia. Nevertheless, the broad social sphere that Russia declares to be “our people” points to the specific style and ambitions of Russian foreign policy.

Several Russian experts involved in the issue of compatriots use the term “divided nation”, stressing that Russian compatriots living in the “near abroad” (the post-Soviet nations) have remained outside their homeland against their will. They claim that these individuals didn’t leave their country but, rather, that their country itself has “disappeared”. In these cases, of course, the migration processes strategically implemented by Moscow in the occupied territories during the Soviet period are not mentioned.

Thanks to President Putin’s special attention to the issue of compatriots living abroad, Russian policy in regards to compatriots abroad was activated and experienced a yearly growth in financial support during his term as president. The Russian ruling elite’s suspicions about the possible transfer of a “color revolution” to Russia from its neighboring states provided the basis for the larger involvement of NGOs in the implementation of Russian foreign and domestic policy from 2005 to 2007. Compatriots policy was no exception. With the support of the ruling powers, NGOs were established in Russia itself and compatriots’ NGOs were supported in Russia’s neighboring states, including in Latvia.

The “Program for Working with Compatriots Abroad, 2006—2008”, approved by the Russian government’s mandate Nr. 1370-r of October 2, 2006, guaranteed the provision of information support for compatriots (the creation and maintaining of web sites, press publications, TV and radio programs for compatriots, collaboration with Russian-language mass media abroad), among other things. Similar tasks were formulated in the new program for 2009—2011. Because a different part of this report discusses the activities of the Russian media in Latvia, this section will examine only a few examples of Latvian media published in Russian.

The target audience of Russian compatriots’ policy in Latvia are as follows: citizens of the Russian Federation who live in Latvia; the entire Russian minority (including citizens of Latvia); non-citizens of Latvia; and all non-citizens of Latvia who speak Russian. Within the context of Latvia we cannot speak about some consolidated community of compatriots.

It is clear that a socially and politically consolidated state is less susceptible to external influence. Even though Latvia has not experienced any serious ethnic conflicts since the regaining of independence, it would be premature to speak of a consolidated, integrated society. A demographically and linguistically weak majority is not well placed to live with a large post-imperial minority, which is politically supported by a non-democratic neighboring state. Researcher Nils Mužnieks has concluded that, since 2001, Latvia has not moved any further in achieving the objectives of integration programs, i.e., the consolidation of the values of people and the promotion of a feeling of belonging to Latvia. There are still persistent disagreements about values and attitudes, with ethnic Russians and other minorities on the one side, and ethnic Latvians on the other.

**Support of Coordination of Pro-Russian Organizations**

The role of NGOs in the reaching of foreign policy goals was secured in the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of 2007. NGOs have been assigned a significant role in the structuring of the “Russian World”. This applies both to Russian NGOs and to compatriots organizations elsewhere in the world.

Today, approximately 250 NGOs related to ethnic minorities are registered in Latvia, the most organized and visible of which are Russian organizations (approximately 100 organizations). Russian non-governmental organizations can be classified into the following groups, according to interests and type of activities: organizations with cultural aims (for example, the Culture Society of Russians in Latvia, the Association of Russian Language and Literature Teachers in Latvia, and others); organizations that provide legal or informative assistance (Independent Expert Association of Latvia, Citizen and Non-citizen Union); organizations that were established as a result of the education reform (Association for the Support of Russian Language Schools in Latvia); organizations with broad aims to support Russian social life (Community of Russians in Latvia, Russian Society in Latvia); and organizations claiming the cross-sectoral rights of non-citizens (Latvian Human Rights Committee, associations of war veterans and participants of the Leningrad blockade, Headquarters for the Protection of Russian Schools).

Most of the above-mentioned organizations are small and have rather low membership figures. Therefore, in recent years individual Russian organizations have joined together into larger associations in, such as the United Congress of Latvian — Russian Communities, which established the Russian Compatriots Coordination Council under the auspices of the Russian Embassy. A separate Association of Russian Citizens in Latvia exists, as well as a Latvian Union of Russian Compatriots. These associations represent a number of small and divided Russian organizations.

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348 Speech at the conference Policy of Integration, organised by the IUMSILS on November 28, 2007, in Riga, Latvia. On personal file with author.

which individually have financial difficulties that reduce their capabilities. Many Russian organizations depend of institutional and financial support from Russia, which has expressed an interest in providing more support if local organizations are united and uniform.

Although Russian NGOs are not formally coordinated in Latvia, there are several scarcely interconnected structures that have generally similar functions and frequently overlap in their implementation. In the coordination of the NGO sector, two primary structures can be distinguished: the Coordination Council at the Russian Embassy and the Center of Culture and Business at the Moscow House. Meanwhile, Russia has opened a Russian Center at Daugavpils University and the Baltic International Academy.

Since 2007, an increasingly larger role has been played by the Russkiy Mir Foundation, whose aims are to support Russian-language mass media abroad, to support the creation of organizations for youth, children, and women abroad, and to support civic organizations. The foundation has also played an increasingly larger role in the coordination of Russian organizations in Latvia. A review of the results of project applications published in 2008 reveals that the foundation supported 35 projects submitted from Latvia — one of the largest numbers that year. In comparison with the number of countries in which the foundation is based, the projects from Latvia amount to approximately 7% of all supported projects. In Latvia, the foundation supports such organizations as the Latvian Russian Culture society, the War and Work Veteran Society of Liepāja, the Latvian Youth Club, the Dzimtene Association of Compatriots, the Association of Russian-Language Schools, the Latvian Human Rights Committee, the Union of Leningrad Blockade Participants, the Union of underage Concentration Camp Captives. These organizations are generally financed through the Russkiy Mir Foundation by supporting the projects they submit.

In 2008, Valērijs Buhvalovs and Jakovs Pliners, both members of parliament from the party For Human Rights in United Latvia (FHRUL, in Latvian: PCTVL) compiled a pedagogical methodical collection in Russian, Russians Schools in Latvia in the Twenty-first Century, with the support of the Russkiy Mir Foundation. European Parliament deputy from Latvia Tatjana Ždanoka also collaborates with the foundation. In recent years she has often participated in events organized and supported by the foundation in various countries. Ždanoka also gave a speech at the ceremony marking the establishment of the foundation, in Moscow in 2007. These and similar activities give politicians the chance to enhance their political capital and popularity.

Russian interests are also looked after by the Moscow House in Riga, founded and run by the government of Moscow and envisaged “for humanitarian and business” partnerships with Russian compatriots residing abroad. Russian officials habitually see organizations of Latvia’s Russian speakers as their natural partner for disseminating information, organizing seminars or conferences, recruiting participants for mass rallies and pickets, and collecting signatures for petitions to international institutions and EU governments claiming discrimination against national minorities. The Moscow House approbates and manages the distribution of finances between Latvia-settled NGOs. In Latvia, the Moscow House realizes the interests of its founders, especially Yury Luzhkov, a minion of Vladimir Putin, and the pro-Kremlin party United Russia. The fund grants money to veterans of World War Two, paying their medical expenses, such as hearing aids, and supplementing their pensions. It also organizes programs for teaching Russian language and culture to Russian youth in Latvia. The priorities of the Moscow House are veterans of World War Two and young people—the two psychologically most sensitive parts of society, who are most easily subjected to politically ideological manipulations.

According to official information, the Embassy of Russia has financially supported a number of Russian NGOs in Latvia, for instance, the Association for the Support of Russian Language Schools in Latvia and the Latvian Human Rights Committee. Support for NGOs sometimes is related to the support for pro-Russian political parties.

Example:
On March 22, 2009, the Latvian news program Nekā personīga (Nothing personal), broadcast on Latvian channel TV 3, ran a story claiming that two pro-Russian parties, PCTVL (For human Rights in United Latvia) and SC (Harmony Center), received money from Russia. The journalists claimed that those parties were probably getting finances from the pro-Kremlin Russkiy Mir Foundation. Journalists interviewed two politicians who also represent Russian NGOs, Igor Pimenov (SC) and Gennady Kotov (PCTVL and Latvian Human Rights Committee). They said that large problems exist in detaching financing between parties and NGOs. Pimenov said that resources are managed just for the tasks of projects. Both politicians demonstrated that NGOs could only be like a defilade for getting money from Russia, which in the case of parties is illegal. Another story in the broadcast included material from a conference on March 15 in Riga, entitled “A Future without Nazism”, which was probably financed by Russia. Kotov, one of the conference organizers, told journalists that the bill for the conference room was 1,000 euro, though he didn’t know where the organization got this money from.

Information Support for Russian Compatriots

The mass media plays an important role in the implementation of compatriot policy in Latvia. Newspapers such as Čas and Vesti Segodnya, which define themselves in terms of common journalism terminology as daily newspapers, which have expressed an interest in providing more support if local organizations are united and uniform.

Although Russian NGOs are not formally coordinated in Latvia, there are several scarcely interconnected structures that have generally similar functions and frequently overlap in their implementation. In the coordination of the NGO sector, two primary structures can be distinguished: the Coordination Council at the Russian Embassy and the Center of Culture and Business at the Moscow House. Meanwhile, Russia has opened a Russian Center at Daugavpils University and the Baltic Interna-
pers with a political, social, and cultural orientation, are really rather far from this definition as it is understood in the Western world. The Russian-language newspaper Čas, in its publications from March 2006 until the end of 2008, has, on the one hand, been pretentious about the conditions of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia, and, on the other hand, it has praised the compatriot policy implemented by the Kremlin.

Overall, there have been 120 publications of different size over the specified period of time, which deal with a vast array of topics related to compatriot issues in Latvia. Most of these publications have a tendency to reflect the conditions of the Russian community in Latvia as discriminating. These articles mostly discuss the problems of non-citizens and emphasize the restrictions of rights they have in Latvia. Most often the articles discuss the condition of the Russian language and non-citizens’ aspirations for achieving voting rights. These articles have adorned the columns of Čas since 2006, when Russia started an active policy of retrieving compatriots. The newspaper developed a real campaign for praising Russian compatriot policy; it also invited Russians to return to Russia, emphasizing what benefit it would be to Russia if they returned there. The feeling of belonging to another country was invoked in Russians — not to the one where they currently live, but to some primordial homeland from which they all arose. Čas works by using well-processed, though obvious propaganda methods characteristic of Soviet newspapers, and praise particular circumstances and personalities. Russian compatriot policy is reflected in a positive light: it is stated that nationals who are ready to re-emigrate have a good opportunity to do so and shall receive various benefits from the Kremlin, like housing, compensations, and renewal of Russian citizenships. The newspaper also casts a positive light on the social situation of Russian citizens in Russia. When discussing the Russian compatriot program, there is a heavy use of continuous juxtapositions of Latvia, Russia, and their situations.

Another Russian-language newspaper Vesti often condemns processes in Latvia and dramatizes the conditions of the Russian community here. For example, in the article “Moscow will seriously deal with Russians in Latvia”, the author partially emphasizes the discrimination of the Russian community in Latvia and states that this situation is not present in any other country in the world. The article shows that the problems of Russians in Estonia and Latvia are dealt with at the highest levels, by involving the diplomatic corps of these countries as well as the nationals and Russian parliamentarians. The title of the article states that Russia will deal with solving the problems of Russians in Latvia; however, the content indicates that a task group has been created not only to tackle the “problems” of Latvian Russians, but also the conditions of Estonian and, partly, Lithuanian Russian-speaking residents.

The article “The Russkiy Mir Foundation will support Russians abroad” outlines the idea that the foundation will support Russians in Latvia with special-purpose programs, and emphasizes that Russians in Latvia have a poor situation concerning culture, language, and education. Thus the view is accentuated that Russia should be taking responsibility for its compatriots and should save its compatriots in Latvia. The author indicates that the foundation will support the teaching of Russian in Latvian high-schools and secondary schools through the use of special-purpose programs.

### Activities Regarding Russian Youth

In 2003 and 2004 protest actions against the new amendments of the Education Law took place throughout Latvia. These amendments prescribed that 60% of the subjects at school should be taught only in the official language. This created a wave of unprecedented protest activities around the country. To “protect” Russian schools a “headquarters for the protection of Russian schools” was established; its leaders were Yuri Petropavlovsky, Jakovs Pliners, Valery Buhvalov, Gennady Kotov, and Alexander Kazakov (deported from Latvia in 2004). The protests were widely reflected by the Russian press, and labeled as both a “victory of ethnocracy” and “genocide towards Russians”. One of the organizers of the activities, Gennady Kotov, stated in an interview that the reform of schools was a crime towards the Russian nation in general, because the Latvian establishment consciously wants to make Russians less educated by providing them with low-grade education.

Moscow House, based in Riga, coordinates the education policy in Latvia organized by Russia. Each year, the Moscow House invites Latvian and Russian youth to apply to 60 grants for study at Latvian universities. The grants are available (coverage of study fees and a monthly grant of monthly USD 700) at the Baltic International Academy and the Information Systems Management Institute, where Russian is the language of instruction. Moscow House also invites young people to apply for studies in Russia, fully covering the study fee and awarding a grant, with total expenses amounting to $1,400 a month.

Russian policy makers support the efforts of a part of Latvia’s Russian speaking residents to repeal educational reform, to proclaim the Russian language as the second state language in Latvia, and to support the idea of a two-community state. The Russian-language information environment in Latvia has become largely self-sufficient and, in terms of its size, has long outgrown the corresponding information environment in the Latvian language.

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353 B.Gulbis’ (Research about Russian ethnos situation in Latvia) interview with G. Kotov, February 5, 2009, Riga.
Protection of Compatriots’ Rights

Latvia has several organizations for protecting compatriots, including legal protection and medical aids. This kind of aid is practiced by the Human Rights Committee, the Union of Russian Lawyers, and also formally by such political forces as the party For Human Rights in a United Latvia and Harmony Centre. The aforementioned forces, however, only deal with legal consultations. The Human Rights Committee was primarily created to stand against the reform of minority schools in the country, which prescribes that 60% of the learning programs in minority schools be enforced in state language.

Most of the social aid programs implemented in the country are carried out through the Moscow House Business and Culture Center. The director of Moscow House, Yuri Silov, revealed that Russians can get support for medical help and treatments in leading Russian clinics. “We [Moscow House] keep in touch with health security department in Moscow, which ensures this program. In 2008, 10 people received such medical help, besides regardless their nationality — Russian or Latvian. Of course, we help World War Two veterans, because in Russia veterans have very large benefits, 50% paid for public facilities, larger pensions. Since our war veterans are not Russian citizens and cannot get such kind of help, then Moscow allots finances and Yuri Dolgorukov Foundation receives help once a year amounting to 500–700 USD, as well as medical equipment.”

Russia has directly participated in Latvian domestic policy matters and legal proceedings, by getting involved in the protection of the interests of the red guerrilla Vassily Kononov. On January 21, 2000, a Latvian court found Kononov guilty of mass murder in a small village in 1944. Three months after this guilty verdict, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree that granted Russian citizenship to Kononov. In 2004, Russia became involved as a third party in the proceeding of the ECHR in the case Kononov against the Latvian State, asking for a payment of 5.18 million euro to Kononov. The ECHR issued a verdict in 2008, compensating Kononov with 30,000 euros.

Repatriation Program for Compatriots

The Russian State Program to Help Compatriots Living Abroad Voluntarily Resettle in the Russian Federation was adopted with a decree by Russian President Putin on June 22, 2006. The program also applies to Russian compatriots living in Latvia. However, no special activity has been recorded over these years. Although there is no precise data about the number of people who have moved, there is no significant data from the migration offices about a rapid shrinking of the Russian community. In early April, 2008, in an interview for Neatkarīgā Rita Avīze, Russian Ambassador Alexander Veshnyakov declared that, over the first three months of the year, the embassy received 335 applications for repatriation, which indicated a large surge of interest in this opportunity. In 76 cases, these applications were submitted by Russian citizens, in 110 cases, by Latvian citizens, and in 165 cases, by non-citizens. (The wish to move to Russia was also expressed by citizens of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.)

However, the amount of actual repatriates was significantly smaller; in early April the Russian embassy issued 26 moving certificates to 38 people (that is, one certificate per family). 23 certificate holders planned to go to Kaliningrad, two to Lipeck, and one to Kaluga. (At that moment, 21 certificate holders had left, that is, 32 people including family members.)

4.3.3. Consular Issues of Russian Foreign Policy in Latvia

General Description

Beginning in 2006, when the first compatriots’ conference took place, Russia began active domestic and foreign policy movements to consolidate the Russian community abroad. However, consolidation policy was never based solely on the desire to ensure the preservation of the spiritual and cultural traditions of ethnic Russians.

Russian policy for consolidating compatriots includes several stages. One stage is the legal acknowledgments of compatriots; the second is a resettlement program for compatriots, to enlarge the number of Russian citizens living abroad and to increase parliamentary influence, with the help of compatriots, in countries with high Russian-speaking populations.

Russian has distributed more than 2.9 million Russian passports in post-the Soviet countries. Beginning in 2000, the Russian government has distributed 2.9 million Russian passports to Russian compatriots in Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, and Ukraine, explaining its actions with humanitarian purposes.

Russia has very successfully taken advantage of the obstacle that the Russian community living in Latvia is not homogeneous, and that integration policy in Latvia did not succeed. The increasingly slow movement of naturalization proves that the Russian-speaking public in Latvia does not want to identify itself with Latvia. Of course this obstacle has been contributed to by Russian foreign policy, by allowing Latvia’s non-citizens to enter Russia without a visa. Most of the non-citizens of Latvia live in an informative space influenced by Russia, where they receive non-objective information about events in Latvia. Elderly people and the young generation of non-citizens — the parts of society that are

356 Ibid.
358 Б. Лулле, “Krievija sauc!” [Russia is calling!], Neatkarīgā Rita Avīze, April 5, 2008.
easiest to influence — are more radically disposed towards the state of Latvia, and are loyal to Russia.

During these years Russia has developed an active campaign of propaganda, which creates the impression that Russian compatriots living in Latvia are not faring well, that they are being discriminated against and pursued because of their political views and ethnic affiliation. In its official space of information, Russia is depicted as a rich and wealthy state, which takes care of its citizens and ensures them perfect social protection.

**Latvian Non-citizens and Russian Citizens in Latvia**

Latvia legislation includes several terms that characterize citizenship, for example, “Latvian citizen”, “non-citizen of Latvia”, and “foreign citizen”. The Russians living in Latvia encompass all of these three categories. Under the circumstances, the special status of non-citizen was introduced. Non-citizens are persons who were Soviet nationals but who, after 1991, did not qualify for Latvian nationality and did not acquire Russian nationality or any other nationality. The status is granted on the basis of the 1995 Law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens Who Are not Citizens of Latvia or any Other State (Status Law). The Latvian Constitutional Court has defined the status in the following way (Constitutional Court Case 2004-15-0106, Official Gazette, 9 March 2005, no. 40):

The status of non-citizens is not and cannot be considered as a mode of Latvian nationality. However, the rights given to non-citizens and the international obligations which Latvia has undertaken in relation to these persons, signify that the legal link of non-citizens to Latvia is recognized to a certain extent and based on it mutual obligations and rights have emerged. This is derived from Article 98 of the Constitution which inter alia states that anyone who possesses a Latvian passport has a right to protection by the state and the right to freely return to Latvia (paragraph 17 of the Judgment).

This provision recognizes non-citizens as a special category whose legal status in some areas provides them with more rights and guarantees than, for example, permanent residents. However, non-citizens are not yet nationals of Latvia. Latvia has consistently defended its position that non-citizens cannot be qualified as stateless persons, and this view has been accepted by international human rights monitoring bodies.

Non-citizens are given a special passport. The passport not only grants the special status of belonging to the state, and thus allows the constitutional right of return, but has even been recognized by the EU as valid for visa-free travel according to Regulation 1932/2006/EC. In accordance with Article 2 of the Status Law, non-citizens of Latvia cannot be deported, and their status is permanent. When ratifying international conventions, Latvia as a rule submits a declaration requesting the equal treatment of citizens and non-citizens. For instance, upon ratification of the European Convention on Extradition and its Protocols, in 1997, Latvia stated that it shall apply to both citizens and non-citizens. Moreover, in accordance with Article 2 of the Law on the Diplomatic and Consular Service, non-citizens enjoy Latvian diplomatic protection. Non-citizens, however, are not granted political rights and they are barred from practicing certain professions related to civil service jobs and the judiciary. There are also restrictions on possessing land and calculation of pension rates.

The status of non-citizen was meant to be temporary until non-citizens naturalized or acquired the nationality of another state. However, the practice turned out to be different and Latvia still hosts 365,164 non-citizens, about 16% of the total population. This can be explained by the overall acceptance of the status. For instance, 64% of Russians and 64% of other ethnic minorities consider the status as convenient. The reasons are the travel benefits to C.I.S. and the fact that they see no major differences between citizens and non-citizens. According to surveys, 48% of non-citizens do not plan to naturalize. The main reasons mentioned are that they do not see specific privileges by being citizens. On the other hand, 86% of non-citizens want their children to become Latvian citizens. This number has slightly increased since 2000. Moreover, only 23% of non-citizens consider Latvian citizenship as prestigious, compared with 49% of Latvian citizens. According to studies, the main motives for naturalization are the following: the fact that person lives in Latvia; to feel a sense of affiliation with the state; to increase safety; to improve the lives of children; for travel; to avoid professional restrictions; and to buy land. EU accession has also been mentioned as important.

Therefore, we can conclude that, over the years, by getting additional privileges non-citizens have become used to the status and adjusted to their status. They have become accustomed to daily life and being excluded from political processes in Latvia. Self-sufficiency and lack of commitment to Latvian republican values, while being open to citizenship in the case of children, are the main conclusions to be drawn.

It is difficult to define the number of Russian citizens in Latvia, because of the possibility that several citizens of Russia have double-citizenship. The Russian embassy in Latvia refuses to give any concrete data about the official number of Russian citizens living in Latvia.

It is possible to calculate the number of Russian citizens living in Latvia by using data from their participation in elections for the State Duma and for President of

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360 Ibid., p. 23.

361 Ibid., pp. 20–21.

362 Ibid., p. 3.

363 Ibid., p. 3.
In August of 2003, 9,261 Russian citizens participated in the elections for the State Duma; however, the Russian embassy didn't give absolute calculations, which would allow us to calculate the number of Russian citizens living in Latvia.\textsuperscript{364} In 2004, in the elections for the President of Russia, a total of 10,500 Russian citizens voted at the Russian embassy and consulates. The Russian embassy declared that more than 60% of Russians living in Latvia participated in the elections, asserting that there are more than 15,000 Russian citizens living in Latvia. The national news agency LETA reported that more than 9,000 voters placed ballots for Vladimir Putin. Likewise, in 2007, more than 10,000 Russian citizens participated in the elections for the State Duma. According to information given by LETA,\textsuperscript{365} 10,400 Russian citizens participated in the Council elections, of whom 83.35% voted for Putin's pro-Kremlin party, United Russia. According to data given by the embassy to the news agency it is possible to calculate that there are 16,024 Russian citizens living in Latvia. These calculations are made possible because the Russian embassy declared that 64.9% of eligible Russian voters living in Latvia participated in the elections. In the 2008 elections for President of Russia, 14,000 voters placed ballots. The embassy asserted that the number of eligible voters who placed ballots was the same as it was in Russia, therefore it is possible to deduce that this figure constituted 65 — 70% of the eligible Russian voters living in Latvia. Therefore, in year 2008, there were 21,646 Russian citizens living in Latvia.\textsuperscript{366}

As we can see from these figures, which were recorded only because of the election processes, the proportion of Russian citizens in Latvia has a dynamic tendency to grow; this displays the growth of Russia’s influence in Latvia.

The Latvian Central Statistical Bureau shows in its calculations that the number of Russian citizens in Latvia has a tendency to grow. For example, the number of Russian citizens in 2008 increased more than three times when compared with 2005, from 8,149 to 28,521.

### The Major Trends of Russian Citizenship in Latvia. Is Russia Promoting its Citizenship and Russian Foreign Passports?

Reviewing the last important tendencies, we find a dynamic of growth in the number Russian citizens in Latvia. This is possibly explained by the fact that the Russian legislation doesn’t forbid double-citizenship; also, many non-citizens of Latvia supposedly hold both non-citizen Latvian passports and Russian passports.

A Russian passport gives its holder two privileges: the person can travel freely to Russia and has all the rights of a citizen of Russia, and, as resident of Latvia, one has the free rights to travel in the EU and the Schengen zone.

### Are There Any Benefits for Russian Citizens?

At the moment, the most active movement related to questions about Russian citizenship are related to compatriot certificates, or “compatriot cards”. Russia is currently discussing the necessity of such cards, but this task has suffered structural failures, because there is no unequivocal opinion about the definition of “compatriot” in Russia. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, S. Lavrov, has announced that the compatriot card could be based on the criterion of nationality, but the Kremlin-financed Russkiy Mir Foundation believes that compatriots should equal to Russian citizens, because it is understandable that compatriot cards would be equated to Russian passports. The draft of the Law on Compatriots Cards defines that the cards would provide a visa-free regime with Russia, the possibility of employment in Russia without any extra permissions, absolute social protections, education, and advantages in eventually acquiring citizenship.

At the end of 2008, the newspaper Latvijas Avīze reported alarming events in Estonia, where in ten months of that year 3,700 residents of Estonia had received Russian citizenship — twice as many as those who received Estonian citizenship by naturalization. The same situation occurred in Latvia. The head of the Office of Naturalization in Latvia, Eizenia Aldermane, explains that in Latvia the number of Russian citizens is much bigger, possibility even more than 60,000.\textsuperscript{367} Russia has started its wave of producing passports. The fact that passports were the pretext for Russia attacking the sovereign territories of Georgia in August of 2008 has created some anxiety. And the fact that everybody who holds a Russian passport is a citizen of Russia has also raised some doubts. Supposedly, Russia gave foreign Russian passports to persons who had gained Russian citizenship in Estonia as well as in Latvia. Because in order to gain the passport of a Russian citizen and Russian citizenship, it is necessary to fulfill strict legislative demands, one of which is, assuming that citizen passports announce only former citizens of the U.S.S.R., these persons must live one year in Russia, which must be proven by propiska. Whereas the Russian Federation has relieved the order of getting foreign passports, because it does not provide the right to vote and gain the guarantees ensured to citizens of Russia. Foreign passports had been given to South Ossetian residents as well, which led to the escalation of conflict between Georgia and Russia. Unequivocally, Russia wants to enlarge its influence in neighboring territories. Citizens or persons with approved affiliation to the Russian Federation are available both as diplomatic weapons in the international arena and as practical weapons, by sculpting a diverse structure of residents of the proper states.

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First, citizens of Russia who are also residents of Latvia (citizens or non-citizens of Latvia) gain the prerogatives of travel; they can travel to Russia, countries of the visa-free zone, the EU, and countries of the Schengen visa-free zone, and stay there for up to 90 days. Second, citizens of the Russian Federation gain the right to receive education in Russia, child support, participation in educational and health projects in Russia, support for large families, salary premiums or pensions, and free health care. Third, Russian citizens can participate in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation and the State Duma.

All of this makes acquiring Russian citizenship especially attractive, especially in regions of Latvia where most of the residents live in Russian informational space. The media controlled by the Kremlin has established a solid base of information, generating the impression that Russia is a rich, prosperous, and influential country—one of (if not the only) great powers in the world. The media has also generated the impression that we must be proud of Russia as a country, as well as proud of its politicians—first of all, the presidents of Russia. If Estonia and Latvia fail to perform preventative measures to ensure that 28.5% of their residents do not become citizens of another country, these countries could endanger their sovereign power.

**Political Activities of Russian Citizens in Latvia: Participation Levels in Russian Elections**

Since the Russian citizens living in Latvia and non-citizens of Latvia do not have right to vote, these groups of residents cannot directly influence political processes in Latvia. However, both these groups of residents actively take part in NGOs associated with Russia, and support such political forces in Latvia as PCTVL (For Human Rights in United Latvia) and the Centre of Harmony, which are represented in parliament, the municipal governments, and European legislation.

In regards to Russian citizens living in Latvia and their participation in Russian political boards, it must be said that the Russian Federation has always recorded relatively high (usually exceeding 60%) rates of activity of citizens both in elections of the State Duma (GosDuma) and in the elections for President of Russia.

In March of 2008, the Russian embassy in Riga announced that in the elections for President of Russia, 70.35% of eligible Russian citizens in Latvia took part, of whom, of course, 85.33% supported Dmitry Medvedev, who was chosen by Vladimir Putin. Here we must pose the question of whether voter activity really was at such a high level as claimed by the Russian embassy. According to the number of voters, it is possible to calculate that there were exactly 20,000 eligible citizens in Latvia at that time. Doubts are raised not only by the rounded number of citizens, but also by the discrepancy in data given by the Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, which had calculated that there were 28,521 Russian citizens in Latvia at the time.

The Russian embassy had declared a high level of activity in the 2007 elections for the State Duma, in the 2004 presidential elections, and the 2003 elections for the State Duma. But the high level of voter activity is doubtful; if we compare the publicly accessible data on voter activity in the last two elections of the State Duma and the presidential elections, the achieved result is radically contrary to information given by the Russian embassy. According to our calculations, we find that in the last elections voter activity never exceeded 50%:

- Presidential Elections 2004 – 70% (46.74%);
- Parliamentary Elections 2003 – 58% (41%);
- Presidential Elections 2008 – 70.35% (49.3%);
- Parliamentary Elections 2007 – 64.9% (36.46%).

Alarming, of course, is fact that the Russian embassy presents such corrupted, purposely false information. The distortion of election results is a rude offence to international law. The percentage of voter support for political parties is therefore also questionable.

**Russian Visa Policy**

At the moment, Russian visa policy holds that non-citizens can enter Russia without any complications, which in the context of Latvia means 28.5% of the Latvian population. The Russian Federation is adopting a law that relieves the procedure of entering Russia for non-citizens of Latvia and Estonia; the border is practically open and at this moment, and travel is absolute free. For citizens of Latvia, preliminary visa politics have been preserved, which foresee a strict program of registering for a visa, declaring an official invitation from a resident citizen of the Russian Federation, or a tour arranged by a travel agency, or approval from an educational establishment, a medical institution, or a burial place. At the moment, depending on the processing speed, a citizen of Latvia must pay a duty in amount of USD 50 or 100 for a visa.

**Projects, Proposals, Information, Initiatives, Expectations regarding the Implementation of the So-Called Russian Compatriot Identification Card**

At the moment, Russia has activated the issue of compatriots. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the issue of compatriots has been considered solved, but it is “embedded” because of institutional problems. At the moment, the power structures inside Russia do not have a unified opinion about what must be included in the conception of “compatriots” in general, and there is no unified opinion about which structures will be responsible for distributing compatriot cards.

In the case of Latvia, the individuals who could receive a compatriot card are those Russians who have a termed residence permit. For non-citizens living in Latvia who travel to Russia, nothing changes, because Russia has established a law that re-
lies the procedure of entering Russia. Travel to the EU and countries of the Schengen zone will not change, either, because at this moment it is controlled by C.E. regulation, and it is possible to stay in these countries for up to 90 days.

The question of compatriot cards will be actualized in 2009. In April of 2008, the Russkiy Mir Foundation presented a draft bill that was based on the 1999 federal law “On Russian Governmental Policy Toward Compatriots Abroad” to the Russian Federal Assembly. According to this bill, the classification “Russian compatriot” includes members from the following groups:

- persons who permanently live outside the Russian Federation;
- persons who do not have Russian citizenship, but are historically relevant to Russia;
- persons who have ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and spiritual ties with Russia;
- persons who are trying to maintain their Russian identity;
- persons who want to keep in contact and cooperate with Russia.

This definition of “compatriot” is so broad that it allows a wide range of individuals to become a “compatriot”. One group that expresses a radical attitude regarding the definition of compatriots, insists that compatriots should be those persons who are citizens of Russia, but have been living abroad for a long time.

Russian organizations based in Latvia had actively participated in the formulation of the bill. In August of 2008, the newspaper Chas published an interview by Igor Vatolin with the author of the corrected bill, Sergey Tantsorov, where Tantsorov says that the bill had been officially modified by the public group Humanitarian Perspective. The author of the bill says that there was a necessity for new redactions, because the bill was really “blocked” by the thought that, after passing the bill, redactions would continue regarding the order in which the status of compatriot is to be accepted. The author of the bill states that obviously a description of the status, rights, and duties of a compatriot is missing. The author of the modification of the bill states that the bill offers compatriots the right to cross the border without a visa, free education, a work permit, and prerogatives in getting Russian citizenship.

Tantsorov offers a mechanism that prescribed how to become a compatriot, which foresees that it is possible to become a compatriot only if the concrete person is a member of some non-governmental Russian organization. This would provide that the person is actively participating in promoting Russian cultural, political, and social life.

In real life such modification of a bill would mean that a person who would like to become a Russian compatriot must become a member of some Russian non-governmental organization. This would create the precedent that Russia would gain control of part of the population of other sovereign countries. Assigning the status of a compatriot would also mean a disintegration of the extant processes of integration and consolidation of society, and would possibly mean that more than 25% of the residents of Latvia would adapt to the Russian informational sphere.

At the end of 2008, an movement begun with the Kaliningrad regional administration together with the Baltic shipyard Yantar started a project whose purpose was to stimulate Russians living abroad to resettle in Russia. In September of 2008, according to data given by the Kaliningrad regional administration, 2,500 applications for resettlement to Kaliningrad were received. But it is strange that, in September of 2008, only high-qualified specialists were invited to resettle, namely individuals who could fulfill duties in the Kaliningrad shipyard. The program of re-immigration foresees that around 300,000 high-qualified employees — compatriots — would move to Kaliningrad by 2012.

In an interview with the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, the Russian ambassador to Latvia, Alexander Veshnyakov, expressed an opinion that was opposite to that of the Kaliningrad regional administration. Veshnyakov acknowledged that only 330 Latvia residents had applied to the re-immigration program. Veshnyakov also said that persons who applied to the project had immigrated to the Kaliningrad region.

One reason why compatriots do not wish to re-immigrate to their ethnic fatherland could be the fact that Russia does not offer re-immigration to the central regions of Russia but, rather, to the regions of the Far East: Amur, Irkutsk, Tyumen, Kaluga, and Khabarovsk. These regions cannot offer the same opportunities for employment as a member state of the EU. Therefore, many compatriots chose to live in Latvia, where they already have social guarantees and a social life already in place.

### 4.3.4. Culture, Education

Presence of Russian culture in Latvia is broad and is sustained through various cultural artifacts and assets of institutional matter. In general there are two ways how Russian culture is promoted in Latvia. First is institutional frame of the official cultural interactions, cultural centers, sustained values and events that are directed primarily on Russian speaking minority living in Latvia. Second, is market of popular culture that provides vast amount of cultural artifacts and is directed on both – Russian speaking minority living in Latvia and Latvia’s society in general. It should be also noted, that contents of culture in its practical expressions, implies several different meanings of “Russia’s culture”: 1) deep-rooted traditions of Russian “high culture”; 2) historical identification with Soviet Union; 3) modern, developing and in some sense “westernized” culture with particular qualities specific for Russia.
“High” and Traditional Culture

Although there are also commercial visits of Russian artists and performers, a lot of universal or “high culture” events are brought to Latvia in the frame of inter-governmental cooperation. The same can be told about Russian traditional culture that is mostly performed in frame of an official level of cooperation between two countries.

On the official level cooperation in field of culture is regulated by intergovernmental agreements between governmental institutions and also particular municipalities. Latvia — Russia inter-governmental committee for co-operation in the areas of economy, science and technology, humanities, and culture was established in 1996. Agreement on cooperation between ministries of Culture was signed in March 2002 and prescribes also establishment of national cultural associations apart from favoring other kinds of cultural interaction. Several cultural events have been conducted in frame of governmental cooperation – arts exhibitions, conferences, etc. Agreements of cooperation in sphere of culture are also common on level of municipalities. For example, an agreement between Valmiera (Latvia) and Pskov (Russia) where culture is one of the major spheres of cooperation was signed in 2001 and exchanges of photo and arts exhibitions as well as mutual participation in festivities are carried out regularly in both cities. Agreement in cooperation between Jūrmala (Latvia) and St. Petersburg (Russia) was signed in 2003 — the 4th chapter of the agreement stipulates cooperation in humanitarian and cultural affairs where wide range of activities is supported.

In framework of Russian Cultural days in Latvia performances of professional Russian theatres, opera and ballet troops are organized. Also theatre festivals (for example: annual theatre festivals “Russian classics in Latvia” and “Golden Mask”) and days of Russian writers are organized with support of Russian Embassy. Rich traditions of Russian “high culture” are substantial sources of presence of Russian culture in Latvia. Russian ballet and opera troops and artists, orchestras and are well known and popular in the world and thus also in Latvia.

In case of traditional [folk] culture, it should be noted that there are various cultural societies of Russian culture are also supported by Latvian government or municipalities. These cultural societies include ensembles of Russian folk song and dance groups. At the same time developed nature of Latvian traditional culture overshadows Russian traditional culture and festivals and performances of Russian tradition dance and songs are rare.

Popular Culture

Russian industries of popular culture have grown rapidly during last few years. Amount of Russian movies, TV shows and music in markets of nearer and further abroad are becoming more common and popular. As noted by executive director of media holding “Baltic Media alliance” Ivars Belte: “It is impossible to go hundred meters in Moscow and not see another bojevik (blockbuster) is shooted in every sidestreet.” Russian movie industry has grown not only in amount of released movies, but also in quality of these movies. Several Russian movies have been released internationally during last years and captured the attention also of foreign audiences.

Market of Russian popular culture in Latvia works through several channels – cable television and analogue TV broadcasts, movie sessions in cinemas, music broadcasts on Radio’s and performances of Russian artists.

Presence of Russian popular culture is most widespread in TV broadcasts of Russian TV programs and movies. All of the major providers of cable television offer channels of Russian production. These channels provide programs for various audiences (including sports, programs for children etc.) that represent Russian culture starting from nostalgia about “Soviet times” till modern Russian popular culture. It is not only trough Russian channels, how Russian TV programs are offered – also major Latvian commercial channels LNT and TV3 provide Russian TV shows and movies.

Presence of Russian TV programs and films in national commercial channels show that these are also popular among Latvian-speaking population. What is also of large importance – these programs are broadcasted at most marketable time of the day.

Contents of Russian TV broadcasts provide two kinds of associations about Russian popular culture – first is historical nostalgia represented by Soviet-time films and TV shows and second is “special” approach of Russian cinematography and show-making, which addresses audiences by simplicity of narration and unostentatious humor. Thus, even if working primarily on Russian-speaking population, also

The practice of the last years shows that Russian Orthodox Church has involved intensively in compatriots policy. Previously the present ROC head Kiril represented the Church in contacts with the foreign countries. He actively favoured uniting of the Russian Exile Orthodox Church with the Moscow Patriarchate. The then Russia’s President Putin, too, expressed in May 2007 his support for joining of the two split orthodox organizations. This is one of the examples of consolidation activities of the “Russian World”.

The “New Wave” is a contest of performers of popular music that was founded in 2002 by Russian composer Igor Krutoy and Latvian composer and pianist Raimonds Pauls. Festival is hosted in Jurmala – coastal city of Latvia near the Baltic Sea which is known as a place of resort of Russian tourists since period of Soviet Union. Mostly representatives of the Post-Soviet countries are participating in the contest, and only some of the participants come from other countries (U.S., Indonesia, Italy, etc.).

383 Most watched Russian TV shows also by Latvian audience include: humor shows “Krevije zerkala” (“Distorting mirrors”), “Nasha Russia” (“Our Russia”), and “Comedy club” TV shows “Bita extravasenos” and “Oko” (“Window”) as well as various TV serials by seasons.


385 It should be noted, that Russian media questions official number of Orthodox community and argues that it is in fact larger – in some cases it is even argued, that Orthodoxy is the largest religious community in Latvia. These claims are usually stressed in context of recognition of Orthodox Christmas as a national holiday, which has been rejected by the parliament for several times.


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393 There is an average of 350 performances made yearly and about 75 000 spectators every year for Russian Drama Theater.

France, Finland, China etc.). To highlight importance of the event internationally, well known guests are invited to perform at the festival395 and it is broadcasted internationally trough satellite channels "RTR Planeta" and "Rossija".396 Festival is well attended and gains attention of major media in Latvia as well as in Russia. According to the national commercial TV station LNT, there were about 1.5 million people watching concerts of the contest during 4 days of its broadcast.397 It is not a surprising that “New Wave” is compared to the “Eurovision” song contest in Russian media and called "Russian Eurovision"398 – some even claim, that "the" New wave will overspread "Eurovision" in future.399

Despite patronage of Jurmala municipality and international status of the festival it is regarded as part of Russian culture in Latvia.400 Attitude towards festival is not unambiguous in Latvia’s public opinion – some support and actively follow the contest (both – Latvian and Russian – speaking), but others (mostly Latvian speaking) condemn it as a symbol of Russian presence, “gathering of old and falling Russian [ex-Soviet] stars”,401 or “reflection of a past...[and]...teleportation of “heroes” from program of 1980-s/1990s “Pesnja Goda””.402 President of Latvia, Valdis Zatlers attended festival as a guest and was also criticized for that. For example, known lawyer in Latvia Andris Grūtups commented that “…the key words named at the festival are "ľūmula" and "Dzintaru" concert hall...Latvia is not mentioned at all....Latvia seems like a province of Russia for foreign audiences watching festival”.403

Contintental Hockey League

The Continental Hockey League (KHL) is an ice hockey league that was founded in 2008 on the basis of Russian Superleague. KHL includes teams from former USSR, most of which are from Russia, but also one team from each Belarus, Kazakhstan and Latvia are participating in a league. Latvian team “Dinamo Riga” is in a spotlight of sports life in Latvia since its creation in 2008. In fact KHL and “Dinamo Riga” embraces several important backgrounds – Soviet nostalgia of Soviet ice-hockey traditions, popularity of hockey nowadays and elements of cultural interaction. In this context, elaboration on ideas behind foundation of KHL together with importance of ice-hockey in Latvia are crucial to assess its role for Russia’s "humanitarian" presence in Latvia.

First of all, it should be mentioned, that KHL was initiated on a political level – at least according to Prime minister of Russia Vladimir Putin: „I am not just supporting KHL, I was its initiator, I invented it because I thought that hockey has lost a lot a lot after the end of competition between Canadian and Soviet hockey”404 The fact is also supported by the financial side of the „project“, because league by itself and most of the teams are financed by Russian local governments or enterprises that are state-owned/controlled.405 In this sense, it is important to mention, that creation and sustaining of “Dinamo Riga” was possible only because of financial support provided by Russian gas company "ITERA".406

It is an ambition of Russia to create KHL as a pan-European League with teams from Sweden, Chech Republic, Slovakia, Switzerland, etc. As stated by President of the KHL Alexandr Medvedev: “If Europe doesn’t want to be left far outside the National Hockey League or serve as slaves in the NHL, then Europe needs to develop a European league and the base for that has been created in the KHL.”407 Thus Russia would be at the center of hockey life in Europe and its influence in field would expand. It has been also mentioned, that KHL was made as a competitor to NHL. For example KHL Chairman Vyacheslav Fetisov – famous Russian former hockey player, three-time Stanley Cup winner – “Within five years, the Continental Hockey League plans to compete on equal footing with the NHL in terms of quality of play and team organization”.408 This is also obvious when looking at the attempts of KHL to entice ice-hockey players from the NHL or marketing actions for popularization of the league.409 KHL is a highest level where Latvian ice-hockey club have ever participated, and expansion of KHL towards Europe is mostly perceived as a positive trend. KHL is also compared to the “ping-Pong diplomacy” by Russian officials and named as a part of Russian cultural policy with “…big positive humanitarian impact”.410 Vladimir Putin also has mentioned, that KHL is a project that “…allows to think seriously about the renewal of common humanitarian space on post-Soviet territo- riess – to unite people from former Soviet countries on basis of common interests.”411
High quality of Russian hockey traditions together with high popularity of hockey in Latvia made an impressive public interest in KHL. In practice, KHL and Latvian team “Dinamo Riga” involves something more than interest in ice-hockey or its quality – it also a question of Soviet nostalgia.

- First to mention in this case are symbols of Soviet past encoded in KHL: 
- KHL started as a competition between post-Soviet countries; 
- Main trophy of the league – “Gagarin Cup” is named after cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, the first person in space and symbol of scientific primacy of USSR; 
- Divisions are named after famous Russian ice-hockey players of Soviet period (Bobrov, Tarasov, Harlamov, Chernishev).

The case of “Dinamo Riga” is even more interesting concerning “Soviet nostalgia”. Ice-hockey club “Dinamo Riga” was known in Latvia and Russia also at the Soviet period and ceased to exist in 1995. “Dinamo Riga” was a symbol of ice-hockey in Latvia at that time and had good results in Championship of USSR. At the beginning of negotiations on creation of a KHL and participation of team from Latvia, there were rumors that it was demanded by the officials from Russian side, that club must be called “Dinamo”, just like the one played in championship of USSR. Although it was denied by creators of the club, also at the official site of the club it is mentioned, that club was established on 1946 and renewed in 2008. Now, there are most of the players of Latvian national ice-hockey team playing for “Dinamo Riga”, that only ads to its popularity and popularity of the KHL.

Language and History

Language and history are two important pillars of Russian presence and culture in Latvia. The role of Russian language in Latvia is inevitable, because it is the most popular language in Latvia – about 95% of population can communicate on Russian, and about 90% in Latvian language. Advantage of Russian language and substantial number Russian-speaking minority, has led to demands for Russian as an official language in Latvia from both – Russia and part of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia. Language is a symbol of Russia’s presence in Latvia, which allows spreading Russian culture and media information in Latvia. An issue of language is most stressed also on the political level. Russia uses argument on Russian language not being an official language as a violation of human rights.

Attitude towards history is also a part of culture and in case of Latvia, history is used as a symbolic artefact of Russia’s presence. Essence of the story about history in Latvian – Russian relations is based on different interpretations and perceptions of historical past. For example: Latvia stands on the position that it was occupation by Soviet Union at the eve of the Second world war – Russia denies accusations on Soviet Union and argues that Latvia was incorporated and later liberated from the Nazi Germany; Latvia wants the recognition of the fact on Soviet repressions and compares that with repressions of Nazi Germany – Russia denies any links with whatever repressions where made by Soviet Union; etc. This controversy has let to situation when Latvia is trying to prove its truth on historical events and Russia is trying to keep its truth and accusing Latvia about “attempts to rewrite history” and even “glorifying and renewing fascism”.

“Battle over history” continues to be an important topic in Latvia’s public – especially in two dates at spring – 16th of March and 9th of May. 9th of May is a Victory day over Fascism for Russians and is regarded as the most important event of the history of last century. The celebration in Latvia takes place in several places, but largest one is near the monument of Victory in Riga and brings together about 10 000 people. Veterans of the Red Army are wearing their uniforms and medals and singing Russian songs of Soviet times and having picnic near monument together with other participants of the event. On the one hand celebration of 9th of May could be regarded as a Soviet-time nostalgia of an older generation of Russians living in Latvia, on the other – it is also a symbol of Russia’s presence in Latvia, because not only the Soviet paraphernalia is carried on the event, but also flags and coat of arms of Russian Federation.

Other event in 16th of March is an unofficial day of memorial of Latvian legionaries serving in Nazi Germany’s army at World War II. Its major event is laying down flowers near Monument of Freedom. Although it is not an official day of memorial in Latvia, Russia has criticized Latvia for letting event happen at all and accusing Latvia for rebirth of Nazism.

Russia’s interpretation of history is also sustained by “informative” materials and history books.

Education

There are no governmental agreements between Latvia and Russia in sphere of education. There have been efforts to establish such agreement, but taking into account problems of overall political dialogue between countries and primacy of other issues in

412 “Dinamo Riga” was a silver medalist of USSR ice-hockey championship in season 1987/1988.
419 For example: documentary film “Victory Day – our celebration” was distributed to primary schools for “educating” pupils on history.
There are three kinds of schools in Latvia that are financed by government and where Russian language is taught – schools that taught Russian language as a foreign language, and minority (“Russian”) schools, where Russian language is primary language of instruction and “two-stream” schools where two separate streams of Latvian and Russian languages of instruction are provided. In case of Russian as a foreign language, it remains second most taught foreign language in general schools in Latvia. Although, number of schools teaching Russian language is decreasing, it still remains strong position among other foreign languages.

There are 135 “Russian” schools in Latvia and 81 school of “two-stream” education in Latvia. In school year 2008/2009 – about 26% of all students at the primary and high school education were taught in Russian as a language of instruction. Russia’s interest in education in Latvia is primary related to “Russian” schools as a basis for development and sustaining of Russian language in Latvia. It is also a priority of Russian Embassy in sphere of education in Latvia: “to maintain position of Russian language in Latvia.”

Higher Education

There are 34 accredited higher education institutions in Latvia – 20 are state-financed and 14 are private. According to the Law of education, studies in state-funded secondary education to 60 per cent. Implementation the reform brought dissatisfaction of many students of “Russian” schools and Russian-speaking part of the society. In result “…anti-reform activists, strongly echoed by Moscow, have mobilized in a series of demonstrations and appeals to the international community.” Demonstrations started on January, 2004 in under the slogans “Hands off of Russian schools” or “Russian schools – our Stalingrad!” Later there was also a video made using Pink Floyd song “Another Brick in the Wall” to oppose education reforms, and even letter was written to the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin.

In period of Soviet Union an education system in Latvia was highly segregated – ethnic Latvians were taught in schools with Latvian language and other minorities (including Russians) were taught in Russian language instruction. In the early 1990s these “Russian” schools taught virtually no Latvian language and Latvian authorities made steps on changing the situation by gradually introducing Latvian language in these schools. According to education law that was adopted by parliament in 1998 it was planned to increase the percentage of instruction in Latvian language in state-funded secondary education to 60 per cent. Implementation the reform brought dissatisfaction of many students of “Russian” schools and Russian-speaking part of the society. In result “…anti-reform activists, strongly echoed by Moscow, have mobilized in a series of demonstrations and appeals to the international community.”

In some schools where Russian language was primary language of instruction, teachers were trying to influence on Russian schools” trough submission of education programmes and usage of books produced in Russia were dispelled, document has not been approved and signet by none of the countries.

Primary and High Schools

There are 34 accredited higher education institutions in Latvia – 20 are state-financed and 14 are private. According to the Law of education, studies in state-funded secondary education to 60 per cent.

It should be also noted, that priority of Russian embassy in sphere of education in Latvia is “to maintain position of Russian language in Latvia”. According to sociological surveys in Latvia, reform of minority education has caused ethnic split in a society and negative attitude towards Latvian language among Russian-speaking minority. At the same time, tensions concerning reform and its implementation are mainly sustained by particular political forces and activists, but are not evident in a daily life of the overall society.

423 Ibid.
financed higher education institution are in Latvian language, but there are no restrictions on Language for private higher education institutions – they are allowed to teach in foreign language.432 With amendments in Law of Higher education, proposed by Ministry of Education and Science, also government financed higher education institutions would be allowed to teach on foreign languages. Rationale behind such proposal is related to commercial advantage of teaching in foreign languages by attracting foreign students. About half of the private higher education institutions provide education also in Russian language and it accounts about 10% of the overall number of students. Cooperation between state-financed higher education institutions and universities in Russia is not developed – only some schools have agreements on students or academic personnel exchanges433 and cooperation in research.434

There are scholarships available for students from Latvia to study in Russia. “Scholarship of Major of Moscow” is provided since 1997 and as noted by Director of Department of Foreign economic and international relations of Government of Moscow Anatolij Sorokin, its aim is to “…strengthen intellectual potential of Russian diaspora”.435 There is also a scholarship of Government of Russian Federation436 and other options provided by embassy of Russian Federation to study in higher education institutions in Russia for “compatriots”437.

4.3.5. Russian Mass Media in Latvia

The characteristics of the public or audience for Russian mass media is dependent on the ethnic demographics of the Latvian population, their territorial location and national affiliation, their knowledge of Russian, their media consumption needs, and their degree of trust in the Russian media.

As of January 1, 2009, 27.79% of the population consisted of ethnic Russians,438 though the number of ethnic Russian residents has decreased in all Latvian regions (Kurzeme, Zemgale, Vidzeme, Latgale and Riga) since 1989.439 One of the challenges of the Latvian population’s ethnic makeup, which is mostly a result of Soviet Russification policy, is the low proportion of ethnic Latvians in the largest cities. Ethnic Latvians are in the absolute minority in Riga and in the Latgale cities of Daugavpils and Rezekne, though in the capital city they are once again becoming the relatively largest ethnic group.440

Ethnic Russians — just like knowledge of Russian — are more widespread in the southeastern part of the country.441 Riga has the largest proportion of former Soviet citizens who live permanently in Latvia and have not taken advantage of the right to obtain Latvian citizenship (so-called non-citizens).442 It is understandable that the level of social integration in Latvia of this part of the public is relatively smaller and, correspondingly, the search for identity in the direction of Russia is relatively larger.

As of January 1, 2009, ethnic Russians were in the absolute majority among the 357,811 non-citizens in Latvia; but at the same time, Latvian citizens are in the absolute majority among ethnic Russian residents.443 Among ethnic Russians, only 30,328 are Russian citizens — half the number of Russian citizens in Estonia.444

In the 2000 census, 36% of residents called Russian their native tongue.445 It is still the case that more of the Latvian population speaks Russian than Latvian; there are two per cent more Russian speakers than Latvian speakers, or 81% of the Latvian population.446

Speaking about the effects of the Russian media, the homogeneity of its consumption or use is a decisive factor; the more these media are consumed — and, most importantly, without alternative choices — the larger its effects.447 In this respect, knowing that all Russian television channels are under the control of the official authoritarian regime (for more information, see below), the large proportion of television viewers and particularly viewers of Russian television channels among Russian-speaking residents in Latvia stands out. These residents watch more television and read fewer printed media than ethnic Latvians, particularly daily newspapers (more...
read weekly papers, and have comparatively less trust in printed media. However, Russia's television channels dominate their television viewing, particularly the First Baltic Channel, which constituted 10.7% of television viewing (share) in 2007. For more information on the structure of this TV channel, see below). By coordinated and conspicuously employing a so-called "hidden ad" in favour of the party Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs), the winner was the television channel – First Baltic Channel, which has worked from Riga since September 4, 2002, as a quasi satellite channel, broadcasting to all three Baltic States, and is based on the programs of the Russian state television channel Pervy kanal. Latvia's Pervy kanal – the descendant of Soviet central television – is central part in the circle of media controlled by the Kremlin. The First Baltic Channel is included in the list of the party Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs), the winner was the television channel – First Baltic Channel, which has worked from Riga since September 4, 2002, as a quasi satellite channel, broadcasting to all three Baltic States, and is based on the programs of the Russian state television channel Pervy kanal. Latvia's Pervy kanal – the descendant of Soviet central television – is central part in the circle of media controlled by the Kremlin.
the largest cable television operators in all three Baltic States. In 1996, the stock company TEM ART GROUP began to place Latvian commercials in advertising blocks on its neighbour state’s television channel over the Latvian airwaves. In 1998, TEM ART GROUP signed a contract for the right to retransmit ORT in Latvia. A year later, limited company TEM TV, as the official representative of ORT in the Baltic States, expanded the cable-cast zone of ORT by signing a licensing contracts with the largest cable television operators in all three Baltic States.465

A description of the television-channel format at Baltic Media Alliance: the First Baltic Channel is a broad-based channel for families; REN TV Baltic is an entertainment channel for urban residents; and the First Baltic Music Channel (IBM) is an attractive youth channel.466

The cable channels most in demand are the channels broadcast in Russian. All cable television systems in Latvia offer major channels from Russia: RTR Planeta, REN TV Baltic, MTV Mir, MTV Sport, and NTV Baltic. In an expanded package of channels, other Russian channels are also popular, including Our Cinema (Nashe kino, which shows Soviet films in Russian), the Russian version of Eurosport, and Muz TV.467

It must be noted that, before newly elected Riga city council chairman Nils Usakovs (Nils Ushakov) became chairman of the Harmony Centre party (an association of four political entities), he was head of the Latvian branch of the official Russian news agency, ITAR-TASS, as well as news director at the First Baltic Channel.468 Vjačeslav Stepanenko (Vjacheslav Stepanenko) (Latvian Way / Latvian First Party), a deputy in the 8th Saeima, parliamentary secretary of the ministries, and now head of Riga’s Housing and Environment Committee, was a lawyer for TEM TV as well as for the above mentioned limited company Baltic Media Alliance.469

City Council Deputy Vadims Baraņņiks (Vadim Barannik) (Harmony Centre) led the legal department at the First Baltic Channel and was a lawyer at Baltic Media Alliance.470 And Sergejs Kārītis, a member of the board at the National Radio and Television Council, which oversees broadcasting, was formerly a lawyer at the First Baltic Channel; he was elected to the position by the Harmony Centre, just like the chairman of the council A Abramskleins who promoted the cancellation of critical French documentary The Putin System from the program of Latvia’s public television at December 8, 2007.471

It is also important to note that, on his first official visit to Moscow, Mayor Usakov was accompanied by city council deputy Andrejs Kozlovs (chairman of the board at the publishing house Fenster)472 and the aforementioned Baraņņiks. During the visit, the new head of Riga visited the official Russian news agency, ITAR-TASS. The delegation also included representatives from the publishing houses Petits and Radio Baltkom, as well as from the organizational committee of Novaja volna (New Wave), a Russian media event and young performers competition. They were united by their close collaboration with the Russian media and by their participation not only in the organization of the New Wave competition, but also in the activities of the Baltic Forum think tank, which is also connected with the Harmony Centre.473

The planned merger of Riga’s Russian daily newspapers Čas and Telegraf, which did not take place in the end, was assessed as an example of structural coordination and consolidation.474

Following the holding company Baltic Media Alliance and the publishing house Fenster, the third most important player in the Russian-language media market in Latvia is the publishing house Petits.475 This transnational company also relies on funds directed based on print runs and audience size, though the majority of this consists of ads, notices, and TV program guides that are mostly in Russian.476 The publishing house considers itself “the centre of cultural, social, and profession life among the Russian-speaking diaspora in Latvia”, and also participates in the World Russian Press Association.477

465 See http://www.ibma.lv/?call=678&mod=28id=483. Last accessed on September 9, 2009. The holding company Baltic Media Alliance was founded in 2007, but has worked in Latvia since 1995. Owners: Oļegs Solodovs (Oleg Solodov) (50%) and Aleksija Plasunova (Aleksy Plasunova) (50%). Includes eight TV channels in Russian (First Baltic Channel, First Baltic Music Channel, REN-TV Baltic, TTC International, Cinema House, Music, Time, TeleNanny), a weekly advertising sales company Baltijas Modju reklīme, the film rental and concert organization company First Pictures, the TV channel sales company TEM TV, and the web sites 4more.lv and Torgi.lv. 2008 turnover: 12 million lats (+5%, compared with 2007). See Procesvca, Olga (2009) “Notorvelānas kursu: Izdāvējumuajumum un pēcām pēcām ar augstumu rentabilitāti”. [A Course in Losing Weight: For Surviving Companies, the Turnover: 12 Million Lats (+5%, Compared with 2007)]. 2009. 466 First Baltic Music Channel (IBM) is a broad-based channel for families; REN TV Baltic is an entertainment channel for urban residents; and the First Baltic Music Channel (IBM) is an attractive youth channel.
467 See Beitika, Ieva (2009) Master’s Thesis: Nacionālās radio un televīzijas pēcēm pēckrīzes posms nāks ar augstu rentabilitāti” . [A Course in Losing Weight: For Surviving Companies, the Turnover: 12 Million Lats (+5%, Compared with 2007)]. 2009. 468 Vjačeslav Stepanenko (Vjacheslav Stepanenko) (Latvian Way / Latvian First Party), a deputy in the 8th Saeima, parliamentary secretary of the ministries, and now head of Riga’s Housing and Environment Committee, was a lawyer for TEM TV as well as for the above mentioned limited company Baltic Media Alliance. 469 City Council Deputy Vadims Baraņņiks (Vadim Barannik) (Harmony Centre) led the legal department at the First Baltic Channel and was a lawyer at Baltic Media Alliance. 470 And Sergejs Kārītis, a member of the board at the National Radio and Television Council, which oversees broadcasting, was formerly a lawyer at the First Baltic Channel; he was elected to the position by the Harmony Centre, just like the chairman of the council A Abramskleins who promoted the cancellation of critical French documentary The Putin System from the program of Latvia’s public television at December 8, 2007. 471 See Brikše, Zelče 2008, pp. 98.
472 Communication science studies have ascertained that, as a publisher, he strongly influences the editorial line at Latvia’s largest Russian-language daily newspaper, Vesti segodnja. Overall in Latvia, this form of powerful influence from a publisher is more characteristic of Russian-language papers than Latvian-language papers. What is more, the existence of a non-transparent media-owner structure, facilitated by Latvian media legislation — which does not require that the true publisher is more characteristic of Russia-language papers than Latvian-language papers. What is more, the existence of a non-transparent media-owner structure, facilitated by Latvian media legislation — which does not require that the true
The company got its start as the free advertising paper SM reklama for the Communist youth newspaper Sovetskaja molodež, which was privatized in 1991 by one of its employees, Aleksējs Sejinš (Aleksy Shejinin), who, together with Russian citizen Andrej Vasilyev, the editor in chief of Moscow newspaper Komsomert (since December of 2007 until July 2009 member of the board of Petits), is the managing owner of limited company (Publishing House) Petits.478 Though he originally agreed to participate, he was ultimately the only one who refused to participate in a study on the motives of Latvian Russian-language newspaper publishers and editors in creating and publishing their newspapers; he expressed this refusal by telephone several times.479

The structure of national-scale Russian-language printed media is displayed by the latest top 10 list of most-read Latvian press publications for the target group “other ethnicity”, based on the average audience for one issue (the publishers are indicated in parenthesis, because they are what generate the greatest amount of interest in relation to the topic of discussion):

1) weekly TV guide Televizionnaja programma (Fenster);
2) weekly TV guide Teleprogramma s dniej Mişej (Petits);
3) popular weekly newspaper Subbota (Petits);
4) popular weekly newspaper MK Latvia (Baltic Media Alliance);
5) daily newspaper Vesti segodnja (Fenster);
6) weekly newspaper Vesti (Fenster);
7) popular weekly newspaper 7 sekretov (Fenster);
8) free weekly advertising paper Rigas Santims (Petits);
9) daily newspaper Ķas (Petits);
10) weekly women’s magazine Ljublju (Petits).480

It must be stressed that, on the one hand, there is not a single newspaper in these leading positions that represents the so-called “quality” press. This gives a basis for speaking about the marginalization tendency of Latvia’s Russian-language press. It is interesting to note that the local free newspaper 5 min, which is published with identical content in Latvian and Russian by the stock company Diena, has the most “other ethnicity” readers among all readers of dailies in Riga.481 On the other hand, the sales volume of Russia’s publications in Latvia is not large, and does not exceed a fourth of the Russian-language press published in Latvia.482 Therefore, we can say that a new identity of Latvia’s Russians is gradually taking shape.

This is most apparent in the second largest Latvian city, Daugavpils, where media consumption attests to the strengthening of local identity and a stable regional identity, not in Riga, where there is a considerably larger portion of non-citizens on editorial staffs. 77% of surveyed Daugavpils residents were interested in the news in their city; 67% were interested in Latgale as a whole; and 59% were interested in Riga and the rest of Latvia. Information about Russia was less important, and was actively sought out by only 42% of those surveyed. The need to read news about the European Union can be equated with the importance of Russia’s news. In Latgale, the audience for local press publications — 84% — is three times larger than the audience for national-scale daily newspapers, 27%. The average Latvian data is 47% and 49%.483 What is more, in the case of Daugavpils, local Russian-language newspapers are chosen in favour of Russian-language papers from Riga.

It is important to note that Romāns Samarins (Roman Samarin), editor in chief and a co-owner of Daugavpils newspaper Dinaburg vesti, is a Russian citizen;484 the publisher and sole owner of Naša gazeta, Oļegs Guščins (Oleg Gushchin), is a citizen of Ukraine.485

A larger proportion of audiences in Riga listens to the radio in Russian. The Russian-speaking audience in Latvia definitely forms a large proportion of listeners of radio programs produced in Latvia,486 whereas Russian speakers mostly consume TV shows produced in Russia and programs produced in other abroad and then translated into Russian. One can agree, the point here is that, in Latvia, the radio does a better job than television at satisfying the interests and needs of Russian speakers in the country. The popularity of Russian-language radio stations in Riga shows that radio shows the information environment of the local community far more than television does, where widely available satellite and cable television programs allow Russian speakers to live in Russia’s information environment.487

However, in relation to the consumption of internet media, we can assert that, for the target group “other ethnicity”, the top 10 most-visited internet resources based on total weekly audience (reach) in the summer of 2009 in Latvia did not include a single Russian resource, because TNS Latvia’s regular surveys of internet use certainly are not representative when it comes to the Russian-language audience, as it encompasses only sites in Latvia.488

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480 Based on data form summer, 2009, compiled by the media, market, and social research company TNS Latvia. Available at http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=2996. Last accessed on September 9, 2009.
486 This applies particularly to the public radio organization Latvijas Radio, whose Russian-language station, Latvijas Radio 4, is the most popular Russian-language radio station in Latvia, according to TNS Latvia data. See, for example: http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=2572. Last accessed on September 9, 2009. Yet the internationally broadcast Russian radio station Russkoje radio, which, for example, is rebroadcast in Liepāja by the radio station Radio Liepāja, is also trying to expand into the radio market. Compare Kaprāns, Mārtiņš (2009) “Liepājas lokālie masu mediju” [Liepāja’s Local Mass Media.] Reinholde, Irveta (ed.) (2008) Liepāja kā attīstības celsdis. [Liepāja as a Guidebook to Development.] Riga: Zinātne, p. 100.
Media Content

Before examining the content of Russian media, it is worth mentioning that according to Reporters Without Borders data, in the media freedom index of 2008, Russia was on the 141st place, and Latvia — on the 8th place. Russia’s state administration control of the leading television channels allows subordination of the content of television broadcasting to political objectives. Russia has a possibility, within strategic communication, in a medium-term (3 – 5 years), to maintain a single interpretation of events, presenting similar opinions on all television channels addressed to both internal and external audience. Centre for East European Policy Studies (CEEPS) research of 2007, “Outside Influence on the Ethnic Integration Process in Latvia” and Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI) at the University of Latvia research of 2008, “Manufacturing Enemy Images?: Russian Media Portrayal of Latvia” prove the existence of such strategic communication.

Nils Mužnieks, director of ASPRI, indicates that „The Russian media did systematically manufacture an enemy image of Latvia with regard to some, but not all topics. As expected, the most pronounced negative portrayal concerned Latvia’s treatment of Russian-speakers, Latvia’s approach to history, and Latvia’s accession to NATO.” 489 Mužnieks acknowledges however that over the last years Russian media interest in Latvia has been declining.

On the other hand, when using various media channels, both individuals and social groups are conscious of and express their socio-cultural identities, common interests, and needs, thereby creating a more or less virtual reality. On the other hand, teams of researchers — including some from Russia — have concluded that the Russian diaspora in the Baltic States has an irreplaceable role in the implementation of Russian interests in the Baltic States. 490 Obviously, both processes overlap.

However, news reporting in the Russian media about the situation of the Russian minority in the Baltic States — which is largely inadequate — is mostly addressed for internal Russian consumption or, in any event, for uniting its political elite. 492 It is striking that news reporting in Latvia’s Russian-language media about Russia and international politics, and in the Russian media about Latvia, mostly reflects the official line of Russian foreign policy, focusing on Russia and its interests and hindering social integration in Latvia. 494 There is often a basis to describe it as “the production of imperial propaganda and Soviet nostalgia.” 495 Riga’s Russian-language press is consistent in its defence of minority language and culture, thought it does not have a perspective preconception of the form of ethnic relations in the near future. 496 We must also admit that Russian information campaigns are rather effective, at least in relation to the minds of the masses in Russia, which conforms to the official mandate to declare that Russia is experiencing a “rebirth of democracy”, and “to form effective information campaigns everywhere that a real challenges appear to Russian interests, supporting a broad public consensus about the course of Russian foreign policy”, also, “with the creation of a network of information platforms abroad, the expansion of a circle of mutual collaboration with Russian and compatriot mass media”, and “on the basis of privileged partner relations with [Russian] state mass media or mass media that receive the support of the [Russian] state”. 497 The new Russian national security strategy emphasizes that a common “humanitarian, information, and telecommunications space” must be developed in the C.I.S. and neighbouring regions. 498 Alexander Kramarenko, director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, has said that “Russia has overcome its national disaster after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 500 … It is too early to declare an end to Russia’s geopolitical mission — as it is equally inappropriate to speak of the ‘end of history.’ 501 … Moscow simply cannot overlook the issues that Beijing can keep silent on, since Russia’s vital interests are at stake.”

Therefore, we should not be surprised about, for example, the official support for a media productions like the film The Baltics: the History of an “Occupation” and its demonstration on the corresponding television channels, 503 and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s official greeting on the anniversary of Riga’s‘Vesti segodnja’ newspaper, “For all of these ten years, a highly professional group of journalists has, under the leadership of [Vesti segodnja editor in chief] Aleksandr Blinovs (Alexander Blinov), constantly worked in the name of uniting Russian compatriots, performing the difficult task of defending the rights and interests of Latvia’s Russians and Russian-speaking residents.” 504 In turn, during the five-day war between Russia and Georgia in August of 2008, the differences between the Latvian daily newspapers printed in Latvian — Diena and Neatkarīga Rīta Avize — and the papers published in Russian — Cas and Telegraf — were very apparent: “Cas defends Russian interests

496 Dvibis, Leo (2007) “Sharp konfliktu un kompromisu: Rīgas krīzes prese par ‘krievuvelādas kopienas’ etnopolitisko orientāciju Latvijā.” [Between Conflict and Compromise: Rigas Russian Press on the Ethno-political Orientation of the Russian-speaking Community in Latvia.] Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls, No. 2, p. 133. As proven by the aforementioned studies by the Communications Sciences Department at the Turība Business School, the same can be said about the content of Russian papers in Daugavpils. However, taking into account the larger proportion of Latvian citizens, it is important to note that, overall, they are not characterized by such an aggressive style in the implementation of official Russian positions as the Russian-language papers in Riga, and basically accept Latvian state policy in the corresponding issues.


501 Ibid., p. 80.

502 Ibid., p.82.

503 See Cabinet by 2009.

504 Diena (July 28, 2009), p. 2.
with patriotic pathos; Telegraf adheres to the official position of Moscow; Diena urges a harsh condemnation of Russia's actions; but Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze is much more reserved in its criticism of Latvia's Eastern neighbours.505

It is also important to note that the Russian-language media are particularly critical about the activities of diaspora Latvians from the West in Latvian politics.506 What is more, it must also be taken into account that, unlike the standard practice in Western journalism, Russian-language media still do not differentiate news from the opinions of journalists or the editorial staffs,507 and this presents more opportunities to manipulate the public.508

Russia's television channels' news reports often include stories on activities of Russian Orthodox Church, paying homage to the WW II veterans. Events in the U.S. are usually presented in a negative interpretation. Russian major television channels' talk shows relatively often include presentations of various experts calling to unite Russian community under the slogan of anti-Americanism. The aforementioned indicate that attempts are made to seek the society unifying ideological conceptions: Orthodoxy as a cornerstone of the specific Russian civilization; the victory in WW II as the symbol of national heroism and anti-Americanism as a one more unifying idea seeking of external enemy. News reports present Russian political leaders as strict, sometimes even merciless leaders thereby stimulating support for authoritarian tendencies.

Such situation does not favour ethnic integration of Latvia's society, because Russia's television channels cultivate specific values unacceptable for the Western democracy-oriented Latvian community. Wherewith, Russia's television channels are one of the factors hampering the Latvia's society integration process.

4.4. The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy in Lithuania

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4.4.1. Russian Human Rights Practice 2006–2008: Lithuania

The protection of human rights of the Russian diaspora or compatriots living abroad is presented as a top priority in almost all official Russian foreign policy documents. Officials responsible for the compatriots’ policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs make a difference between the Russian diaspora in the “far abroad” and the “near abroad”; they stress that there is an urgent need to protect the rights of Russian-language speakers in the latter region. The Kremlin constantly questions the ability of the states formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union to protect the rights of Russian ethnic minorities in their respective societies. In this way the legitimacy of post-Soviet national governments is put under the question. Moreover, public opinion polls in Russia show that the majority of population thinks that the rights of Russian-language speakers are being violated in former Soviet republics: several years ago 79 percent of the respondents said so.

Russia targets Latvia and Estonia in particular on the human rights issue. It does so through a network of international forums: the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and in the forums of the European Union. Therefore it is possible to analyze Russian human rights practices vis-à-vis Latvia and Estonia by researching how Russia presents this issue to those organizations and international community at large. This is not the case with Lithuania, because in Russian official statements to those international organizations one would not find any Russian complains about the rights of Russian speakers in Lithuania.

On the other hand, when analyzing the same policy in Lithuania, an interesting paradox unfolds: most politicians and experts (in Lithuania and in Russia) admit that the issue of Russian-language speakers is not on the agenda of Lithuanian – Russian relations. But Russian society has a totally different opinion on this matter. In the above mentioned poll, experts from the Levada Centre asked “In which former Soviet republics the rights of the Russian minority are violated the most?” and Lithuania ended up second (after Latvia and before Estonia) on the list.

If Russia’s allegations about human rights violations of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States have such a huge impact on the perception of Lithuanian public mind, it would be misleading to think that such Russian policies are the concern of Latvia and Estonia only, not of Lithuania or other countries that are included on such lists in Russia.

The way Russian speakers living in Lithuania see their rights and their status in this country stands out in total contrast to the above mentioned Kremlin’s rhetoric. At the end of 2008, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights conducted a minorities and discrimination survey called EU-MIDIS which revealed that Russians living in Lithuania felt the least vulnerable to discrimination compared to other ethnic minorities or immigrants in other countries of the European Union: out of all 45 ethnic minorities, Russians living in Lithuania ranked best on the table, with only 12 percent indicating the existence of ethnic discrimination in the country. This figure could be compared to 25 percent of Russians who felt being discriminated in Finland. Discrimination was mentioned by one fourth of Latvia’s Russian ethnic minority and more than half of Russians in Estonia. However, only 17 percent of Estonia’s Russians could indicate a specific discrimination case over the past year. Therefore, such a belief could be the result of constant propaganda pressure by the Kremlin on Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia. According to the poll, Russian minorities in the EU were not listed among the ethnic groups feeling the most vulnerable to ethnic discrimination.

The results of the survey are in stunning contradiction to the above mentioned popular understanding of this problem in Russian society, and those stereotypes are constantly supported by the accusations made by Russian politicians. The latest incrimination to all the Baltic States has been voiced just recently by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov:

“Unfortunately, many of our partners pretend not to be hearing us. For almost twenty years we have been speaking about discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States. The situation there not only has not undergone any radical change, but it is precisely from there that a new wave of xenophobia is beginning to spread across Europe, that of rejecting “aliens”.”

4.4.2. Russian Support of Compatriots Living in Lithuania

The first impression, when analysing the modern history of Baltic – Russian relations, is that Lithuania stands out as a more “lucky” neighbour of Russia than Latvia and Estonia. In 1989, before re-establishing independence, Lithuania adopted a citizenship law that set forth an inclusive policy of granting citizenship – the so-called zero option – simply because it had significantly fewer Russians living in Lithuania as compared to the situation in Latvia or Estonia at the time. Moreover, a very liberal law on ethnic minorities was adopted in 1989, which guaranteed the right to education in national language. It gave a good start for Lithuania to negotiate troop withdrawal and border agreements with Russia. The troops left Lithuania in August 1993.

515 Interview of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov with the BBC Russian Service, April 23, 2009. See http:// www.ln.mid.ru/bpr_4/ud/00572272A5A4853BDC32375ABA02532A.
of 1993, while they stayed for one more year in Latvia and Estonia. The treaty concerning the state border between Lithuania and Russia was signed in 1997. It became effective only in 2003, but for Latvia and Estonia this process was even more irritating and time consuming.

Lithuanian politicians had high hopes for normalising relations with Russia, especially when Lithuania seemed to be “a good Balt” vis-à-vis Russia’s foreign policy towards the Baltic States.518 This sketchy impression proved to be wrong. Already at the beginning of the last decade, the Russian political elite revived the doctrine of Russia’s spheres of legitimate influence, which viewed all the post-Soviet area as a zone of exclusive Russian interest. It was, and still is, very difficult for the Kremlin to treat the three Baltic States as equal partners and sovereign neighbours. And because of this, Russia’s foreign policy – including its humanitarian dimension – is perceived in Lithuania with a high degree of distrust.

This distrust was sparked in the autumn of 1992, when the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official magazine “Diplomaticeskii Vestnik” published an article by Russian political expert Sergey Karaganov (later his ideas became known as the “Karaganov doctrine”),519 suggesting that the entire post-Soviet area holds special interest for Russia and that Russian ethnic minorities should be used as a tool to implement Russia’s long-term interests in the region. Boris Yeltsin echoed this idea in 1994, when visiting the United States, by saying that Russia has the right to protect the interests of millions of Russians in the newly independent states who looked on these places as home and who now live there as guests.520 In 1995 the Russian foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, went even further by stating that “there may be cases where direct military force will be needed to defend our compatriots abroad.”521 Russian compatriots’ policy in Lithuania is not very effective. Its shortcomings could be explained by several factors. First, this is due to the relatively small size of the Russian diaspora in Lithuania. Russian minority in Lithuania is considerably shrinking in size. During the last decade, it went down from first to second (after Polish) largest ethnic minority in the country. The Russian ethnic minority decreased twofold from 344 thousand in 1989 to 168 thousand in 2008.522

On the other hand, there are Russian diaspora islands in three Lithuanian cities: Vilnius (15%), Klaipėda (22%) and Visaginas (58%).523 The Russian compatriots’ policy first of all targets Russian speakers and their organizations in these three Lithuanian cities where, according to Census 2001, 89 percent of all ethnic Russians live.524 Another important factor in explaining the shortcomings of the Russian compatriots’ policy is lack of political and civic consolidation among Lithuania’s Russian speaking community: for example in the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Union of Russians in Lithuania Party received only 11,357 votes, i.e. 0.92 percent of all votes, and lost by a landslide. This chronic problem of civic mobilization among the Russians in Lithuania is admitted not only by Lithuanian scholars, but by the representatives of the Russian minority as well.525 The inability of the Russian minority to mobilize itself stands out in sharp contrast to that of the Polish minority, which has its own strong political party – the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania;526 which even had its own candidate in the 2009 presidential elections: Voldemar Tomaševski.527

The analysis of the organization of Russian compatriots’ institutions in Lithuania results in some confusion because it is still not clear which umbrella organization is responsible for coordinating the Russian compatriots’ policy in Lithuania. The 2009 official manual for Russian compatriots abroad states that there is a public consultative council working at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Lithuania, chaired by Andrei Fomin,528 who is also member of the Worldwide Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad.529 However, there are several other organizations which, considering their title and activities, are also claiming this role. These are:

- Russian Compatriots’ Public Organizations Co-ordination Council of Lithuania headed by Tatiana Michniova;530
- Russian Compatriots’ Public Organizations Co-ordination Council of Lithuania headed by Olga Gorshkova;531
- Association of Teachers of Russian Schools in Lithuania headed by Ela Kanaite;532

This chaotic situation among the organizations of Russian compatriots in Lithuania reflects a wider problem: an ongoing competition for finances allocated under the Program of Work with Compatriots Abroad for 2009–2011 for activities of country-specific Coordination Councils of Compatriots’ Organizations.533 Until now the traditional public forum for the above mentioned and other organizations representing ethnic minorities of Lithuania to meet and discuss their problems was the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. However, at the moment several

523 Ibid.
526 In the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania received 4.79 percent of all votes and 3 members of the party won seats in parliament in single-member constituencies. See http://www.vrk.lt. Last accessed on July 12, 2009.
527 He received 4.7 percent of votes in the election. See http://www.vrk.lt. Last accessed on July 12, 2009.
worrying tendencies are emerging. First of all, the present government of Lithuania has voiced its ambition to reorganize the Department which is responsible for implementing integration policies of Lithuanian ethnic minorities. At the same time, Russia has stepped-up its compatriots’ projects in Lithuania: the Russkiy Mir centre started functioning at Vilnius Pedagogical University in May of 2009; the House of Moscow, still under construction, is due to be fully functional in Vilnius in the near future.

If this public forum for compatriots’ discussions shifts from the Department of National Minorities to Russian (non)governmentally controlled forums, the tone and topics of discussions held there can change significantly. At the present moment, when the Lithuania-based organizations of Russian compatriots meet with Russian officials and their counterparts in Latvia and Estonia, they pursue (usually instigated by Russian embassies) not only cultural, but also political goals. For example, during one of the recent conferences of compatriots from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the Resolution concerning the events in South Ossetia was adopted, which stated: “...Russia was forced to take measures to protect the peaceful population and compel the aggressor to consent to peace. In this way it saved the people of South Ossetia from total extermination.”

The stand taken by the leaders of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia arouses condemnation. On the basis non-objective information and completely disregarding the views and attitudes of a major part of people in their countries, they assumed a one-sided position and denounced the victim – the aggressor. This demonstrates not only a deficit of morality, but also the absence of respect to the neighbouring country, Russia, and a desire to please the United States even against the interests of their own people. [...] The Russian compatriots’ policy is build not only on an organizational and networking basis, but on informational support as well. The Russian Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the Program of Work with Compatriots Abroad for 2009–2011 specifically state that it is highly important to preserve and develop a media environment for Russian compatriots. The analysis of the Russian-language media in Lithuania will be presented later on in this report, but particular attention should be devoted to media outlets and internet projects specifically aimed at Russian compatriots in Lithuania.

In Russia, there is the World Russian Press Association which individually networks professional Russian language journalists from around the world. Each year the Association organizes world Russian press congresses: the 10th Congress took place in Moscow in 2008. The media support for compatriots’ policy in Lithuania focuses on several specific projects: first of all, there are paper editions of the pan-Baltic bimonthly magazine "Baltic World" (regional editor for Lithuania is Andrei Fomin) and the Lithuanian monthly newspaper "Compatriot’s Manual"; secondly, there is a new internet portal www.rusorg.lt devoted to spreading information about the organizations of Russian speakers in Lithuania. The managers of this portal have organized one of the biggest conferences of Russian compatriots of Lithuania in 2009 entitled “Continuity of Generations: Preserving Traditions and Solutions to Modern Challenges.” It is important to underline that the above mentioned paper editions on compatriots’ news outlets in Lithuania face a serious problem of distribution: you cannot buy them at newspaper stands and stores. They are available only at the Embassy and the Consulate of the Russian Federation and can be subscribed to only by compatriots’ organizations, not individually. Therefore, most probably, the publishers of both the magazine and the newspaper seek to distribute them freely via the internet. The official Russia does not even try to conceal that one of the principal goals which should be achieved through the use of the above mentioned compatriots’ organizations and their media outlets is to implant Russia’s version and understanding of history in the countries of the so-called “near abroad”. This goal is accentuated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation as follows: “to firmly counter [...] attempts to rewrite the history [...] and revise the outcome of World War Two.” Ukrainian scholar Tatjana Žurzhenko labelled such Russian policy as the “geopolitics of memory.” This “geopolitical” objective is pursued by different organizational, legal, administrative, and propaganda strategies. One of the best examples of such activities is the History Foundation established in 2008 and headed by the notorious Russian historian Alexander Diukov. At the same time, the Kremlin tries to build a legal framework to counter alternative interpretations of history: the so-called project “on preventing the rebirth of Nazism” which would allow to prosecute those who deny the official version of history. The President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, took administrative steps in this sphere as well: a commission to counter the attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests was created on May 21, 2009. However, the most intensive work is going on in the media and this is reflected by the analysis of the propaganda material intended for the Baltic States (see Table No. 4).

550 The official Russia does not even try to conceal that one of the principal goals which should be achieved through the use of the above mentioned compatriots’ organizations and their media outlets is to implant Russia’s version and understanding of history in the countries of the so-called “near abroad”. This goal is accentuated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation as follows: “to firmly counter [...] attempts to rewrite the history [...] and revise the outcome of World War Two.” Ukrainian scholar Tatjana Žurzhenko labelled such Russian policy as the “geopolitics of memory.” This “geopolitical” objective is pursued by different organizational, legal, administrative, and propaganda strategies. One of the best examples of such activities is the History Foundation established in 2008 and headed by the notorious Russian historian Alexander Diukov. At the same time, the Kremlin tries to build a legal framework to counter alternative interpretations of history: the so-called project “on preventing the rebirth of Nazism” which would allow to prosecute those who deny the official version of history. The President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, took administrative steps in this sphere as well: a commission to counter the attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests was created on May 21, 2009.
However, the most intensive work is going on in the media and this is reflected by the analysis of the propaganda material intended for the Baltic States (see Table No. 4).
### Table No. 4. Russian propaganda material designed to spread official version of history

Source: Analysis conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Co-authors, sponsors or producers</th>
<th>Propaganda techniques used**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 onwards</td>
<td>Internet</td>
<td><em>Fascist Tendencies in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania</em></td>
<td>IA „Regnum“ journalists</td>
<td>IA „Regnum“</td>
<td>Bandwagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td><em>Basic States Between Stalin and Hitler</em></td>
<td>Michael Kristin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Glittering Generalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Documentary</td>
<td><em>National Baltic-style</em></td>
<td>Boris Chechlov, Alexander Tkachenko*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Internet contest of caricatures</td>
<td><em>Death to Fascist Occupants</em></td>
<td>Various caricaturists</td>
<td>IA „Regnum“</td>
<td>Name Calling; Transfer; Card Stacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Collection of documents</td>
<td><em>Crimes of Nazis and their Collaborators in the Baltic (Estonia) 1941–1944</em></td>
<td>Public Society Against Neo-fascism and intra-national hatred (Estonia)*</td>
<td>Vechė</td>
<td>Name Calling; Transfer; Card Stacking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
2. The propaganda tendencies were documented in a series of reports compiled by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
3. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
4. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
5. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
6. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
7. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
8. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
9. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.
10. The analysis of media production was conducted by Nerijus Maliukevičius.

**Propaganda techniques used:** Name Calling; Transfer; Card Stacking

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[Further details can be found in the original document.]

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[Additional notes and references are provided in the original document.]
Despite the propaganda noise, there are some promising bilateral projects between Lithuania and Russia. First of all, since 2006 the Commission of Lithuanian and Russian Historians is working intensively, although not as publicly as the Russian propaganda machine. The Commission meets every year (three bilateral meetings happened already), it has organized several conferences, and its member experts have published an important historical book called “The Soviet Union and Lithuania during the Years of the Second World War,” with a second volume to be published in the future. Secondly, the Embassy of the Russian Federation and Russian experts from the Ministry of Defence organize the caretaking of the cemeteries of Soviet soldiers in Lithuania. According to the Russian magazine “Komсerant Vlast,” during World War Two around 80 thousand Soviet soldiers died on the territory of Lithuania and around 3 thousand are still buried here in military memorials. The magazine writes that around 154 thousand lost their life on the territory of Latvia and around 23 thousand are still buried in Latvia; 280 thousand died on Estonian soil and 12 thousand are buried there. At the same time, every year young people from Lithuania organize voluntary expeditions “Mission Siberia” and travel to Russia to look after the cemeteries of the victims of Soviet repressions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Vygaudas Ušackas, together with his son took part in “Mission Siberia 2007.” However, this very important social project – to give proper respect for the dead buried in Lithuania and in Russia – is not consolidated by any official bilateral agreements between the two countries and therefore totally depends on the goodwill of Russian and Lithuanian politicians and officials.

4.4.3. Consular Issues of the Russian Foreign Policy in Lithuania

The Russian Foreign Policy Review singles out consular work as a priority in Russia’s humanitarian strategy. Effective consular activities usually energize migration flows (tourism, cultural or educational exchanges, and migration of workers) between the countries. Therefore, it constitutes an important part of public diplomacy work. However, the Review focuses only on the protection of Russian citizens travelling or living abroad, not on consular activities to enhance migration flows between Russia and the neighbouring countries. This official wording makes Russia’s neighbours very suspicious of such consular activities because of the experience in the 2008 war with Georgia when the Kremlin declared that it was using military force to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.

In 2007, Russian consular posts released information that about 1.5 million Russian citizens were temporarily or permanently living in foreign countries. Moreover, each year about 7 million Russian citizens travel abroad for tourism or short business trips and this number is constantly growing. According to official Russian sources, around 16 thousand Russian citizens live in Lithuania (114 thousand in Estonia and 40 thousand in Latvia). The latest available data indicate that in Lithuania there are around 12 thousand Russian citizens who have permanent or temporary residence permits.

Russian citizens in Lithuania are represented by the Association of Russian Citizens, chaired by Valentin Mescheriakov, with branches in Vilnius and other cities. It actively participates in the activities of Russian compatriots in Lithuania, but its chairman complains that Russian citizens do not get the same attention as other Russian speakers in the Baltic States do when Russia implements its humanitarian projects in the region.

Interesting data unfold in the analysis of tourist flows in and out of Lithuania. In 2007, more than 2.3 million foreign visitors came to Lithuania. The highest number of tourist trips was from Russia – 224,300 (15.1% of total trips), Germany – 179,100 (12.1%), and Belarus – 174,400 (11.7%). Tourist trips from those three countries accounted for 39 percent of the total inbound touristic trips. The State Department of Tourism reported that in 2007 the largest number of organized tourist trips was from Germany – 23,600, less by 7.6% than in 2006, from Russia – 13,200, less by 11.9% than in 2006, and from Poland – 9,500, more by 18.4% than in 2006.

The highest number of same-day trips in 2007 was from Latvia (40%), Poland (30%), Russia (14.5%), and Belarus (8%). In 2007, residents of Lithuania made 3.6 million trips abroad (less by 16.8% than in 2006); same-day visitors mostly travelled to Latvia (40%), Poland (23%), Russia (21%), and Belarus (16%). However, the main

549 For example, conference "Empire and Nations in the 19th Century" took place in Vilnius on 17–18 September 2008.
552 Ibid.
553 In 2009, an expedition will go to Kazakhstan, see http://www.misijasibiras.lt/2009/. Last accessed 19 July 2009.
560 Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania.
The drop in tourism from Russia compared to the 2006 data could be explained by Lithuania's accession to the Schengen Area in 2007, when visa requirements for Russians travelling to Lithuania were tightened and visas became more expensive to obtain. However, migration flows between the two countries are still very intensive. Russians account for the vast majority of those coming to Lithuania for tourism, health care and short-term business trips. According to the consular information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, in the first half of 2008 most of the visas for Russian citizens were issued in Moscow (a total of 20,108 in six months), Kaliningrad (18,568), Sovietsk (9,892), and St. Petersburg (6,514).569

4.4.4. Culture, Education

Culture

The Russkiy Mir foundation realised that Russian language teaching was the greatest challenge faced by the Russian humanitarian policy in Lithuania. Therefore, the foundation chose to open its centre at a university which prepares teachers for Lithuanian schools: the centre was opened at the Lithuanian Pedagogical University in May of 2009. This foundation is tasked not only with spreading the Russian language, but Russian culture as well. The concept of culture by itself is very vague: there could be classical Russian culture, mass culture or political culture. Lithuania does not have such grand events of Russian popular culture as “New wave” in Jurmala, Latvia. However there is a new tendency, when Lithuanian singers and artists take part in such festivals abroad. One notable event, which is organized each year in Belarusian town Vitebsk, is song festival “Slavianski bazar”. Each year this festival attracts more and more Lithuanian artists. This can be explained by the amount of publicity they get in the Lithuanian media afterwards: for example, in 2009 “Slavianski bazar” was broadcasted on one of the biggest Lithuanian TV networks TV3.

On the other hand, Russian classical culture has old traditions in Lithuania. Russian theatre was established in 1864 in Vilnius.570 At that time it was the only theatre in Lithuania. After the Second World War this theatre renewed its activities, but in the beginning party leaders appointed artists from other Soviet republics, not Lithuania, to be directors of the theatre. After Lithuania regained its independence Russian theatre plays an important role in the cultural life of the country. The Embassy of Russian Federation regularly supports this theatre and organizes tours of Russian theatres here.

Each year the Embassy of Russian Federation organizes cultural events during the Day of Russia (12th of June). Those events draw in all organizations of Russian compatriots in Lithuania.571 Moreover, Russkiy Mir foundation already started actively supporting Russian high culture events in Lithuania. In 2009 Vilnius is the European capital of culture and in this context Russkiy Mir foundation sponsors festival of folklore "Pokrovskije kolokola". This event is also supported by companies that have common business with Russia: for example one of the sponsors is construction company “Masyvas”, which is building the House of Moscow in Vilnius.

Language

Russia has a competitive advantage for its humanitarian policies in the post-Soviet sphere due to objective reasons: Russian compatriots living in this region, the popularity of Russian mass culture, and the spread of Russian Orthodox Christianity. However, one of the biggest advantages Russia has in transmitting its humanitarian influence throughout the region is the widespread use of the Russian language. The census of 2001 showed that the knowledge of Russian, if it is not the native language, is very high in Lithuania: there are about 65% of Lithuanians and about 75% of Poles speaking Russian. Compared to the situation in the European Union, where the Russian language ranks seventh (7% of the EU population speak Russian), it is an enormous advantage for Russia’s humanitarian policy in Lithuania.

The most recent results show that the English language is gaining in popularity among the youth (57.4%), pupils and students (66.7%) (see Table No. 5). This latter group communicates in English and Russian almost equally well. The Poles speak English language the worst, only 5.9% (in 2001 the same indicator was 6.9%), but what is mostly worrisome is that this ethnic group speaks Lithuanian (70.6%) worse than Russian (96.5%). The comparison of the results of this survey with the Census 2001 results shows that the ability of Lithuanians to speak the Russian language increased from 64.1% to 85.9%,572 and the ability of Russians and Poles to speak the Lithuanian language also improved: in 2001 65.8% of Russians and 61.6% of Poles were able to communicate in Lithuanian and at the end of 2006 73.5% of Russians and 70.6% of Poles said that they are able to speak Lithuanian.

569 Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs data.
573 The deputy director of the research company “Baltijos tyrimai”, Romualdas Mačiūnas, told a conference organized by Russkiy Mir that around 50% of Lithuanians speak Russian. This survey took into account the ability to write in Russian, which decreased the overall portion of those who can speak Russian. See Русский язык в новых независимых государствах: реалии, возможности, перспективы. February 8, 2008. Available at www.fundeh.org/xml/t/library.xml?s=-1&lang=ru&nic=library. Last accessed on July 25, 2009.
Table No. 5. Ability to communicate in different languages among various groups of Lithuanian society (in percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Lithuanian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Belarussian</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>country</th>
<th>language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 29</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30 to 39 years</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils and students</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, for the Russian humanitarian policies to reach the Lithuanian audience, the ability to understand Russian language is sufficient (see Table No. 6).

Table No. 6. Ability to understand different languages among various groups of Lithuanian society (in percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Lithuanian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Belarussian</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>country</th>
<th>language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 29</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30 to 39 years</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils and students</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos, p. 96.

This latter indicator represents the language environment of Lithuania the best: according to the results, all social groups understand Russian equally well. However, when analysing the knowledge of foreign languages among different age groups, it emerges that the Russian language is beginning to lose in competitiveness to English among the young generation in Lithuania. Among young age group (15–24 yrs) in Lithuania, the Russian language is giving way to English. Respondents, most of whom belong to the high-school segment, know English better than Russian, which is a natural result of foreign language education in schools (see the chart).

Dynamics of learning foreign languages in schools*

In the Lithuanian system of secondary education, foreign languages are taught as the first, second or third foreign language. From fourth grade children start learning the first foreign language and they can choose from three options: English, German or French. From sixth grade they start learning second foreign language and they can choose from English, German, French, Russian, Polish, Italian, Spanish or other foreign language, if there are enough children willing to learn this language and the school can find a relevant teacher. There is also a possibility to learn third foreign language.

The data issued by the Lithuanian Ministry of Education and Science reveals an interesting pattern in the few recent years: the Russian language is not just the most popular second foreign language; in the 2008/2009 school year, it became the 574 From the 2009/2010 school year, the first foreign language will be taught from second grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/2005</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The longest column represents the total number of pupils studying in the respective school year. Pupils can learn several foreign languages at the same time: for example, English as the first foreign language and Russian as the second. Therefore, foreign language columns represent the sum total of pupils who are learning a foreign language, irrespective of whether it is the first, second or third foreign language.


574 From the 2009/2010 school year, the first foreign language will be taught from second grade.
most popular third foreign language. However, the marked increase of those who are learning the English language among the young generation and the widening gap between the English and Russian language learners induced the analysts from Russkiy Mir, in 2008, to attribute Lithuania to those post-Soviet countries where the Russian language is in the worst position, i.e. where young people not only have a poor knowledge of Russian, but also show little initiative to learn it.

Education

It might be expected that Russian schools in Lithuania are the strongholds of the Russian language and Russian culture. The analysis, however, reveals a continued decline of the Russian-language secondary education in Lithuania. In the 2008/2009 school year, there were 1,228 Lithuanian, 68 Polish and 34 Russian schools; meanwhile, in the 1990/1991 school year, there were only 44 Polish and as many as 85 Russian schools. This significant decrease of Russian schools is even more impressive, when looking at the changes in the number of their students – in the 1995/1996 school year there were about 55,000 students (10.8% of total number of students) in Russian schools and that number is decreasing constantly and has reached 19,673 students (4.3% of total number of students) in school year 2008/2009. The number of students in Russian schools in Lithuania decreased four times since 1990. This number stands in sharp contrast to that of Polish school students: in 1990 there were 11,000 students studying in Polish schools and in 2009 this number was 15,000.

Russian-speaking families tend to enrol their children in Lithuanian schools: they want their children to integrate more easily into Lithuanian society and the European labour market. Secondary schools based on the ethnic principle and ethnic minority language are viewed by Russian speakers as socially closed systems of education. Lithuanian experts admit that the graduates of such schools face multiple challenges in the labour market, the principle challenge being poor knowledge of the Lithuanian language. Therefore, the Lithuanian Government wishes to implement reforms in the education sector. There are plans to introduce Lithuanian-language courses in schools of ethnic minorities: at least two Lithuanian-language courses in basic schools and three courses in secondary schools. In this way, ethnic minority schools would become bilingual.

Higher education in Lithuania is based on the state language. However, there are bachelor or master programs in English as well. The European Humanities Uni-

4.45. Russian Mass Media in Lithuania

The results of electronic media monitoring, which has been constantly conducted by the author since 2005, reveal a steady increase of the Russian media presence in the Lithuanian information environment. Significant segments of Lithuanian society receive popular information as well as news about the world and the post-Soviet region through the Russian media. Television is the dominant medium for the general public in Lithuania and the majority of viewers (up to 70%) watch popular national TV channels. The public opinion survey conducted by the research company Vilnius University in the end of 2006 examined the specific characteristics of watching national TV networks (LTV, LNK, TV3, BTB) compared with the most popular Russian-language TV network Pervij Baltiskij Kanal (PBK). The results show that nearly three fourths of the respondents watch LNK and TV3 every day; the number of LTV viewers is just slightly lower. Half of those questioned watched BTV every day and 17 percent are daily PBK viewers. The results of the survey show that many viewers in Lithuania turn on the PBK channel when searching for news about Lithuania: about 30 percent of the respondents said that they watch this channel several times per week or even more. The four-year (2004—2007) tendency reveals that the audience of the main TV channels declined in terms of watching time, while the PBK audience increased by almost 1.5 times from 3.6 to 5.8 percent. Moreover, an interesting tendency unfolds when analysing channel preferences by nationality. These results show that the


577 Article 29 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania.


Russian minority in Lithuania consider the PBK channel to be the best media for receiving news about Lithuania: almost 56 percent of Russians in Lithuania watch the PBK channel every day. They watch Lithuanian national TV channels considerably less. PBK is also popular among the Polish minority: 47.6 percent of Poles in Lithuania watch it every day. An additional survey by TNS Gallup reveals that PBK programmes are the most popular among ethnic minorities in Lithuania. Based on such data, we can state conclusively that the dominant news source for Russians and Poles in Lithuania is the Russian-language PBK channel produced daily news programme "Litovskoye Vremia". One must bare in mind that Russian minority consider Russian media to be credible, when compared to Lithuanian media: according to the above mentioned Vilmorus poll, 53 percent of Russians stated that they consider Russian media to be a reliable source of information (only 14 percent of Lithuanians thought the same about Russian media).

Even when searching for the same news (about events in Lithuania), viewers of different nationalities use different television sources. Russians and Poles in Lithuania find themselves in a different television information space than Lithuanians. On the other hand, more than half of Russian and Polish minorities watch Lithuanian channels every day. Only 10–20 percent of the respondents belonging to ethnic minorities never watch Lithuanian TV channels LTV, LNK or TV3. The situation therefore is not the same as in Latvia or Estonia where two different media environments exist: in Lithuania, the Russian and Lithuanian media have there own audiences, but those different audiences show some interest in the opposite media environment as well.

Within this context, it is interesting to compare how Russian programmes, serials, movies, and talk shows are broadcasted in major Lithuanian TV networks (LTV, TV3, LNK, BTV, and 5 Kanalas (currently this network is called "Lietuvos Ryto TV")). During the three periods – April 30 – May 6, 2005, February 25 – March 3, 2006, January 20 – 26, 2007, the Lithuanian Television broadcasted two programmes in Russian: "The Russian Street" and "News in Russian", which amounted to more than 1 hour of the LTV broadcasting time in the respective periods. In this aspect, LTV should be described as the most consistent television network that produces original programmes for ethnic minorities. We could even question whether the Russian-language programmes produced by the public broadcaster are adequate in terms of quantity because Russian is also used by the Polish ethnic minority. Having too few Russian-language programmes is likely to make the Russian population understand Russian media to be credible, when compared to Lithuanian media: according to the above mentioned Vilmorus poll, 53 percent of Russians stated that they consider Russian media to be a reliable source of information (only 14 percent of Lithuanians thought the same about Russian media).

This analysis reveals several important tendencies in the Lithuanian TV environment:

first, some television networks broadcast a significant amount of Russian production (e.g. in 2006, during the reference week, 5 Kanalas broadcasted 46 hours of such programmes, which accounted for nearly 42 percent of the total weekly broadcasting time (112 hours); other TV networks broadcasted less of Russian production (e.g. TV3 did not broadcast any Russian programmes during the same period);

second, we can presume that the ongoing changes are mostly predetermined by economic factors and business decisions: e.g. in 2007, 5 Kanalas significantly reduced broadcasting NTV (Russian network) production; meanwhile in 2007, after its general director was appointed to head the DTV network (Viasat Group) in Russia, TV3 started broadcasting Russian-made humour programmes, reality shows and serials;

Russian-made TV production continues to fiercely work its way to Lithuania’s two most popular national networks: TV3 and LNK. Taking into consideration that the Law on Provision of Information to the Public (Article 34) states that foreign-language programmes must be either voiced over or subtitled in Lithuanian and given that a major portion of people in Lithuania understand Russian, commercial TV networks prefer to use subtitles in Russian TV serials and talk shows, while the English-language production is usually voiced over. The reasons behind the prevailing tendency to voice over Western-made video products and subtitle Russian-made production can be determined by analysing two basic arguments:

1) Costs. Subtitles are less expensive than a voice over, therefore most Russian television products are subtitled because a large portion of the Lithuanian audience understands Russian;

2) Demand. Elderly people do not understand English or any other Western European language; therefore TV networks tend to use a voice over since they do not wish to lose their elderly audience which finds it more difficult to read subtitles.

The survey conducted by "Vilmorus" asked respondents what language newspapers they read. The results show that most read in Lithuanian; some read newspapers in Russian, very few in English and Polish. Newspapers in other languages are practically never read. Russian and Polish minorities do not read much in Lithuanian: 25 and 26 percent, respectively, read Lithuanian-language newspapers every day. Only 3 percent of Russians read Russian-language newspapers on a daily basis. The percentage of Russians in Lithuania who read Russian-language newspapers every day stands at 45.6 percent. English-language newspapers are mostly read by young people, school and university students. Only slightly more than 9 percent of Poles in Lithuania read Polish-language newspapers every day.

An analysis was made to find out whether Russians and Poles read Lithuanian weekly magazines in the Russian language to find news about Lithuania (there is only one daily Russian-language newspaper: the Russian version of the Lithuanian daily "Respublika" and it is impossible to compare it with any other Russian daily). The most popular weekly at the present moment among both Russians and Poles is "Express Nedelia". It is read at least once per week by almost 6 percent of all of the respondents. Slightly more than 17 percent of the Russian respondents read "Obzor".

at least once a week in search for news about Lithuania; less than 11 percent read “Litovskij Kurjer”.

To analyze Russia’s informational penetration into Lithuania’s Russian-language media, TNS-Gallup conducted a monitoring of information published by “Litovskij Kurjer” and “Obzor”. The survey covered those periods in 2005 when a stir was created in the Lithuanian media about the 60th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II in Moscow and the Russian SU-27 crash in Lithuania. The results of the monitoring show that “Litovskij Kurjer” and “Obzor” published reports about the above events and also about political, economic and cultural issues in Lithuania mostly based on sources from Russian news agencies (e.g. REGNUM) or the internet media (e.g. Lenta.ru). These weekly magazines are news digests where Russian media reports about news and events in Lithuania and the world take dominant position. The situation in the written media is similar to the prevailing tendency in the television environment where Lithuania’s ethnic minorities (Russians in particular) also get to know about political, cultural and economic events in Lithuania from the Russian media.

We can assume that Russians and Poles prefer to read those weekly magazines that may be described as Russian-made news digests. Despite the dwindling need to read newspapers in the Russian language, Russian newspapers and analytical journals are streaming into the Lithuanian press market: beginning with last year, the most popular Russian daily “Komsomolska Pravda”, tailored as a weekly for the Nordic countries, is sold in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Russian language radio stations are the most popular in Vilnius and Klaipėda, where a significant share of the Russian minority lives: Russkoje Radio Baltija is the leading radio station in Vilnius and Radio Raduga is second in Klaipėda.

Internet is steadily gaining in popularity as a news source. In Lithuania there are two internet news portals in the Russian language. Both of them have been launched just recently. The most popular internet portal Delfi.ru was opened at the end of 2007. UAB “Savaitės Ekspresas” – publishers of the most popular Russian weekly “Express Nedelia” – are also entering the internet news marked with a new project Runet.It started in 2008.

4.5. The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy in Moldova

587 The monitoring was commissioned by the author [N.M.] and implemented by TNS-Gallup in 2006.
**4.5.1. Russian Human Rights Practice 2006–2008: Moldova**

Moldova has tried to form positive relations with Russia. Its foreign policy has been flexible regarding the EU and NATO. The case of Moldova differs from the cases of the Baltic States and Ukraine because the volume of Russian criticism is much lower in bilateral and multilateral relations. However, in describing the Russian human rights practice in Moldova, the case of Ilascu and others vs Moldova and Russia (Application no. 48787/99), with a judgment on July 8, 2004, is an illustrative example of political interests within human rights framework.

The case originated in an application by four Moldovan nationals, Mr. Ilie Ilasuć, Mr. Alexandru Leșco, Mr. Andrei Ivițoc, and Mr. Tudor Petrov-Popa, on April 5, 1999. The application mainly concerns acts committed by the authorities of the Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria (the M.R.T.), a region of Moldova which proclaimed its independence in 1991 but is not recognised by the international community.

The applicants submitted that they had been convicted by a Transdniestrian court which was not competent for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention; that they had not had a fair trial, contrary to the same provision; and that following their trial they had been deprived of their possessions in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They further contended that their detention in Transdniestria was not lawful, in breach of Article 5, and that their conditions of detention contravened Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In addition, Mr Ilaşcu alleged a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the fact that he had been sentenced to death. 

The applicants argued that the Moldovan authorities were responsible under the Convention for the alleged infringements of the rights secured to them thereunder, since they had not taken any appropriate steps to put an end to them. They further asserted that the Russian Federation shared responsibility, because the territory of Transdniestria was and is under de facto Russian control on account of the Russian troops and military equipment stationed there and the support allegedly given to the separatist regime by the Russian Federation.

Lastly, the applicants alleged that Moldova and the Russian Federation had obstructed the exercise of their right of individual application to the Court, thus breaching Article 34.

In order to clarify certain disputed points and, in particular, the question whether Moldova and/or the Russian Federation were responsible for the alleged violations, the Court carried out an on-the-spot investigation. However, 7 out of 43 witnesses did not appear, including Commandant Bergman.

The Court discussed in great detail the facts of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the Moldovan — Transdniestrian conflict over the breakaway of Transdniestria, starting with an historical account from 1940.

The European Court of Human Rights concluded the following in its judgment:

“The Moldovan Government argued that they had never claimed that the army of the Russian Federation had been legally stationed in Moldovan territory, or that the 14th Army had not intervened in the Transdniestrian conflict.

On the contrary, they asserted, as appeared from the witness evidence taken by the Court’s delegates, that the 14th Army had intervened actively, both directly and indirectly, in the Transdniestrian conflict, against the armed forces of Moldova. The Transdniestrian separatists had been able to arm themselves with weapons belonging to the 14th Army and with the 14th Army’s complicity. The Moldovan Government considered that no faith could be placed in assertions that women had forcibly seized weapons and ammunition from the 14th Army’s stores. Moreover, not a single Russian soldier had subsequently been disciplined for negligence or complicity in the seizure of equipment from the 14th Army’s stores.

“The Russian Government argued that the 14th Army had been in Moldova when the Transdniestrian conflict broke out. The Russian military forces as such had taken no part whatsoever in the fighting and had not been involved in the acts complained of. However, where illegal armed operations had been carried out against soldiers of the 14th Army, appropriate measures had been taken in accordance with international law. In general, the Russian Government were prepared to accept as a hypothesis that individuals claiming allegiance to the 14th Army might have taken part in the acts in issue, but emphasised that if that had been the case such conduct would have constituted a gross breach of Russian legislation, for which the individuals responsible would have been punished.

“The Russian Government went on to say that the Russian Federation had remained neutral in the conflict. In particular, it had not supported the combatants in any way, whether militarily or financially.

“The Court notes that all the Moldovan witnesses questioned categorically confirmed the active involvement, whether direct or indirect, of the 14th Army, and later of the ROG, in the transfer of weapons to the Transdniestrian separatists. They also confirmed the participation of Russian troops in the conflict, particularly the involvement of tanks bearing the flag of the Russian Federation, shots fired towards the Moldovan positions from units of the 14th Army and the transfer of a large number of 14th Army troops to the reserves so that they could fight alongside the Transdniestrians or train them (see Annex: Mr Costăș, § 406; and Mr Creangă, § 457).

“Those assertions are corroborated by the information contained in OSCE report no. 7 of 29 July 1993, added to the file by the Romanian Government, and by other sources (see Annex: Mr Moșanu, § 244). In that connection, the Court notes both the abundance and the detailed nature of the information in its possession on this subject.

“It sees no reason to doubt the credibility of the Moldovan witnesses heard, and notes that their assertions are corroborated by the Moldovan Government, who
confirmed these facts in all of the observations they submitted throughout the proceedings.

“As to the Russian Government’s allegation that the witnesses belonged to political circles opposed to the Russian Federation, the Court notes that this has not been substantiated”.

Analyzing the following European Court of Human Rights Judgment, one can observe certain similarities with the situation in Georgia:

“On 22 June 1992 the Moldovan parliament appealed to the international community, opposing the “new aggression perpetrated in Transdniestria on 21 June 1992 by the forces of the 14th Army” and complaining that its actions of destruction and pillage had driven large numbers of civilians to flee their homes. The international community was urged to send experts to Transdniestria to halt the “genocide” of the local population.

“In the first half of July 1992, intense discussions took place within the C.I.S. about the possibility of deploying a C.I.S. peacekeeping force in Moldova. Mention was made in that connection of an agreement signed in Minsk in March 1992 concerning groups of military observers and strategic C.I.S. peacekeeping forces.

“At a C.I.S. meeting held in Moscow on 6 July 1992, it was decided to deploy in Moldova, as a preliminary step, a C.I.S. peacekeeping force made up of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, Romanian and Bulgarian troops, on condition that Moldova requested this. Although the Moldovan parliament made such a request the next day, the force was never deployed since some countries had had second thoughts about their agreement to join a C.I.S. force.

“On 21 October 1994 Moldova and the Russian Federation signed an agreement concerning the legal status of the military formations of the Russian Federation temporarily present in the territory of the Republic of Moldova and the arrangements and time-limits for their withdrawal. This agreement was not ratified by the authorities of the Russian Federation and so never came into force. The Moldovan delegation asked their government to consider the possibility of replacing the Russian peacekeeping forces in Transdniestria by a multinational force under the auspices of the United Nations or the OSCE.

“In observations submitted in 1999 on a draft report on Moldova by the Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe, the Moldovan Government indicated that the separatist authorities were illegally removing weapons from the ROG’s stores “with the tacit agreement of the authorities of the Russian Federation, whose peacekeeping forces are deployed in the security zone of the Transdniestrian region of Moldova”.

“The Court observes, however, that the evidence in question is contradicted by the JCC’s official documents, which show, with an abundance of details, that in various areas of Transdniestria under the control of the Russian peacekeeping forces, such as the area of Tighina (Bender), Transdniestrian separatist forces were breaching the ceasefire agreement.

“In their declaration at the Istanbul summit of 19 November 1999, the heads of State and government of the OSCE States indicated that they were expecting “an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova” and welcomed the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of its forces from Moldovan territory by the end of 2002. Lastly, they pointed out that an international assessment mission was ready to be dispatched without delay to explore removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments.

“According to a document submitted to the Court in November 2002 by the Moldovan Government, the volume of high-tech weaponry, ammunition and military equipment belonging to the ROG which had been withdrawn by November 2002 from the territory of the Republic of Moldova by virtue of the agreement of 21 October 1994 represented only 15% of the total volume declared in 1994 as being stationed in Moldovan territory.

“The Court discussed in great detail economic, political and other relations between the Russian Federation and Transdniestria.

“Facts of the specific case

“Applicants were arrested at their homes in Tiraspol between 2 and 4 June 1992, in the early hours of the morning. They were arrested by a number of persons, some of whom were uniforms bearing the insignia of the 14th Army of the U.S.S.R., while others were camouflage gear without distinguishing marks.

“In a 140-page indictment, among others, the applicants were accused of anti-Soviet activities and of fighting by illegal means against the legitimate State of Transdniestria, under the direction of the Popular Front of Moldova and Romania. They were also accused of committing a number of offences punishable, according to the indictment, in some cases by the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova and in others by that of the Moldovan Socialist Republic. The offences of which the applicants were accused included the murder of two Transdniestrians, Mr Gusar and Mr Ostapenko.

“Applicants were tortured during the arrest and subject to ill-treatment. There was a lack of any contact with a lawyer during the first two months after their arrest, very limited access thereafter, infringement of the right to be tried by an impartial tribunal, in that the court had refused to examine the applicants’ allegations that their confessions had been wrung from them by inhuman treatment, and infringement of the right enshrined in Article 14.5 of the Interna-
nitional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in that the applicants’ trial had been conducted according to an exceptional procedure which denied them any right to an appeal. Lastly, the authors described the trial as “a political event from beginning to end”. They concluded that some of the terrorism charges preferred against the applicants on the basis of the Criminal Code of the Soviet era would be considered merely free speech issues in modern democracies.

“Arguments by Russia

“The Russian Government merely observed that the Moldovan Government was the only legitimate government of Moldova. As Transdniestrian territory was an integral part of the Republic of Moldova, only the latter could be held responsible for acts committed in that territory.

“The Russian Federation had not exercised and did not exercise jurisdiction over the region of Transdniestria, which was a territory belonging to the Republic of Moldova. In particular, the Russian Federation had never occupied part of the Republic of Moldova and the armed forces stationed there were there with Moldova’s agreement.

“It had not been possible to honour the undertaking given by the Russian Federation in 1994 to withdraw its military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova within three years from signature of the agreement, since this withdrawal did not depend on the Russian Federation alone. Firstly, the authorities of the “MRT” were opposed to it; secondly, technical considerations relating to the removal of military stores had to be taken into account. At the OSCE summit in Istanbul, the deadline had been put back to 31 December 2002, and the Russian Federation intended to honour the agreements reached at the summit.

“Court position

“Even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, financial, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.

“Throughout the clashes between the Moldovan authorities and the Transdniestrian separatists, the leaders of the Russian Federation supported the separatist authorities by their political declarations. The Russian Federation drafted the broad lines of the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992, and moreover signed it as a party.

“In the light of all these circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian Federation’s responsibility is engaged in respect of the unlawful acts committed by the Transdniestrian separatists, regard being had to the military and political support it gave them to help them set up the separatist regime and the participation of its military personnel in the fighting. In acting thus, the authorities of the Russian Federation contributed both militarily and politically to the creation of a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria, which is part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The Court also notes that even after the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992 the Russian Federation continued to provide military, political and economic support to the separatist regime.

“The Russian army is still stationed in Moldovan territory in breach of the undertakings to withdraw it completely given by the Russian Federation at the OSCE summits in Istanbul (1999) and Porto (2001). The Court attaches particular importance to the financial support enjoyed by the ‘MRT’ by virtue of the agreements it has concluded with the Russian Federation.

“All of the above proves that the “MRT”, set up in 1991—92 with the support of the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and its own administration, remains under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation, and in any event that it survives by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian Federation.

“Ruling

“By eleven votes to six that the applicants come within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention as regards its positive obligations. Several judges attached their dissenting opinion, considering that Moldova has no control over disputed territory.

“By sixteen votes to one that the applicants come within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. Russian judge dissented on this.

“By eleven votes to six that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention by Moldova.

“By sixteen votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention by the Russian Federation on account of the ill-treatment inflicted on Mr Ilaşcu and the conditions in which he was detained while under the threat of execution, and that these must be termed torture within the meaning of that provision.

“By eleven votes to six that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention by Moldova since May 2001 on account of the ill-treatment inflicted on Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa and the conditions in which they have been detained, and that these must be termed inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision.

“By sixteen votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention by the Russian Federation on account of the ill-treatment inflicted on Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa and the conditions in which they have been detained, and that these must be termed inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision.

“By sixteen votes to one that there was a violation of Article 5 of the Convention by the Russian Federation as regards Mr Ilaşcu until May 2001, and that there has been and continues to be a violation of that provision as regards Mr Ivanțoc, Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa”.

4.5.2. Russian Compatriots Policy in Moldova

Protection of citizens living outside the borders of their state of origin is one of the excuses often used by large powers in their attempt to expand their influence over other states. This is exactly what the Soviet Union did when it attacked Poland in 1939, and this is specifically what happened in the recent war in Georgia when the Russian Federation intervened with its military forces to defend “the dignity and honor of the Russian citizens from South Ossetia”.

A similar practice is also used by the Russian Federation in regard to other ex-Soviet states, including Moldova. Every time relations with Russia become colder, there are discussions in the Russian press about the situation of the Russian community from Moldova, which is presented as rather precarious. However, the situation of Russian minorities from Moldova is different from that in the Baltic countries, with whom the Republic of Moldova is often compared in this regard. In the opinion of a number of experts specializing in the issues of national minorities, Moldovan legislation is one of the best in the entire region. It should be mentioned that when the Law on National Minorities was adopted, it was highly commended even by Valeriu Klimenko, leader of the Congress of Russian Communities from Moldova, who stated, “finally the ruling powers started to manifest some interest in the plight of minorities.”

Starting with its first article, the Law stipulates that “persons belonging to the group of national minorities are those persons who reside on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, are its citizens, have ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious particularities, which distinguish them from the majority of the population – the Moldovans, and are considered of another ethnic origin.” This article allows them to create communities of their own, as compared with other countries where these communities are clearly specified, as in the case of Slovenia, for instance.

Apart from that, there are a number of other legal provisions, including stipulations about financial allocations earmarked by the state for the organization of cultural events dedicated to national holidays. There is also a Bureau of Interethnic Relations in Moldova, which is responsible for coordinating all activities in this area, though the leadership of the country constantly emphasizes that “Moldova is a multi-ethnic state.” Nevertheless, it shall be mentioned that minorities from Moldova do face some problems, but these are mainly caused by the economic situation they live in rather than their ethnic belonging.

Of all the national minorities in Moldova, Russians appear to be more active than others. First, this is due to the status of the Russian language as one used for “interethnic circulation” and the influence it has over the entire population. Both in official and unofficial settings, the Russian language is used at a level similar with that of the state language, whereas in some sectors it is practically the dominant language of communication. According to Moldovan legislation, all official documents are issued in both languages, and all civil servants are obliged to respond to requests submitted by citizens in the language used in the respective request. Besides, as oddly as it may seem, there are civil servants in the government and the parliament of the Republic of Moldova, even ministers and MPs, who speak only Russian.

Therefore, during many of high-level meetings, such as meetings in the government or office of the President, discussions are held in the Russian language, whereas plenary sessions of parliament are simultaneously translated for those members of parliament who do not speak the state language.

Such a broad use of the Russian language in many spheres of the social, cultural, and political life of Moldova has led to a situation whereby many foreign diplomats accredited in Chisinau find it more practical to study Russian than to learn the official language.

In addition to the Russian media, which is very popular in Moldova, there is also a series of TV channels, newspapers, and local radio stations that write in the Russian language. It is suffice to mention that practically the entire local mass media has at least several programs for the Russian population.

The business community, and in particular service providers, is mainly composed of Russians. This can be explained by the fact that major businessmen from this sphere are Russian speakers. Also, as a rule, the basic language spoken in cinemas, clubs, entertainment venues, and commercial outlets from Chisinau is not the state language.

As we can see, the Russian-speaking population is in a good position; it has the possibility to communicate in its mother tongue. What is more, there are many persons who even do not speak the official language. Nevertheless, many of the challenges faced by Moldova today are associated with the name of the official language and the situation with Russian.

For instance, the pretext for the outbreak of the Transdnistrian conflict was the so-called desire of the Chisinau Government to be united with Romania, as a result of which the population from the left bank would be forced to learn the Romanian language and renounce Russian. Though almost two decades have passed since the outset of the conflict, the Romanian factor still remains one of the main propaganda tools used by the Tiraspol administration.

Several stereotypes associated with the name of the language spoken in the territory of the Republic of Moldova exist on the right bank as well. As paradoxical as it may seem, even if part of the Russian population does not speak a word of the state language, they are nevertheless very categorical in calling the Moldovan lan-
guage by its true name: Romanian. Another stereotype is unification with Romania, although this possibility is almost nonexistent. In spite of that fact, some Russian-speaking youth have declared that there is a chance that the events of 1989 — when the National Liberation Movement began in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (M.S.S.R.) and Romanian Language Day was proclaimed, which in the long run led to its independence, on August 27, 1991 — might happen again, in particular in 2009.

This situation amplified in 2001 with the coming to power of the Party of Communists and the worsening of Moldova’s relations with Romania. In an attempt to build a new ideology for the Moldovan state, the ruling party managed to affirm that Moldovans are not Romanians, although this could only be noticed at the level of rhetoric. On several occasions, the head of state and other high-ranking officials made such statements publicly, which has thus antagonized and polarized Moldovan society even more, as it is still seeking for its national identity.

**Russian Community in the Republic of Moldova (Right Bank)**

According to the last census, in 2004, the total number of Russians in Moldova is 201,212 inhabitants, representing approximately 5.9% of the country’s total population. The majority of them, that is, over two-thirds, live in urban areas. Furthermore, one fact appears to be rather interesting, namely, that a portion of other nationalities consider Russian their mother tongue, thus making the Russian-speaking population the largest of all. As mentioned above, the majority of them live in cities, and almost half of the total number is concentrated in Chisinau. Besides, a big share resides in the second largest city, Baltsi, and in particular in the northern regions of Moldova.

From an organizational point of view, there are several non-governmental organizations divided on the basis of various criteria. Two of them, the Russian Community and the Congress of the Russian Community, are the largest organizations. Each considers itself to be the only one representing Russians in Moldova.

The Russian Community is a national organization led by Tatiana Lascionova which has branch offices in all the regions of Moldova. It collaborates with the Bureau of Interethnic Relations and the Russian Embassy in Chisinau, with the help of which it organizes a number of cultural events, such as Russian Culture Days, Maslenitsa, and the anniversaries of classic Russian figures like Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Gogol, etc. In addition, this organization helps certain schools teach Russian with didactical materials and organizes study visits to Russia for pupils and students from Moldova. A characteristic feature of the Russian Community (CRM) is its close collaboration with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, different high-ranking officials from Chisinau attend the majority of the events organized by CRM. In addition, it organizes various cultural and scientific events, with which CRM wants to show that the present territory of Moldova is under Slavic influence, thus promoting the idea of everlasting friendship between the people of Moldova and Russia.

For instance, in 2008, when Moldova celebrated the year of Dmitrii Cantemir (a Moldovan ruler (1710–1711) who in his battle against the Turks asked for the help of Tsar Peter the First, whereas after the defeat in Salinesti (in July 1711) he left for Russia, where he joined the court of the Tsar; his son Antioh is considered one of the Russian classics), the Russian Community actively participated in organizing a scientific conference where the issue of close friendship and everlasting help granted to Moldova by Russia was actively discussed.

Another organization pretending to be the only one that represents and protects all Russians from the Republic of Moldova is the Congress of the Russian Community in Moldova (CRCM), led by Valerii Klimenko. Unlike the CRM, this organization is more diversified, consisting of several organizations created on the basis of professional criteria. The scope of its activity is a bit different from that of the Russian community, because it also organizes political events, among other activities. Thus, the CRCM, in particular through its youth organization, called the League of Russian Students, organizes protests to support the actions of the Russian Federation and to condemn the “enemies” of this country. For instance, displays of solidarity with war victims from Georgia were organized, where the participants condemned the “aggressive actions of the Georgians” and saluted Russian military intervention there. However, in 2003, after the U.S. and its allies attacked Iraq, the situation reversed into an organization of protests calling for withdrawal of these troops from this country. On several occasions, the Congress has organized alternative meetings in response to protests organized in front of the Russian Embassy by other political formations condemning the actions of the Russian Federation; on other occasions these protests have degenerated into street fighting, as was the case in November of 2008.

The leader of the CRCM, Valerii Klimenko, is a politician as well as a leader of a political formation called Ravnopravie, which participates in local and parliamentary elections (except for the 2009 parliamentary elections, when he participated as part of another formation, the Centrist union of Moldova). Ravnopravie has not managed to win a seat in the parliament of Moldova, though at the local level it has several representatives in regional and municipal councils. Valerii Klimenko, on the other hand, has been a councilor in the Chisinau Municipal Council for several years now.

At the same time, in the political sphere, Klimenko is one of the supporters of the Tiraspol regime. He is one of the public figures who has made open declarations stating that the military conflict of 1992 was initiated by the Chisinau government with the support of Romania, with the aim of liquidating the Russian population from Moldova. He has also said that due solely to Transdnistria, Moldova is forced to respect the rights of Russian minorities, thus repeating Transdnistrian and Russian propaganda in this matter.

The Congress of Russian Community in Moldova does not have close relations with the authorities of Moldova; the Congress is often in conflict with them and blames them for their unwillingness to collaborate with Russia. The Congress is one
of the adversaries of the European integration course adopted in 2005, which it considers a betrayal of the aspirations of Moldovans. In May of 2008, at the inaugural ceremony of a “European corner” in the central park of Chisinau organized by the E.C. Delegation and the City Hall of Chisinau, Klimenko in its speech attacked the persons present and accused them of selling themselves to the West, thus generating a scandal and altercations between Russian and Romanian-speaking persons.599

Although the CRCM does not get financial support from the Government, its financial situation seems to be better than that of other non-governmental organizations. This is because one of the organization’s major partners is Jury Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow, who is known for giving large financial and political support to Russian citizens living abroad, particularly in ex-Soviet countries. There is another non-governmental organization in the Congress called the Guild of Russian Businessmen, which financially supports the CRCM.

In the cultural sector, the events put together by this organization as a rule bear a military/patriotic character, such as the 9th of May (Victory Day), the 23rd of February (Soviet Army Day), and the anniversary of the last-Chisinau World War Two operation. Apart from this, the CRCM supports a number of schools and lyceums from Moldova with didactical materials, gives scholarships to pupils to study in Russia, and organizes study tours and excursions. Representatives of this organization participate in the World Congress of Co-nationals and other events organized by the Russian Cultural Center in Moldova.

As mentioned above, the Congress of Russian Communities in Moldova also includes a number of professional organizations, such as the Association of Russian Painters, the Association of Russian Language Teachers, and the League of Russian Students. A newspaper entitled Russkoye Slovo (Russian Word) is also published in Chisinau, and is a sort of Congress newspaper.

In addition to these two organizations, there are a number of other organizations, but they are smaller and lesser known in Moldova. However, we would like to point out a recently created organization called Friends of Russia, which is not a classical type of organization consisting, as a rule, solely of ethnic Russians. This organization includes a series of well-known Moldovan public figures, including ex-prime minister Vasile Tarlev, Mihail Formuzal, governor of the autonomous region of Gagauzia, and former deputy prime minister Nicolae Andronic, and one of its goals is the development of closer and deeper relations with Russia. Although it looks like a newly founded organization, Friends of Russia served as the basis for the reformation of the Centrist union of Moldova, which participated in the Parliamentary elections of 2009 and appears to be capable of uniting all pro-Russian forces in Moldova. Klimenko’s participation in the lists of this party during the last parliamentary election is a good example of this assumption.

It should also be mentioned that, although little is being said about Russian – Moldovan collaboration in the humanitarian sector, a number of agreements (more than a dozen) exist between the two countries at the governmental and ministerial levels, which shows that the Russian government is quite active in this sphere as well. Through its governmental agencies, Russia provides support to its co-citizens living in Moldova and this, in turn, contributes to the strengthening and enhancement of the Russian influence there.

Recently, in February of 2009, Sergey Lavrov, the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, paid a visit to Chisinau, where he signed a Program of Collaboration in the Humanitarian Sector between the government of Moldova and the Russian Federation for the next five years and participated in the opening of the Russian Cultural Center in Moldova.600 The Russian embassy in Chisinau periodically supports the organization of various activities to promote the Russian language and culture in Moldova.

**Russian Community in Transnistria**

According to data presented by the administration of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic (Transnistria),601 of the 750,000 persons living in this region, about 29% are Russians, compared with a total of 33% Moldovans and 29% Ukrainians. More than that, pursuant to the legislation from that region, three official languages are functioning on the territory of Transnistria: Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan language in the Cyrillic script, whereas any citizen can request documents in any of the aforementioned languages.

However, reality sharply differs from what is written in Transnistrian documents. The Russian population from this side benefits from the majority of rights, and the Russian language is the de facto language of communication in the entire region, particularly in urban areas. The majority of Tiraspol leaders are not natives; they come from Russia and hence know only Russian, so the meetings of the Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol are carried out only in the Russian language. Another interesting detail is that although ethnic Moldovans exceed ethnic Russians in this region, 82% of pupils study in the Russian language. Out of a total of 182 schools, only 33 schools teach in the Moldovan language and only 2 schools teach in the Ukrainian language.602

There are three big organizations in Transnistria that deal with the protection of the rights of Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians in the region. They are the union of Moldovans in Transnistria, the Union of the Russian Community, and the union of Ukrainians in Transnistria, but in the majority of cases they are inefficient and their positions often correspond with those of Tiraspol administration.

As we can see, the situation of Russians in the Transnistrian region is good; but in spite of that, Russia, under the pretext of protecting the rights of Russians in this


602 Ibid.
of the given countries. repatriation, and readmission of persons who had stayed illegally in the territory of conducted solely on the basis of their foreign passports. There is a series of agreements makes traveling and movement between these countries easy and lax, as it is con- ducted solely on the basis of their foreign passports. This situation contributes even more to an increase in Russia’s influence in a region that is pro-Russian anyway, and to the blockage of the process of normalizing the situation on the Dniester River.

4.5.3. Consular Issues of Russian Foreign Policy in Moldova

Within the spectrum of bilateral ties between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, consular relations belong to the category of relations that cannot be characterized as “univocal”. On the one hand, no visa regime exist between the two countries, and annual consultations with a view to improve cooperation in this area are carried out between the related ministries of these countries. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has ignored the proposals of Moldova several times, when the former considered that “it acts to protect its own citizens”.

In this chapter, we will analyze three important aspects in the consular relations between the two countries, namely:

1) granting Russian citizenship to Russians residing in the territory of Mol- dova, including people living in Transnistria, which de facto represents an impediment to unblocking the political process;
2) pensions, in particular the allocation of an extra sum of USD 15 for retired people from Transnistria, which represents an additional tool to increase Russian influence in this region, especially taking into account that this target group is an important electorate core here; and
3) challenges or difficulties faced by Moldovan citizens who are currently working in the territory of the Russian Federation.

Citizenship

At the present time, no visa regime exists between the two countries, which makes traveling and movement between these countries easy and lax, as it is con- ducted solely on the basis of their foreign passports. There is a series of agreements between these two countries regulating all legal aspects of citizens traveling abroad, repatriation, and readmission of persons who had stayed illegally in the territory of one of the given countries.

Moldovan legislation is also quite balanced in this regard. Thus, the Republic of Moldova adopted the Law on Citizenship, which allows Moldovan citizens to hold the citizenship of another country, provided665 that the country in question provides for such a right. Given this situation, there are numerous people in Moldova today who additionally hold either Romanian, Bulgarian, Russian, or Ukrainian citizenship. Since the granting of citizenship is mostly done at the consular office of the respective countries, there is no exact data about the total number of Moldovan nationals with dual citizenship, though it is clear that their number is quite significant. Most of the times, people want to have dual citizenship because it facilitates the possibility of going abroad and finding a job there.

Of all citizenships, Romanian is the most widespread. According to the Law on Regaining Citizenship, adopted by the Romanian government, all citizens who have second-grade relatives, i.e., grandparents, have the possibility to obtain or regain Ro- manian citizenship for those who lived between 1918 and 1940 within the borders of the present-day territory of Moldova, when the latter was part of Romania.

Although the procedure of obtaining Romanian citizenship is rather compli- cated, many people still apply to get it, and their number has already amounted to over 200,000 people. This increase in the number of people wishing to regain their citizenship in the context of rather tense relations between Moldova and Romania made the Parliament in Chisinau adopt a law prohibiting people with dual citizenship to hold public office. This law provoked the dissatisfaction of many people who had already obtained their second citizenship, according to the law on dual citizenship, but now have to face a dilemma about whether to refuse their second citizenship or become ineligible for a public function. Also, it should be pointed out that Bulgarian citizenship, for instance, is in rather high demand in Moldova, especially in the Tara- clia region, which is inhabited by a large number of ethnic Bulgarians.

Most of the time, Russian and Ukrainian citizenship is claimed by people liv- ing in the Transnistrian region. It should be mentioned that, although so-called Transnistria citizens are entitled to obtain Russian citizenship in the same way as those living in the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the process of obtaining Russian citizenship is rather complicated, and people often have to pay large sums to middlemen.

Based on the statements made by a number of Tiraspol residents interviewed for this study, who for understandable reasons asked to remain anonymous, we can infer that payment for these services ranges between USD 700 and 1,000, which represents a very significant amount of money in comparison with the average monthly salary in Transnistria, about USD 200. At the same time, it should be mentioned that the process of obtaining Russian citizenship by people living on the right bank of the Dniester River is even more cumbersome and difficult. Therefore, there are cases when Moldovan inhabitants living on the right bank of Moldovan-controlled territo- ry resort to a more sophisticated pattern. As a first step, they try to obtain Transnis- trian citizenship, which is not officially recognized and costs money, but nevertheless opens the possibility to apply for Russian citizenship as a ‘Transnistrian citizen.’
However, it should be mentioned that there is no evidence proving that this scheme is actually put into practice. But in studying these cases we managed to meet people who hold a Transnistrian passport, although they have never lived in the territory controlled by the Tiraspol administration, and later received Russian citizenship as well.

Nevertheless, it seems that the difficulties in obtaining Russian citizenship result from changes in the attitude and relations of Chisinau towards Moscow. The same holds true for other areas of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Moldova; as long as Moldovan authorities keep promoting a loyal policy towards Russia, then the latter does not intensify its support of Tiraspol leaders. For instance, although Transnistria belongs to the same group as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, its independence has not yet been recognized. As we have mentioned above, the same holds true for the issue of granting Russian citizenship to Transnistrians, who often complain that they have an exclusive pro-Russian orientation similar to that of the separatist regions in Georgia, though the attitude towards them is nevertheless different.

In this context, we can compare the current situation with the 2004—2007 period, when the relations between Chisinau and Moscow were rather tense. Based on the opinions of Transnistrian residents, the process of obtaining Russian citizenship was quicker then. Moreover, during that period, a diplomatic incident also occurred between these two countries: The Russian Federation requested the opening of a consular office in Tiraspol, explaining that there were many Russian citizens in the territory of Transnistria who required consular assistance and who found it rather difficult to go to Chisinau every time they needed to solve an issue.

However, Moldovan authorities refused to open this consular office, claiming that the territory was not under the de facto control of the constitutional authorities and that they could not ensure the good functioning of the office. Therefore, despite the refusal of Moldovan authorities, Russian authorities opened a center that did not have the status of a consular office, but was nevertheless visited twice a week by consular officers from the Russian embassy in Chisinau, and was focused on providing the necessary assistance.

Until today, similar difficulties continue to appear in the relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova. In most of the cases, they derive from the arrogant attitude that Moscow has towards all ex-Soviet states, including towards its traditional allies, Belarus and Armenia. For instance, during every parliamentary or presidential election in Russia, despite the fact that Moldovan authorities offer certain premises for the opening of voting sections in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, voting constituencies are opened in the territory of Transnistria region as well.

There is no doubt that these actions do not contribute to improving the friendly relations between the two countries, and practically compel the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration in Chisinau to protest, at least formally. Regardless of all these protests, Russian citizens from Transnistria — including Igor Smirnov, the leader of Tiraspol, who is also a Russian citizen — do not fail to participate in the elections in Russia every time they are held there. It is interesting to note that the results of Russian elections in the Transnistrian region match the general elections in Russia. Thus, when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, he and his party, United Russia, managed to win the elections in Transnistria as well; the situation was similar in the case of Medvedev’s victory, in March of 2008.

In this regard, it is also important to draw the comparison that, during Ukrainian elections, the Ukrainian authorities do their best to comply with the requirements set forth by the Moldovan authorities and open voting sections only in close cooperation with, and with the consent of, Moldovan authorities. This is done in spite of the fact that the number of Ukrainian citizens is almost equal to the number of Russian citizens.

### Pensions

The granting of pensions to Russian citizens residing on the territory of Transnistria represents another challenge in the relations between Moldova and Russia. Thus, after the referendum of September 17, 2006, which showed that the absolute majority of Transnistrian residents voted for consolidation of ties with Moscow, and in order to maintain the influence of Russia in this region, a decision was passed to add an extra amount of USD 10 to the existing pension received by each pensioner from Transnistria. Initially, this money was channeled through the budget of the Tiraspol administration. Later, having identified certain large-scale financial irregularities and cases of misappropriation of funds by Transnistrian civil servants, the Russian Duma decided that money shall be sent directly to the legislative body of Tiraspol, i.e., the Supreme Soviet. Starting with last year, the amount of this extra amount to pension went up to USD 15.

In our opinion, these actions on the part of Russian authorities are rather unfriendly by nature, because adding USD 15 to the amount that pensioners already receive, ranging from USD 40 to USD 50, constitutes a very significant sum for them, and, as a rule, they vote for anything that is pro-Russian. At the same time, it is important to mention that this money is not distributed to other Russian citizens residing in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and thus supports the administration of Tiraspol and implicitly endorses Transnistrian statehood. This situation runs counter to the official position of Russia, reiterating its total support of the sovereignty and territorial independence of Moldova.

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604 In reality, the form and modality of organizing this referendum, combined with massive propaganda, leads us to believe that the results are false.
Legal Difficulties of Moldovan Citizens Working in Russia

Another important aspect in tackling the issue of consular relations between the two countries is related to guest workers from Moldova (the so-called Gastarbeiters). For Moldovan citizens, unskilled labor in the Russian Federation, in particular in Moscow, represents one of the employment methods that has proved rather accessible. There are no official sources to show how many Moldovan citizens are currently in Russia, but the unofficial sources and a number of studies mention a figure ranging from 200,000 to 500,000 people who work in various spheres of the Russian economy, especially in construction. Apparently, these persons benefit from the support of Moldovan authorities if certain consular difficulties appear in the territory of Russia. In reality, however, most of the time these people have left their country illegally, and often have to pay a fine or offer bribes to Russian militia, which periodically organizes raids to identify people staying illegally in the territory of the Russian Federation.

It should be mentioned that the authorities in Chisinau have undertaken several attempts to provide Moldovan nationals with the possibility to legalize their stay in the territory of the Russian Federation, by negotiating an agreement with the Russian Federation. However, in the long run, this attempt brought no results whatsoever for several reasons. The first is that economic companies from Russia did not want to officially employ Moldovan nationals, because if they did, they would have to pay taxes and other duties. The second reason is explained by the refusal of Moldovan citizens to legalize their stay in Russia, who until now preferred to go to Russia via illegal routes, hoping and believing in the promise of better pay.

It should be mentioned that the information described above shows that the Republic of Moldova has lately tried very hard to improve its relations with the Russian Federation. In this context, Moldova tried to avoid any conflicts with Russia in order to gain its support in settling the Transnistrian conflict. Regardless of these efforts, Moscow continues to promote its policy of granting Russian citizenship and pensions to people living in Transnistria. These actions contribute to fostering the Tiraspol administration and implicitly enhancing Russia’s influence in the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova.

4.5.4. Culture, Education

Russian presence is widespread in Moldova, and is expressed by the cultural values of Moldovans. Today, these values are much closer to Russia than they are to Europe or Romania. This situation has developed because of several factors:

1. Historical factor. In 1812, the territory stretching between the Dniester and Prut rivers was incorporated into the Russian Empire. In a short while, civil servants from Russia were brought to this territory; they were the ones who introduced Russian as a language of communication, particularly in cities and towns. Over two centuries (including the period when Moldova was part of the U.S.S.R.), the practice of using Russian for communication was reinforced and became even stronger.

2. Linguistic factor. Due to the widespread use of the Russian language and the strong need of every person to know it, the majority of the population speaks Russian, and it is a known fact that language is an important tool for manipulations.

3. Religious factor. The Metropolitan Church of Moldova, which administers about 70% of all Orthodox parishes in the country, is canonically subordinated to the Russian Archdiocese. Every church service usually starts with an eternal memory to His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and Entire Russia. Also, certain prayers are officiated in Russian in practically all the churches under the jurisdiction of the Moldovan Metropolitan Church, regardless of the ethnic specificity of the locale.

4. Mass media. This is another very powerful instrument used, most often successfully, to impose the Russian point of view over certain events taking place worldwide.

5. Culture. The majority of mass-scale cultural events organized in Moldova today, such as films, concerts, or discos, are conducted in the Russian language. Also, certain holidays from the Soviet times, such as the 9th of May, continue to be celebrated in the territory of Moldova; these festivities are used to reinforce Russian influence.

Culture

Everything that involves Russia is very popular in Moldova, both at the level of mass culture and “high” culture. The majority of cinemas show films in Russian, because it is easier and cheaper to buy pre-translated films from Russia. Genuine Russian movies also come to Moldova through Russian networks, and given the high publicity of these Russian movies organized by Russian channels broadcasting in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, they become rather popular with Moldovan audiences. A similar situation can be seen in Russian music, which is often broadcast on national TV and radio channels, thus enhancing its popularity. As a result of this popularity, concerts by Russian artists organized in Moldova enjoy a high degree of popularity among local audiences. Concert halls thus become fully packed, contrary to the situation with concerts by Romanian artists, which on several occasions have had to be cancelled due to the scarcity of audiences. At the same time, another explanation is that the arrival of Russian artists to Moldova is often funded by local businessmen who, in the majority of cases, are Russian.

In addition, many monuments to Russian culture and Russian museums can be found in Chisinau as well, such as the monument to Pushkin, the house museum of Pushkin, and two Russian theaters (one of which, the Chekhov Theater, is among the
best theaters in Moldova). Although it is true that these institutions are used to maintain Russian influence in the Republic of Moldova, they do not leave a very significant impact, since Moldovans are not avid theatergoers, and theater halls often remain empty.

Two of the most efficient expressions of the Russian presence in Moldova are the Orthodox Church and holidays left over the Soviet times.

**Orthodox Church**

The Russian Orthodox Church is regarded as one of the most efficient instruments for propagating Russian interests in the regions that Moscow considers zones of influence. The Republic of Moldova is part of this group of countries because the majority of the population is Christian Orthodox (93.3%), and the church is the most trusted institution for Moldovans.

The role of the Orthodox Church is well understood by the Communist Party. When the Communists came to power in 2001, they did not incorporate religious values in their party platform; in documents presented to the Central Election Commission, Voronin, the leader of the Moldovan Communist Party, mentioned that he was an atheist, but in a short while the party started paying special attention to the church. In this context, under the patronage and during the mandate of President Voronin, several churches and monasteries were repaired and restored; among them are Capriana Monastery and Curkhi Monastery. These actions endorsed the sympathies of citizens, particularly elderly people, who actually constitute the core electorate of this party.

Apart from this, the Moldovan Communist Party also pays special attention to the celebration of various religious holidays, the majority of which are attended by the Communist Party. As mentioned by experts in election matters, this produced an important impact on people because Moldovan society, particularly in rural areas, often believes what spiritual leaders have to say.

In its relations with the Russian Federation, the leadership of the Republic of Moldova pays special attention to the church as well. President Voronin was considered one of the friends of ex-Patriarch Alexei the second, whom he visited several times and managed to bring to Moldova, and who decorated him with the medal of the Russian Church. President Voronin also participated in the inauguration of the new Patriarch Kiril, and was the only head of state from the C.I.S. region who took part in the ceremony.

Due to good relations existing between Moldova and Russia, the Patriarch of Moscow has become one of the allies of the President of Moldova, in particular in its relationship with Romania. However, as it was experienced in past, Russia can change its attitude towards Moldova for the political purposes.

**National Holidays**

Patriotic former Soviet holidays have become more pronounced since the Communist Party of Moldova came to power. The authorities have started paying special attention to these events, which are usually attended by the entire senior leadership of the Republic of Moldova. Such holidays as the 7th of November (anniversary of the "Great October Socialist Revolution"), Lenin's Day (22nd of April), and Pioneers' Day (19th of May), which were almost forgotten before 2001, are now broadcast live on public television channel or other pro-government channels.

The most grandiose and highly confusing holiday from the point of view of its symbolic interpretation is the 9th of May, which coincides with the Day of Europe. The fact that Moldova's entire leadership participates in the festivities dedicated to Victory Day, and does not participate at all in the celebrations dedicated to the Day of Europe, demonstrates once again that Moldova remains under the Russian sphere of influence, despite the fact that European integration is officially declared as the foremost priority of Moldovan foreign policy and that Russia continues to play a major role in influencing the events taking place in Moldova today.

In continuation, we will describe how Victory Day is celebrated in the Republic of Moldova today. However, it should be mentioned that, during the last two years, a

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606 Population according to Population Census data for 2004.
607 From a religious point of view, the difference between the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and the Metropolitan Church of Basarabia is insignificant. The only difference is that the former celebrates religious holidays according to the Julian calendar, i.e. the old style, while the latter celebrates according to the Gregorian calendar, or the new style.
new tradition called Gheorghievskay Lentochika, or St. Gheorghe Ribbon, has been introduced in these celebrations at the suggestion of the Russian Embassy in Chisinau and has been enthusiastically adopted by the ruling party. According to the new tradition, young members of the Communist Party (Komsomol members) give this souvenir to all passers-by, so that most of the automobiles from Chisinau bear this Russian symbol during the entire given period.

The 9th of May holiday — Victory Day or Liberation Day — as conceived by the current ruling power of Moldova, has remained in the sphere of Soviet propaganda. A resuscitation of the old scenario started on April 25, 2001, when, pursuant to a presidential decree, the Communist government instituted a special commission for organizing festivities dedicated to the 9th of May holiday. The actions recommended by this commission were inspired by the Soviet epoch and included "thematic parties and traditional meetings with the World War Two veterans", contributions to "preserving the tradition of tending the tombs of soldiers fallen for their Motherland", "organization of a festival of patriotic songs, sporting contests, and other manifestations dedicated to Victory Day". This document also said that managers of enterprises, organizations and institutions were recommended "to organize measures to commemorate the fallen heroes (…) and to find solutions to material and social problems", while "the means of mass communication and the State Teleradio Moldova shall provide comprehensive coverage of the actions related to preparation and celebration of the respective anniversary".

Thus we can say that the propagandistic arsenal used in the Soviet era was taken over by the Moldovan ruling party. Such propagandistic clichés as the "Great Patriotic War for Defense of the Motherland", the "Great Victory", and commemoration of the "Soviet Soldier and Liberator", along with myths about "friendship among nations" and "Soviet liberation", have been continuously used on a mass scale here, while the biased selection of images reminiscent of the glorious past brought back frustrations about national identity and the old conflict between collective memory and the discourse pursued by the ruling power.

The scenario launched in 2001 for commemorating Victory Day has been carried out without any changes for more than eight years now. This scenario included the ritual of bringing flowers to the monument of Stefan cel Mare si Sfint (Stephan the Great) and then to the Eternal Flame at the Eternity Memorial Complex of Military Glory, followed by meetings, a military parade, festive concerts, and fireworks. The eulogies addressed in the past, as well as central symbolic figures from the Soviet era such as V.I. Lenin, have become inadequate and unfit for the Moldovan nation-building project, and have thus been replaced by evocation of Stephan the Great as the "founder of Moldovan statehood". On the one hand, the incorporation of the monument to Stephan the Great in the festivities is an attempt to make up for the imagery gap created after the collapse of the U.S.S.R.; on the other hand, it is also an attempt to legitimize the new ideological project of "Moldovanism".

Invocation of the "historical roots" of the Moldovan "statehood", through an ideological anchoring in collective imagery from medieval Moldova's period of glory under the reign of Stephan the Great, is used to suggest the idea of "continuity" in Moldovan statehood. The ruling power is organizing the present manifestations in such a way as to project the symbolic proximity of the monument to Stephan the Great to the Eternity Memorial Complex of Military Glory; its aim is to build a sovereign topography of "Moldovanism". The chronological and imagery linkage between the medieval and modern epochs is also articulated through a propagandistic context from the Soviet era, concerning the "lifelong friendship between the Russian and Moldovan people" and the image of the Soviet Moldavian Socialist Republic as a constituent and equal part among the "fifteen sister republics". The rhetoric about the "Romanian and fascist occupation" of the Soviet territory within the borders of the Soviet Moldavian Socialist Republic during 1941—1944, which was zealously adopted by the present senior leadership of the country, was projected in a mythology that legitimized the "Soviet Liberator" in contrast to the "Romanian-fascist occupants".

The symbolic laconism and sobriety of rites performed at the monument to Stephan the Great by the official institutions of our country is compensated by the splendor, proportion, and ampleness of the scene out at the Eternity Memorial Complex of Military Glory, which was often categorized by V. Voronin as "the most sacred of sacred places", thus recognizing it as distinct from the grandiose repertoire of other public monuments dedicated to World War Two victories. Ordinary people represent the overwhelming majority of participants, who, throughout the entire ceremony, are carefully watched by police and security men as they wait for war veterans to make their appearance on the scene. As a rule, this occurs once the rite performed by the political leaders on the red carpet comes to an end. The mere fact that veterans appear on the scene only after symbolic priority is bestowed on the ruling power, to the detriment of those "who risked their lives fighting against the enemy", represents some loyal reminiscences of Soviet era rituals. The participation of ordinary people is strictly staged, without any right to initiatives, and compliant with roles prescribed in the scenario directed by the ruling powers. The abusive historical, artistic, and religious orchestration of the solemn ceremony dedicated to Victory Day, and its skilled concealment under the guise of paternal care for "the people", unveils the ideological instrumentalization of memorial places through the use of authoritarian strategies to legitimate power; it also symbolically shapes the new "Moldovan" topography — the power governing the realm of the Republic of Moldova in the collective consciousness of the people.

We have concluded that war veterans are the target group for this scenario staged and conducted by the ruling powers. This is also confirmed by the attitude of this community towards the 9th of May commemorations.

The community of veterans, together with their families and relatives, is absolutely and neatly integrated into the context of this solemn scene. However, the topographic itinerary of the memorial visited by the veterans differs considerably from the one invoked in the official scenario of the power. The main difference comes to light in the official part of the holiday, when veterans come directly to the memorial, thus ignoring the flower-laying ceremony at the monument to Stephan the Great.
The ideological message about “liberation of the Motherland by the Soviet Soldier” does not leave any space for other symbolic and competing analogies. “Liberation” is perceived separately from other historical symbols, and thus veterans remain solely devoted to the symbolic message evoked by the Eternity Memorial.

Looking at the memorial from the point of view of venue, the 9th of May also becomes a scene of symbolic interactions, disputable speeches, and political manipulations. While political leaders use the past as a tool to foster patriotic feelings and civic dedication, ordinary people do not cease accepting, reformulating, and also ignoring the messages conveyed by the ruling powers. Most of the times when veterans are asked to share their memories about the 9th of May, they refer to two blocks of images from their past: memories of the Victory and memories of the War. The first image, memories of the Victory, is focused on the mythology of “the Glory of the Red Army”, ideological clichés about “Soviet patriotism”. The second image, memories of the War, is focused on the horrors and sacrifices brought about by the war and on the duty of those still living to commemorate deceased heroes. Nevertheless, discussions held at the location of the event bring to light opinions that do not coincide with the discourse pursued by the ruling powers. People interviewed there often mention that “those who fell for their Motherland” were not asked what motherland they were ready to die for.

Thus, Victory Day remains a controversial holiday for Moldovan society, likewise for other states of the ex-Soviet sphere. Selective evocation of images of the past, i.e., a past that, depending on the memory vectors, appears “glorious”, “tragic”, or even “strange”, sometimes brings back to the ex-Soviet countries the pomp of a political liturgy, with deep roots in the era of “totalitarian night”. A selective commemoration of Red Army soldiers on the one hand, and doom to oblivion of Bessarabian warriors enrolled in the Romanian Army on the other hand, divides society and provokes identity-driven tensions. Slogans eulogizing the Motherland and glorifying the “Soviet Soldier Liberator” constitute a key moment triggering a confrontation between communities of memories, suppressing from inside the process of reconciliation in this space. Thus we can conclude that the ruling party does not have a common paradigm about the past developed with the participation of the entire society, and it utopically applies new ideological projects.

Education

At present, of the 1,490 schools in the territory of Moldova, 280 schools teach in the Russian language; 28 are mixed Russian — Gagausian, Russian — Moldovan, or Russian — Ukrainian schools; and a total of 110,000 pupils and students study in the Russian language. The number of schools where teaching is done in Russian constitutes 20% of the total number of schools, whereas the Russian population accounts for only 5–6% of the total population. In addition, the government of Moldova pays enhanced attention to education for the alolingual population, Russian inclusive.

Thus, the textbooks and manuals for all disciplines taught at schools are published in the Russian language under the aegis of the Ministry of Education. Apart from that, an additional subject called “History, Culture, and Traditions of the Russian People” is studied in Russian-teaching institutions. However, the presentation of events in this discipline actually runs counter even to the statehood of the Republic of Moldova, because the U.S.S.R. is described there as an important phase in the history that developed between the Prut and Dniester rivers. The question is how this ideology may coincide with official ideology, which has dissociated itself from the common Romanian past and, in return, tries to prove that Russia was the best friend and closest ally of Moldova. However, it should be emphasized that all educational programs and curricula for these institutions are developed by the Moldovan Ministry of Education, whereas all reference and literature books received from Russia are considered additional materials.

The same situation can also be seen in institutions of higher education where Russian students may enroll in groups where teaching is conducted solely in Russian, regardless of the chosen university or institution, and this is true for almost any faculty or specialty. In addition, two institutions — Slavonic university and the Higher School of Anthropology — have courses only in the Russian language. Baltys, the second largest city after Chisinau, even has two branches of Russian universities.

Slavonic university is one of the largest universities in Moldova, with an enrollment of over 2,700 students in more than 12 departments. Also, professors and students of this institution may continue their education and improve their proficiency by studying at other institutions in Russia.

The Higher School of Anthropology was created by one of the most influential people from the Communists Party, Mark Tkaciuk, and mainly trains specialists in history and archeology. However, judging from presentations and discussions with students and professors at this institution, we can infer that the subjects taught at the school totally coincide with the official position pursued by the ruling party. This position holds that, since ancient times, this territory was populated by Slav and ties between natives and Slavs (and later Russians) were always friendly, as opposed to Moldova’s relations with Valahia, which were always hostile.

Despite all these disparities in methods, it should be mentioned that in most institutions the majority of professors and students do not share the above-mentioned point of view. However, this different approach to teaching history leads to a polarization of Moldovan society. Thus, instead of seeing themselves as citizens of the state of the Republic of Moldova, people remain in a constant search for their identity, with one part of the population tending toward Russia and the other toward Romania.

On the left bank of the Dniester River, in Transnistria, dependence on Russia is even more palpable. The Moldovan Transnistran Republic, artificially created to preclude the development of Moldovan sovereignty and to hold back Romanian influence, which was rather strong in the early 1990s, has become a bridgehead of Russian influence in this zone.

There are three official languages of communication in Transnistria, and
each citizen has the right to study in his mother tongue; nevertheless, all studies are de facto conducted in the Russian language. The curriculum is harmonized with the Russian one, and pupils study in the same way as their peers from Russia. The system of a single graduation exam has recently been introduced, and students have the possibility to get Russian scholarships. This is how education is organized on the left bank.

The highest level of education is represented by a few universities; two of them are branches of Russian universities. The largest of these universities is T. Shevchenko State university, which, despite the fact that it is named after a Ukrainian writer, is actually a Russian university. Russian is the language of study in all faculties and specialties; studies are conducted in Moldovan only in the department of Moldovan language and geography, and in Ukrainian only in the department of Ukrainian philology, regardless of the fact that the proportion of Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Russian students is approximately the same.

At the same time, the teaching staff from the Transnistrian region has the possibility to attend continuous training courses and to participate in various academic conferences organized in Russia. If they want to attend conferences organized by institutions in the West or in Moldova, they have to undergo a complex bureaucratic procedure and are often prohibited from attending.

This state of play in the Transnistrian educational system further strengthens Russia’s influence over this territory, which is already rather high due to the financial, military, and political support provided by Moscow to the Tiraspol administration.

4.5.5. Russian Mass Media in Moldova: General Aspects and Trends

The Russian press — one of the major sources of information for the majority of the C.I.S. population — is used by the Kremlin as an instrument to promote its policy in the region. The case of the Republic of Moldova represents proof in this regard, because several changes in the attitude of the Russian media have taken place in the last eight years. These occurred along with changes in the official Russian discourse towards Moldova.

Apart from traditional propagandistic instruments — like newscasts, analytical programs, and talk shows — indirect instruments such as movies, concerts, sports, and other non-political programs have been used as well. The latter are extremely popular outside the borders of the Russian Federation, and are often more efficient than those bearing an evident political nature.

In addition, it should be mentioned that the results of the latest public opinion polls presented by the Institute for Public Policy of Moldova show that Moldovan society is very dependent on television, which represents the main source of information, having surpassed other information outlets such as print media, radio, and the internet. The same surveys show that television represents the main source of information for about 90% of the population.

At the same time, the Russian public television channel Perviy Canal is the most trustworthy TV channel for approximately 50% of the population, and, generally speaking, Russian TV programs are the most watched by Moldovan audiences, surpassing Romanian and local, i.e., Moldovan, programs.608

This influence of the Russian press (first of all, television) has led to a situation where, over the years, Russia has become the closest neighbor to Moldova in the mental map of Moldovans, having excluded Ukraine, its natural neighbor, although the total geographical distance to the Russian border is over 500 km. At the same time, it is due to this particular influence that Moldovans know much more about the situation in Russia than they do about the state of play in the Republic of Moldova. For many of these people the information news program “Vremea” (Time), broadcast by Pervyi Canal at 8 p.m. local time, is the window through which they see and understand what happens worldwide. The TV program “Messenger”, broadcast by the Public Television Station at 9 p.m., is the local news that keeps people informed about life in Moldova.

This result can once again be found in a public opinion poll of March, 2009, which shows that about 60% of the population sees Russia as the strategic partner of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the partner that could help Moldova integrate into the European Union (?!). Another paradox is revealed if we analyze the credibility ratings of world political leaders in the eyes of the Moldovan population. Vladimir Putin ranks first in the ratings, followed by Dmitry Medvedev, and, only afterwards, in a distant third, Vladimir Voronin, President of the Republic of Moldova (2001—2009), who ranks as the most trustworthy politician in Moldova. The heads of state and governments of Western society occupy a rather insignificant place in the preferences of Moldovans.609

On the left bank of the Dniester River, i.e., in Transdnistria, the situation is even more interesting, because the popularity and influence of the Russian mass media is even higher than on the right bank. This situation is mainly explained by the fact that, first, despite its ethno-cultural composition (30% Russians, Moldovans, and Ukrainians),610 the population residing on the left bank mainly consists of Russian speakers, and, second, by the fact that the regime in Tiraspol was constantly supported by Russia, including through the press.

In regards to the reasons for the credibility and popularity of Russian television, radio, and newspapers in Moldova, we believe that this situation can be explained by nostalgia and some form of dependence of a large portion of the population. Many of the Russian channels, such as Pervyi Canal and Rossia (Russia), have broadcast in the territory of Moldova since Soviet era. During this period, they represented the only source of information; due to the force of habit and nostalgia, the situation remains the same even today. At the same time, given the fact that not so many people speak a foreign language other than Russian (for some of them, Russian is their mother


609 Ibid.

610 Official data presented by Transnistrian State Press Agency - Olvia Press.
tongue), the Russian media represents the only source of information on internation-

al affairs. Last but not least, due to their more advanced technical possibilities (when
compared with local programs), Russian programs, concerts, and talk shows manage
to stir up a higher level of interest among the Moldovan public.

On the other hand, unlike the situation in other countries of our "immedi-
ate neighborhood" — where the Russian mass media pursues an open propagan-
da against the governments of these countries, by presenting materials that make their
domestic problems even more prominent — the attitude of the Russian media here
is rather specific, to say the least. Moldova is not one of the more popular subjects
disseminated by Russian television channels; it appears rather seldom and only when
some major event has taken place. For instance, if there are new developments in
bilateral relations, in particular at the level of heads of state, or if something takes
place within the framework of the Transdnistrian settlement process, these indeed
becomes breaking news for Russian channels. However, whenever information about
events taking place in Chisinau is aired, it is always shown in a positive light for the
government of Moldova. The events of April 7, 2009, when major protests took place
in Chisinau,613 represent the last example of this situation. The Russian press classi-

fied them as actions of vandalism planned by foreign secret services, the same ones
that staged the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.612

Structure of Russian Media in Moldova

The Russian media have a significant presence in the spectrum of mass media
of Moldova. In continuation, we will list the major Russian television channels, radio
stations, and newspapers that write about Moldova. We will also analyze Moldova-
related subjects addressed by these media sources during the last two years.

Russian TV

The most important Russian TV channel is Pervyi Canal, the television station
that enjoys the highest popularity and credibility in the Republic of Moldova. Dur-
ing the last year, this channel has included in its newscasts a number of reports about
events in Moldova. Most of the time, emphasis was put on the situation related to
Transdnistria and bilateral ties between the two states. In the light of the latest fa-
vorable developments in the relationship between Chisinau and Moscow, all reports
contain a note of acknowledgement for both sides.613

As noted by several local media experts, this is more than just an acknowledge-
ment, since the Russian public television channel also started to get involved actively

in the 2009 election campaign in Moldova. Thus, at the funeral ceremony of Patri-
arch Alexei the Second, and at the ceremony inaugurating the new Patriarch Kiril,
Vladimir Voronin was the only president of the C.I.S. community shown in the fore-
front, next to Medvedev and Putin. At the same time, during the negotiations in
Moscow following the gas crisis, Moldovan Prime Minister Zinaida Grecianyi, who is
also on the list of the Party of Communists, stood to the right of Mr. Putin.

Though these actions may seem unimportant at first glance, they have signifi-
cantly improved the image of these leaders, who, through this and in combination
with other actions described above, have proved that, during the elections in Mol-
dova, the Russian Federation de facto supports this party in particular. The govern-
ment of Chisinau enjoyed similar support after the events of April 7, as well as when
these events were labeled a coup d’etat, a position coinciding with the official Mol-
dovan and Russian positions in this matter.614 At the same time, apart from original
Russian programs, a special pro-governmental newscast and a series of cultural and
local entertainment programs are also broadcast on this channel.

“Rossia” (Russia) — another federal channel that broadcasts its programs in Mol-
dova. Its editorial policy is similar to that of the Pervyi Canal. As a rule, it does not
have a lot of news dedicated to Moldova, but if events start taking place it tackles
them in a way favorable to the Kremlin or the forces supported by Moscow here. De-
spite the aforementioned, this TV channel, which broadcasts as RTR-Planeta outside
of Russia, is aimed at popularizing various films, serials, and humoristic programs
among the Russian-speaking population.

NTV — appears in partnership with a local company under the name of TV7.
It does not present news about Moldova other than in important situations, such as
elections or the April 7 post-election events, and is the most balanced Russian TV
channel in terms of how the situation is reflected. Media experts consider the local
news broadcast by this channel be the most balanced and unbiased as well. Although
the channel’s active involvement in the recent Moldovan election campaign was not
noticed either, one of the important newsmen from NTV, Vladimir Soloviyov, au-
thor and presenter of the program “K Barieru” (To the Stand), did come to Chisinau,
where he had an interview with President Voronin. During his meetings in Chisinau,
he also made a statement that the good relations between Russia and Moldova were

611 On April 7, 2009, a large protest took place in Chisinau

240
Apart from these central TV channels, there is a series of other channels mainly specializing in certain segments, like sports, entertainment, culture, and Russian movies, which are aimed at popularizing and advocating all things Russian outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Out of all the channels, we can mention CTC (STS), an entertainment channel that is highly popular among teenagers and young people in the Republic of Moldova, and Nostalgia, a channel targeted at middle-aged and elderly people who used to live in the U.S.S.R., and in the majority of cases feel a certain nostalgia for the past.

Radio

Unlike television, the Russian radio broadcasts in the Republic of Moldova are to a large extent focused on entertainment programs. However, the influence of radio broadcasts is rather high, as many people prefer to listen to Russian channels rather than local or Romanian ones, mainly because Russian music is extremely popular in the territory of the Republic of Moldova. In addition, these channels organize various concerts in Chisinau with the participation of some Russian artists who are also highly popular here. Among the most important channels are Russkoye Radio, which broadcasts only Russian music targeted mainly at the younger population; Radio Shannon, which features a wide range of 90s music; and Nashe Radio, which broadcasts special Russian rock, etc.

Printed Media

Printed media is less popular than television and radio. This is probably due to the fact that, in general, written press is not so popular in Moldova. Many of the published Russian periodicals are not even available in the country, though of all the Russian media, the written press contains the most material about Moldova. Despitet this fact, one of the most widely sold newspapers in Moldova is Komsomoliskaya Pravda, a Russian newspaper. This is actually what defines the market for printed media in Moldova, which is not a consumer of socio-political newspapers but, rather, a market overcrowded by tabloid press. In this regard, tabloid newspapers and magazines, or the "yellow press", are very numerous and enjoy great popularity here.

Moldova in the Editorial Policy of Russian Media (Content)

It should be mentioned that this attitude towards the Chisinau leadership has not always been so good. As soon as Moldovan — Russian relations turn satisfactory for the latter, the press becomes totally benevolent towards Moldova. However, every time Moldovan officials start promoting messages containing elements that only annoy Russia, the attitude of the press changes immediately. To better understand the tone and nature of the articles published in the Russian press, we should take a brief look at Moldovan — Russian relations from 2001 (when the Communist Party won the election) up to the present time. In so doing, we can distinguish three distinct time periods in the attitude of the press.

1. February 2001 – November 2003. Beginning with the moment when PCRM came to power in Moldova until the non-signing of the Kozak Memorandum, in November of 2003. During this period, the Russian press was one of the main allies of the Chisinau administration.  

2. November 2003 – August 2006. Beginning with the collapse of the Kozak Memorandum until the meeting between Voronin and Putin on August 8, 2006. In this period, the Russian press turned from an ally into one of the biggest enemies of the Chisinau leadership.  


On February 25, 2001, after the parliamentary elections, the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) came to power and Vladimir Voronin became the President of Moldova. The election platform of that party contained several items calling for approximation to Russia, including accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus, granting the Russian language the status of a second state language, and other vows that resulted in the support and endorsement of Russia. In the same manner as prior to the elections, Vladimir Voronin was warmly received by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, whereas the Russian press welcomed the coming to power of the PCRM in Moldova, considering it the only party capable of resolving the problems of Moldova, through a follow-up development of its good relations with Russia.  

In this context, Russian Public Television organized a live interview with Vladimir Voronin.

One of the priorities of the new head of state was reintegration of the Republic of Moldova through a peaceful settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict. Indeed, after receiving the support of Russia, Voronin started negotiations with Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, whom he met on April 9, 2001 — two days after his nomination to office — declaring that the Transdnistrian leader “is a person with whom one may come to terms”. However, in a short while, the relations between the two figures worsened, reaching a climax in August of 2001, when President Voronin was denied access to a monastery located on the left bank of the Dniester River. After this incident, Voronin declared that “he would rather negotiate with devil than with Smirnov", refused to meet with him any more, and changed his strategy. The President then addressed his Moscow counterpart with a request to nominate a person...
who could find a solution to the Transdnistrian conflict. The designated person was Dmitrii Kozak, a person close to President Vladimir Putin; he came to Tiraspol and Chisinau and soon managed to prepare a document known as the Kozak Memorandum. This memorandum outlined the design of a federal state of the Republic of Moldova, with Tiraspol granted veto rights and other elements that would have transformed the Republic of Moldova into a dysfunctional state if no support came from Russia, which de facto played the role of an arbitrator between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

At the last moment, on the night of November 17, 2003, just before putting his signature on the given document, and thus exposing himself to internal and, in particular, to international pressure, President Voronin did not sign the agreement. This drew the fury of Russia and Vladimir Putin, who was supposed to come personally to Chisinau to be present at the signing of this memorandum. Despite the attempts of Voronin to justify his decision before the Russian President, the latter decided “to punish” him, and prohibited even low-ranking Russian officials from meeting with their Moldovan counterparts. Thus, a period of coolness has intervened in Moldova’s relations with Russia.

In the Russian press at that time, one could notice drastic shifts in attitude from something like “Moscow will reconcile Chisinau and Tiraspol” to articles that at first indirectly, and then openly started accusing Voronin of a refusal to sign the Kozak Memorandum.

In the subsequent period, after being deprived of Russian support, Voronin changed the political course of the Republic of Moldova and declared European integration as its major national priority. The reaction of Russia, which started supporting other political forces from Moldova, soon came to light. There is no doubt that the Russian mass media was also involved in this anti-Voronin campaign. The press quickly began to accuse Moldova of acceding to orange movements and destroying the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, unlike the situation in 2001, when Tiraspol leaders were accused of hiding the process of Transdnistrian settlement negotiations, Voronin turned to be the main “guilty person” in 2005 for the deadlock situation in this matter.

The crowning moment in the media war unleashed by Russia was reached immediately after March 3, 2006, when the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine introduced a new border regime, which did not allow for the export of goods and products made by economic companies from the Transdnistrian region if they were not registered a new border regime, which did not allow for the export of goods and products made by economic companies from the Transdnistrian region if they were not registered immediately after March 3, 2006, when the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine introduced a new border regime, which did not allow for the export of goods and products made by economic companies from the Transdnistrian region if they were not registered.

Both officially and media-wise, Russia manifested its attitude by declaring this “economic blockage”, and accusing Moldova of generating a humanitarian catastrophe in Transnistria. Following these events, Russia ceased the import of Moldovan wines, which represents one of the most important branches of the Moldovan economy. Through this registration measure, the Moldovan authorities tried to incorporate the activities of the companies located on the left bank of the Dniester River into a legally binding framework. At that time, Ghenadie Onischenko, head of the Sanitary Inspectorate of the Russian Federation, declared that Moldovan and Georgian wines contain certain substances that endanger the lives of his country’s citizens. A news report on the “Vremya” (Time) program that showed Russian bulldozers destroying a warehouse of Moldovan wines represented the most “powerful” media action in this regard.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the Russian press towards Moldova and President Voronin changed once he managed to meet with Putin in Moscow on August 8, 2008. This event was followed by a series of other meetings between the two heads of state, which enjoyed a positive coverage in the Russian press, meaning that the President of Moldova had managed to regain the good graces of mass media from Moscow.

At the present time, the relations between the two countries are viewed as good, which is constantly reiterated by Moldovan and Russian leaders. However, Moscow continues to be the de facto supporter and main ally of the Tiraspol administration, which it assists in the form of humanitarian aid and pension supplements, not to mention political backing, which, in the opinion of a number of experts, represents the core obstacle in unblocking negotiations on the Transdnistrian settlement.

Thus, as we can see from this short description of the evolution of Moldovan—Russian relations, the attitude of the press much depends on the political ties between the two states, and the attitude of news outlets changes in the light of these relations.
4.6. The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy in Ukraine

Introduction

The Russian Federation’s activities in the sphere of human rights are pursued based on the “humanitarian dimension” of Russian foreign policy, as stated in the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007 prepared by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The protection of human rights is an important part of the humanitarian dimension. The reason for establishing this direction of the policy is stated as follows:

In last years the significance of human right protection and humanitarian issues has increased. Broader, this is the security of the individual in the general structure of the international relations. This is reflected in the fact that human rights have obtained their place as one of three U.N. priorities along with the issues of security and development. It is correct to consider these issues in connection between them. Particularly it means that the progress of democracy is feasible only based on strong economic basis. There can not be stable democracy in the conditions of poverty and misery, lack of the potential for self-realization of the individual. …

The attitude to the human rights became one of the verges of intercultural relations. Artificial, forced democratization, imposed from outside, not strengthened by the internal premises of the social processes, held beyond the connection of other global problems, often turn to the rise of extremism, international and interreligious conflicts, leads to the rise of instability and anarchy in the international relations.

The Russian Federation brings forward the issues of stability and security before democratization and wants it to be a careful process. Thus, the problems of democratization, faced by every transition society, can fall under the criticism of the Russian Federation because it results in “the rise of instability and anarchy in the international relations”. Due to this, democratization can be understood by Russia as a factor of risk.

The Foreign Policy Review has three main recommendations in the sphere of human rights:

- The Russian Federation’s reaction to criticism and the human rights discussion and to universalize the relevant approaches of the international community.
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That is why the main actors of Russian human rights practice in Ukraine in 2006–2008 were not the government of the Russian Federation or its entities but, rather, some Ukrainian politicians and civil society activists who acted in favor of Russian interests. Another important fact is that international human rights organizations did not actually receive personal complaints from ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. Bill Barving, the legal expert of the European Commission in human rights protection, including Russian NGOs and parliamentary diplomacy. The Russian Federation wants to overcome the double standards in this sphere and to universalize the relevant approaches of the international community.

Another important document of Russian foreign policy is the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept adopted on July 12, 2008. In the chapter on international humanitarian and human rights cooperation, it states, among other points, that the Russian Federation should protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad on the basis of international law and bilateral agreements. The Russian diaspora consisting of several millions of people—the Rossiyskiy Mir (Russian World) — will act as a partner in strengthening the space of Russian language and culture. The Russian Federation should also “promote studying and spread of the Russian language as an integral part of the international culture and instrument of the international communication”.

The combined action of these two policy documents leads to an active role of the Russian diaspora in promoting the aims of the Russian Federation. Whereas the democratization process is considered a risky factor, the Russian Federation would try to “decrease the risks” of international relations. One of the instruments of Russian foreign policy as mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept is the Russian diaspora and the protection of human rights. Such instruments can be used to eliminate democratization, which is considered by Russia to be “artificial, forced”. The Russian Federation retains the right to determine whether the democratization is “artificial or forced”. So, we witness the usage of the Russian diaspora as an instrument in several countries. Human rights practice is one of the tactics of Russian foreign policy used in cooperation with the activities of the Russian diaspora.

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Russian Human Rights Practice in the United Nations

General Assembly

In the General Assembly, the Russian Federation tries to block all the documents depicting Holodomor (artificially created Great Famine of 1932-33) as a genocide.631 Instead it says that the people of the U.S.S.R. in general suffered the violation of their rights. The official Russian position on the Holodomor issue in the General Assembly is stated as follows:632

The Russian Federation shares the sorrow of people of the former U.S.S.R. in respect to the tragedy of famine of the 1930s that embraced considerable part of the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. people have paid an enormous price for industrialization and huge economic breakthrough, occurring in these years. However, there are no evidences that the famine was organized due to the ethnic principles. Its victims were people of different nationalities who predominantly lived in the agricultural areas of the country.633

It is interesting to note that Russian officials say that there was a huge economic breakthrough, achieved by means of starvation. Bringing the mass starvation into the calculus of costs for achieving purposes seems to be in total contradiction to elementary values of democracy.

Other Practices in the U.N.

During different meetings and cultural activities, Russian representatives try to exhibit a different attitude to the period of Stalinist rule in Ukraine as a violation of the rights of veterans and propaganda of nationalism. In a conference dedicated to WWII, a Russian deputy representative expressed his protest against official recognition of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought against both the Nazis and Communists (as the invaders of Ukraine). Official Russian policy is to show that any kind of respect to Ukrainian forces that resisted Stalin is a violation of international laws and a violation of the rights of Soviet army veterans.635

In the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The humanitarian and human rights advocacy trend of Russian policy towards Ukraine in the OSCE is provided in cooperation with the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities. The Russian Government is concerned with the issues of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and tries to engage the Commissioner for National Minorities into monitoring the situation in Ukraine. In October of 2008, the ambassador of Russia to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, had several meetings with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Knut Vollebaek. Chernomyrdin was especially anxious about Ukraine’s using “fortifying measures without taking into account the interests of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, who appeal to the Russian Constitution”636. Ukraine has ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, but Chernomyrdin emphasized that the prohibitions and limitations in the language policy sometimes “do not leave the right to use the native language, as it is provided in the document”.637 He complained about growing pressure on the Russian mass media, since late 2004, from the side of the National Council of Television and Broadcasting. “The main reason for disconnection of the Russian TV channels by Ukrainian authorities is called to be the unadaptedness of the broadcasts to the Ukrainian legislation. But the reason is broadcasting in Russian”, Chernomyrdin said.638 (For the real situation in this sphere, see the chapter on Russian media in Ukraine.)

As a result of complaints from the Russian side, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek initiated an inspection in Ukraine in October of 2008. After receiving the results of the inspections, he said:

130 nationalities live in Ukraine and it doesn’t make Ukraine unique. Ukraine as any other country tries to find solutions to the issues that occur

631 «Мы не начали с ними относиться с уважением – эксперт ЮНЕСКО решение в Москве». Available at http://www.khpj.ru/index.php?p=1264854&m=x=5%F0%EE%F1%B3%E9%F1%FC%EA%E0+%EC%EE%E2%E0. Last accessed on July 12, 2009.
634 During different meetings and cultural activities, Russian representatives try to exhibit a different attitude to the period of Stalinist rule in Ukraine as a violation of the rights of veterans and propaganda of nationalism. In a conference dedicated to WWII, a Russian deputy representative expressed his protest against official recognition of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought against both the Nazis and Communists (as the invaders of Ukraine). Official Russian policy is to show that any kind of respect to Ukrainian forces that resisted Stalin is a violation of international laws and a violation of the rights of Soviet army veterans.635
635 Вступительное слово заверстеля постоянного представители России при ООН И.И.Рогачева на открытии заседания «Безопасность и угроза второй мировой войны и современность» http://www.un.org/russia/new/Main/BeYouth/docs/press/09/05/05/prel.htm. Last accessed on July 12, 2009.
due to the ethnic diversity. It is clear that the situation in Ukraine is even more complicated than in other countries, taking into account Ukraine’s history, divergences inside the country and these complicated problems can not remain unsolved, we need to find new ways for the adoption for the language and cultural diversity of Ukraine. ... The issue of the language policy is very important. It is rather complicated and sensitive – usage of language in education and everyday life. Ukraine inherited awful language policy after the U.S.S.R. There were times when the Ukrainian language was abused, communist leaders have deprived millions of Ukrainians the right to talk, write and study in Ukrainian. Those, who spoke Ukrainian were ridiculed, some were put to prisons. One day hundreds of Ukrainian schools were closed, as I was told. By such means, the Soviet regime intentionally marginalized not only Ukrainians but also the representatives of the national minorities.639

Anyway, the cooperation between Russian diplomats with the OSCE High Representative on National Minorities was more or less successful. Different pro-Russian NGO leaders and politicians made up the commissioner’s mind “that today Ukraine’s representative on National Minorities was more or less successful. Different pro-Russian schools in Ukraine are not needed (!). This follows from the statement, expressed by the representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russian Federation Mr. Nesterenko. Explaining the absence of the Ukrainian language schools, Nesterenko alleged on the closeness of Russian and Ukrainian language, culture, historical affiliations. 640

Experts have different opinions about this issue. Oleh Medvedev, a Ukrainian political expert, studied the Russian practice in schools for ethnic Ukrainians in the Russian Federation and presented his argument in a polemical way: “The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinks that Ukrainian and Russian are too alike and so Russian schools in Ukraine are not needed (!). This follows from the statement, expressed by the representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russian Federation Mr. Nesterenko. Explaining the absence of the Ukrainian language schools, Nesterenko alleged on the closeness of Russian and Ukrainian language, culture, historical affiliations and the common faith: Why do we need Ukrainian schools due to such proximity? If this argument can be used in the fundamentals of Russian state policy, why the Ukrainian authorities can’t use it?642

In general, Ukrainian policy towards the Russian minority is much more liberal and democratic than Russia’s policy towards the Ukrainian minority in Russia. Pro-Russian organizations have the capacity to stand for their political or cultural rights in Ukraine, while the Russian regime often does not give such an opportunity.643

In the Council of Europe

The representatives of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe have raised questions several times regarding violations of rights of the Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine. This was reflected in several documents of the Russian delegation and several discussions in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In April of 2008, a member of the State Duma and the PACE, Mr. Kosachev, questioned the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, about the problems of the Russian language in Ukraine. He expressed concern about several problems of the Russian minority he had heard about. These were the “closing of the Russian schools after the Orange Revolution, closing of the theatres and prohibiting to show films without Ukrainian subtitles”. Yulia Tymoshenko answered that “because of the Soviet regime Ukrainian language needs support like a minority language”.644

In Other Forums

In its human rights practice in Ukraine, the Russian Federation relies mostly on different Ukrainian political parties and NGOs with a pro-Russian position.645 On March 1, 2008, a congress of the opposition deputies of all the councils of Ukraine was held in Severodonetsk. Among the questions discussed were “the violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking people”. The congress also considered the “falsification of the history of Ukraine”, attitudes toward NATO, and the role of the Orthodox Church. Symbolically, the agenda of the meeting was published in Russian.646

The congress suggested the adoption of a declaration of the rights of Russian-speaking people and other minorities in Ukraine. The resolution contained a warning to state officials about taking responsibility for unconstitutional deeds and a warning about giving the wrong information about Holodomor and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.647

639 ОБСЕ: Украина повторяет крайности языковой политики СССР
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid.
645 For information about the financing of pro-Russian organizations from Russia see: http://siver.com.ua/publ/3-1-0-125. Last accessed on July 12, 2009.
Army. The congress suggested conducting a referendum on joining NATO.

A member of the Party of Regions, Vadym Kolesnichenko, said that the policy towards Russians in Ukraine “comes to racism and xenophobia”. At the congress, the position of the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, was more balanced. For example, he stressed that both Russians in Ukraine and ethnic Ukrainians outside Ukraine need support for their native languages. 647 High officials and party leaders are under the watch of the international community, so the higher the rank of the activist, the less radical he is. They have to be more flexible and pragmatic than radicals in their own organizations.

The Essence of the Russian Practice

The essence of Russian human rights practice in Ukraine mostly concerns the language issue. The main international document applied by Russian human rights practice in Ukraine is the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. This document was finally adopted by Ukraine in 2003. Since that time, the Russian Federation and different pro-Russian organizations in Ukraine frequently use this document in their efforts to bring the use of Russian language into state institutions. The very aim is to adopt Russian as the second state or official language in Ukraine. Many experts consider that such a shift will mean not only a shift of state policy, but also a change in statehood itself (from Ukrainian to Ukrainian-Russian).

4.6.2. Russian Compatriots Policy in Ukraine

The legal status of Russian compatriots abroad is defined in a special law of the Russian Federation adopted in 1999. 648 Due to the broad interpretation of the notion of fellow compatriots in mentioned law leaves open the question of their number in Ukraine. Although some use the term “Russian compatriot” to refer only to those who are Russian by nationality, a frequent criterion for determining the status of “compatriot” is an individual’s use of the Russian language or affiliation with the Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. But such confusion in definitions presents many opportunities for the implementation of various programs to support Russian compatriots in Ukraine. Also, it allows the Russians to interfere in Ukrainian domestic politics, by arguing that they are doing so to protect compatriots’ interests.

Humanitarian Aspect of Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine

The Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review of March 27, 2007, indicated that Russia should keep the offensive position on specific critical areas such as the protection of compatriots. 649 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, which was the author of the Review, indicates the need to promote and strengthen ties with Russia and fellow compatriots and to form a special “Russian World”. A strategic goal is to turn compatriots into partners of Russia in world politics.

We can assume with great confidence that a very strong role was set for Ukraine in these strategic plans, because most of those who can be called Russian compatriots live in our country. Ukraine has the largest number of Russian-speaking people after Russia itself, and quantitatively has the largest Russian diaspora. 650 Most of the parishioners of the Orthodox Church under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarch live in Ukraine. Accordingly, a “Russian World” will be at least inferior and at most inefficient without integrating the citizens of Ukraine. Therefore, almost all types of cooperation with compatriots have an impact on Ukraine. Organizations and institutions that position themselves as defending the interests of Russian compatriots in Ukraine, receive strong support from the government of the Russian Federation. There are many such organizations and institutions in Ukraine. In October 2008, a Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots was created in Ukraine. According to the director of the Institute of Russians Abroad, Sergey Panteleyev, the main reason for its creation was the problem of competition for funding among various compatriots organizations, which sometimes turn into real hostility between them. 651

On the other hand, Russian compatriots in Ukraine are not always satisfied with the quality of care provided by the Russian government. For example, in a report on the roundtable “Russian-speaking Ukraine: Opportunities and Problems of Consolidation”, Ukrainian MP Vadim Kolesnichenko, a member of the Russian Community of Crimea said, “For me it is obvious today that Russia has no clear plan of action support of its compatriots”. 652

Federal Program of Support of Compatriots Abroad in 2009-2011

The first Program to Support Compatriots Abroad was organized in 2006-2008. In 2009, a new three-year program was begun. 653 A whole set of events in cooperation

with compatriots is scheduled for the program. In particular, there are plans to continue developing the coordinating structures of compatriots, to provide assistance and material support for the development of Russian information resources, and to promote education for young Russian compatriots in higher educational institutions in Russia.

It should be noted that more than RUB 400 million from the Russian budget are spent annually on the program. In addition, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov included USD 34 million into the city budget in 2009 for grants to support Russian compatriots in Ukraine, and particularly in the Crimea, for the period 2009-2011.

Special funds and organizations that have received grants from the Russian government in previous years also finance the activities of Russian compatriots abroad. For example, the Russkiy Mir Foundation financed the creation of a Russian cultural center in Luhansk, which will be opened in June of this year. The Russian Federation has another governmental program focused on compatriots abroad. It is called the Russian State Program to Help Compatriots Living Abroad Voluntarily Resettle in the Russian Federation, and is aimed to help compatriots immigrate to Russia. However, it is not particularly popular for Russians in Ukraine. Only 2,000 individuals requested applications for resettlement in 2008. The total amount of applications was only 15,000. The program was largely criticized as inefficient. In addition, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov included USD 34 million into the city budget in 2009 for grants to support Russian compatriots in Ukraine, and particularly in the Crimea, for the period 2009-2011.

The program can be characterized as some sort of the "Gulag" practice. People are made to move to the places, unsuitable for life. Even in the oblasts that take part in the program, people can settle only in certain areas. In Krasnoyarsk region, for example among 36 districts only 17 are open for settling. However, Siberia is a difficult place for living to the compatriots from Central Asia, for example.

**Promoted Ideas**

Russian compatriots’ organizations are very diverse in their activities. They are engaged in cultural projects and educational work, political activities and radiocal protests. Therefore it is very difficult to describe their activities in a single thesis. However, this breadth of interest helps to see clearly the ideas of the compatriot movement, which are consciously or subconsciously used in current activities. Here are the most interesting and ambivalent ideas of the compatriots movement:

- The idea of a historical and cultural commonality between Russians and Ukrainians, including the denial of any difference between the two. The only exception is the Halychany (inhabitants of western Ukraine), who, according to Russian political consultant A. Vasserman, have colonized the Ukrainians, eliminating the opportunity to unite with Russia.
- The idea of a united Orthodox Eastern Slavic civilization and its messianic role in the modern world.
- The idea that Crimea belongs to Russia, and the rejection of the property and land claims of the Crimean Tatars.

**Statements of Russian Officials Regarding Compatriots**

On May 25, 2009, at a meeting with Farid Mukhamentshyn, head of the Federal Agency of C.I.S. Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia should increase its influence in the post-Soviet space. Taking into account the position of the person whom the President spoke with, it seems that Russia will increase its attention to compatriots abroad.

In fact, this practice has been already used for a long time. The frequent statements by Russian politicians about the oppression of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine should be noted. One striking example was the decision of the deputies of the State Duma to report to the oppression of Russian compatriots in Ukraine to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This took place in December of 2008, when licenses were not extended to Russian TV channels to broadcast in Ukraine (for more on this matter, see the chapter on Russian media in Ukraine).

It should be emphasized that Russian politicians, when discussing the rights of compatriots, at least do not raise the question of Ukrainian independence. Meanwhile, some Russian intellectuals and political scientists associated with the Kremlin tend to speak about splitting Ukraine and affiliating some of its regions with Russia. For example, in an interview in May of 2009, Moscow State university Professor Alexander Dugin expressed the need to integrate the south-eastern regions of Ukraine with Russia. He said that the most of the actions in this affair should be done by

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residents of these regions themselves. They have to initiate a referendum regarding integration with Russia, and protest if such a referendum is prohibited.\textsuperscript{665} Another Russian intellectual and political adviser, Anatoliy Vasserman stated that each local commune of Ukraine should hold a referendum about whether its residents want to affiliate their settlement with Russia. In this case, he believes, Ukraine can unite with Russia and resign from the colonial oppression of Galicia.\textsuperscript{666}

It is worth admitting that Dugin and Vasserman are current representatives of the Russian intellectual elite, and have a significant impact on Russian public opinion. It is not surprising that we often hear separatist statements from Ukrainian citizens with a Russian background; there are people who taught them to behave this way.

Non-government Organizations of Russian Compatriots in Ukraine

Ukraine has 14 official non-governmental organizations of Russian compatriots. In addition, there are 4 parties created as parties of Russians in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{667} All of them are now united in the Coordinating Council, which was discussed above.

The consolidation of Russian non-governmental organizations in Ukraine into the Coordinating Council does not withdraw all the problems related to the coexistence of compatriots. As mentioned, Vadim Kolesnichenko’s report says: “Today the Russian movement in Ukraine can be characterized by five components: marginalization, vozhdizm (cult of the leader), lack of structural projects, a low level of financial support, and even ineffective usage of funds allocated earlier. Less than 1% of the 14 million Russian-speaking citizens participate in compatriots’ cultural, human rights, and other organizations. Combining all the Russian compatriots in a single movement is a very difficult task. We face all the problems of the Russian movement, in particular at the Coordinating Council.”\textsuperscript{668} It should be noted that Kolesnichenko obviously exaggerated in speaking about the lack of funding, which is proven by the amount of assistance. But he had no reasons to exaggerate the problem of relations inside the compatriots movement.

Despite the lack of internal unity, there are several organizations that are closely related to the Coordinating Council though are not its members, for example, the self-defense association called Faithful Cossacks, which aims to protect the Russian Orthodoxy and supports organizations that work toward the unity of Russia and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{669} However, the majority of informal partners of the Coordinating Council are organizations with radical aims. They are not officially included in the Council in order not to discredit it. But in critical situations, cooperation is apparent. For example, in April of 2009, the leader of the movement Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia, Valeriy Podyachyy, was put on trial for statements about the need to cancel the Crimean Constitution and adopt a declaration regarding a reunion of Crimea and Russia. Immediately after he was arrested by Crimean SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), articles appeared on the web sites of various compatriots organizations and in their press, reporting that a fellow compatriot was discriminated against and unfairly judged. The official site of the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in particular wrote about this. There were also some protests in Crimea, and round table on the “Persecution of Russian patriots” was conducted. Russian mass media broadcasted the discussion of the “Russian dissident in Ukraine”. Sergey Tsekov, a member of the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots and the head of the Russian Community of Crimea, expressed his support for Podyachyy. He explained that Russian patriots are also among the members of their organization, like the chairman of Sevastopol - Crimea - Russia. Tsekov said that they are just more balanced and constructive, and do not express such statements, but they are totally against the trial of Podyachyy.\textsuperscript{670}

Several radical youth organizations act with a focus on “Russian interests”. One is the Eurasian Union of Youth, whose ideologist is Alexander Dugin. In 2008, its members destroyed Ukrainian state symbols on Hoverla Mountain (the highest peak of Ukraine). Another is the Crimean Proryv (Breakthrough). They are scandalously known by a performance featuring the excavation of the isthmus that connects Crimea with the mainland, as well as frequent fights with the police and the Crimean Tatars.

Some rightist politicians and political analytics in Ukraine are convinced that even the youth “antifa” movement is influenced by Russia.\textsuperscript{671} Although this assertion requires further proof, movements of Russian compatriots often accuse their political opponents of fascism. For example, Vadim Kolesnichenko said that a draft resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the Appointment of Early Elections to the Municipality of Sevastopol”, dated May 21, 2009, was “demonstrative fascism”.\textsuperscript{672}

Examples of Activities

It is not surprising that one of the most important activities of Russian compatriots is the further exploitation of the thesis “the great Soviet people: vanquishers of fascism”. But “Soviet” has gradually been replaced with “Russian”. The last significant action of Russian compatriots was the distribution of St. George ribbons on
Victory Day. The idea to hang black-and-bronze ribbons on cars or clothes appeared in 2005; it symbolized respect for veterans. In fact, this action is part of the construction of a Russian victory myth. In the Russian compatriot newspaper Russkaya Pravda, Victory Day was called the national holiday of Russian identity.673 In addition, it is constantly stressed that during the war the people of post-Soviet countries were citizens of a single country. Thus, there is an effort to unite under the influence of Moscow more people than just ethnic Russians abroad.

Russian compatriots are active in the state politics of Ukraine and its regions. For example, in the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, the majority faction is the bloc For Yanukovych, created by the Party of Regions and the Russian Community of Crimea. The chairman of the Russian Community of Crimea, Sergey Tsekov, became deputy speaker. However, now (in the spring of 2009), there are some discrepancies in the bloc because the Party of Regions failed to realize its electoral promises. One of those promises was the provision of official status for the Russian language. However, State Duma Deputy Konstantin Zatulin (a Russian politician who is strongly connected with Russian compatriots in Ukraine) predicts that the Russian Community of Crimea will again gain seats in the next elections of the Crimean parliament.674

Russian compatriots are working closely with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). This is not surprising, because the UOC-MP is one of the most important components of the unity of the “Russian World”. Among the last scheduled common events is a series of summer camps, called “Our Home – Holy Rus”, for Ukrainian Orthodox scouts.675

The cooperation between compatriots organizations and the Black Sea Navy of Russia plays a very important role in the Crimea. Sergey Tsekov said that Russian compatriots in Crimea will do everything to make sure a Russian naval base remains forever in Sevastopol.676

Crimea occupies a special place in the rhetoric of Russian compatriots. More than 60% of the population of the region constitute ethnic Russians, and nearly 90% are Russian-speaking. Therefore, the compatriots organizations here are much more active, and Russia provides more attention and support to them. “Now the Russians in the Crimea are gaining strength here, and in the coming years a strong national cultural movement will be formed. Russia has improved its work with compatriots in recent years. Now we are working to support education, the preservation of Russian culture, projects with youth and veterans, and human rights, as well as helping compatriots-businessmen who conduct business in Russia and Ukraine” says Tsekov.677

Russian compatriots organizations in Crimea protest against relations with the U.S. and NATO. A serious example of such actions took place in 2008 in Feodosiya, when pro-Russian organizations blocked the Sea Breeze common military training of Ukraine and NATO. The protesters were the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, led by Natalia Vitrenko, together with the parties and civic organizations of Russian compatriots.

Relations between the Crimean Russians and Crimean Tatars is another very acute issue. This problem requires a separate detailed consideration, but in general we can say that there are deep divisions between these ethnic communities in Crimea, from fundamental differences in electoral preferences to the issue of admeasurements of land for construction and agriculture. These problems have repeatedly turned into conflicts with group clashes. For example, a conflict took place in Bakhchisaray in 2006 when a food market was built on the site of an ancient Tatar cemetery. The owners of the market refused to fulfill the official request of the Tatars to remove the market. The Russian Bloc party supported the owners. This led to various pickets, for the market as well as against it, and eventually turned into violent clashes, which were stopped with the help of special police forces.

Not all the activities of compatriots organizations find support among the population of Crimea. In March of 2009, Sevastopol activists tried to gather a citywide parents’ meeting against the obligatory Ukrainian language tests in the external independent assessment and in support of their replacement by Russian-language tests. Despite the fact that the city has more than 90% Russian-speaking residents, parents ignored those meeting.678

The actions of the organizations of Russian compatriots in Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia oblast) deserve special attention. The organizations that incited the Zakarpattia Ruthenian separatism are associated with Russian influence. In February of 2009, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Valentyn Nalyvyaychenko, said in an interview: “People who convened the so-called Congress of Subcarpathian Ruthenians and wanted to provoke the creation of autonomous Subcarpathian Rus’, did so with Russian financing”.679 The World Russian People’s Sobor immediately gathered afterwards in order to protect the organizers of the congress. Besides that, the Ruthenians accused of separatism asked Russia to recognize their independence soon after the congress.680

Another fact was an appeal by the Rus’ Zakarpattia union of Russian Culture...
to OSCE, in April of 2009, regarding harassment of the Russian language in Transcarpathia. Less than a month after the appeal, the Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs issued a formal statement regarding the oppression of the Russian language in Ukraine. It should be noted that there are about 50,000 ethnic Russians in Transcarpathia. The Russian language is studied by 27,000 pupils there. Uzhgorod university has a special Russian department, which publishes an annual almanac of Russian literary works, entitled Russkoye naslediye. In addition to the Rus’ union, there are also Russian scout organizations in Transcarpathia. The Russian community regularly holds cultural events there, and the local authorities place no obstacles in the way of their organization.

In the first half of 2009, organizations of Russian compatriots were active in the Poltava region. This was connected with the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, where the Swedish army, under the leadership of Charles XII, and Ukrainian Cossacks, under hetman Ivan Mazepa, suffered defeat at the hands of the Russian army of Peter I. The information campaign “Chronicles of the Heroic Defense of Poltava: Swedish Invaders and Mazepian Traitors” was begun there in April of 2009. On Victory Day, a St. George ribbon was tied around the column celebrating the glory of the Russian army, which was built to honor the victory in the Battle of Poltava. In regards to the anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, we must mention a suggestion by the head of the Russian community in Poltava, Viktor Shestakov, to celebrate the Day of (Ukrainian) National Treason on October 23. This is the day when Hetman Ivan Mazepa decided to join the side of the Swedish king.

Mazepa is also remembered by the “Russian compatriots” in Kyiv. For example, on May 19, 2009, they send an appeal to the Kyiv city administration against the project to construct a monument to Hetman. The appeal was given during the common action of “Russian compatriots” in Kiev and the parishioners of UOC-MP. These events are Orthodox-patriotic religious processions, devoted to different Russian memorable dates and holidays. They serve to maintain the historical memory and traditions in the way that Russian compatriots organizations see it.

**Statements by Leaders of Russian Compatriots Organizations in Ukraine**

In order to better illustrate the activities and ideas of Russian compatriots organizations in Ukraine, we will provide some examples of direct statements by their leaders.

Sergey Provatorov, chairman of the All-Ukrainian Russian Community Association of Russian Compatriots, regarding the system of cooperation of Russia with the Russian community in Ukraine: “We need a system that would make us useful not just for some political reasons, but would return us to life in the space of single country, even if we live in different states. For compatriots from further abroad, the integrating idea could become the idea of the "Russian World”; for those who live in the borders of the Ukrainian state, it has to become the idea of a single Russian land divided among several states. Our goal may be to build an international alliance of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, similar to the EU.”

“Ataman” of the Faithful Cossacks, Alexey Selivanov, on the future perception of Russians by Ukrainians: “It is not very important which language will be used by the majority of the population. The main thing that remained adamant in the minds of the people is that despite regional differences Russians and Ukrainians are a single people.”

Oleg Rodivilov, a member of Crimean parliament from the party Russian bloc, on the main problems of Russian compatriots in Ukraine: “Since the election of Viktor Yushchenko, we face a strong unconstitutional attack on the human rights of Russians and Russian-speaking persons. The situation of Russian culture is simply unbearable. Everything is coming to an end, an explosion. We hope that the Russian leaders will prevent discrimination of Russians in Ukraine.”

**Official Media of Russian Compatriots**

There are two official media: the newspaper Russkaya Pravda, which is published once a month, and the news digest Russian World, which is distributed electronically three times a week to more than 2,500 addresses. Taking into account how rarely the newspaper is published and the small audience of the digest, we could speak about the weakness of the compatriot movement’s media. But this is a false assumption.

The Russian media, in general, and the Russian media in Ukraine, in particular, pays huge attention to the problems of compatriots in Ukraine, and regularly communicates with their leaders. In addition, every Russian compatriots organization usually has its own web site. The information on these sites is regularly and frequently updated, and feature many news and analytical articles.
Pro-Russian Orientation of other Social and Political Organizations in Ukraine

Influential political forces deny that they act in a pro-Russian manner, because this would not be beneficial for their electoral ratings. But we can safely state that the rhetoric of some of the major parties include statements that indirectly reflect the interests of Russia.

The strongly pro-Russian have a small electoral base. However, they can be represented in the provincial councils of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. This is particularly true of the Progressive Socialist Party, led by Nataliya Vitrenko, and the party Rodina, led by wealthy Odessa rich businessman Igor Markov. The latter is particularly notorious for a clash with a peaceful demonstration of National Democrats in Odessa, and constant problems with the local office of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine). 688 The media that belong to Markov often quote Anatoliy Vasserman and other speakers of the inseparability of Ukraine from Russia. These two parties have never rejected their pro-Russian orientation. But despite support in the “stronghold regions”, they have almost no chances to take seats in the parliament of Ukraine.

Involvement of Ukrainian Politicians into the Activities of Compatriot Organizations

The Coordinating Council of Russian compatriots in Ukraine includes two members of Verkhovna Rada, Vadim Kolesnichenko and Alexander Chornomorov, who both are representatives of the Party of Regions fraction. Other politicians are also involved in events organized by Russian compatriots. For example, in 2009, financial support for the St. George Ribbon event in Transcarpathia was provided by the so-called General Military union of Ukraine. The head of this union is MP from the Party of Regions, Oleh Kalashnikov, scandalously known for beating a television journalist. 689 In Luhans in May of 2009, a roundtable was held on the equality of Russian and Ukrainian languages. The roundtable was conducted within the framework of the third International Great Russian World Festival and was attended by many Russian and Ukrainian politicians, including the leader of the Communist Party, Petro Symonenko. 690

Experts on Russian Compatriots in Ukraine

After Viktor Yanukovych was appointed prime minister in 2006, experts from the Institute for Foreign Policy said the following: “threats gained strength in the sphere of humanitarian relations between Ukraine and Russia. It concerned the efforts of the Russian side to strengthen the role of the Russian language in public and political life, and the promotion of its official status to a state language. It is obvious that the aim of these efforts is the reanimation of the common historical, cultural, and information space of Ukraine and Russia. In the future, this process foresees a return of the spiritual unity between the Ukrainian and Russian people, based on the Russian national idea about the national spirit, Russian statehood, and Orthodoxy.” 691

Konstantin Matviyenko, a political expert from the Gardarica Corp., on the idea of the “Russian World”: “First, Russia had to abandon the idea of Slavic world. You know that Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria entered NATO despite the voice of Slavic blood. The loss of Russian influence in Serbia was even worse. Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia escaped from the zone of influence of Russia. Thus, the idea of the Orthodox world for Russia is closed too. So, if you talk about building a “Russian World”, a network system, Ukraine is a major donor of construction material for that idea. The mere existence of the Ukrainian state already casts doubt into the idea of the Russian World.” 692

Editor in Chief of the magazine I (Vi), Taras Wozniak, on Victory Day: “The task [of actions initiated on the day of Victory] is to deprive Ukraine of honor to be called the winner over Nazism in World War II. And it is unimportant that Ukraine lost 10 million of its residents in the fight against Nazism, unimportant that Ukrainian guys were not only in the ranks of the Red Army (usually as simple cannon fodder used by Soviet military leaders), but also in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, who struggled with Nazism and Bolshevism. But the winner can only be Russia. But not in reality, only in that avalanche of films that Russian film industry have made recently.” 693

4.6.3. Consular Issues of the Russian Foreign Policy in Ukraine

General Background of Russian Consular Relations with Ukraine

Russian consular relations with Ukraine are an important part of the humanitarian aspects of bilateral cooperation. A central document for Ukrainian-Russian consular relations is The Consular Convention between Ukraine and the Russian Federation,

693 Гіркі міркування напередодні Дня закінчення ІІ Світової війни. Available at http://www.zaxid.net/blogentry/39658/
from January 15, 1993, which provides a legal basis for establishing the activities of consular institutions, consular functions, and the privileges and immunities of consular institutions. According to the Convention, Ukraine has agreed to open five general consulates, in Kyiv (as part of the Embassy of the Russian Federation), Kharkiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Simferopol, and one honorable consulate in Chernihiv. Another important document is the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation about Visa-Free Travels of the Citizens of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, from January 16, 1997, which provides visa-free entrances for Russian citizens to Ukraine and vice versa. Citizens of the Russian Federation, notwithstanding the aim of the trip, can enter the territory of Ukraine with national or foreign passports, or other documents that prove the person’s identity. Children under the age of 14 can use their birth certificate. The same rules apply for transit through Ukrainian territory. Registration procedure at border units requires that individuals get an “entry-exit” stamp in their passports and fill out an immigration card. Those persons who want to stay in Ukraine for more than 90 days, for example, for residence, study, or work, have to be registered in the institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This procedure significantly facilitates the process of registration, because it avoids the need to register in the proper institutions within a period of 3 days after entry into the territory of Ukraine like Russia demands from time to time from Ukrainian citizens visiting Russia. Another important document in the sphere of consular relations is the agreement concerning readmission of illegal migrants that entered into force in 2008. Although it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this agreement, some experts, for example, Oleh Pokalchuk, director of the Ukrainian-Russian Information Centre, expressed doubts, before its ratification, over the willingness of Moscow to accept illegal migrants in its territory: “It is a good idea, though a bit late, and will encounter a large amount of local problems regarding its realization.”

In 1999, Serhiy Pyrozhkov, then director of the National Institute of Ukrainian-Russian Relations, admitted that “the relations between Ukraine and Russia in the humanitarian sphere are very often pushed to the back stage, in comparison with their economic, political, and military relations, and this has already become an ordinary thing.” Moreover, humanitarian relations, including consular ones, are dependent on and to some extent determined by the political aspects of bilateral relations and the overall political situation in both countries. Several aspects could be mentioned here. First, the practice of forbidding entrance to its territory for citizens of another country. The challenge that dual citizenship or citizenship of a neighbouring country presents to Ukrainian national security is felt particularly acutely in the case of crime regions. In 2007, about 75,000 Russian citizens were on the Russian consular office lists in Ukraine. In 2008, the Russian authorities estimated that 97,000 adult Russian citizens resided in Ukraine (these are the individuals on the lists of voters participating in the Russian Presidential Elections in the consulates of Ukraine).

Number of Russian Citizens in Ukraine

According to the Ukrainian census of 2001, 168,000 foreigners reside in Ukraine. More than half of them, 95,900 people, were citizens of the Russian Federation. Most of them live in the Crimean peninsula and in highly industrialized regions. In 2007, about 75,000 Russian citizens were on the Russian consular office lists in Ukraine. The announcement of a list of personae non gratae (see paragraph 5).

Major Trends of Russian Citizenship in Ukraine

The challenge that dual citizenship or citizenship of a neighbouring country presents to Ukrainian national security is felt particularly acutely in the case of persons who have a dual citizenship or have stayed in a country with a large amount of local problems regarding its realization. The war of August 2008 in Georgia raised the problem of dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship, especially in the potentially unstable region of the Crimea where Russian passports are provided without the necessary procedures that meet Ukrainian laws (see paragraph 3). On the other hand, Ukrainian political expert Volodymyr Fesenko thinks that “the problem of dual citizenship for Ukraine is now and is typical not only in the Crimea. Many people from Chernivtsi oblast or Zakarpattya have two passports – a Ukrainian and a Romanian one.”

Three examples of Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin and some top political figures in Russia, Russian consuls in Ukraine allow themselves to make some comments that are inadequate to their status. That was the case when the Consul General of Russia in Kharkiv expressed an acknowledgement from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to the residents of eastern Ukraine, “for their absolutely right position in the issue of Russian - Georgian conflict.”

pact settlement areas of ethnic Russians, most of all in Crimea. Ukrainian legislation prohibits dual citizenship. This problem in Ukrainian society was exacerbated after the invasion of Russian troops in Georgian territory in August of 2008, following the policy of "mass distribution" of Russian passports among Georgian citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The reason why the Crimean case caused concerns over the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and a certain resemblance to the scenario of events that took place in the Southern Caucasus, was the Russian ethnic majority (58.5%) in the Crimea and the Russian Black Sea Fleet located in Sevastopol. The Vice Admiral of Ukraine, Volodymyr Bezkorovaiy, claimed that released officers from the Russian fleet stay in Ukraine and get Ukrainian citizenship, while preserving their Russian citizenship. Moreover, ethnic Russians with Ukrainian citizenship could easily get a Russian passport. The Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Volodymyr Ohrysko, interviewed by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, confirmed the information on Russian passports provided to Ukrainian citizens by the Consulate General of Russia in Simferopol. Mass media differed on the numbers of those who obtained Russian citizenship; figures ranged from 8,000 to 40,000. Russian officials, however, denied the mass distribution of passports in Crimea.

Despite prohibition of dual citizenship in Ukraine, the offence in this case does not cover any sanction. That's why, on September 11, 2008, MPs from Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc drafted legislation to strengthen penalties for offences to the Law on Citizenship. This draft law has still not been adopted. However, article 4 of the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (The Hague, April 12, 1930) says: "A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses," Ukraine, as a successor to the U.S.S.R. (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), and Russia, also as a successor to the U.S.S.R., adopted this convention while still in the Soviet Union, so it is in force in both countries and its norms should be adhered to, especially because dual citizenship is prohibited in both countries.

According to studies by the Alexandr Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 13% of Crimean residents perceive Ukrainian citizenship as a burdensome necessity, related to the impracticability of changing their country of residence. 10.3% of Crimeans are proud of being Ukrainian citizens. If they had a chance, 48% of the Crimean population would agree to change their Ukrainian citizenship for some other. 80% of them would choose Russian citizenship instead of Ukrainian.

Nevertheless, for the overwhelming majority (68.3%) of the Crimean population, Ukrainian citizenship is a purely practical matter that arouses neither positive nor negative feelings. Therefore, the potential exists at least for the neutralization of this issue.

Political Activities of Russia Citizens in Ukraine: Their Participation Level in Russian (Parliamentary, Presidential) Elections

Only 23,190 Russian citizens residing in Ukraine took part in the last Russian presidential elections, held on March 2, 2008, according to the official site of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Most of them—about 17,000—voted as officers of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The other Russian citizens voted in polling stations at departments of the Russian embassy in 5 Ukrainian cities: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Simferopol. Their voting pattern does not differ much from the voting of those living in Russia.

The main target of Russian politicians in Ukraine is not Russian citizens, which as we can see are not a large community, but Russians and Russian-speakers who are Ukrainian citizens and who vote in Ukrainian elections (see below and part on Russian policy toward "compatriots").

Expositional information 1. To the Problem of the Activities of Russian Politicians in Ukraine: Zatulin, Lushkov, Dugin, Zarifullin

In connection with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s quotation of General Denikin about the "Impermissibility even of a thought about the division of Russia and especially about the separation of Ukraine", it becomes urgent to evaluate the activity of Russian politicians, whose activities and views are connected with attempts to restrict and even eliminate the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
in its current borders, and therefore provide an ideological context for Putin's statements. The politicians who should be mentioned include Russian State Duma Member Konstantin Zatulin, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and Eurasian movement leaders Alexander Dugin and Pavel Zarifullin.

Konstantin Zatulin (born 1958) is the chief deputy to the chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for the Cooperation with the Russian Compatriots Outside Russia. He also takes part in the Presidential Commission to Counteract Attempts to Interpret History Contrary to Russian Interests. The chairman of this commission is the head of the Presidential Administration, Naryshkin. Its other members include General Makarov, the chief of staff of the Russian Army. Such personnel indicates the high status of this commission, which has the actual task of defending, through recommendations to the President, the state ideology of Russia outside Russia, first of all, in the post-Soviet states. In April of 1996, Zatulin founded the Institute of the C.I.S. Countries, which actually became a think tank and a promoter of pro-Russian political and media activity in post-Soviet countries. Among its founders is also the city administration of Moscow, headed by Yuri Luzhkov. During 1997–1998, Zatulin was an advisor to the Mayor of Moscow, and took part in the foundation of the party Homeland under Luzhkov’s leadership. The Institute for the C.I.S. Countries includes the Ukrainian branch headed by Vladimir Kornilov. At a conference on the Russian vision of the future of Russophones in Ukraine, which took place in Moscow on April 27, 2009, Zatulin characterized his vision of the Ukrainian future in the following way. He did not reject independence of Ukraine, but sees the future of the Ukrainian state as Russia’s closest ally. This relationship, in his opinion, must be similar to the relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain after the Second World War. According to Zatulin, the Ukrainian governing elite should take the following steps:

- non-aligned status of Ukraine;
- federalization of the country;
- official status of the Russian language, along with Ukrainian;
- unity of the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches under the Moscow Patriarchate;
- special status of Crimea and Sevastopol within Ukraine, preserving the basing of the Russian Black Sea Navy after 2017;
- economic integration within the Common Economic Space, along with the drawing together Russian and Ukrainian educational and cultural spheres.

The more radical wing of Russian chauvinistic politicians is represented by the Eurasian movement, whose aim is to restore the authoritarian Russian Empire as the Eurasian civilization. Among the politicians in the movement are Alexander Dugin and Pavel Zarifullin. The latter is the leader of the Eurasian League of Youth (E.L.Y.). According to E.L.Y. resources, this movement sympathizes with both Stalinism and extreme right ideologies. The E.L.Y. takes part in aggressive actions against the Ukrainian independent state, for example, the desecration of Ukrainian state symbols on Hoverla Mountain in 2007. The E.L.Y. also organizes camps in Ukraine, in both the central and eastern regions;

- The chief ideologist of the Eurasian Movement, Alexander Dugin (born 1962), has stated, contrary to Konstantin Zatulin, that the dismemberment of the Ukrainian state will not result in any economical and political problems for Russia in its relations with the West (because of the dependence of the Europeans on Russian natural resources). Dugin supports the division of Ukraine into a pro-Russian major part and western Ukraine, which, to his mind, does not belong to the Eurasian Civilization.

**Persons Declared Non Grata**

Because of the tense relations between Russia and Ukraine, there have been many cases where both countries have forbidden citizens of another country from entering their territory. In the case of Ukraine, this was done by announcing a list of personae non gratae, who were forbidden to enter Ukrainian territory. Such persons included the leaders of the Eurasian League of Youth, Alexandr Dugin and Pavel Zarifullin, and Russian parliamentary deputies Konstantin Zatulin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

On several occasion, Russia has also forbidden Ukrainian politicians from entering its territory, for example, an adviser to the President of Ukraine, Mykola Zhulynsky, and a member of Ukrainian parliament, Petro Poroshenko, who are not radical Ukrainian nationalists. But as Zhulynsky said, “Ukraine, when making a decision about some politician or public person, announces who is forbidden to enter Ukraine and explains why. The Russian side does nothing like that.”

These bilateral actions of the Russian and Ukrainian authorities, which include mutual detainments and proclaiming Russian and Ukrainian politicians personae non gratae, does not have similar results for the two countries. In the Russian case, the general support of the authorities’ actions by the citizens can be seen as a continuation of the consolidation of Russian elites and authorities. But in Ukraine, such actions lead to a deconsolidation of elites and authorities, and loud statements from chauvinistic Russian politicians and their structures in Ukraine. In general, according to the surveys of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Russian Levada Center, 91% of Ukrainian citizens have a positive attitude towards Russia; at the same time, 62% of Russian citizens have a negative attitude toward Ukraine.

This could be explained by the fact that Ukrainian society is much more open than Russian society, and Ukrainians have different sources of information about Russia (including Russian TV channels), while in Russia negative coverage of Ukraine is dominant in the mass media.

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On the Russian “Compatriot Card” for Individuals Living Outside the Russian Federation

In December of 2008, the State Duma announced the draft of the Federal Law On the Russian Card for Compatriots Living Outside the Russian Federation. The author of the draft, deputy Illya Ponomariov (faction of Spravedlivaya Rossiya), claimed that this ID should be created mainly for the citizens of Ukraine: “The concept of this law is to prevent actions that are so painfully perceived by all the countries, where their citizens get Russian citizenship. We would like to circumvent dual citizenship prohibited in Ukraine”.716 The lobbyists of the draft assured that card holders could visit the Russia Federation without a visa at any time, enter a Russian university, and get a work permit without being a citizen of the Russian Federation.

In the preamble of the draft law, which is available on the official site of the Russkie Foundation, it was justified because of 1) a systemic limitation of the Russian people’s rights by newly formed independent states, using forced assimilation and other forms of discrimination, and 2) a decreasing population in Russia. Compatriot cards were declared as a geopolitical means. The draft law also suggested that the compatriot card would prove one’s “belonging to the Russian nation, Russian civilization, and the Russian world.” A cardholder would have the right to visit Russia without a visa (depending on intergovernmental agreement), to work in Russia without getting a work permit, to gain an education with the same rights as Russian citizens, to receive benefits for the second, third, and fourth child born in the family, to receive the “energy allowance” for salary or pension, if the price for energy services is higher than in Russia.717 The last point is the most ironic, because Russia is increasing gas prices for Ukraine, not to mention the "gas wars" between Ukraine and Russia in 2005-2006 and 2008-2009.

The initiators of this draft law were members of the Russkie Foundation, established in October of 2007. The president of the Russkie Foundation is Major General Leonid Shershniev, a security expert at the State Duma and Federation Council and allegedly an ideologist for establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.718 The mission of the foundation is the unification of the Russian people in different legal forms. One goal of the foundation is the "development and consolidation of the intellectual, cultural, and creative potential of Russians living in the Russian Federation and the newly formed states to the reunification of the Russian people in a variety of legal forms ... providing Russians who appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the territories of the new states with the same equal rights as citizens, representatives from the "title nations", and the official recognition of the Russian language as a state language in countries with large Russian-speaking populations.”719

The draft law was also supported by radical Ukrainian politician Vasyl Volha, leader of the political party Soyuz Livykh Syl (union of Left Forces), who claimed that the "Russian compatriot card could determine the status of Russians living outside the country; it would also be good for Ukraine, where Russian and Russian-speaking citizens constitute more than half of the population; and receipt of this card would be possible not only for ethnic Russians but also for people who consider the Russian language and culture as native and who perceive Russia as their historical homeland.”720 Moreover, Vasyl Volha participated in the work group on drafting the law.

Russkie Foundation president Leonid Shershniev justified the legitimacy of adopting the law by providing the example of Hungarian and Polish compatriots policy.721 At the same time, he emphasized the difference between the proposed Russian compatriot card and Polish or Hungarian policy: "Polish and Hungarian origins are identified there as being "in the blood"; Russian origins should be based in an ethnic community, spiritual, moral, and cultural affinity, and an attraction to Russian civilization and Russian political ethics".722

In this case, it is worth appealing status law policies concerning the protection of minority kin. The law for the protection of minority kin is also called diaspora law. The laws on the protection of kin were adopted in almost all the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. In these states, diaspora laws “alternate between leaving the question of “origin” to self-identification or spelling specific requirements.”723 In fact, it appears in some combination of the different criteria (language, culture, identity, etc.) chosen to identify minority kin by the state of the kin.

On March 4, 2004, Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted the law On the Legal Status of Foreign Ukrainians. As Oksana Shevel stresses, Ukrainian diaspora law, contrary to some other Central and Eastern European countries, was not specifically aimed to co-ethnics in neighboring countries, but applied to “foreign Ukrainians” all over the world, with symbolic benefits for them. Only a few people received foreign Ukrainian certificates — 1,315 as of January, 2007.724 Ethnic Ukrainians receive the certificate based on the decision of the commission on foreign Ukrainians—a governmental body in Ukraine that works only in the territory of Ukraine. In contrast to the Ukrainian case, on June 19, 2001, the Hungarian parliament adopted the law On Ethnic Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. This

724 Ibid. p.13
law granted social, cultural, and employment rights to ethnic Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, the former Yugoslavia, and Ukraine. Hungarian authorities guaranteed the issuance of a Hungarian identity card for ethnic compatriots upon the recommendation of ethnic Hungarian organizations.\textsuperscript{725} This raises the role of ethnic communities in foreign countries, creating a double authority upon the ethnic Hungarian community, of Hungary and of the neighboring state. That’s why it appeared controversial and provoked criticism from the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{726} The main issue of this conflict is that ethnically-based diaspora laws can infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbors.

In regards to the Polish compatriot card, there is a lack of “Polish-speaking” or “ethnic Polish” issues in western Ukraine, boarding Poland, in contrast to tangible “Russian-speaking” or “ethnic Russian” issues in the eastern or southern parts of Ukraine, near the border of the Russian Federation. So, the Polish compatriot card is unlikely to cause challenges to stability in Ukraine. The EU membership of these countries supports this argument. Only the case of Romanian ambitions on Moldova could cause anxiety about Ukrainian Northern Bukovyna, inhabited partly by ethnic Romanians.

The issue that exacerbates the issue of a Russian compatriot identification card is the events of August, 2008, and the invasion of Russian troops in Georgia, taking into consideration the presence of the owners of Russian foreign passports. The described controversial points of the draft law and some financial costs (like the energy allowance for salary or pension, if the price for energy services is higher than in Russia) are probably the reasons why this draft has not been still adopted.

**Other Aspects of Russian Consular Relations (Migration)**

The issue of migration processes between Russia and Ukraine is also important, and obviously has a strong impact on consular relations between the two countries. Both countries are now facing sharp demographic problems, made manifest in the general process of aging and low birth rate indices. The population of Ukraine decreased from approximately 52 million in 1992 to 46 million in 2008.\textsuperscript{727} Some experts consider that, in the case of preserving the current tendencies of the birth and death rates, Russia will need 69 millions immigrants, or 1.4 million annually, in order to compensate its demand for human resources.\textsuperscript{728} The main issue of this conflict is that ethnically-based diaspora laws can infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbors.

In 2007, 51,500 Ukrainians were legally working in Russia, placing second on the list after Uzbekistan\textsuperscript{729} (in 2006 there were almost half as much, 32,700). However, the number of illegal Ukrainian migrants is significantly higher. Igor Markov, an expert at the Ukrainian Center of Social Studies, supposes that the total number of Ukrainian workers in Russia at the end of 2008 was up to 2 million, while the overall amount of Ukrainian labor migrants was 4.5 million.\textsuperscript{730} Thus, Russia is a primary target for Ukrainian labor migrants.\textsuperscript{731}

The Federal Law on Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons provides for stricter regulations on registering foreigners within a period of 3 days at the relevant territorial office of the Federal Migration Service (F.M.S.). Because these new rules are contradict the current Russian – Ukrainian agreement about waiving the need for Ukrainian citizens to register within a period of 90 days, after a few rounds of negotiations the Russian side agreed not to apply those provisions for Ukrainians.

Both Ukraine and Russia are transit countries for illegal migration from Asia and Africa to the European Union. \textsuperscript{732}That is why the issue of refugees is an important part of the negotiations agenda between Ukraine, Russia, and the EU. According to data from the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, more than 80% of illegal migrants come to Ukraine through the Ukrainian-Russian border.\textsuperscript{733} In 2007, the number of illegal migrants coming through the Ukrainian-Russian border was about 24,000. To address the cross-border co-operation issues arising from EU enlargement eastwards, and to promote dialogue on asylum and irregular migration issues among countries situated along the EU’s eastern border, a pro-active initiative called The Soderkoping Process was launched in early 2001. These countries have signed a treaty on readmission of illegal migrants who came to EU through their territory. Ukraine signed this treaty with the EU in 2007. Ukraine and the Russian Federation signed the treaty on readmission, which came into force in November 2008.\textsuperscript{734} According to the treaty, illegal migrants who came to Ukraine through the Ukrainian-Russian border must be brought to the Russian Federation and vice versa.


4.6.4. Culture

Cultural relations between Ukraine and Russia are under strong influence of existing political differences, contributing to Russia’s intense ideological pressure upon Ukraine rather than to adequate cultural interchange. At the same time, official relations between Ukraine and Russia in this field are formally sufficiently regulated.

Bilateral Agreements in Cultural Sphere

The first bilateral agreement concerning the cultural sphere was signed on March 25, 1994, between the Ministries of Culture of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In this document, the parties recognized the equal value of national cultures and respect for their originality, historical roots and traditional cultural ties between the two peoples and assumed obligations to promote them. This agreement maintained the basic principles of cooperation between two states in the cultural sphere, which would be reflected in all subsequent agreements signed on this matter. Thus, the parties agreed upon the following: to promote the cultural interchange and cooperation (Article 1), functioning of the existing and creation of new national and cultural centers and public organizations, aiming the full satisfaction of cultural demands of the Ukrainians – citizens of Russia and visa verse (Article 2). The states declared intentions to conduct the information exchange in order to elucidate cultural life of the both nations and joint scientific study of culture and art (Articles 7–10). The parties recognized the necessity to prevent the illegal removal of cultural values from their territories and mutual restitution of these values (it was envisaged to establish a bilateral commission on clarifying the principles of restitution, Article 11). The parties also agreed to conduct jointly international cultural fests and programs and finance them on mutual principles (Articles 16–17).735

The next agreement “On Cooperation in the Sphere of Culture, Science, and Education” was concluded on July 26, 1995, between governments of Ukraine and Russia.736 This document was based on the principles of the previous one. At the same time, it brought some novelty. For example, an emphasis was put on the promotion of the mutual access to libraries, archive and museum reserves (Article 1), distribution on their territories of printed matter published by the other party (Article 7), copyright protection (Article 8), creation and functioning of cultural centres of the other Party (Article 20), intensification of ties in the physical culture and sport, and support of all kinds of tourism on the territories of the both states (Articles 21–22). This agreement also envisaged the support of exchange programs (Article 24).

In 2006, another (and the last at the moment) agreement between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine and the Ministry of Culture and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation was concluded, but it didn’t contain any significant novelties (except the Article 6, which due to the revival of the cinema process in Russia, contained provisions to promote the mutual film production and international film festivals). Besides the bilateral agreements, Ukraine and Russia are, on international level, members of the Council for cultural cooperation of the CIS countries, established in 1996, but for the time being, this organization showed no evident activity.737

Activities of Russian Cultural Centres in Ukraine

The most obvious effect of the Russian soft power is demonstrated by the Russian cultural centers. Still, they are not only the sources of cultural influence, but also the matter of the permanent tension. The most known centers are located in Lviv and the Crimea.

The Russian cultural centre in Lviv, founded in 1990 under the Pushkin society, was the first establishment of this kind in the territory of Ukraine.738 Among the centre’s program goals, such statements as “the cultivation of Russian culture under conditions of language and national assimilation, discrimination, political pressure and reduction of Russian diaspora in Lviv” were declared. At the centre, several associations of fellow-countrymen, art studios, and historical clubs function and various congresses of Russian organizations are held, but the most vivid response in the society is provoked by attacks, periodical burnings and shattering of Pushkin’s bust. These incidents, that happen almost every year, are claimed by the RCC as “acts of vandalism and xenophobia” and provoke the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to criticize Ukraine for unfriendly treatment and disrespect for Russian diaspora and culture in general.739 It is worth to mention that investigation of these crimes still shows no results.

Another important Russian cultural centre was opened in Simferopol740 in 2001 by the Moscow–Crimea Foundation headed by Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of the Russian capital, and financed by the government of Moscow.741 Among the program aims of the organization are the preservation and development of Russian culture in the territory of the Crimea, strengthening the relations with Russia and assistance to peaceful international relations in the peninsula. Since the time of its establishment, it is worth not discussing the questions of cultural influence of the Russian centre. The centre’s program goals, such statements as “the cultivation of Russian culture under conditions of language and national assimilation, discrimination, political pressure and reduction of Russian diaspora in Lviv” were declared. At the centre, several associations of fellow-countrymen, art studios, and historical clubs function and various congresses of Russian organizations are held, but the most vivid response in the society is provoked by attacks, periodical burnings and shattering of Pushkin’s bust. These incidents, that happen almost every year, are claimed by the RCC as “acts of vandalism and xenophobia” and provoke the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to criticize Ukraine for unfriendly treatment and disrespect for Russian diaspora and culture in general.739 It is worth to mention that investigation of these crimes still shows no results.

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the centre conducted days of national cultures of minorities living in the Crimea, various concerts and art exhibitions of Crimean performers, artists and writers.

Still, besides the cultural events, the centre is engaged in Crimean inhabitants' ideological perception of themselves as Russians. For example, such actions as The Day of Russia, The Day of Moscow, The Day of the Reunion of the Crimea with Russia and so on are permanently conducted there.742 The Centre contributes to circulation of Russian textbooks in the Crimea. Every week the RCC TV Studio telecasts the Kuranty (chimes) program, which "acquaints peninsulans with the activity of the government of Moscow, Moscow-Crimea Foundation and condition of the Russian-Ukrainian cooperation". The Center supports actions for popularization of Russian flag among the local inhabitants. RCC branches are located in almost all biggest Crimean towns. As to other Russian cultural centers in Ukraine, their activities are not so marked because of the absence of political scandals around them and are oriented rather on cultural cooperation – studying of Russian history, language, culture and intensification of business cooperation with Russia.744 Now Russian cultural centres function in almost all big Ukrainian cities (strange as it may seem, but in Kyiv it was opened only in June 2009).745 In general, actions concerned with Russian culture are the most numerous among all international activities conducted in Ukraine. For example, since 2000, International Forums of Ukrainian Specialists in Russian Philology, The Days of Slavic Writing and Culture, and The Pushkin Days are held annually.746 In the Crimea, the annual international festival "The Great Russian Word" is conducted from the year of 2007.747 At the same time, the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of Nikolai Gogol in 2009 were held almost separately: Ukrainian and Russian celebrating programs had only the Gogol readings in common (in particular, conducted in Myrhorod).748 But those projects which could favour mutual understanding at least in question of Gogol's jubilee celebration, also raised the tension in bilateral relations.

Thus, the novel Taras Bulba screened for the anniversary in Russia, appeared to be too biased even from Russian critics' viewpoint. Words like Rus', "Orthodox faith", glorification of "the Russian Tsar" are met in the movie even more frequently than in the second version of the novel.748 Finally, the artistic value of this Russian film also appeared to be doubtful. In 2009, two other Gogol's screen versions are expected to be released – Viy (director Oleg Stepchenko) and Gogol. The nearest (director Natalya Bondarchuk). In the field of mass culture Russian movies have almost caught up with American ones according to box-office returns (near 30% Ukrainian movie theatres sales).

Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarch in Ukraine

The traditional role of the official Russian Orthodox Church as a political and cultural integrator of the Russians inside Russia and the pro-Russian forces outside Russia (first of all, in the post-Soviet countries) was drastically revived after the fall of the U.S.S.R., though even during the Soviet period, when the power of the Church was weakened, this role was evident. This revival took place during the Yeltsin rule, when the now-deceased Patriarch Alexiy II of Moscow used to emphasize that the Moscow Patriarchacy was the only structure that remained united after the fall of the Soviet Union.749 The active merging of the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy with the Russian governing elite became evident after Vladimir Putin's rise to the Presidency. During this period the highest-ranking Russian state officials openly began to take part in the unifying of the various orthodox structures under the Moscow Patriarchate. The example of it is the participation of President Putin in the process of reunion between the ROC and Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR).750 At the same time, both the highest Russian governmental officials and the exponents of ROC reject the attempts of the Ukrainian leaders to further the dialogue between the branches of divided Orthodoxy in Ukraine, to involve the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople as the conciliator.

Under the Putin's regime the Russian Orthodoxy began to mention as one of the factors of the Russian global might, along with the nuclear weapons and natural resources. In 1993 the highest hierarchs of the ROC were also among the leading founders of the World Russian People's Council (WRPC) – one of the leading social forums of the nowadays Russian Federation. This organization, which includes the ROC hierarchs, governmental officials, political activists, scientists and cultural figures not only from Russia and post-Soviet countries, but also from the entire world, is created for "forming the civil society in Russia, … discussing the problems of the

743 Without speculations about "forbible Ukrainisation or oppression of Russian minority". For example, see the aims declared by the Russian cultural centre in Rivne (founded in 2005).
746 In general, actions concerned with Russian culture are the most numerous among all international actions conducted in Ukraine. For example, since 2000, International Forums of Ukrainian Specialists in Russian Philology, The Days of Slavic Writing and Culture, and The Pushkin Days are held annually. Available at http://www.nia.rus.ru/culture_society/20090607/73519695.html. Last accessed on June 27, 2009.
749 In 2003 President Putin met personally Metropolitan Lavr (the now-deceased first hierarch of the ROCOR). In New York to invite him to Moscow on the consent of Alexiy II. Such coordinated actions of the ROC hierarchy and the highest state officials of Russia resulted in the reunion of the ROC and ROCOR on the May 17, 2007. Putin named this event "the essential condition of the unity of the Russian world". See Единение РПЦ - начало возрождения былой силы and so on. See: Единение РПЦ - начало возрождения былой силы – Книга, 2007 – с.61;
750 In 2003 President Putin met personally Metropolitan Lavr (the now-deceased first hierarch of the ROCOR). In New York to invite him to Moscow on the consent of Alexiy II. Such coordinated actions of the ROC hierarchy and the highest state officials of Russia resulted in the reunion of the ROC and ROCOR on the May 17, 2007. Putin named this event "the essential condition of the unity of the Russian world". See Единение РПЦ - начало возрождения былой силы and so on. See: Единение РПЦ - начало возрождения былой силы – Книга, 2007 – с.61;
good of Russia". The head of this organization is always the Patriarch of Moscow. During the Putin's rule (July 21, 2005) the WRPC was given the special consultative status in the United Nations and the Representative Office of the WRPC in the UN was created.

The Role of Orthodox Church in Ukraine in the View of the Russian Clerical and Political Elite

Since the rule of the Russian Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855) the role of the Kyiv and its Metropolitan See as the origins of Russia and Russian Orthodox Church started to be emphasized. This concept continues its existence also nowadays, and according to its modern interpretation, the loss of Ukraine and the autocephaly of its Orthodox Church may become the serious blow to the Russian material and moral power and, as the result, may put an end to Russia as the Empire. During his meeting with the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy on October 6, 2004 Vladimir Putin called the UOC-MP "The Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine". Such words actually ignore the autonomous status of UOC-MP. On May 24, 2009 Prime-minister of Russia Putin and his confessor archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov) visited the graves of White Guard leader Anton Denikin and such philosophers as Ivan Ilijin and Ivan Shmelev – the most zealous enemies of the Ukrainian independence in 1918–1921. Both Vladimir Putin and archimandrite Tikhon quoted the thoughts of Denikin and Ilijin about the "Impermissibleness even of a thought about the division of Russia and especially about the separation of Ukraine".

Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate: Structure, Influence, Views

Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine is represented by Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of Moscow Patriarchate) – UOC-MP, which consists of 44 eparchies and 11,444 communities. It is the largest Church of the Byzantine tradition in Ukraine. The other Churches of this tradition include just 8,842 communities (see table below: "The Traditional Religious Denominations of The Byzantine Tradition in Ukraine"). The UOC-MP is influential in all the regions of Ukraine, except Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk.

Table No. 7. The Traditional Religious Denominations of The Byzantine Tradition in Ukraine (January 1,2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Religious Institution</th>
<th>Number of Communities</th>
<th>Monasteries/monks and nuns</th>
<th>Number of Clerics</th>
<th>Number of Institutions/Students</th>
<th>Number of Periodicals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate</td>
<td>11444</td>
<td>177/4562</td>
<td>9275</td>
<td>19/4211</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchy</td>
<td>4093</td>
<td>45/130</td>
<td>2893</td>
<td>16/1128</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>7/195</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church</td>
<td>3566</td>
<td>106/1250</td>
<td>2303</td>
<td>15/1593</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UOC-MP has an autonomy which gives the UOC-MP right to form its own Synod and appoint bishops without formal approval of the Moscow Patriarch, who has only to approve the result of the election of the Metropolitan of Kyiv – the first hierarch of the UOC-MP. This status results in independence of some UOC-MP hierarchs from the Patriarch of Moscow.

Not the whole representatives of the UOC-MP identify themselves as pro-Russian advocates of administrative unity between ROC and UOC-MP. The leading promoter and spokesman for the autocephaly of the UOC-MP is Metropolitan Sophronius of Cherkasy. In 2005 he appealed to the bishops of the UOC-MP with the aim of recognition of the canonical autocephaly of the UOC-MP by Patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople. Metropolitan Sophronius considers the canonical autocephaly of the UOC-MP to be the only way to unite all the branches of divided Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Sophronius is also the outspoken critic of the political anathemizing on the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa by ROC, initiated by Tsar Peter I. Among the other supporters of the UOC-MP autocephaly, though not so outspoken as Metropolitan Sophronius, should be mentioned Metropolitan Nyphont of Lutsk and Bishop Alexander of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky, who are one of the closest advisers and assistants of the UOC-MP Primate. At the same time, Metropolitan Nyphont and Bishop

Alexander do not support any rapid and radical actions and movements towards the UOC-MP autocephaly, which could cause the new divisions within the Church, and do not support the reaching of the autocephaly in the nearest perspective if such divisions happen.

Among the supporters of the UOC-MP autocephaly should be also mentioned Fr. Petro Zuev, the Editor-in-chief of the theologian monthly “Synopsis” and one of the most able analytics within the UOC-MP clergy. Fr. Zuev argues that the autocephaly along with the Eucharistic unity of the Ecumenical Orthodox Church is the traditional form of the Orthodox unity and political independence, geographical location and unique cultural traditions make up sufficient reason for granting the UOC recognized autocephaly. The model, proposed by Fr. Zuev, is the establishment of the autocephalous UOC through the consensus of all the recognized autocephalous Orthodox Churches, which could be reached through the Conference of the canonical Orthodox Churches (became the mechanism of resolving the current problems of the Orthodox Church since 1923). Fr. Zuev argues that such mechanism could become the universal way of the autocephaly establishing, treating the schisms within Orthodoxy and also guaranteeing the all-Orthodox recognition of the UOC autocephaly.

But, according to Fr. Zuev, the main problem of organizing such a conference on the problems of Orthodoxy in Ukraine is the lack of unity on the question of autocephaly within UOC-MP.

The major problem of the consensus on the problem of the UOC-MP autocephaly is the inflexible position of its influential opponents, who are supported directly by the Patriarch of Moscow. The most outspoken opponent of the UOC autocephaly is Metropolitan Agathangel of Odessa – one of the most influential members of the UOC-MP Synod. The similar views on this problem also share Metropolitan Onuphrius of Chernivtsi (the member of the UOC-MP Synod), Metropolitan Hylarion of Donetsk, Archbishop Jonathan of Tulchin and Bishop Evlogius of Suny. It should be mentioned that Metropolitan Agathangel, Archbishop Jonathan, Bishop Evlogius are actively involved both in resolving the problems of Russian Church and in the activity of Russian and pro-Russian NGOs in Ukraine.

The above mentioned hierarchs are the frequent participants in the sessions of the WRPC along with such Ukrainian MPs as Yuri Boldyrev (Party of Regions) and Petro Symonenko (Communist Party). The example of the activity of these hierarchs was their behavior during the Conference of the UOC-MP bishops, which took place in January 2009 and was dedicated to the preparations for the ROC Council. Metropolitan Agathangel, Hylarion, Archbishop Jonathan firmly opposed the ideas of any dialogue with the unrecognized autocephalous Churches and of additional theological studies on the problems of divisions within the Ukrainian Orthodoxy proposed by the UOC-MP Primate Metropolitan Volodymyr of Kyiv. Their allies among clergy argued that the autonomy of the UOC-MP should be eliminated because it was gained due to the efforts of Pre-Primate of the UOC-MP Metropolitan Philaret, who later became the Patriarch of the unrecognized autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchy.

The representatives of the pro-Russian anti-autocephalous wing of the UOC-MP demonstrated hostility to any compromise not only with the believers of the autocephalous branches of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but also with the moderate representatives within UOC-MP. The periodicals and web-sites sponsored by pro-Russian wing within the UOC-MP do not accept not only the idea of the UOC-MP autocephaly, but also the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture and sceptical attitude towards the political independence of Ukraine. One of the most frequent contributors of these resources is the Chairman of the Moscow Division of the union of Orthodox Citizens Cyril Frolov – the journalist and political activist, who is greatly influenced by Patriarch Cyril of Moscow.

Metropolitan Volodymyr of Kyiv, the Primate of the UOC-MP, is the person, whose authority is strong enough to unite at this moment the different wings within the UOC-MP. During the years 2007–2009 his actions are characterized by restraining the influence of the pro-Russian wing within the UOC-MP and approval of the dialogue between the UOC-MP and autocephalous branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The examples of such actions are:

- the meeting between Metropolitan Volodymyr and Bishop Alexander (UOC-MP) with Archbishop Demetrios and Archimandrite Evstratius (UOC-KP) on December 20, 2007, which became the first publicly known sign of the tendencies towards dialogue between UOC-MP and UOC-KP;
- the condemnation by Metropolitan Volodymyr and the UOC-MP Council of Bishops in December, 2007 of organizations which represent so-called “Political Orthodoxy” and which stand for justification of pro-Russian, chauvinistic position on the issues of Orthodoxy;
- the evaluation of the Great Famine in Ukraine (1932–1933) as the genocide of the Ukrainian people by the UOC-MP Synod (November 11, 2008);
- the raising of the outspoken supporter of the idea of the UOC-MP autocephaly Archbishop Sophronius of Cherkasy to the rank of Metropolitan (September 24, 2008).

Such tendencies in Metropolitan’s actions can be explained by the growth of pro-autocephalistic tendencies in the UOC-MP after the Orange Revolution and by the personal influence of such advisers of the Metropolitan as Bishop Alexander. At the same time, Metropolitan Volodymyr stresses that there are no reason to change

the current status of the UOC-MP urgently and the question of the autocephalony of the Church can come to agenda only in the case of unanimity of the UOC-MP clergy and believers, and the returning of “schismatics” (UOC-KP, UAOC) into the UOC-MP. Such position is explained by the care about the unity within the UOC-MP, the inflexible position of the pro-Russian wing of the Church and the pressure of both the newly-elected Patriarch Cyril of Moscow and Russian political elite.

Within the UOC-KP there can be also seen the tendencies towards the readiness for the dialogue with the UOC-MP. But, according to the hierarchy of both UOC-KP and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the unity of the Orthodoxy in Ukraine can be achieved only in the case of gaining autocephalous status by the UOC-MP. Since the obtaining of the political independence of Ukraine, its authorities were always anxious about obtaining the autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This tendency did not change with the changes of Ukrainian presidents. The actions of the current President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko in this sphere are characterized by:

• public acknowledging his aim to help the establishment of united autocephalous UOC;
• equal respect towards all branches of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church;
• trying to involve all the autocephalous Orthodox Churches into the resolving of "Ukrainian Problem", first of all, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as the highest spiritual authority in Orthodoxy and the restraining factor to the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate.

The only success in these actions was the organizing of the visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to Kyiv in July 2008 during the celebration of the 1020 Jubilee of the baptism of Rus’. Such limited success can be explained first of all by the resistance of the Moscow Patriarchate and his threats to Constantinople if it takes part in resolving of the "Ukrainian Problem" without its consent (like in 1996 when jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Estonia was created).

The UOC-MP can not be called just the "ROC in Ukraine" because of the existence of the influential pro-autocephalous movement within it. The aim of these UOC-MP clerics coincides with the aim of the autocephalous branches of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but they try to reach it in evolutionary way with the guarantees of the universal recognition of the newly created autocephaly. Only the pro-Russian wing of the UOC-MP and its social organizations threatens to integrity of Ukrainian society. The tendencies towards autocephaly of the UOC-MP are not changing with the changes in government and remain quite stable.

4.6.5. Russian Policy in Education and Science in Ukraine

The Russian Federation has vast cooperation with Ukraine in the fields of education and science. The RF applies many efforts in developing the network of branches of Russian educational institutions in Ukraine. This allows to achieve several goals: to select the most talented students and bring them to live and work in RF; to educate Ukrainians as the supporters of Russian policy in different spheres; commercial interests also play important role – education becomes a profitable business in Ukraine and Russia. Cooperation in the science sphere is aimed not only to import technology, but also to support Russian industry and science, which were closely related to the scientific institutions of Ukraine in Soviet period.

The goal of RF in primary school education is rather simple – to widen the sphere of use of Russian language. The more Russian-speaking people in Ukraine, the more potential supporters of the “Russian World” idea and the addressers of the Russian mass media. That is why, the quantity of Russian-language schools and pupils who study in Russian in Ukraine is so important for RF. Important issue in education and science is the interpretation of history. Ukrainian historians have many divergences of views on history with official Russian science and Russian politicians. Refutations of the official Russian point of view can ruin the whole ideology of the ruling elite in Russian Federation. So in May 2009 president Medvedev formed a special Commission for counteraction to the attempts of the interpretations of history contrary to the interests of Russia (see below).

Agreements on Science and Education Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine

The basis for Russian-Ukrainian relations in any sphere is the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation which is in force for Ukrainian side from 1998. Article 12 deals with the rights of minorities in partner countries and guarantees, for example studying Russian language in Ukraine and Ukrainian language in Russia among other issues.762

The next important bilateral document is an Agreement between Government of Ukraine and Government of Russia regarding Cooperation in the Sphere of Culture, Science and Education signed in 1995. It states that both countries will promote cooperation between national Academies of Sciences, signing agreements between universities, student’s and teacher’s mobility, learning of history, language, culture of both countries. It was agreed that two neighbours recognize certificates about secondary education which give right to be admitted to university.763

From 1998 the Agreement between Government of Ukraine and Government of Russia on Scientific and Technical Cooperation is in force. It includes common scientific and technical projects, establishment of joint organizations, carrying out scientific work in research centres, participation of scientists in sem-
In primary education there is a lot of discussions from Russian side about support of schools in Russian language teaching. From 1996 to 2000 the quantity of such schools in Ukraine decreased from 2,940 till 2,399 and 2,1 million of children were studying there. Now in Ukraine there are approximately 1,119 state schools with Russian language teaching. 768 In 2002 an Agreement between Government of Ukraine and Government of Russia about Reciprocal Acceptance and Equivalence of Education Certificates and Academic Ranks was signed in 2000. According to it, school leave certificates from both countries are equivalent and give the same rights for further education in universities, institutes, colleges. The same concerns bachelor and master’s diplomas as well as certificates of associate professor and professor. 769 In 2002 an Agreement between Government of Ukraine and Government of Russia about Cooperation in the Sphere of Certification of Scientific Personnel was concluded. It restates the clauses of preceding agreement and gives right to specific government agencies to re-confirm the certificates given by other side. 767

There is specific Agreement between Ministries of education of Ukraine and Russia on Education’s Cooperation signed in 1998. It gives the right to citizens of both countries to be educated on the territory of other country, to establish classes or schools for language and ethnic minorities. Mentioned schools or classes should get the financing as other ones from state budget. 768

Ukraine also signed and ratified a number of agreements in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), for example an Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Education, an Agreement on Cooperation to Create Common Educational Space of C.I.S., an Agreement about Procedure of Establishment and Functioning Branches of universities in the C.I.S. Member States, Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Framework of C.I.S. 765

In 2005, Russian-Ukrainian Bilateral Commission was created. In its structure there is Committee on Humanitarian Cooperation headed by Ministers of education from both countries. Last time when they had meeting was 2007. There were discussions on increasing the students’ mobility, support to studying Russian language and literature in Ukraine and Ukrainian language and literature in Russia, developing contacts and exchange of researchers to conduct common projects, support and broadening branches of Russian and Ukrainian universities in both countries. 769

There is also specific cooperation agreement in nuclear power. 764

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were studying. Additionally, the course of Russian language is studied by 1.5 million of pupils (almost 50%). During last years 15 methodic programs for 1-4 classes with Russian language teaching were developed. The specialization in Russian language and literature exists in 31 of Ukrainian universities.772

Exams and Testing Issues

Since 2008 Ukrainians can apply to universities with the results of external independent testing in specific subjects. It looks like school leaving exams which give certain number of points. Based on the results, universities select future students. Ukrainian laws define that such testing is done only in state language which is Ukrainian. But for the years 2008-2009 authorities included exceptions that pupils can go through testing in the language of their studies except subject of Ukrainian language and literature. In 2008 23,5 thousands of pupils in Crimea registered to take part in testing. Among them 98 per cent got tests from different subjects in Russian language (in Crimea there are only 7 schools with Ukrainian language teaching).773

In 2008 Ivan Vakarchuk, Minister of Education and Science, signed a decree on improving studying Ukrainian language in schools where learning is in languages of national minorities for 2008-2011. It increases the quantity of hours for studying Ukrainian language in 2-4 classes in 1 hour per week and learning of some subjects will be both in language of national minority and Ukrainian language starting from the 5th class.774 However, in 2009 Sevastopol city council issued its own decision. It says that city schools should continue education process in Russian language. Also, city schools’ statutes should include the provision that teaching is conducted in Russian language. But according to Zhanna Slyusar, official from the Department of Education and Science of Sevastopol state administration, in Sevastopol there is only 1 school with the full cycle of education in Ukrainian which could provide education only for 3% of the pupils (while the number of those who would like to receive education in Ukrainian is twice higher). However, the Crimean parliament approved a decision to support education in Russian language. Among other things, it includes studying the possibility of increasing the number of hours for Russian language and literature in Crimean schools; all information in schools should be written in Russian; Crimean ministry of education needs to monitor studying of Russian literature and develop special course on it.775

According to sociological research 43,5% of Crimean inhabitants are happy with the education in native language and 41,2% think in other way. Among them 48,6% of Ukrainians say that their need of education in native language is satisfied and 39,6% say that it is not satisfied. Among Russians more people say that such need is not satisfied (45,2% vs. 36,7%). At the same time, this problem is not rated among the most actual ones. Only 15,5% Crimean inhabitants, including 14,3% Ukrainians and 16,6% Russians, rated the problem of impossibility to study in native language as important one.776

The comparison of Ukrainian policy on Russian minority and Russian policy on Ukrainian minority leads to the conclusion that the RF provides the policy of double standards when “defending the Russian language” in Ukraine. In 2009 the Association of Ukrainians in Russia conducted an investigation on the current status of Russian language education in Ukraine and Ukrainian language in Russian Federation.777 The table below presents the numbers as of May 2009.

Table No. 8. Satisfaction of educational needs of Russians in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russia (academic year 2008-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official number of ethnic Russians in Ukraine</td>
<td>8 334 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school institutions with the Russian language of education</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children in them</td>
<td>164 027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General comprehensive schools with Russian language of education</td>
<td>1 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total school pupils who study in Russian language</td>
<td>779 423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preschool institutions with the Russian language of education</td>
<td>1 755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils who study Russian language as a school subject</td>
<td>1 292 518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils who study Russian as an optional subject or in study groups</td>
<td>165 544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and technical educational institutions with the Russian language of training</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total pupils of the professional and technical educational institutions with Russian and Ukrainian languages of training</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total students of the high educational institutions of the I and II levels of accreditation who study in Russian</td>
<td>39 656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total students of the high educational institutions of the III and IV levels of accreditation who study in Russian</td>
<td>395 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbooks in Russian, printed at the expense of the state budget of Ukraine (copies)</td>
<td>1 555 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost (hryvnya = 7.3 USD)</td>
<td>18 616 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminological Ukrainian-Russian vocabularies printed at the expense of the state budget of Ukraine (copies)</td>
<td>125 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost (hryvnya = 7.3 USD)</td>
<td>1 500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of supply of the educational institutions with the Russian language of education, spent from the budgets of different levels in Ukraine (hryvnya = 7.5 USD)</td>
<td>3 195 634 300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.maidanua.org/static/mai/1241694784.html

This table shows that Russian Federation does not care about the language needs of the Ukrainian minority. In 2007 there were several Ukrainian language schools in Russia.779 All of them were closed down as we can see from the table.

Scientific Cooperation

Since 2002 in the structure of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia there was a special Centre on International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (Roszarubezhcentr). In 2008 president Medvedev issued a decree which abolished it and renamed existing “Federal Agency on C.I.S. Issues” to “Federal Agency on C.I.S. Issues, Patriots who Live Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation”. Altogether the quantity of hired people by Agency in Russia and abroad is approximately 1,3 thousand and its budget only for salaries is 22,8 million rubles. In education sphere, Federal agency supports scientific contacts between Russia and C.I.S. members, participates in organizing research events, promotes Russian universities, popularize Russian language.779

As to academic cooperation in 2003 National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund signed agreement on cooperation. In 2008 the delegation from the Fund visited Ukraine and met with officials from Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. They discussed the five years of cooperation, exchanged views on common research, publishing projects, organising conferences and expeditions. Special attention was paid to social and humanitarian sciences. It was agreed to finance 22 new common scientific projects and continue financing 13 other ones which started before. Ukrainian side emphasized the interest in further cooperation with Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund and was particularly interested in the process of organisation of scientific competition.780

Ukrainian State Fund on Fundamental Research has an agreement with its equivalent in Russia. They are committed to financially support seminars, conferences and research projects implemented by teams composed of Russian and Ukrainian scientists. For example, for study year 2009-2010 in one of the competitions they have chosen almost 100 projects with the financing 4.8 million UAH.781 Ukraine and Russia have lasting cooperation relationship in space sphere. There is a program of cooperation in the sphere of research and use of space for 2007-2011. It includes modernization of rockets, providing launching services, carrying out fundamental research in space.782

780 Визит делегации Российского гуманитарного научного фонда до НАН Украины
History Interpretations Issues

Russia considers humanitarian sphere as one of its priorities in international affairs. On May 19, 2009 president Medvedev issued a decree about Presidential Commission for Counteraction to the attempts of the interpretations of history contrary to the interests of Russia. It is managed by the head of President’s administration and includes representatives from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Security Service, Secret Service, Security Council, other ministries. Dmitry Medvedev constantly repeated that Russia will not accept falsification of history under any circumstances. For example, Russian authorities do not share Ukrainian point of view on the Great Famine in 1932-33 (Holodomor) and on Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Russian parliament prepared the draft law on counteraction to rehabilitation of Nazism and its accomplices on the territories of the former U.S.S.R. republics. Such actions will be treated as crimes for both Russian and foreign citizens. It supposes 3-5 years of imprisonment, Russia could expel ambassador and severe diplomatic relations.

Professional historians differently commented mentioned Commission. For example, director of Institute of General History of Russian Academy of Sciences Alexander Chubaryan thinks that Commission will analyze information from press and historical literature which tries "to minimize international prestige of Russia". It should coordinate activities of different authorities in this sphere. Such Commission is needed because "there are a lot of free interpretations of political events with regarding to the history of Russia which could misrepresent Russian image." Other historian Pavel Uvarov, researcher at Institute of General History, asks about the aim of the Commission and the way in which it will work. Andrei Zubov, professor of Institute of International Relations, prefers to talk about interpretation of history and not about falsification. He gave example of Viktor Suvorov who wrote about plans of Soviet Union to attack Germany in 1939. Researcher considers indicated above draft law as intervention in home affairs of other states, "like Estonia or Ukraine where there is different view on Second World War and understanding that not only Nazi criminals are horrible but also Communist ones."784

The tendency for forbidding the researches that can conflict with the state vision of history leads to depriving individuals the right of the freedom of speech and the rights for information. Creating the Commission is not only the internal affair of Russian Federation, but an attempt to interfere into the home affairs of the former U.S.S.R. countries. The projected law spreads its regulations on the territory of these countries (but not all the countries of the world – here we can see the borders of the influence that the Russian Federation would like to have). This action can cause the aggravation of the relations of these countries with the Russian Federation. But the Russian Federation is not going to counteract different vision of history in the countries (but not all the countries of the world – here we can see the borders of the influence that the Russian Federation would like to have). This action can cause the aggravation of the relations of these countries with the Russian Federation. But the Russian Federation is not going to counteract different vision of history in the countries of European Union; it is not going to counteract rehabilitation of militarism in 783

4.6.6. Russian Mass Media in Ukraine

According to data from a public opinion poll conducted by the Russian think tank the Levada-Center in January-February, 2009, 62% of Russians treat Ukraine negatively. At the same time, 91% of Ukrainians declared a positive attitude towards Russia. "Obviously, the reason for the sharp strengthening of anti-Ukrainian moods in Russian Federation in recent years is the informative campaign against our state which is permanently conducted by Russian mass media. It artificially creates a negative image of Ukraine in the minds of the great masses of Russians. Tendentious interpretation of historical events and preconceived coverage of the complicated attempts of Ukrainian society to estimate frankly and openly the past of Ukraine are especially destructive", said the Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, Kostiaynt Hryshchenko (it is worth stressing that he is close to the Party of Regions but defends the position of the Ukrainian state).785

Russian TV Stations in the Ukrainian Mass Media

The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine states that, in July of 2008, of the 45 foreign programs that it considers adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation and recommends for broadcasting on the Ukrainian cable networks, 37 programs were in Russian and only 8 programs were in Italian, English, French, or German.786

Such a significant amount of Russian TV channels in the media space of Ukraine causes some anxiety, especially if we take into consideration the public scandals surrounding a few leading Russian TV channels presented in the media market of Ukraine.

On November 1, 2008, a decision of the National Council obliged the providers of cable television in the country to withdraw channels unadapted to Ukrainian legislation from the list of broadcasted products. Four Russian TV channels — First Channel. World Net, Ren-TV, RTR-Planeta, and TVCI (an international version of TV-Center) — were included on the list of unadapted stations. The first vice-chairman of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, Ihor Kuchenko (it is worth stressing that he is close to the Party of Regions but defends the position of the Ukrainian state).785

reported violations from 6 more Russian TV stations: NTV-Mir, NST (Nastoyaschee Smeshnoe Televizienie), Russkiy illyuzii, RBK-TV, Nashe kino, and Comedy-TV.  

Russian high-level officials did not delay with a reaction. Before the decision of the National Council entered into force, on October 24, 2008, the Russian minister of communications and mass media, Igor Schegolev, called Kyiv to “stop the discrimination of Russian mass media in Ukraine”. According to his words, “after the aforementioned statements of the National Council, there is a hidden attempt to involve Russian TV channels and Ukrainian operators of cable television in a political conflict”.  

Commenting similar statements, the chairman of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, Vitaliy Shevchenko, said: “There is no civilized country that would admit broadcasting companies which ignore the norms of national legislation in the information space. We stress once again that our requirements to foreign stations are not connected either with the content of the programs or with a language. They are related to elementary implementation of norms of national legislation”.  

Ukraine addressed the competent institutions of the Russian Federation many times with requests to stop the provocations of the Russian channels in the Ukrainian mass media. For example, on May 16, 2008, the National Council sent a statement to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a request to appeal to the competent organs of the Russian Federation concerning the programs of Russian TV channels which touch the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The statement stressed that, on May 15, 2008, a discussion about the territorial status of the city of Sevastopol took place on the program Sudite sami (Judge yourselves), on the TV channel Pervy Kanal. Vsemirnaya set’ (First Channel. World Net), which is retransmitted by the biggest place on the program "Judge yourselves", on the TV channel Pervy Kanal.  

Ukrainian authorities are concerned about the scope of the active Russian presence in the Ukrainian information space, especially as the audience size for Russian TV channels in Ukraine is sufficiently considerable. According to data from the research company GfK Ukraine, in May of 2009 the average audience for such Russian TV stations as First Channel, World Net and NTV-Mir was 4.84% and 1.29%, respectively (7th and 12th place in the general ratings). Together this constitutes more than one million Ukrainian citizens. Certainly, when compared with the leaders of the domestic media space (Inter, 19.04%; TRK Ukraine, -9.7%; 1+1, 8.19%; ICTV, 7.64%; STB, 9.9%), Russian TV channels occupy a relatively small part of the Ukrainian media market.  

According to data from GfK Ukraine, in the first half of 2008 the percentages of audience of the First Channel, RTR-Planeta, and TV-Center was 2.23% (10th place in the general Ukrainian ratings), 0.76%, (16th), and 0.23% (27th), respectively.  

In 2009, the audience of the First Channel almost doubled in size. This can be explained by its "catching" the audiences of the TV channels RTR-planeta and TV-center, which were prohibited from being retransmitted in Ukraine, in November of 2008, and a new sharpening of the political crisis in Ukraine.  

But in general, the popularity of Russian TV channels in Ukraine has decreased in recent years. According to data from GfK Ukraine, in 2007 the Russian First Channel had 3.33% of Ukrainian audience (2.23% in 2008), RTR-Planet had 1.02% (0.76% in 2008), and NTV-Mir had 1.25% (0.94% in 2009).  

Though the percentage of audiences of Russian TV stations in Ukraine does not exceed 7% in total, it creates a threat to Ukrainian national security due to the aggressive informative policy of some Russian TV channels in relation to Ukraine and its citizens (see below: 4. Choice of Topics).  

**Russian Radio Broadcasting in Ukraine**  

According to data from the research company SIREX Marketing Service, in May of 2008 the following network radio stations in Ukraine had the largest audience: Nashe Radio (Ukraine), with 21.7% of listeners; Lux FM, with 20.6%; Russkoye Radio (Ukraine), with 15.3%; Hit FM (Ukraine), with 15.2%; and Melodiya, with 9.5%.  

The aforementioned networks have transferred wireless FM-stations in 30 or more cities in the various regions of Ukraine. These radio stations have the largest territorial coverage in Ukraine; in addition, they are presented in Kyiv city. The rating leaders (Nashe Radio and Lux FM) retain high positions not only due to the clear format of air time but also to the size of territorial coverage of the regions; they are presented in most of big cities of Ukraine.  

Most radio programs are conducted in Russian or in Russian/Ukrainian (in different correlations). The only exception is the news programs, which are conducted mainly in the official language. On July 21, 2006, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine signed a memorandum on collaboration with the representatives of radio companies, directed at the development of national information space. The memorandum was signed by the representatives of Europe Plus-Ukraine, Trust LTD. (Avtoradio), TRK Kiev News (Vzrosloye Radio), TRK Russkoye Radio-Ukraine, Nashe Radio, TRK Leader LTD. (Chanson), Ukrainian Radiogroup LTD (Renaissance), New wave (Sharmanka), Music-radio LTD., TRK Pilot Ukraine.
During the period of validity of the memorandum (1.5 years), TV and radio organizations were obliged to improve their material and technical base, to improve contractual bases on acquisition of television and radio products, and to reach the maximum implementation of the requirements of national legislation in the area of electronic mass media. After the period of validity of the memorandum expired, on January 2, 2008, the National Council carried out the monitoring of television and radio air time.795

However, not everything is so transparent in Ukrainian radio. On October 3, 2006, the National Council promulgated a report on retransmitting the programs of the Russian radio stations Lighthouse (Mayak) and Voice of Russia (Russian state radio broadcast company) in the territory of Crimea. The chairman of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, Vitalij Shevchenko, commented: "Radio Mayak was illegally translated on wire in Crimea for a few years. I think it is a unique case for any state when information networks of a foreign state [Russia – Aut.] are passed to transmitters that work without any control, without proper licensing and documentary ground. Another case is the radio in Crimea which, under the name Trance-M-Radio, broadcasts Voice of Russia in many Crimean cities, though it is forbidden by legislation.796

Several members of Ukrainian parliament began openly to defend the interests of Russian state radio broadcasts. Communist party member Leonid Grach, who by then (July 2007) held a position as head of the Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities, and International Relations, supported the actions of the initiative group of Crimean inhabitants to organize broadcasts of the wireless stations Mayak and Voice of Russia from the territory of Russia to the Crimea and eastern regions of Ukraine.797 However, broadcasting using very powerful radio stations can cause harmful obstructions, which is forbidden by a statute of the International Telecommunications union.800

On May 11, 2009, the programs of radio station Voice of Russia started to be broadcasted on the waves of radio station Era FM. The Voice of Russia prepares to occupy a part of the Ukrainian radio market. The first radio program was devoted to the "eternal" theme of Russian mass media: the possibility of fascism in Ukraine.801 Nevertheless, experts are confident that, in some cases, it is possible that the amount of Russian radio stations in the Ukrainian market will decrease. The launching in 2006 of NRJ—a French brand that belongs to the companies of the NRJ Group (one of the biggest radio corporations in Europe) — was the beginning of this process. 2006 also saw the purchase of the Ukrainian network Our Radio and Kiev TRK Dyvosvit (Radio Orange) by an Irish company, Communicorp Group Limited.802

Russian Printed Mass Media in Ukraine

In 2007, according to data from the Ukrainian Book Chamber, the annual circulation of books and brochures in Ukrainian was 32,606, or 56% of the general circulation, and the annual circulation of Russian books was 22,535, or 38.7%. As for newspapers, among the 3,966,113 in general circulation, Russian-language newspapers numbered 2,647,385, or 66.7%, and Ukrainian-language newspapers numbered only 1,141,877, or 28.7%.803

This proves that the Russian language dominates in the print media. The real issue is how to support Ukrainian language publications in the media market.

Choice of Topics

The huge amount of Russian-language mass media in the Ukrainian market does not mean that all of them follow the pro-Russian course. Many of them are simply "gutter press" that amuse people but do not give news. Others provide rather balanced information and support Ukrainian statehood and independent policy. However, there are also mass media outlets with a clearly pro-Russian orientation. One of their main topics is the issue that Ukraine should not join NATO. Today, as the chances for joining NATO in the short run are quite small, language issues started to become more and more important. Mass media in Crimea and some eastern regions of Ukraine support campaigning to promote the status of the Russian language to an official language or the second state language.

The third topic for pro-Russian mass media in Ukraine is to accuse different Ukrainian center-right parties of ultra-nationalism or even fascism. Such accusations are made especially on Victory Day (May 9) and day of the founding of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (October 14).

It is important to mention that attacks from pro-Russian mass media rise during elections and political crises. It is easier for pro-Russian forces to mobilize their supporters with pro-Russian slogans instead of by developing programs for serious socio-economic reforms.

797 Ibid.
5. COMPARISON

5.1. Russian Human Rights Practice

According to Russian policy functions of monitoring of human rights become stronger in the world. Russia therefore takes the view that it has to maintain an active position in protecting the rights of compatriots in neighboring States and protesting against what it perceives to constitute revisionism and falsification of history. Official policy determines that Russia has to increase its activity in international human rights, by involving its NGOs and parliamentary diplomacy. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends concentrating on the development of monitoring system of election processes and of human rights situation, both in Russia and in the EU States. Russia expresses its concerns about the status of national minorities in Latvia and Estonia with reference to responsibilities of EU. Russia recognizes the growing impact of the human rights vernacular in structuring international relations. To respond to increasing criticism on human rights and other issues, Russia employs the criticism of other States and organisations as a convenient form of response. In particular, Russia uses the human rights arguments relating to Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to respond to criticism by EU and other international organisations.

Human rights issues in context of other problems are means of the foreign policy. In context of multilateral diplomacy Russia declares that U.N. has a particular role, it must ensure equality in the world, Russia stands for human rights and liberty against “double standards policy” in U.N. Human Rights Council framework. On the one hand, Russia declares U.N. as an universal international organisation but, on the other hand, stands up for necessity of informal mechanisms in international policy. Regarding spots of conflict and crisis Russia’s views differ from international organisations, and it has consciously used the system to exclude or at least to limit the multilateral involvement in the disputes where it feels that its interests are directly affected, like regarding Georgia and Moldova.

Human rights language is used not only by Russia itself but also by politicians sympathetic to it in the neighbouring countries. It is fair to say though that the support for human rights is almost inevitably limited to a very particular angle of a particular dispute, with the systemic problems raised by Russia’s own conduct not being addressed.

Russia sees only two prerequisites for improvement of its relations with the Baltic States – transformation of home policy background in the Baltic States and their willingness to take into account interests and concerns of Russia. Protection of Russian compatriots in Latvia and Estonia is seen as a fundamental task.

As numerous international delegations have visited Estonia without finding any human rights violations, Russia’s oft-repeated mantra about the discrimination of Russian-speaking minority groups in the Baltic States no longer elicits a strong response from the international community.

However, accusations of rehabilitation of Nazism and persecution of anti-Fascists in Estonia have been more effective and convincing, which is why Russia has put these accusations at the forefront of its anti-Estonian campaign. Several events in Estonia can have contrasting interpretations based on different collective historical memories. In explaining its views on these issues, Estonia is at a disadvantage in comparison with Russia’s huge propaganda machine.

As a countermove, Estonia and other Eastern European countries have successfully raised the issue of rehabilitation of Stalinism in Russia at the level of several European decision-making bodies. The European Parliament decided to proclaim the anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as a day of remembrance for victims of totalitarian regimes. In a declaration adopted by the OSCE in Vilnius at the beginning of June, states were called upon to refrain from condoning both Stalinism and Nazism.

An overview of the recent Russian practice in human rights issues regarding Latvia permits a number of general observations. First, Professor Žiemele’s words from 2005 about the constant and far-reaching nature of Russian human rights objections ring just as true in 2009. The arguments are made constantly, in bilateral and multilateral forums, in Russia and abroad, and in both informal and formalized international settings. Second, the human rights and related arguments are of a particular nature: their form is sometimes more intemperate and ad hominem than one would expect in international discourse; they show a general (although not absolute) preference for non-binding forums; and they prefer a mixture of the more general argument about lawfulness of 1940-1991 and the narrower human rights recommendations, implying or expressly suggesting them to be two sides of the same normative coin.

The conclusions to be drawn for the formulation of future Latvian practice are linked to the nature of the Russian approach. To the extent that the Russian arguments are intemperate, the Latvian position should be exquisitely courteous, relying on authorities of unobjectionable integrity (respected courts and legal writers). In particular, it is questionable whether tu quoque is an appropriate framework for responding to human rights criticisms. To the extent that the Russian preference is for identifying the two disputes about the lawfulness of 1940-1991 and human rights of minorities, Latvia should draw a clear analytical distinction between these issues. State practice, the opinions of legal writers, and such documents as the ECtHR Ždanoka judgment and Diène’s report permit making a clear distinction between the general agreement about the unlawfulness of 1940-1991 and the conceptually separate issue of minority rights in 21st-century Latvia.

Finally, to the extent that Russia finds it more comfortable and efficient to advance its practice in the non-binding settings of multilateral negotiations and diplomacy, Latvia could consider the value of making a clearer preference for formalized and judicial dispute settlement. While it is not very likely that Russia would agree to settle any aspects of the disputes in a judicial or arbitral setting, a clear suggestion and offer to Russia to bring its claims to the ECtHR, the International Court of Justice, or another permanent or ad hoc body would emphasize the Latvian preference for clarity, predictability, and certainty, instead of the double-talk of diplomatic language.
A thorough analysis of Russian humanitarian policy in Lithuania reveals several important trends. First of all, although the protection of human rights of Russian speakers is not on the official agenda of Russian-Lithuanian relations and ethnic Russians in Lithuania consider themselves to be the least vulnerable to discrimination compared to other minorities in the European Union, Lithuania in the Russian public mind is still considered to be one of the countries where the rights of Russian speakers are violated the most. This is due to the fact that the Kremlin uses the human rights issue in the Baltic States as a contemporary Russian “whataboutism”. This “politechnological” strategy is not the concern of Latvia and Estonia only; it should be tackled by the collective effort of all post-Soviet countries as well as their partners in the European Union.

The broader framework for the Russian human rights practice may be traced back to the disagreement between Russia and Baltic States about the legal aspects of the de facto extinction of the Baltic States in 1940 due to their incorporation in the Soviet Union. Russia takes the view that the incorporation took place in accordance with the international law in force at the time, and that in any event it was recognised by the principle of inviolability of frontiers in the Helsinki Final Act. As a result, Russia considers that in 1990–1991 Baltic States gained independence as new States that were under a legal obligation to grant nationality to residents of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. The failure to do so Russia considers to be a principal problem in the bilateral relations, “linked to the imaginary interpretation by the Latvian authorities of the Latvian membership in the U.S.S.R. as “occupation”, and necessary to be addressed “at the bilateral and multilateral levels”.

Another aspect of formulating the substantive argument relates to the analytical clarity about what the particular dispute relates to. Russian practice in relation to minority protection in Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine and regarding the 2008 August war with Georgia tends to merge together different issues, in particular broader historical developments and human rights. For example, in the Latvian and Estonian context, a clear distinction should be drawn about the unlawfulness of the Soviet annexation — an issue where Russian position is one of a small minority — and the question about the scope and content of minority rights — where different views exist and there is scope for a reasonable and legitimate debate.

Russian human rights practice in Ukraine concerns mostly the sensible “prestige” point of the policy: the usage of the Russian language. There are no cases when the Russian state or even pro-Russian organizations have defended ethnic Russians or Russian citizens in Ukraine in local or international courts for violation of rights other than the use of language or related issues. The Russian government did not complain about the violation of such rights as the right to assemble, economic rights, the right to private property, etc., so there is no discrimination of Russians in these fields in Ukraine.

5.2. Russian Compatriots Policy

The Russian diaspora is one of the largest in the world: Russian specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimate that there are about 26 to 30 million Russians living outside modern Russia proper. Half of this population is based in the C.I.S. and the Baltic States. According to national censuses in the respective countries, there are more than 8 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine, around 4.5 million in Kazakhstan, almost 1.3 million in the Baltic States (646,000 in Latvia, 344,000 in Estonia and 220,000 in Lithuania) and more than 1 million in Belarus. An analysis of Russian Compatriots policy in each region reveals some differences. The real target of Compatriots policy is the so-called “near abroad”. Therefore, Russia potentially has a very large natural ally for its policies in the post-Soviet area.

The methods Russia has chosen for the implementation of its soft foreign policy do not contribute to the development of public diplomacy or to the improvement of the situation of Russian compatriots in host countries. Instead, the methods transform compatriots into a “fifth column” used by the Kremlin, opposing them to the democratically-elected authorities of their host countries. The aim of Russia’s efforts to consolidate the Russian-speaking community in Estonia is not to make them a part of Estonian society, but rather to push them outside society and to lead them into confrontation with it. This, in turn, does not make the image of Russia more attractive; it only increases tensions between nations.

Russian compatriots in Estonia have also raised serious criticisms of Russia’s compatriots policy, primarily because democratic decision-making procedures are not followed in the formation of representative bodies. However, as was stated by Dmitry Kondrashov, editor-in-chief of the journal Baltiyskiy mir, “Russia chooses its partners by itself”. Thus the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia is not a representative body, democratically elected by Russians living in Estonia. Rather, it is a project led by emissaries selected in Moscow.

Russia’s attention has mostly been concentrated on organizations that could be used to influence Estonian politics. The political community in Estonia as well as in Latvia continues to be ethnically split. In both countries, pro-Russian political parties have centered their key election promises on the introduction of bilingualism, the blanket citizenship option, and so-called equal rights.

With its ethnicity policy, Estonia has contributed to the creation of an identity vacuum among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia — a vacuum that Russia can now fill with its Compatriots policy. Non-Estonians have not been sufficiently involved in social life and political decision-making processes in Estonia. It is sad that Estonian politicians often contrast foreign and domestic political aims, finding it hard to differentiate between the political interests of Russia and the real needs of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

While Russia tries to use Russians living in Estonia as a tool for the implementa-
Estonian authorities have to admit that members of the Russian community in Estonia are social subjects, with whom cooperation and dialogue is needed. If Estonia were successful in implementing social integration policy, it would win the hearts and minds of the Russian community in Estonia. In that case, Estonian authorities would not have to fear Russia’s success in implementing the humanitarian dimension of its foreign policy by creating a fifth column in Estonia. Moreover, it is possible that the Russian-speaking community in Estonia will begin to support proactive forces and support the introduction of democratic reforms in Russia.

Russia has been active in exploring contacts with local communities in Latvia, including political parties and NGOs, and with international organizations for voicing its interests on behalf of Soviet-era settlers in Latvia. Russian policy makers support the efforts of some of Latvia’s Russian-speaking residents to repeal the educational reform, to proclaim the Russian language as a second state language in Latvia (or at least some official status for the Russian language), and to support the idea of a two-community state.

Russia has provided financial support for NGOs’ activities in Latvia. The sponsorship is rendered through grants from the Embassy of Russian Federation and Foundation Russkiy Mir. The law of Latvia does not allow the political parties receiving sponsorship from the foreign countries. Therefore, attention should be paid to the fact that there are NGOs in Latvia that have been funded from Russia and which are carrying out their activities with the participation of local politicians. Although formally the law is not violated, in point of fact the politicians are raising their political capital by the means of Russia’s money. In a small country like Latvia, that may influence also results of elections.

Russian foreign policy toward compatriots abroad can influence domestic policy processes in places where its target group (Russian-speakers) is not sufficiently integrated into the local country. In this way, a certain vulnerability on the part of state authorities is maintained toward possible Russian manipulation with its compatriots in Latvia and Estonia.

When analyzing the modern history of Baltic-Russian relations, one’s first impression is that, of the three Baltic States, Lithuania is the “luckier” Russian neighbor. In 1989, before re-establishing independence, Lithuania adopted a citizenship law that set forth an inclusive policy of granting citizenship — the so-called “zero option” — simply because it had significantly fewer Russians living in Lithuania as compared to the situation in Latvia or Estonia at the time. Moreover, a very liberal law on ethnic minorities was adopted in 1989, which guaranteed the right to an education in the national language.

Russian compatriots policy in Lithuania has not yet fully materialized. Lithuania does not have as many Russian speakers as Latvia or Estonia. Additionally, throughout the years Russian speakers in Lithuania have demonstrated a continued inability for political or civic mobilization. Russian compatriots organizations in Lithuania currently compete with one another for recognition and for financial support allocated under Russian humanitarian programs. However, the Kremlin has intensified its Compatriots policy in Lithuania: Russkiy Mir Foundation opened a center in Vilnius in May of 2009 and the House of Moscow is scheduled to be opened by the end of 2009. This social-organizational network is used primarily for the goals of Russian foreign policy and Russian identity politics, to implant the Russian version of the Soviet past.

The analysis confirms that Russia has a competitive advantage for its humanitarian policies in Lithuania, primarily because of the language competences in Lithuanian society: Russian is still the most popular foreign language in Lithuania. Moreover, a thorough evaluation of the Lithuanian media system demonstrates a significant penetration of Russian networks and media products (TV shows, series, programs, and films made in Russia) into the Lithuanian information environment. Finally, research shows that Russian and Polish ethnic minorities evaluate the Russian political system and regime more positively than the Lithuanian majority does. At the same time, the situation in Lithuania is not the same as in Latvia and Estonia. Different information environments — Russian and Lithuanian — still have some points of juncture. Russian-language secondary education is losing in competitiveness to Lithuanian schools. The gap between knowledge of the English and Russian languages is growing among the young generation.

The analysis of Russian Compatriots policy in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia shows that the agenda between Russia and the Baltic States is filled with the “politics of history”. Modern Russia uses compatriots organizations not just as a tool of political influence in the post-Soviet region, but also as a social network to implant its official version of history. In this way, it strengthens its own identity. At the same time, the analysis shows that Russian Compatriots policy faces serious problems in Lithuania: the Russian minority is constantly shrinking in size; it has chronic problems regarding political and civic mobilization; and local compatriots organizations compete for financial resources and recognition in the Russian diaspora in Lithuania. The way Russia abuses its humanitarian instruments could potentially produce paradoxical results; it could make Russians in Lithuania turn away from the Kremlin and become Lithuanian rather than Russian compatriots.

The organizations of Russian compatriots in Ukraine are very diverse in their activities. They are engaged in cultural projects and educational work, political activities, and radical protests. There are certain ideas supported and propagated by Russian compatriots organizations. For example, the idea of historical and cultural commonalities between the Russian and Ukranian people, including the denial of any differences between them. Another idea is the existence of a united Orthodox Eastern Slavic civilization, with a messianic role in the modern world. In order to spread these idea, Russian compatriots work closely with the Ukrainian Orthodox

805 According to the 1989 census, there were about 345,000 ethnic Russians living in Lithuania, accounting for 9.4 percent of its total population at the time. See the Lithuanian Department of Statistics: www.stat.gov.lt/en.
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Another issue propagated by Russian compatriots is the idea that Crimea belongs to Russia, and a rejection of the property and land claims of the Crimean Tatars.

Cooperation between compatriots organizations and the Russian Black Sea Navy plays a very important role in the Crimea. For the Russian government, foreign compatriots will remain a serious instrument of influence on Ukraine. They have become the main “fuses” of NATO membership and the main defenders of the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. The biggest problem here is that it will be very difficult to overcome instability using standard disciplinary methods. Even the arrests of ultra-radical members of the compatriots movement will be perceived as repressions. This, in turn, will cause even greater radicalization and increase their activity. Therefore, Ukrainian policy makers need to find flexible methods of soft power to downgrade tension in the Crimea.

The issue of Russian compatriots in Ukraine will apparently remain very important for a long time. Serious problems may be caused by an unclear interpretation of the notion of “Russian compatriots”. One more problematic factor is the construction of “Russian World” as a new unit of collective identity in the C.I.S. space. Another is the absence of the Ukrainian government’s programs for interaction with Russians in Ukraine. This question will influence Ukrainian domestic policy as well as relations with Russia at all levels of interaction.

In general, it is worth noting that, in the long run, the problem of radical Russian compatriots organizations will hamper bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine. It is important for Russian authorities to understand this, because the behavior of compatriots organizations depends on Russian Compatriots policy. The Russian diaspora and Russian compatriots are minor issues in Georgian society. The issue is most acute in the conflict zones (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and also because it has been politicized by Russia. The ethnic and lingual aspect of the issue is not the core of the problem.

Separatist sentiments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as in Transnistria) were caused not by “the division of the Russian people” but, rather, by other historical factors. In the case of Georgia, there is the paradox that, during the war in 2008, the Russian community was supporting Tbilisi rather than its “official compatriots” in South Ossetia or Abkhazia.

Moscow is expected to ratchet up its efforts in Georgia to create a footstool for its policy in the form of national minorities living in Georgia. For this purpose, the Kremlin will attempt to make the best use of the Georgian diaspora living in Russia, as it is completely subjected to the Russian ideological machine and political pressure from the Kremlin. Therefore, Georgia must make its best efforts to work with Georgians living in Russia and to direct its efforts primarily at overcoming current information barriers. It would be expedient to get state support for setting up Russian-language internet sites and forums to provide information support to Georgians living in Russia.

Looking at the use of the Russian language, its obvious that, alongside the Romanian (Moldovan) language, Russian is widely used in Moldova. Translation into Russian is even provided in the parliament. The Russian language is used in many spheres of social, cultural, and political life in Moldova. Russian is the dominant language in the breakaway region of Transnistria.

At present, the relationship between the two countries (Russia and Moldova) is considered good, and this is constantly reiterated by Moldovan and Russian leaders. Notwithstanding, Moscow continues to be the de facto support and main ally for the Tiraspol administration, which is assisted by Moscow in the form of humanitarian aid and pension supplements, as well as the political backing that, in the opinion of a number of experts, represents the core obstacle in unblocking negotiations on Transnistrian settlements.

The main objective of Russian Compatriots policy is to create and promote influential pro-Kremlin interest groups in all focus countries. These groups can be used in bilateral relations (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) or in multilateral relations (Latvia and Estonia) as a Russia-supporting actor. In the case of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Compatriots policy is directly related to separatism and Russian strategic interests there. Even in the military aggression against Georgia in 2008, compatriots’ interests played an important role in Russian informative policy. Another goal of Russian Compatriots policy is to lobby and promote its interests among national elites in Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Moldova.

Cases of target countries in this research show that Russian Compatriots policy has been implemented through Consultative Councils under auspices of Russian Embassies, Russian centers, Russkiy Mir Foundation network as well as Moscow Houses. The main actors of Russian human rights practice in Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were not the government of Russian Federation or its entities but some local politicians and civil society activists who acted in favor of Russian interests.

The set of utilized instruments is similar in all target countries in this study: support for specific NGOs; support for use of the Russian language; support for mass media; and appeals to the international community regarding supposed violations of compatriots’ rights (except Moldova). The Russian Orthodox Church is involved as far as possible. Separatism is promoted in Ukraine (Crimea), Georgia, and Moldova, and partly tied to the protection of compatriots.

It is obvious that Russia applies its Compatriots policy to all the target countries in this study. Implementation of Compatriots policy in a particular country depends on the number of ethnic Russians and so-called Russian speakers, their degree of integration in their country of residence. Regarding the compatriots’ rights violations, Russia is criticizing most intensively the countries whose foreign policy is oriented to integration in Western structures. Thereby, it is obvious that a target country’s foreign policy priorities are one of the main factors influencing the specific character of Russia’s compatriots policy towards the particular country.

Russia’s differentiated approach to support for compatriots in Central Asia, Belarus, and the target countries in this study indicates that Compatriots policy is an
instrument for achieving more foreign policy objectives that just a protection of the interests of compatriots residing abroad.

Russian homogenizes and simplifies the very concept of “compatriots’ interests”. For ethnic Russian, integration in their new country of residence would be in their own best interests, not separation and the creation of a new, mythic cross-border unity called Russkiy Mir.

5.3. Consular Issues

In 2008, Russian consular posts released information that about 1.5 million Russian citizens were temporarily or permanently living in foreign countries. Moreover, each year about 7 million Russian citizens travel abroad for tourism or short business trips and this number is constantly growing. According to official Russian sources, around 16,000 Russian citizens live in Lithuania 114,000 in Estonia and 28,0000 in Latvia, 200,000 in Moldova, 98,000 in Ukraine and about 200,000 in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

Humanitarian relations, including consular ones, are dependent and to some extent determined by political aspects of bilateral relations and overall political situation in both countries. The political relations and Kremlin attitude towards particular countries is more important factor as the numbers of Russian citizens or their social and economic benefits. Georgia is example where Russians promoted massive passportization in separatist regions for its own foreign policy goals. The Russian government has distributed 2.9 million Russian foreign passports to residents of the post-Soviet states, an action some view as interference in the affairs of these countries because there are few bilateral agreements on this and because Moscow has invoked the presence of its citizens there as a reason for Russian involvement. This has been case in Georgia and Moldova and Ukraine (Crimea). So passportization of people in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as consular issue has been used to promote separatism and pro-Russian interest groups.

In context of all six countries Moldova is intersting case. Within the spectrum of bilateral ties between Moldova and Russia consular relations belong to the category of relations that cannot be characterized as „univocal” ones. On the one side, no visa regime exist between the two countries, annual consultations with a view to improve cooperation in this area are carried out between the related ministries of these countries; on the other side, several times Russian Federation ignored the proposals of the Moldovan side when the former considered that „it acts to protect its own citizens”. We can see granting of Russian citizenship to the Russians residing on the territory of Moldova, including people living in Transnistria, which de facto represents an impediment in unblocking the political process.

Pensions, in particular allocation of an extra amount of 15 USD for the retired people from Transnistria, which represents an additional tool to increase Russian influence in this region, especially taking into account that namely this target group make an important electorate core here. The difficulties in obtaining the citizenship of Russia result from changes in the attitude and relations of Chisinau towards Moscow. Likewise in other areas of cooperation between Russia and Moldova, as long as Moldovan authorities keep promoting a loyal policy towards Russia, then the latter does not intensify its support of Tiraspol leaders. For instance, although it belongs to the same group as South Osetia and Abkhazia, independence of Transnistria has not been recognized yet.

As we have mentioned above, the same refers to the issue of granting Russian citizenship to Transnistrians who often complain that they have an exclusive pro-Russian orientation similar to that of the separatist regions from Georgia, but attitude towards them is nevertheless different. Moldova has tried to improve its relations with Russia. In this context, Moldova tried to avoid any conflicts with Russia in order to gain its support in settling the Transnistrian conflict. Regardless of all these efforts, Moscow continues to promote its policy on granting Russian citizenship and pensions to people living in Transnistria. These actions contribute to fostering the administration from Tiraspol and implicitly enhancing Russia’s influence on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova.

Ukrainian case differs from Moldova and Georgia because its legislation does not accept double citizenship. Therefore, the number of Russian citizens is lower than in Moldova and Georgia. It is important that about 25% of all Russian citizens in Ukraine live in Crimea which is another subject of Russian interest. Crimea like other separatist territories in Moldova and Georgia has been target for Russian passportization policy.

According to International Organization of Migration, Russia is a second country in the world regarding the number of international migrants. It hosts 13,3 millions of migrants, that is 7,6% of world migrant stock. Most of immigrants in Russia come from the C.I.S. countries. So Russain consular issues are related with Georgian, Molodavian as well as Ukrainian citizens living ad working in Russia. Russian and Georgian bilateral relations had direct impact on Georgian community in Russia (deportations, discrimination). At the same time challenges or difficulties faced also by Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens who are currently working on the territory of Russian Federation.

The case of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia from consular policy point of view is different from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. As members of the EU and Schengen area Baltic States have multilateral context of consular issues regarding Russia. Since December 2007, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to the Schengen area. Citizens of non-Schengen countries and stateless persons, who have a residence permit in a Schengen country, do not need a visa for entering the Schengen area. So, at the moment, those who have a Russian or an alien’s passport in Estonia or Latvia can enjoy visa-free travel to both the EU and Russia. All three Baltic States like Ukraine do not accept double citizenship.

Complaints about the alleged mistreatment of Russians have been a permanent feature in Russia’s arsenal of rhetoric against former Soviet republics that have taken a pro-Western stance. Latvia and Estonia, which did not automatically grant the Soviet-era immigrants citizenship, have been the object of the fiercest criticism, al-
though their citizenship policies and practices have passed the scrutiny of all relevant Western organisations. In addition to wounded pride, Moscow’s real problem with Latvia and Estonia (but also Lithuania) is their legal concept of restored statehood and everything this brings along: citizenship laws as well as (by now abandoned) calls to return to pre-war borders; concepts of history that are increasingly at odds with those of Russia and calls for compensation for occupation. Russia’s aim is to treat all post-Soviet countries as new countries that became independent in 1991. Thus it has become almost obligatory for Russia to bring up the status of Russians in Estonia and Latvia – and it does not agree with the causes and implications of that status.

Interest in obtaining Estonian and Latvian citizenship grew after accession of these countries to the European Union. Unfortunately, when the EU granted the right for visa-free travel to permanent residents (an alien’s passport given to non-citizens is recognised by the EU as valid for visa-free travel according to Regulation 1932/2006/EC), this interest dwindled again. In 2007, Russia allowed its compatriots living in Estonia and Latvia to enter Russia without a visa (by a Russian Presidential Decree, dated June 17, 2007), which decreased the interest to determine one’s citizenship even further.

Russian citizens in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia basically have the same social, economic and political rights. It is important that owners of Russian foreign passports in separatist territories of Moldova and Georgia have only travel benefits. According to the Russian citizenship policy their status in Russia is very limited. So Russian official interest to support Russian citizens by any means is just part of political rhetoric with different foreign policy or even military context. Russian citizens in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are active in political processes. They actively participate in elections of State Duma or President. Usually in all six countries the majority (about 70%) vote for parties and candidates supported by Kremlin.

In context of Russian consular issues there is idea about Russian “compatriot card”. In April of 2008 Russia’s Federal assembly had been given in an introduction of a bill by Foundation Russkii Mir, which was based on year 1999 federal law "About governmental policy of Federation of Russia according to compatriots in foreign states". According to this bill ”Russian compatriot" includes such groups:

Persons, who constantly lives abroad Federation of Russia;
Persons, who do not have citizenship of Federation of Russia, but are historically relevant to Russia;
Persons, who has ethnic, cultural, lingual and mental ties with Russia;
Persons, who are trying to maintain their Russian individuality;
Persons, who feels like to keep in contact and cooperate with Russia.

This kind of definition of “compatriot” is so wide, that it allows becoming a “compatriot” very spacious range of persons. One of groups, who expresses radical attitude about question of define compatriots, insists on a point of view, that compatriots should be those persons, who are citizen of Russia, but they are living abroad for a long time. In preamble of the draft law, that is available on the official site of Russkie Foundation, it was justified because of 1) systemic limitation of the Russian people rights by newly formed independent states using forced assimilation and other forms of discrimination, and 2) decreasing population in Russia. The compatriot cards were declared as geopolitical means. The draft law also suggested the compatriot card would have been showed the belonging to Russian nation, Russian civilization, “Russian World”. A card holder have the right to visit Russia without visa (depends on intergovernmental agreements), to work in Russia without getting work permit, to gain the education on equal rights with Russian citizens, to receive benefit for second, third and fourth child born in the family, to receive the ”energy allowance” for salary or pension, if the price for energy services is higher than in Russia.

The issue that exacerbates the situation upon the issue of Russian compatriots identification card is the events of August 2008 upon invasion of Russian troops in Georgia, taking into consideration the presence of the owners of Russian foreign passport. Probably, described controversial points of the draft law and some financial costs (like the energy allowance for salary or pension, if the price for energy services is higher than in Russia) are the reasons, why this draft has not been still adopted.

5.4. Culture and Education

Culture and education are spheres of the “humanitarian dimension” of Russia’s foreign policy trough which Russia attempts to implement its soft power capabilities. These capabilities include presence of Russian language and culture in target countries as well as frameworks of formal cooperation between countries that allows promoting culture and education.

When comparing formal frameworks of cooperation between the countries in field of culture, we can find governmental agreements in all the target countries. Ukraine has rather developed official framework of cooperation with Russia – two of the important agreements were signed already at the mid-1990’s. Contents of the agreements include not only formal awareness of cultural heritage, but also specific issues of access to libraries and archives as well as cooperation in movie production. An issue of film co-production is also stated by the protocol of intension in case of Estonia. Agreements of cooperation with Georgia and Latvia include mostly exchange of cultural activities between the parties. Agreements of cooperation in sphere of culture on level of municipalities are regarded as an important part of the overall framework of cooperation in case of Latvia. There are also agreements between Russia and Lithuania in field of Culture, but these are not regarded as an important basis for promotion of Russia’s culture.

There is a wide presence of Russian cultural activities in almost all the target countries. Russian culture is most popular in Moldova where its manifestations are significant in both – “high” and popular culture. What is specific about situation in Moldova – feeling of a Soviet nostalgia is actively promoted there – by major [Communist] party. In Ukraine, Russian culture is mostly promoted trough Russian cultural centres and popular culture of film industry. It should also be noted, that cultural centres are located in areas where there is a largest number of Russia’s
“compatriots” and act openly on promoting Russian identity for them – for example: trough The Day of the Reunion of the Crimea with Russia or popularization of Russian flag. There are also Russian cultural centres in Latvia which are active in promoting Russia’s “high culture” and traditional culture. At the same time, Russian culture in Latvia is most spread by movies, TV shows and performances and music or “popular culture” that embraces both “soviet nostalgia” and new cultural artefacts. Such manifestations of Russian popular culture as music festival The “New Wave” and “Continental hockey league” are specific examples to mention in this context. Russian “high culture” and traditional culture is mostly promoted in Estonia where exhibitions, theatre performances and folk festivals are carried out constantly. Although in a lesser extent than in case of popular culture in Latvia and “high culture” in Estonia, Russian cultural activities are notable in Lithuania also. Keeping recent events between Russia in Georgia in mind, it should not be regarded as a surprise, that presence of Russian culture in Georgia is weaker than in other target countries – events are rare and mostly related to the traditions of “high culture”.

Majority of the populations in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are Orthodox Christians with strong tradition of relations with Russian Orthodox Church. Although, branches of the Orthodox Church in all three countries have tried to gain certain independence from Moscow; only Georgian branch has more of autonomy, because of the political tensions among countries. Orthodox Church in Ukraine is divided in three branches thus possessing certain autonomy from Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy still remains the largest branch of Orthodoxy. There is also a significant political support for united and autonomous Orthodox Church in Ukraine, but these aspirations are not fulfilled yet. Strongest presence of Russia in case of the Orthodox Church is obvious in Moldova, were autonomy of a church lack political support of a ruling political forces. When viewing the situation in Baltic States, presence of Russian Orthodox Church is most significant in case of Latvia where Orthodoxy is 3rd largest faith and Orthodox Church is also under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow. In case of Estonia, it is possible to describe the Orthodox Church as an emerging asset of Russian Orthodoxy where most of the believers are “Russian-speaking” population and infrastructure of a church is still under construction. Lithuania shares smallest proportion of Orthodox believers from all the target countries and the role of Orthodox Church is rather insignificant for promoting Russia's culture.

Common past of the Soviet Union has left a good knowledge of Russian language as a legacy in all the target countries. In Ukraine Russian is well-known also because of the common roots of Eastern-Slavic language group. Presence of Russian language in Moldova is evidentiary also when viewing spread of Russian culture and traditions of a Soviet past as well as in education. In Georgia, there are around 10 times more people knowing Russian than English. Also Russian is introduced as a Language of Public and Other Institutions in Abkhazia and declared status of an official language in South Ossetia. In absence of other significant artefacts of Russian culture, Russian language is regarded as major element of Russia's soft power in Lithuania. This argument is also supported when comparing the proportion of “Russian-speaking” population and knowledge of Russian language among Baltic States – knowledge of Russian language is highest in Lithuania among Baltic States for those whose native language is not Russian. Russian language in Lithuania thus represents an expression of soft power. Russian is also the most popular language in Latvia where even more of an overall population knows Russian than Latvian language. In general, situation with Russian language is similar in Baltic States where younger generation of students learn less Russian language in schools and the overall number of those knowing the language is decreasing.

History is a topical issue regarding Baltic States and Ukraine. In case of all three countries, Russia's interpretation and promotion of its version of history is related mainly to the events before and after 2nd World War. Russia's rhetoric's about perception of historical events in Latvia and Estonia is most harsh among Baltic States and has brought political tensions in relations between Russia and these countries. In case of Moldova, Russia is proposing a historical course where it is presented as a close ally with Moldova, while “erasing” Moldova's historical relations with Romania from the textbooks of history for “Russian schools” in Moldova.

Russia also displays most significant presence on matters of education in Moldova among other target countries. Proportion of “Russian schools” is large and teaching in these schools is carried out in Russian language and by textbooks in Russian. Russia's influence is obvious not only because of teaching in Russian, but also concerning contents of an education programs in these schools. Presence of Russian influence is also obvious when viewing situation with Higher education in Moldova – there is an option to enrol in groups where teaching is done exclusively in Russian regardless of the university or specialty. Also one of the larger higher education institutions in Moldova has courses only in the Russian language. Also in case of Transnistria all studies, de facto, are done in the Russian language, despite the “official” recognition of three languages in a region.

Russia has vast cooperation with Ukraine in the fields of education and science that is also strengthened by bilateral agreements and agreements within framework of C.I.S. Russia applies many efforts in developing the network of branches of Russian educational institutions in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian-Russian cooperation in the field seems one-sided and favouring Russia, because activities to develop minority education of ethnic Ukrainians in Russia are disproportional in comparison to the same actions in Ukraine. In field of higher education Russia's activities have been reduced, because several higher education institutions were previously acting under licenses of Russian Ministry of education and not by jurisdiction of Ukrainian institutions. Russia is also active at providing grants for students to gain higher education in Russia.

There are no governmental agreements between Latvia and Russia in sphere of education despite political tension on issue. These tensions are related to the reform of “Russian schools” in Latvia that prescribe to increase the percentage of instruction in Latvian language in state-funded secondary education. In case of higher education,
there are some private higher education institutions teaching in Russian. Education in Russian language as well as grants for studying in Russia are directed primarily on the “compatriots” living in Latvia.

Agreements on education between Russia and Estonia were signet at the mid-1990s, but at the 2004 agreement on Higher education was terminated. Thus, cooperation in field of education has been slowed down by the overall political context between countries. Estonia has chosen more gradual approach of reforming “Russian schools” than in the case of Latvia, thus causing less obvious dissatisfaction within “Russian-speaking” population within country. Situation is similar to Latvia concerning higher education where private higher education institutions are providing education in Russian and study grants are offered to study in Russia.

There are also Russian and Georgian-Russian schools in Georgia. Specific issue is related to teaching within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia where students are taught by the curriculum and guidebooks approved by the Ministry of Education of Russian Federation. There are only two private education institutions, teaching in Russian and due to conflict between the countries number of Georgian students studying in Russia is small.

With smaller number of “Russian-speaking” population, there are also less tensions concerning general education in Russian language in Lithuania then in other Baltic States. It should be noted that government of Lithuania plans a reform of minority schools towards bilingual education. Also Russian institutions of higher education were closed when the Lithuanian authorities intervened and publicly stated that they were not certified to grant university diplomas in Lithuania.

5.5. Russian Mass Media

The Russian Federation's national security strategy up to the year 2020, adopted in May of 2008, makes repeated mention of television, state-commissioned film production, and “patriotic education” as a part of national security. The same document talks about the need to integrate the activities of non-profit associations, media enterprises, and the cultural sphere, along with actions by Russian authorities, into a single package of measures for promoting Russia’s security interests both domestically and in the near abroad.

Subsequent to the restoration of Baltic independence, the availability of Russian newspapers and magazines fell sharply and Baltic Russians became significantly less interested in them. Compared to Estonian and Latvian readers, the Russian-speaking population has significantly fewer readers of newspapers and magazines. However, in the sphere of printed media, as in television and radio, there is an obvious tendency to develop projects for cooperation between the Russian media and Russian-language media companies in the Baltic countries.

Russian television channels became much more important for the Russian-speaking segment of the population. However, Russian-language audiences lie predominantly in the sphere of influence of television stations originating in Russia. The First Baltic Channel is the leader in broadcasting national news in each of the Baltic States; it operates on the basis of the First Russia Channel. The Russian-speaking minority trusts the station more than it does the national media of its respective country, particularly in situations when Russia’s interests are impacted.

The situation in Lithuania is different from the situation in Latvia or Estonia, which have two different media environments. In Lithuania, the Russian and Lithuanian media each has its own audience, but these audiences show an interest in the opposing media environment as well. It would be easier to achieve this scenario in Latvia, because of the Indo-European relationship between the Latvian and Russian languages, than it would in Estonia, where the Finno-Ugrian Estonian language has a completely different structure.

At the same time, the proportion of Russia's audio-visual products (talk shows, films, etc.) on Lithuanian and Latvian private televisions is obviously growing.

In all three Baltic countries, two clear leaders have emerged among the radio stations that broadcast to Russian-language audiences: public radio, especially Radio 4, in Estonia, and Latvijas Radio 4, in Latvia; and the Russian national music station Russkoje radio, which operates internationally.

Regular surveys of internet use conducted by TNS Emor and TNS Latvia are certainly not representative when it comes to Russian-language audiences, as they encompass only sites in Estonia and Latvia, respectively. A very large part of the Russian-language population uses Russian-language sites, such as gareta.ru, which receives very high visitor traffic.

Different information spheres lead to a different view of the world—not only in regards to historical interpretation but also in fields related to the perception of risks and security. For instance, in the case of Estonian/Latvian/Western and Russian media channels, the diametrically opposed coverage of the August, 2008, war between Russia and Georgia automatically became a potentially divisive topic domestically in Estonia and Latvia, without necessitating any specific official Russian propaganda operations aimed at Estonia and Latvia.

A key channel in shaping the views of Russians living in the Baltic States is the magazine Baltiskiy mir, published with the support of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for Russians Abroad. It is distributed free of charge in the three Baltic States through diplomatic consulates and Russian community organizations, and can also be downloaded on the internet.

The aggressive informative policy of Russian television channels against Ukraine — against the “Eastern Slavic brothers” — is very significant. This indicates that Moscow successfully directs the content of television channels for


purely political purposes. Therefore it is quite logical that, according to a November 2008, decision by the Ukrainian National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council, four Russian TV channels — First Channel, World Net, Ren TV, RTR Planeta and TVCII (an international version of TV Center) — were on the list of unadapted stations. Retransmitting of the First Channel was temporally settled, as the station declared its intention to legalize its activities in Ukraine. During recent years, the popularity of Russian TV channels in Ukraine has decreased, and the percentage of people who watch Russian TV stations in Ukraine does not exceed 7% of total television audiences.

However, most radio programs in Ukraine are conducted in Russian or in Russian/Ukrainian (in different correlations), and the leaders again include such Russian pop music stations as Russkoje radio. As to newspapers, in 2007 Russian-language newspapers constituted 66.7% of the general circulation, and Ukrainian-language newspapers made up only 28.7%.

Illegal retransmitting of programs from Russian radio stations Lighthouse (Majak) and Voice of Russia (Russian state radio company) in the territory of Crimea is of a particularly specific character. Today, as the chances for joining NATO in the short run are quite low, language issues have become more and more important. Mass media in Crimea and some eastern regions of Ukraine support a campaign to promote the status of the Russian language to the official state language or the second official state language.

Similar to previous situations in the Baltic countries, pro-Russian mass media in Ukraine accuse various Ukrainian center-right parties of ultra-nationalism or even “fascism”. Just the same, it is important to mention that attacks from pro-Russian mass media rise during elections and political crises, and the main target audience of this influence is ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers.

On May 11, 2009, Voice of Russia radio programs began to be broadcast on Era FM, as Voice of Russia prepared to occupy a part of the Ukrainian radio market. The influence of Russian broadcasters has been restricted by Western investments entering the Ukrainian radio market over the last few years.

Nowadays, Russian TV channels within the territory of Georgia (other than in the conflict zones) can be broadcasted only by private commercial channels. No Russian radio is retranslated. Russian newspapers and periodicals come to Georgia in low, almost insignificant quantities. Therefore, the influence of the Russian media in Georgia can be considered very slight. But the situation in the breakaway regions of Georgia — South Ossetia and Abkhazia — is radically different.

In October of 2008, the Georgian Telecommunications Regulation Commission fined Russian TV companies such as Pervyi kanal and Vesti FM for broadcasting within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A special license is required to broadcast within the territory of Georgia, particularly within the occupied territories. The Russian channels held no such license. At present, such channels as Rossia, Pervyi kanal, NTV, Kul‘tura, STS, and others are freely broadcast across the entire territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addition, the local media territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is under the complete influence of Russia. The local population only gets information acceptable by Moscow. In both separatist regions, the number of Russian media is growing and the number of local media in the local language is decreasing.

In Moldova, Russian TV programs are the most watched by Moldovan audiences, having surpassed the Romanian and local, i.e., Moldovan programs. In the minds of Moldovans, Russia has replaced Ukraine as the closest neighbor of Moldova. For many of these people, the information news program Vremja (Time), broadcast by First Channel at 8 p.m. local time, represents a window through which they see and understand what happens worldwide; the TV program Messager, broadcast by the Public Television Station at 9 p.m., represents a type of local news through which people are informed about life in Moldova. First Channel enjoys the highest popularity and credibility in the Republic of Moldova.

On the left bank of the Dniester river, i.e., in Transnistria, the popularity and influence of the Russian mass media is even higher than on its right bank. This is because, first, the population residing on the left bank mainly consists of Russian speakers, and, second, the regime in Tiraspol was constantly supported by Russia, including through the media.

The attitude of the Russian media toward Moldova depends greatly on the political ties between the two states, and the attitude of a single news course can change in light of these relations. The events of April 7, 2009, when major protests took place in Chisinau, represent the last example of this situation. The Russian media classified these events as vandalism planned by foreign secret services. As a rule, Russian TV channels do not feature much news dedicated to Moldova, but if an important event does occur, the channels report it in a way that is favorable for the Kremlin or Moscow-supported forces.

Similar importance is held by Russkoje radio and other Russian pop music stations; Russian television channel STS, an entertainment station highly popular among teenagers and youth in Moldova; and the channel with the symbolic title Nostal’gia, targeted at middle-aged and elderly people who used to live in the U.S.S.R. and often feel nostalgic about the past. In addition, one of the highest selling newspapers in Moldova is Komsomol’ska Pravda, a popular Russian newspaper.
CONCLUSIONS

“Compatriots in all the „near abroad“ unite!” has replaced the Soviet period political slogan „Workers of all the world unite!“ in Russian foreign policy ... at least regarding foreign policy towards countries in Russia’s „near abroad“. Such slogan seems to be the best way to describe Russia’s new policy approach in its neighbouring countries and substantial part of its overall aspiration of “great power”. Some may still draw parallels with Soviet politics regarding development of Russia’s foreign policy and worldview, but in fact it represents less of a dogmatic ideological struggle and more of the logics of “power politics”. Thus, Russia’s quest for power should not be regarded just as a historical relic of regaining Soviet position, but as aspirations towards new [important] role in a globalized world.

As it was noted in a conceptual part of this study, Russia’s contemporary foreign policy has two major directions:

- to become a “global power” by means of growing Russia’s own capabilities and changing the structure of international system [towards multi-polarity];
- to preserve Russia’s role in “zone of exclusive interest” (post-Soviet area or “near abroad”) by means of both – hard and soft strategies.

Both of these directions are closely related and none can be carried out without certain results in other. This research is an attempt to take a closer look at the “soft” strategies of Russia towards particular countries of it’s “near abroad”. This soft approach is named “humanitarian trend” and compiles actions of the “humanitarian dimension” of Russia’s foreign policy.

Simply defined, “humanitarian trend” is a sum of different political and administrative resources, instruments and approaches of Russia’s foreign policy designed to influence particular target countries, groups within target countries and/ or international society for the purpose to “legitimize” or gain political support for Russia’s foreign policy objectives. “Humanitarian dimension” has developed gradually and has gone further than just a particular elements embraced in a foreign policy actions. “Humanitarian trend” is a separate dimension of Russia’s foreign policy, that combines some of the traditional elements of Russia’s of Russia’s non-military and non-economic actions in its “near abroad”, while displaying significant shift in Russia’s foreign policy with new approaches of soft power.

Although we draw a connection between the two concepts, “humanitarian dimension” is not viewed only as a manifestation of a soft power, because, as noted in a conceptual part of this study, there are similarities as well as differences between the two. At the same time, soft power is the closest theoretical framework to explain the rationale behind “humanitarian dimension” and Russian officials also recall on soft power when talking about “humanitarian dimension”. “Humanitarian dimension” includes issues and features that directly comply with original notion of soft power—promotion of culture and language, use of media, education and public diplomacy, primary aim of attractive image etc. At the same time, there are issues that are not contextual – criticism and “manufacturing enemy images” on target countries, aggressive pursuing of interests on multinational level and within bilateral relations.

“Humanitarian dimension” thus implies less of an idea of soft power and more of its practical expressions: “humanitarian dimension” does not share the same positive meaning of power that is evident in soft power, thus, lacking a soul of soft power which is essential for Nye’s concept.

Instruments used for “humanitarian dimension” are broader in scope of their usage than those for the soft power – not only trough media or events that are promoting image of Russia, but also propaganda campaigns, political confrontation, hidden campaigns and financing, that more closely refers to the manipulation not persuasion.

Russia also try’s to avoid an error described by Nye when actions of other producers of soft power can be in contrary with countries aspirations – Russia tries to be in control of institutions that can shape countries image (media, NGO’s, performers of culture, universities, Orthodox church, etc.).

When taking the framework of the “humanitarian dimension’s” conceptual meaning as a basis for advice to react on Russia’s activities, we can draw several conclusions.

It should be taken into account, that an aim of employing “humanitarian” action for Russia is based on the assumptions of “power politics” where Russia’s aspirations of “great power” are of major importance. According to the logics of these premises, countries can either align with Russia’s cause or with those balancing against Russia. Taking into account the political tensions and historical background between Russia and target countries of this study, possibility of aligning with Russia is rather small. Countering Russia in this case does not mean direct counteractions to Russia’s “great power” ambitions – it is more related to the “passive” balancing where sustaining close relations with U.S. or EU is the most effective way to act against Russia’s influence. At the same time, target countries should sustain “normal” relations with Russia – thus demonstrating their will for cooperation also to their partners. This cooperation could be developed by both – bilateral relations and multilateral forums where equal terms of cooperation for both sides should be the main principle to follow.

Other way to react on Russia’s aspirations of “great power” is to stand against Russia’s perception of the international system as unipolar. Academic debate and political stance on the current state of the international system and variables by which Russia defines it as unipolar is required for that.

There should also be a debate on Russia’s assumption about post-Soviet area “zone of exclusive interest”. First of all, countries of Russia’s “near abroad” should argue that such assumption about “zones of interest” embraces legacy of the Cold War and are not acceptable by none of the countries. Dividing the world by “zones

of interest” should be viewed as Russia going against its own declared principles of “multipolarity” and “sovereignty” of these states.

In should be noted, that effects of soft power are rather difficult to tackle and part of the “humanitarian dimension” that implies means of soft power is also rather difficult to react against! Soft strategies must be met with other soft strategies, which could reduce its effect. This can be done in two ways: 1) by strengthening internal identity of a society within country – emphasising cultural artefacts and symbols of great [national/historical/social] importance for the society and promoting values that differ from the ones promoted by Russia; 2) enhance development of a competing soft power – for example EU. It is also important to avoid open criticism and institutional restrictions regarding soft power, because it mostly affects masses – if Russia’s activities have already gained attraction of masses, such restrictions could cause discontent. Thus, also an assessment/monitoring of Russia’s soft power activities is needed, to define the state of its impact.

These conclusions mark only general lines to follow, but specifics of particular case should be taken into account regarding reaction on “humanitarian” actions of Russia’s foreign policy (manifestations of “humanitarian dimension” of Russia’s foreign policy). Conclusions on particular areas of actions are viewed further.

Russian Human Rights Practice – Advice

Undoubtedly, the different historical and political situations of different States influence both the arguments that Russia may and does present relating to the human rights situation, as well as the type of responses that can plausibly be made. Nevertheless, some common broader themes may be identified from this practice. The analytical starting point is that the choice of different types of arguments and the procedures within which they are employed has profound significance for the settlement of disputes because:

the shift imposes limitations upon the kind of arguments which can be made by each party in defence of its actions; and ... the shift into legal context increases the power of one party to the dispute at the expense of the other.810

Consequently, in considering the substantive and procedural options available, States should consider the relative advantages of one over another.

In substantive terms, two aspects should be emphasised. There is a perfectly natural temptation, when faced by a criticism by another person, to first of all point out his or her inadequacies in similar matters. In the particular context, the numerous problem issues faced by Russia in the area of human rights make such an approach particularly attractive. However, this tendency should be resisted. The technical reason is that the erga omnes partes nature of human rights obligations means that a similar breach by the criticising State is irrelevant for the particular allegation.


In practical terms, Russia often relies on human rights arguments in some multilateral settings precisely to deflect attention from its own human rights or other problem areas. Therefore, to choose a tu quoque response instead of a reasoned explanation of the position would seemingly play into Russia’s hand. Consequently, while an en passant note of Russia’s human rights record may be useful in sketching the general background, it should certainly not constitute the focus of the argument.

The second aspect of formulating the substantive argument relates to the analytical clarity about what the particular dispute relates to. Russian practice in relation to minority protection in Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine and regarding the 2008 August war with Georgia tends to merge together different issues, in particular broader historical developments and human rights. In many cases, a greater clarity about the issues in dispute would be beneficial to States responding to Russia, therefore the choice of such language and discourse should be preferred. For example, in the Latvian and Estonian context, a clear distinction should be drawn about the unlawfulness of the Soviet annexation – an issue where Russian position is one of a small minority – and the question about the scope and content of minority rights - where different views exist and there is scope for a reasonable and legitimate debate. For different States, the context may be different but the general proposition stands: if the Russian practice prefers to blur distinctions between different allegations and imply that human rights criticisms support its general position, then other States should dissect different elements of disputes and demonstrate how human rights arguments are relevant for some but not others.

In procedural terms, States should consider the type of forum that would be most favourable for putting forward their positions. While different disputes may involve different considerations, the preference should be for more formalised types of fora and dispute settlement regimes. Bilateral negotiation is the least preferable type of forum, with legal arguments likely having the least influence. Multilateral negotiations may bring some marginal formalisation, but again would probably leave Russia with considerable opportunities for putting forwards tu quoque human rights arguments. Different international organisations provide different kinds of relative influence to Russia and other States, and the practice of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe after the 2008 August war suggests that such fora can be effectively used against Russia where is does not possess any specific procedural privileges. However, the preferable means of dispute settlement lies in international judicial (and arbitral, where available) proceedings. Russia does not appear to have much experience in formalised State-to-State dispute settlement, and the Georgian use of ECtHR and ICJ demonstrates that Russian “real world” power is relatively irrelevant in formalised proceedings.

The chief lesson to be drawn is that States should consider a more active use of judicial proceedings, both in initiating proceedings as well as joining or intervening in ongoing proceedings, and in developing expertise on the issue so as to be able at least to negotiate in the shadow of law. To bring the procedural and substantive strands together, analytical clarity and professionalism in identifying arguments and pursuing them through formalised dispute settlement mechanisms is the language

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and context that should give relatively less power to Russia and more power to States responding to its criticisms.

**Russian Compatriots Policy, Conclusions**

In Russia, discussion on the principles of compatriots policy is related to a search for Russian identity. The state's multi-ethnic population structure does not allow for an affiliation with the Russian nation to be a cornerstone for establishing compatriot identity. In the 1990s, Russian nationalist opposition politicians spoke about the protection of compatriots' interests. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, official governmental institutions assumed an initiative to resolve compatriots issues. With the Kremlin more actively involved in the formulation and implementation of Compatriots policy, the nationalists' rhetoric in discussions of compatriots issues has been somewhat silenced.

If Russia established a concrete legal status for compatriots, neighboring countries would implement counter-measures. In late 2008 and early 2009, discussion regarding the introduction of a compatriot card was begun. Although the compatriot card — a specific certificate establishing a compatriot’s identity — was mentioned in the 1999 Law on Compatriots Policy, the document was not issued. Although the Law On the Russian Federation's State Policy Regarding Compatriots Abroad implies a definition of a Russian compatriot, the question of who really is a "Russian compatriot abroad" remains open. Any strict borderlines (ethnic or legal) can cause counter-reactions on the part of ethnic organizations both domestically and abroad. Are the ethnic Tartars, Jews, and Ukrainians who emigrated from Russia classified as Russian compatriots? Although the ideological concept of the Russkiy Mir, or "Russian World", and the Russkiy Mir Foundation both include the word "Russian", Russian officials and experts involved in compatriots policy speak about close ties with Russian culture, Orthodoxy, and the use of the language in everyday life, not a sense of affiliation with ethnic Russians.

Therefore it became necessary to create the concept of a "Russian World" and to join Russia and its émigrés into a single unity. The "Russian World" was developed as a unifying concept that does not cause any legal problems. Affiliation with the language, religion, and cultural community was taken as the basis for the "Russian World".

However, the concept may create problems on a political level. After applying the concept of the "Russian compatriot abroad" to citizens of several neighboring countries who have "close ties with Russian culture, religion, language", Russia has announced its wish to protect these compatriots' rights and interests. Russia has declared a fight for the "hearts and minds" of the citizens of these independent countries, and promised legal assistance to Russian compatriots who appeal to international organizations.

According to the Kremlin, the idea of compatriots is based on several principles. First, it attempts to maintain a working relationship with Russian speakers abroad by encouraging them to form a loyalty to modern-day Russia — including its interpretation of history and its political system — while remaining in the country of residence. In the future, this soft loyalty may evolve into a formal relationship through the use of compatriot cards or even Russian citizenship.

Second, this policy is based on creating and consolidating compatriots organizations into an effective social networking system, which can be used to attain specific foreign policy goals. Therefore, Russian Compatriots policy in the post-Soviet sphere is not just a humanitarian tool; it is also a tool of geopolitical influence. The championing of Russian compatriots' rights is seen as a tactical means for expanding Russian influence. The ideological concept of the "Russian World" tries to unify compatriots living abroad with their historic homeland, inviting them to actualize the interests of Russian foreign policy. Russian foreign policy makers and ideologists still speak in the categories of the "sphere of influence" and "state borders that don't conform to the actual situation". The Putin-supported "Russian World" concept is a resource or an instrument for popularizing the Russian language and culture in Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Moldova (in countries with a large number of Russian speakers). In recent years, the activities of the Russkiy Mir Foundation has been Russia's most striking attempt to initiate the long-term use of soft power in the focus countries.

Official Russian policy does not even try to conceal that a principal goal in the use of compatriots organizations and their media outlets is to implant Russia's version of history and its political system — while remaining in the country of residence. Officially, Russia has set up various NGOs or funds that have the task of attracting compatriot historians, journalists, and political experts from the neighboring countries to organize conferences and round tables on history, and to spread books and other media material among Russian compatriots in the Baltic States. At the same time, the Kremlin is trying to build a legal framework to counter alternative interpretations of history: the so-called "project on preventing the rebirth of Nazism", which would allow for the prosecution of those who deny the Russian version of history.

According to research, Russian Compatriots policy is more effective in Latvia and Estonia, where social integration processes are more difficult and contradictory. The more the Russian community is integrated in national society — such as in Lithuania and in Georgia, excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia — the less importance is placed on Russian Compatriots policy. Russian policy towards the Baltic States and the C.I.S. forms only a part of Moscow's wider and more comprehensive efforts to restore and improve its international status and reputation. This is connected with Russia's overall foreign policy towards the EU and NATO, and with its more specific policy toward the new member states of the two organizations. Moscow treats the Baltic States as parts of the "near abroad", presenting them as "problem" countries that undermine Russian-EU and Russian-NATO relations. In so doing, Russia wants to create tensions within the EU and NATO, which would hamper the formulation of joint positions by the organizations.
The C.I.S. countries are Russia’s foreign policy priority. The rest of the actors involved (EU, NATO, U.S.A.) are considered adversaries, and their influence in this region is regarded as negative. Each reconsideration of Russia’s dominant role in the post-Soviet area is seen as worsening the compatriots’ condition and discrimination against Russian interests. The EU is accused of implementing a “double standards” policy toward Russia, and suspected of giving preference to new countries at the detriment of Russian interests. Democratic neighboring countries do not matter to Russia. Russia’s priority is “friendship” which is defined by criteria selected solely by Russia.

By implementing post-Soviet-era politics, Russia plays itself as a guardian of the interests of Soviet-era settlers in the Baltics and the C.I.S. Thus, Baltic-Russian or Ukrainian-Russian tensions are inevitable. There are fundamental differences in the perception of values, history, political rights, and culture. The recent Russian initiatives only foster a re-emergence of post-Soviet sentiments and identity.

The Europeanization process in the Baltic States and the C.I.S. is a key factor in reducing the importance of Russian Compatriots policy. Europeanization has facilitated this process, because an ongoing harmonization of immigration laws provides non-citizens with additional rights—for example, in the case of Latvia and Estonia. Russian compatriots remain a strong group in regards to inter-state relations; they are also a power resource for certain interest groups and parties. They have not been promoters of Europeanization but, rather, speakers or messengers of Russian Federation propaganda.

It can be argued that neither the EU nor the Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are interested in having marginal and isolated groups, i.e., Russian compatriots. The process of definition and learning, as well as the process of becoming associated with EU values, is still ongoing. It should become a process that can resist Russia authoritarianism. Values such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law have already entered the language of pro-European, non-citizen NGOs in many different, and sometimes misused, ways.

It is necessary to balance Russia’s desire to influence the public processes with the assistance of compatriots NGOs in countries where the so-called Russian-speaking population is large, with the participation of Russian NGOs who defend values of democracy. In Russia independent human rights defending non-governmental organizations are not supported by the state (often - even hampered). These organizations should be involved in communication with sometimes nationalistically disposed Russian compatriots organizations in the Baltic countries and Ukraine. With the help of various projects, independent from Kremlin’s influence Russian organizations, could address a wide range of so-called Russian-speaking segments of populations in neighboring countries. This would allow the Russians living abroad to better understand the real lack of democracy in Russia, as well as true objectives and consequences of Compatriots policy. To implement this approach, active involvement of policy makers, experts and NGOs of study target countries is necessary.

Consular Relations, Conclusions

The Russian Foreign Policy Review singles out consular work as a priority in Russia’s humanitarian strategy. Effective consular activities usually energize migration flows (tourism, cultural or educational exchanges, and migration of workers) between countries. Therefore, it constitutes an important part of public diplomacy work. However, the Review focuses only on the protection of Russian citizens traveling or living abroad, not on consular activities to enhance migration flows between Russia and the neighboring countries. This official wording makes Russia’s neighbors very suspicious of such consular activities because of the experience in the 2008 war with Georgia, when the Kremlin declared that it was using military force to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.

Russian consular activities are concentrated on gaining additional leverages for Moscow’s foreign policy, not on easing migration flows; experts point out that in Ukraine and Estonia, the Russian consulates issue large numbers of passports. In the future, Russian consulates in the respective countries may start issuing compatriot cards. However, at the present moment, these institutions in post-Soviet countries have the task of implementing the National Program for Supporting Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad to the Russian Federation. Russian officials admit that this program faces acute difficulties: in 2008, only 10,000 compatriots resettled in Russia (the majority came from Kazakhstan).

Particular attention should be paid to the Russian approach to consular issues in the breakaway regions. In the case of Moldova, there is a risk that if the current policy of Moscow and Tiraspol continues, the population from the Transnistrian region will estrange itself from the right bank, whereas it is beneficial for Transnistrian leaders and disadvantageous for Moldova to maintain the present status quo for a longer period of time. Therefore, one of the important actions to be performed by the Moldovan government is to ensure the active involvement of European partners in the settlement process, which could contribute to the territorial integration of the Republic of Moldova.

It is perfectly clear that the Consular Service is one of the most powerful and serious instruments of Russian policy, and is completely absorbed in ideology. The passportization that Russia carried out within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has yet to be fully assessed. Neither the Georgian government nor the international community proved discreet enough to foresee the magnitude of risks associated with this process, or the deplorable consequences it would have for the country. The conflict zones within Georgian territory have become a sort of laboratory for the aggressive Russian policy where “home tasks” hatched in Moscow are tested and implemented. Russia carried out passportization in Transnistria as well. The same process is now taking place in Ukraine (Crimea). It is clear that the process is assuming increasingly dangerous forms and dimensions, calling for a timely and adequate response from the international community.

811 The term “home tasks” (domashnie zagotovki) was used by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In 2008, he stated that Russia had prepared a “home task” as a response to the recognition of Kosovan independence.
The persecution of Georgians in Russia and their deportation in 2006 has yet to be given an adequate international assessment. In 2008, Georgia raised the issue before the Hague International Criminal Court. In addition, a number of applications have been filed with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The pan-European security system has been caught by surprise, and therefore cannot prevent or adequately respond to such risks and challenges. Current Russian policy provides ample basis to conclude that the events will recur in the future, with renewed force.

Due to the current situation in Russian–Ukrainian relations, the following recommendations for Ukrainian authorities can be formulated. The Verkhovna Rada (parliament of Ukraine) should adopt a state program on citizenship and migration issues. This program should include measures for countering dual citizenship and should develop the state’s general attitude to compatriot certificates issued to the citizens of Ukraine by foreign countries. The Cabinet of Ministers has to suggest a project for an international treaty on avoiding illegal dual citizenship. The parties of the treaty should inform each other if citizens have not refused one citizenship when taking another, or if a person is highly suspected of having dual citizenship. Law enforcement agencies should keep a special list of personae non gratae and inform the corresponding states why these persons are not desirable. Such decisions should be supported by information from the mass media, explaining the decision to the public.

**Culture & Education, Conclusions**

There is an active cooperation in fields of culture and education between Russia and target countries in this research. Case studies of particular countries reveal certain differences of resources and approaches applied by Russia when promoting its culture and education. These differences are caused by objectives and target audiences of influence, availability of resources, and choice of instruments and nature of background conditions.

In case of Russia’s objectives when promoting culture, one should take a logics of soft power into account – ability to attract others can change their preferences in a way that they act in the interests of the country projecting attractiveness (so that others want what you want). To create an attraction is a primary aim for promoting Russia’s culture, but its objectives are to persuade target countries or groups within them to act in favour of Russia’s interests. This can be attained by convincing these countries or groups about benefits from running Russia’s interests or at least by not opposing these interests. Cultural resources (artifacts of culture – music, movies, fine arts, language, etc.) available for Russia are employed in a manner that can best suit its interests and in respect to the target audiences. There are two kinds of audiences towards which Russia directs its culture’s attraction: 1) “compatriots” living in a particular target country; [or] 2) society of a target country in general. Thus, Russia attempts whether to consolidate “compatriots” for a political support or to create positive impression on Russia in general population which would reduce opposition to Russia’s policies. Various instruments are employed for this cause – starting with direct involvement from the government till markets of culture. Nature of background conditions shift Russia’s choices over resources and instruments and determine chances for achieving the objectives. Most common examples of such conditions are political relations between the states or historical experience of interaction between the states.

Artifacts of Russian “high culture” are the most constant sources of attraction for Russia. Its presence is appreciated and treated positively in all the target countries whatever the nature of background conditions is. At the same time Russia’s “high culture” is grounded mainly on historical heritage of Russian cultural traditions and there are rare examples of newly created artifacts. Despite such lack of originality in a field, this heritage still possesses impressive potential for Russia’s attractiveness for both – its “compatriots” around the world and publics in general. Russia’s “high culture” and the fact, that it is appreciated and well-known in the world create pride of belonging to Russia for “compatriots”. Together with notion of great civilization, which is systematically sustained by Russia, it works as a factor to consolidate “compatriots” in particular countries and around the world. On the other hand, audiences that frequently consume artifact of “high culture” are rather small and do not play a decisive role in reaching Russia’s objectives. Looking back at the comparison of the cooperation in sphere of culture, it is possible to indicate, that “high culture” is more actively promoted in Estonia – where “compatriots” have rather weak degree of political consolidation and general population of a country is less attracted by popular culture of Russia.

Promotion of Russian popular culture is expressed by manifestations of “Soviet nostalgia” and cultural artifacts of “Western” type of popular culture. Popular culture is spread in all the target countries, but its expressions are most obvious in case of Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine. In case of Moldova, promotion of Soviet cultural artifacts is most widespread – it is introduced not only trough markets of popular culture, but even institutionalized by formen ruling political forces (The Communist party). Soviet and “new” artifacts of Russia’s popular culture affect both – “compatriots” and general population – in case of Latvia, thus demonstrating an advantage for market of Russian culture, which is based on common Soviet history and knowledge of Russian language. Russian popular culture is developing in its scope for an audience and this is mainly caused by lack of diversity at the markets of popular culture where the products of a U.S. culture are dominant and relatively weak positions of domestic popular culture (movie-production, scope of a music markets, TV program production, etc.). Ensuring access to diverse cultural artefacts (for example: European, Indian, or Latin-American.) would disperse an attraction of an audience while development of a domestic popular culture is essential to sustain national pride and appeal to values of a domestic nature.

Background conditions in relationship between countries play major role in case of Russia’s conflict with Georgia. As a result, presence of Russian cultural artefacts in Georgia is rare, thus not producing any attractiveness. Nevertheless, this
does not mean that Moscow will not attempt to improve her methods and to enforce her policy with renewed efforts and new technologies of soft policy. At the same time, situation regarding Baltic States and Ukraine show different pattern where Russian culture works well as a source of attraction despite political tensions between countries. This shows that certain scope of background conditions is required for culture to stop being attractive.

There are several symbols of Russia’s presence in target countries. One of the most influential symbols is Orthodox Church where majority of the population in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are Orthodox Christians, Orthodoxy is 3rd largest faith in Latvia and it is developing also in Estonia. Strong historical tradition of relations with Russian Orthodox Church, makes Orthodoxy an important part Russian cultural heritage. Patriarchy of Moscow is actively resisting any breakaway branches of the Church, because it does not want to loose its power in other countries – also loosing important source of influence for Russia. Debate on the autocephaly of Orthodox Church is most active in Ukraine where views on the future of Ukrainian Orthodoxy are still divided between the supporters of autocephaly and conservative side of those against it. Political and popular support is required to develop autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Issues of faith are sensitive within a society, thus, despite growing political support for creation of a unified Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the government of Ukraine should avoid radical actions in gaining autocephaly. Better solution would be to act as a mediator to provide the ground for reconciliation.

To support activities for promotion of culture Russia has developed a network of cultural and business centres. These centres mainly sustain cultural activities that are directed on persuasion and consolidation of “compatriots” while officially are defined as promoters of Russian culture. These are important assets of infrastructure that carry also symbolic meaning of Russia’s presence in target country. It is predictable, that Russia will continue development of such centres also in the future, thus increasing its presence and activities in target countries.

Good knowledge of Russian language in target countries is important pillar of Russian presence. On the one hand, language allows promoting Russian culture to a wider audience than compatriots. On the other hand, language also serves as a basis for arguments to support compatriots. Numbers of those knowing Russian language is decreasing in case of Baltic States while still remaining an impressive advantage towards other foreign languages. It is regarded as major expression of Russia’s soft power in Lithuania where knowledge of Russian language is highest among Baltic States and has stable positions in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. An example of Baltic States shows, that with an increasing process of Europeanization, other languages (English, French, German) are gaining more stable positions and weakening overall knowledge of Russian language. An argument is not about extinction of a Russian language, but of the appropriate presence of it a foreign language in target countries along with other foreign languages. Using language as an argument in a political debate on Russian compatriots is closely related to the topic of interpretation of history. Historical events a viewed from different perspectives regarding some of the target countries and Russia is actively resisting reassertion of these events. For the purpose to defend Russia’s interpretations of history even special “Commission for Counteraction to the attempts of the interpretations of history contrary to the interests of Russia” was created recently. Russia is demonstrating a behaviour that is in contrary to an open debate and plurality of views, thus not creating attractiveness for general population in target countries. By its stance on interpretation of history Russia is most likely to attract compatriots in these countries and gain a support from the international community. Academic and political debate on issue of history in required within each country and in the frameworks of international cooperation.

Education is one of the ways to sustain the role of Russian language in target countries or even to spread Russia’s interpretation of history. Each of the target countries follows different patterns in dealing with issues of education in Russian. An interesting example in this case is differences in Baltic States where Latvia introduced most radical way of education reform of “Russian schools”, Estonia choose more gradual way of improving knowledge of Estonian language and Lithuania seems to introduce such reforms even on a lesser extent. The results of these reforms will be available after some period of time, but what is obvious already now – radical changes in a field bring more ethnic tensions and worsening of relationship with Russia. Such reform also leaves more space for action to Russia, when its compatriots are searching for political support against changes.

There is a large impact of Russia on education in Moldova where even some of the best higher education institutions tough exclusively in Russia. There are also educational institutions with the Russian language of education in Ukraine and Georgia which sustain the role of language. Unfortunately most part of the cultural cooperation between Russia and other countries is “one-sided” and favouring mainly Russia’s interests. This is obvious when viewing situation with ethnic Ukrainians in Russia – the education in Ukrainian language has been abandoned there. Stance on equal partnership between Russia and other countries should be actively proposed.

Mass Media, Conclusions

On the one hand, taking into account the activities of the Russian mass media, Russia’s unified and well-coordinated media policy can be observed in the six target countries, where the central role in the implementation of strategic communication is played by the Russian state television channel First Russian Channel and the Russian pop music radio station Russkoje radio. On the other hand, a diversity also exists, and is determined by each country’s specific language and culture situation.

The Baltic countries stand out in this group of states. They are followed by Ukraine, which, including the Crimea, is situated seemingly in the middle, not only geographically but also from the point of view of the Russian media’s influence on public opinion. Next come Georgia and Moldova with their pro-Russia enclaves (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria), where the effect of Russian media is most considerable.
A common feature is related to conflict situations (such as the five-day Russian – Georgian war in August of 2008) where Russia's interests are endangered, at least among Russian-speaking minority representatives, and Russian media broadcasts are trusted to a higher degree that the national media in each country.

There also exists a pronounced tendency to develop Russian media cooperation projects with media companies in these countries, and to disseminate Russian mass cultural products (talk shows, films, etc.). Talk shows, movies, concerts, sports, and other non-political programs have all been used to reach political goals. However, these programs are popular outside the borders of the Russian Federation, and are often more efficient in multiplying official Russian values than those programs with an obvious political nature.

The following recommendations have been derived from the six countries’ experience for their future media policy:

• in order to prevent Russian-speakers from a too homogeneous use of the Russia-dominated media thereby getting in the sphere of influence of Russia’s official politics, it is advisable to create a positive alternative – support for the public broadcasters’ programmes, including Internet news portals meeting the needs of the local Russians’ identity (in this regard the experience of Estonia and Latvia is quite successful), as well as general alternative media offers in Russian (for example, drawing Western private investments), and minority-oriented and democratic judicial state values-based media content in the state language;

• in order to decrease the public’s latent dependence on uncharacteristic for a democratic judicial state interests and simultaneously secure diversity of media offers which is of vital importance for democracy, a media owner transparency principle should be introduced in the media legislation up to the level of physical person – real beneficiary, special restrictions should be introduced (at least not more than 40% of the market, similar to the EU Competition Law) for the media concentration not according to turnover of media companies, but according to the numeric strength of audience showing potential influence on the public opinion, as well as official (state) commercial support from the foreign countries for media should be forbidden;

• in order to reduce the possibilities for manipulating the public, the formation of a common journalism culture, based on professional standards accepted by Western journalism, should be promoted, including the separation of news from the opinions of journalists and editors.

Of course, neutralizing of Russia’s official propaganda, at least inside the country, would be possible also by successful public relations realized by the governmental institutions.

Food for Thought – “Humanitarian Dimension” on the Move

An aim of this research was to reveal the meaning and elements of “humanitarian dimension” of Russia’s foreign policy and its expressions in six target countries – Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Meaning of “humanitarian dimension” was revealed through analysis of its components and placing in broader contextual and theoretical frameworks. Case studies explored practical implementation of “humanitarian dimension” while comparison provided basis for conclusions on: 1) whether differences and trends in Russia’s attitudes and actions toward the six neighbouring states exist; and 2) what should be the response of target countries to these actions.

In addition to the conclusions that were made out of conceptual part, case studies and comparison, there are also some more general conclusions to mention at the end of the research.

Weak possession of soft power and insufficient results when using hard power in Russia’s “near abroad” has convinced Russia that more latent ways of gaining what you want cost less and seem to be more effective. Using soft strategies in relations with neighbour thus should be regarded as a positive trend of Russia’s foreign policy. However in practice, “humanitarian dimension” interacts with Russian hard power. Also “humanitarian dimension” is implemented in a flexible way – Russia is changing emphasis on various “humanitarian” issues (human rights, culture, “compatriots”, etc.) according to the course of relations with particular countries – the more tense the relations with country the more aggressive actions are imposed. Intensity of Russia’s “humanitarian actions” therefore is constantly growing, while Russia’s gains from that not always correspond to the efforts made. For example, Russian influence in Ukraine has decreased since 1994 and is no longer a decisive force in Ukrainian politics. This is determined first of all by domestic logic and a correlation of forces among Ukrainian elites. The results of elections in 2004, 2006 and 2007 clearly support this view.

Russia is developing its capabilities of “humanitarian dimension” by learning from the examples of other countries and employing issues that suits its interests. According to that, it is high possibility, of new issues of “humanitarian” character to supplement already colourful notion of “humanitarian dimension”. At the same time “humanitarian dimension” has been developed as a constant direction of policy that is not going to vanish by change of the political course or leadership in Russia.

Russia states that “humanitarian dimension” is its way of imposing soft power. Yet its methods are not always accordant to soft power: they do not exclusively underscore the attractiveness of Russian culture, the humanity of its social values, or the credibility of its policies. For example, Russia’s attempts to use its compatriots for representing Russia’s national interests in other countries creates image of being aggressive and hostile toward their host countries. It should be noted, that for soft power to work and invoke positive attitude, goals behind it must be based on a “win-win-strategy” – adequate gains must be offered to those over whom soft power is
imposed. In case of Russia it is rather hard to find such gains.

Countries neighbouring Russia have hopes for normalising relations with the largest neighbour. At the same time, there are numerous examples of disagreements between these countries and Russia that have caused political tensions or even open conflicts. In respect to that it is interesting to look at the advice to Russia by Dmitri Trenin: „The best that Russia could do for its smaller neighbours would be to become more stable, prosperous and at peace with itself. This, together with a more enlightened approach to dealing with its neighbours, would give Russia considerable soft power – the ability to convince rather than coerce – in the region“.

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PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

Centre for East European Policy Studies (Riga, Latvia)
The Centre for East European Policy Studies (CEEPS) is non-governmental non-profit organization founded in Riga in 2006. The main objectives of CEEPS are: 1) to make its contribution into development of Latvian foreign policy, by doing a research work in the scientific fields of politics, history, economy of Eastern European countries; 2) to develop its cooperation with scientific institutions and other organizations of Latvia and foreign countries; 3) to be aware of and to explain Latvia’s state interests abroad. See more at www.easteurope.lv.

International Centre for Defence Studies (Tallinn, Estonia)
The International Centre for Defence Studies (ICDS) is a think tank, devoted to the analysis of security and defence policy questions. The Centre's roles are to analyze global developments in the security and defence field, and to examine narrower topics that are of special interest to Estonia. ICDS aims to promote and strengthen foreign policy discussion in Estonia and to raise the general public's awareness of issues that influence Estonia's security and defence. See more at www.icds.ee.

School for Policy Analysis at the University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine)
School for Policy Analysis at the University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy (SPA at UKMA) is a training and analytical center created in 2002. SPA provides analysis of recent events in Ukraine, trainings for students and young analysts, and civic education projects. SPA conducted radio programs, published popular voter education brochures, holds seminars and panel discussions. See more at www.spa.ukma.kiev.ua.

International Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia)
The International Centre for Geopolitical Studies (ICGS) was founded on 18 July, 2008. The Centre gathers, studies and analyzes the necessary information on policy, economics, human rights as well as in social-environmental, cultural-educational and other spheres. ICGS cooperates with analytical centers around the globe, local and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and private entities. See more at www.icgs.ge.

Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (Chisinau, Moldova)
The Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (Asociatia pentru Politica Externa (APE)) is Moldova’s leading foreign policy think-tank, committed to supporting Moldova’s Europeanization, integration into the European Union and a viable settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. It was established in fall 2003 by a group of well-known experts, public personalities and former senior officials and diplomats reunited by their commitment to contribute their expertise and experience to a comprehensive
analysis of Moldova’s foreign policy options and formulation of an efficient foreign policy. See more at www.ape.md.

**Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Vilnius, Lithuania)**

The Centre for Geopolitical Studies (CGS) was established in 2005. Main objectives of the Centre for Geopolitical Studies are: supervision and analysis of political processes within the geopolitical space relevant for Lithuania; investigation of possible impact of these processes and their changes on political, economic, defense, social, cultural etc. situations in Lithuania and its neighboring countries. See more at www.geopolitika.lt.

**NOTES ON AUTHORS**

**Aīnārs Lerhis** (PhD) is Chairman of the Board of Centre for East European Policy Studies. He is leading researcher at Institute of Latvian History, at the University of Latvia. He was Assistant Professor and Program director (International Relations – European Studies) at Riga Stradins University (2002–2003). Scientific interests (research and publications): contemporary problems and history of foreign policy of Latvia; history of diplomatic service of the Republic of Latvia; „Baltic Issue” in international relations during 1940–1991.

**Aīnārs Dimants** (PhD, Free University of Berlin, Germany) is Associate Professor at School of Business Administration Turiba (Latvia) and Head of the Department of Communication Sciences at this Business School. He is the author of many publications on media development in Latvia and on issues related to Latvia’s membership in the European Union, including four books on the press and journalism. During the 1990s he made a career as a journalist in several Latvian media companies, including Latvian Television, the daily newspaper Diena and the daily newspaper Lauku Avize, where he at one point worked as the deputy editor-in-chief.

**Andis Kudors** is Executive Director of the Centre for East European Policy Studies. While studying political science at the University of Latvia (Department of Social Sciences) his specialty was Latvian – Russian relations, including Russia’s policy concerning compatriots residing abroad. His main research interests are current foreign policy trends in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet countries. He is particularly interested in political culture of Russian Federation and Russian Compatriots policy.

**Dmytro Kondratenko** received his Master’s Degree in Political Science from University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (UKMA). He is an expert at UKMA’s School for Policy Analysis. He is writing the PhD dissertation on nationalism issues at Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

**Gatis Pelnēns** is a PhD candidate at the University of Latvia (Department of Social Sciences). He is one of the authors of the book “Latvia’s View of the Future of the European Union (Strategic Analysis Commission under the Auspices of the President of the Republic of Latvia, 2007). Gatis Pelnēns is researcher of Centre for East European Policy Studies. His research focuses on security, international politics, terrorism, Russia’s foreign policy and the Baltic Sea region.

**Senior researcher Juhan Kivirähk** is responsible for sociological research at ICDS. His investigations focus on the attitudes of the Estonian population towards state defence issues and the transformation of those attitudes from 2000 until the
present. Juhan Kivirähk regularly writes opinion articles in Estonian newspapers and makes comments on radio and TV.

**Martiniš Paparinskis** is a PhD candidate at the University of Oxford and a Hauser Research Scholar at the New York University. He has written and spoken on different aspects of international law, in particular regarding investment protection, State responsibility and international dispute settlement. Martins has been an international law expert in two cases in the Latvian Constitutional Court, dealing with the constitutionality of respectively Latvian—Russian Border Treaty and Lisbon Treaty.


**Nana Devdariani** is journalist, public and political figure, former Public Defender of Georgia and former member of Georgian parliament, author of many articles and scientific papers. She is expert of International Centre for Geopolitical Studies.

**Nato Bachiaishvili.** Master of Legal science, Barrister, Member of Georgian Lawyer’s Society, specialized in Human Rights, Criminal and Administrative Law. Expert-analyst of International Centre for Geopolitical Studies.

**Nerijus Maliukevičius** (PhD) works as academic researcher at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University. Presently he lectures “Media in Conflict” and “Cross-Cultural Communication and Conflict” courses for “War and Peace Studies” magistrate students. Nerijus Maliukevičius is author of several books: “The Potential of Russia’s Geopolitics of Information and its Spread in Lithuania” (2008); “Russian and American Perspectives on Information Warfare” (2002). His main academic interests: relationship between the media and politics, information warfare, Russia’s foreign policy.

**Radu Vrabie** is Program Coordinator at Foreign Policy Association (Moldova). His main research interests are current foreign policy trends in Eastern Europe and post Soviet countries. He is particular interested in Russian foreign and domestic policy.

**Olexandr Yeremeev** is a PhD candidate at University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (UKMA). His research interests are political ideologies.

**Tengiz Pkhalaadze** is Chairman of International Centre for Geopolitical Studies. He is former diplomat (Senior adviser at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Department of Russian Federation affairs). His main research focus is on Russian foreign policy and political processes in Eastern Europe.

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